Removes kilo, kimi, kimi-code, copilot, windsurf, augment, trae, qwen, hermes, cline, codebuddy and pi end to end: capability descriptors, installer branches and converters (bin/install.js 14.9k -> 11.2k lines), TypeScript converters, hook surfaces and runtime homes, review lanes qwen/kimi-code, the two pi migrations, Kimi payload normalization in the hook guards, dead hostBehaviors vocabulary, launcher home probes, fixtures, runtime-specific tests and the prose that presented them as supported. Installer output for the six kept runtimes is byte-identical to before the prune. The Kimi tool-vocabulary tests in workflow-guard, read-guard and read-injection-scanner are left in place pending a decision.
76 lines
4.4 KiB
JavaScript
76 lines
4.4 KiB
JavaScript
'use strict';
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/**
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* injection-patterns.js — the shared prompt-injection pattern list (#3504, epic #1900).
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*
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* Single source of truth for the standard injection signatures used by BOTH
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* msd-prompt-guard.js (PreToolUse scan of writes into .planning/) and
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* msd-read-injection-scanner.js (PostToolUse scan of Read/WebFetch/WebSearch
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* content). Previously each hook carried a byte-identical copy ("inlined for
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* hook independence") that could silently drift — a pattern tightened in one
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* would stop protecting the other surface.
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*
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* Why a shared lib require is safe here (the old inlining rationale, retired):
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* the installer stages hooks/lib/ from the MSD_HOOK_LIB_FILES allowlist for the
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* shared-bundle surfaces (Claude-family settings.json runtimes), the
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* Cursor stager auto-discovers require('./lib/...') in staged scripts and fails
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* the install loudly when a helper is missing (#2587), and the plugin path
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* ships this directory wholesale.
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*
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* Deliberately NOT unified with src/security.cts's scanForInjection set: that
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* set runs inside the compiled lib tree; hooks must stay loadable standalone
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* without it. The two lists are different surfaces by design, not drift.
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*
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* Keep this file free of literal 'msd:' text — the stager rewrites that marker
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* in staged hook content.
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*/
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const INJECTION_PATTERNS = Object.freeze([
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// #4016: ONE filler-tolerant imperative-override pattern. It REPLACES the
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// five narrow verb patterns (ignore x2 / disregard / forget / override) that
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// used to sit here: they tolerated no filler between verb and noun, so a
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// planted "forget all of your ..." phrasing (measured in the wild) matched
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// nothing. A single pattern rather than narrow-plus-combined because both
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// consumers count one finding PER PATTERN toward the severity threshold
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// (3 = HIGH, blockable under security.injection_blocking): overlapping
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// patterns made one sentence count twice and pushed a two-phrasing LOW
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// payload to HIGH (PR #4061 review).
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// verbs ignore|disregard|forget|discard|override. `override` carries
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// the old `override system|previous prompt|instructions` family;
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// `discard` is the synonym seen in the same planted phrasings.
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// fillers at least ONE of all|of|the|your|my|<qualifier> must sit between
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// verb and noun (a lookahead, no repetition). Bare "override
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// rules" / "ignore instructions" are ordinary repo prose
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// (measured: 6 hits across docs and source) and stay unmatched.
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// tails `disregard (all) previous` with no noun, and bare `forget` +
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// `instructions`, are kept verbatim because the old narrow
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// patterns accepted them; the superset is pinned by
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// tests/injection-patterns-parity.security.test.cjs.
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// known FP determined linter-doc prose such as "ignore (the) rules" trips
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// a single-pattern LOW advisory; one pattern can never block.
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/(?:ignore|disregard|forget|discard|override)\s+(?=(?:all|of|the|your|my|system|previous|prior|above|earlier)\s)(?:all\s+)?(?:of\s+)?(?:the\s+|your\s+|my\s+)?(?:(?:system|previous|prior|above|earlier)\s+)?(?:instructions|directives|prompts?|rules)|disregard\s+(?:all\s+)?previous|forget\s+instructions/i,
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/you\s+are\s+now\s+(?:a|an|the)\s+/i,
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/act\s+as\s+(?:a|an|the)\s+(?!plan|phase|wave)/i,
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/pretend\s+(?:you(?:'re| are)\s+|to\s+be\s+)/i,
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/from\s+now\s+on,?\s+you\s+(?:are|will|should|must)/i,
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/(?:print|output|reveal|show|display|repeat)\s+(?:your\s+)?(?:system\s+)?(?:prompt|instructions)/i,
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/<\/?(?:system|assistant|human)>/i,
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/\[SYSTEM\]/i,
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/\[INST\]/i,
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/<<\s*SYS\s*>>/i,
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]);
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// Short single-line label for a matched pattern, used for both the rendered
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// advisory prose and the typed `findings[].match` field in BOTH consumer
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// hooks. The raw regex source is not user-facing: the #4016 superset pattern
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// is ~280 characters, and msd-prompt-guard.js echoed it verbatim into its
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// advisory (PR #4061 review nit). Byte-identical to the transform
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// msd-read-injection-scanner.js carried inline since #3523, hoisted here so
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// one finding renders the same way in both hooks. Both hooks already require
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// this module, so this adds no new staging dependency.
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function describePattern(pattern) {
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return pattern.source.replace(/\\s\+/g, '-').replace(/[()\\]/g, '').substring(0, 50);
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}
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module.exports = { INJECTION_PATTERNS, describePattern };
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