Files
msd-core/tests/phase6-capstone-conformance.test.cjs
Tom Boucher 70f35ebc7a feat(#1169): wire ship:pre security gate via render-hooks (ADR-857 phase 6)
Part of the ADR-857 phase-6 migration (#1169, epic #857) — not a shipped bug fix. The capability system (registry, render-hooks, gates, capability-state) lives only on next / 1.5.0-rc; npm latest is 1.4.5 and contains none of it, so no released user can hit this.

The security capability declares a blocking gates@ship:pre hook (when=workflow.security_enforcement, predicate SECURITY.md.threats_open==0), but ship.md never called `loop render-hooks ship:pre` and had no inline fallback, so the declared gate never fired. Wire it into ship.md preflight_checks via the render-hooks idiom — fail-closed: the ship blocks unless threats_open is exactly 0.

Add a phase-6 conformance assertion that every declared hook point has a render-hooks call site; execute:wave:post (ui_safety_gate) stays in KNOWN_UNWIRED pending its unimplemented ui.safety-gate check.

Part of #1169. Refs #857.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 11:09:21 -04:00

149 lines
5.2 KiB
JavaScript

// allow-test-rule: source-text-is-the-product
'use strict';
const { describe, test } = require('node:test');
const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const fs = require('node:fs');
const path = require('node:path');
const ROOT = path.join(__dirname, '..');
const HOST_LOOP_FILES = [
'gsd-core/workflows/plan-phase.md',
'gsd-core/workflows/execute-phase.md',
'gsd-core/workflows/verify-work.md',
'gsd-core/workflows/ship.md',
];
const CORE_SUBSTRATE_TERMS = [
'Verification substrate',
'verifier↔predicate contract',
'Probe Core Module',
'Edge Probe Module',
];
const registry = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-registry.cjs');
const { isCentralConfigKey } = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/config-schema.cjs');
function readRepoFile(relativePath) {
return fs.readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, relativePath), 'utf8');
}
function escapeRegExp(value) {
return value.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
}
function activeWhenKeys() {
const keys = new Set();
for (const cap of Object.values(registry.capabilities)) {
for (const group of ['steps', 'gates', 'contributions']) {
for (const hook of cap[group] || []) {
if (hook.when) keys.add(hook.when);
}
}
}
return [...keys].sort();
}
describe('ADR-857 Phase 6 capstone conformance (#1139)', () => {
test('first-party optional feature capabilities are declared in the generated registry', () => {
const expectedFeatureCapabilities = [
'ai-integration',
'audit',
'code-review',
'graphify',
'intel',
'nyquist',
'pattern-mapper',
'research',
'security',
'ui',
];
for (const capId of expectedFeatureCapabilities) {
assert.equal(registry.capabilities[capId]?.role, 'feature', `${capId} must be a feature Capability`);
}
});
test('core verification substrate is documented as deliberately not capability-owned', () => {
const context = readRepoFile('CONTEXT.md');
for (const term of CORE_SUBSTRATE_TERMS) {
assert.match(context, new RegExp(escapeRegExp(term)), `${term} must be documented in CONTEXT.md`);
}
});
test('host loop files do not read capability hook activation keys directly', () => {
const forbiddenKeys = activeWhenKeys();
assert.ok(forbiddenKeys.length > 0, 'registry must expose hook activation keys');
for (const relativePath of HOST_LOOP_FILES) {
const content = readRepoFile(relativePath);
for (const key of forbiddenKeys) {
assert.doesNotMatch(
content,
new RegExp(`\\bconfig-get\\s+${escapeRegExp(key)}\\b`),
`${relativePath} must resolve ${key} through Capability hooks/state, not direct config-get`,
);
}
}
});
test('capability-owned config keys are not reintroduced into the central schema', () => {
for (const key of Object.keys(registry.configKeys).sort()) {
assert.equal(
isCentralConfigKey(key),
false,
`${key} is owned by capability ${registry.configKeys[key]} and must stay out of central config schema`,
);
}
});
test('host loop workflow files have committed byte budgets', () => {
const baseline = JSON.parse(readRepoFile('tests/workflow-size-baseline.json'));
for (const relativePath of HOST_LOOP_FILES) {
const fileName = path.basename(relativePath);
assert.equal(typeof baseline[fileName], 'number', `${fileName} must have a workflow-size baseline`);
assert.ok(baseline[fileName] > 0, `${fileName} baseline must be positive`);
}
});
test('every declared capability hook point has a render-hooks call site in the host loop (#1169)', () => {
// Points whose host call site is intentionally not yet wired, mapped to the
// issue tracking the gap. execute:wave:post (ui.gates / ui_safety_gate) also
// needs its `ui.safety-gate` check implemented before it can be wired — #1169.
const KNOWN_UNWIRED = { 'execute:wave:post': '#1169' };
const declaredPoints = new Set();
for (const cap of Object.values(registry.capabilities)) {
for (const group of ['steps', 'gates', 'contributions']) {
for (const hook of cap[group] || []) {
if (hook.point) declaredPoints.add(hook.point);
}
}
}
// Scan only the host loop files (not every workflow): a `render-hooks`
// mention in a non-host workflow must not mask a lost host call site.
const callSites = new Set();
const reCall = /loop render-hooks\s+([a-z:]+)/g;
for (const relativePath of HOST_LOOP_FILES) {
const content = readRepoFile(relativePath);
let m;
while ((m = reCall.exec(content))) callSites.add(m[1]);
}
for (const point of [...declaredPoints].sort()) {
if (point in KNOWN_UNWIRED) {
assert.ok(
!callSites.has(point),
`${point} is listed in KNOWN_UNWIRED (${KNOWN_UNWIRED[point]}) but now HAS a render-hooks call site — remove it from the allowlist.`,
);
continue;
}
assert.ok(
callSites.has(point),
`Capability hooks declare point "${point}" but no workflow calls \`gsd_run loop render-hooks ${point}\` — hooks at that point can never fire (#1169). Wire a call site or add the point to KNOWN_UNWIRED with its tracking issue.`,
);
}
});
});