* chore(#604): rename get-shit-done/ runtime directory to gsd-core/ Renames the installed runtime directory `get-shit-done/` to `gsd-core/` so the on-disk name matches the package (`@opengsd/gsd-core`), repo, and binary (`gsd-tools`). The npm package name and binary are unchanged; npx/npm consumers are unaffected. Mechanical (bulk, ~90% of the diff): - `git mv get-shit-done gsd-core` - Swept path/identifier references across the repo via `perl -pe 's/get-shit-done(?!-\w)/gsd-core/g'`. The negative lookahead preserves the five legitimate slug variants that are NOT the directory: get-shit-done-{OLD,cc,classic,cli,redux} (old package/repo names). - Build/manifest wiring: package.json (bin, files, coverage globs), tsconfig.build.json (outDir), ~86 .gitignore build-output entries, stryker.config.mjs, scan-ignore files, install.js path strings. - Frozen (not rewritten): CHANGELOG.md history; translated docs (README.<locale>.md and docs/{ja-JP,ko-KR,pt-BR,zh-CN}/). New logic (review here): - src/installer-migrations/003-rename-get-shit-done-to-gsd-core.cts: a proper ADR-0008 installer migration. On upgrade it walks the legacy `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` tree, classifies each file via the prior install manifest, and emits remove-managed / backup-and-remove for managed files while PRESERVING unknown user-added files. Symlink-safe (skips a symlinked root and symlinked entries; bounds-checks every path under configDir). The framework rolls back on install failure. Emptied dirs may remain (framework has no recursive dir-removal primitive) — documented. - scripts/lint-legacy-dir-name.cjs: CI regression guard forbidding the bare `get-shit-done` directory token (split token to avoid self-match; case- insensitive; `(?!-\w)` lookahead allows the slug variants; allowlists CHANGELOG, translated docs, and `gsd-allow-legacy-name` marker lines). Wired into the lint-tests CI job. - Restored scripts/lint-package-identity-drift.cjs detection regexes (the mechanical sweep had wrongly rewritten the old-name patterns it exists to detect) and marked them as intentional legacy references. - TDD tests for the migration and the guard; do.md slash-command guard regex tightened so a `/gsd-core/bin` path segment is not mistaken for a command; changeset + docs/installer-migrations.md row added. Breaking: the installed runtime path moves `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` -> `~/.claude/gsd-core/`. Migration 003 removes the stale legacy dir's managed files (preserving user files) on upgrade. Users with custom hooks/configs hardcoding the old path must update them. Closes #604 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): unsweep pending changesets + allowlist injection-example docs CI fixes for the rename PR: - Do not sweep pending .changeset/*.md (ephemeral release-note fragments, like CHANGELOG); reverted those body edits so 5 pre-existing malformed fragments (missing type/pr) no longer enter the PR diff and trip docs-lint. Allowlisted .changeset/ in the legacy-name guard accordingly. - Allowlisted TEST-EXAMPLES.md and docs/explanation/security-model.md in prompt-injection-scan.sh: they contain intentional injection examples / security-model prose; the path-reference rewrites are kept. CodeQL alerts on this PR are pre-existing (alert lines unchanged by this PR; none in the new migration/guard) and are out of scope for the rename. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): resolve CodeQL alerts surfaced on this PR The rename diff touched files carrying pre-existing CodeQL findings; per the no-pre-existing-dismissal rule, fixing every surfaced alert rather than waving them off. All behavior-preserving: - scripts/ci-test-scope.cjs: build the config-path match from string .includes() instead of a RegExp over an arg-derived value (js/regex-injection). - src/profile-output.cts: escape backslashes before pipe-escaping desc/safeName so the table-cell escape is complete (js/incomplete-sanitization). - tests/{bug-2643,bug-2808,docs-parity-live-registry}: two-pass HTML-comment strip so a bare/unclosed `<!--` cannot survive (js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization). - tests/inline-plan-threshold: drop the no-op `\s`->`\s` identity replace, keep the meaningful POSIX-class conversion (js/identity-replacement). Verified: build:lib green; the touched test files + ci-test-scope + profile-output suites pass; lint:legacy-name clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): correctly resolve remaining CodeQL alerts (regex-injection + sanitization) The prior commit's fixes for two alerts were ineffective: - ci-test-scope.cjs js/regex-injection: the alert is the CLI-arg-derived `file` reaching static regex `.test(file)` calls (not the config rule). Removed ALL regex over file/t — startsWith/includes/=== string checks + an isWindowsHint helper — so there is no regex sink for the tainted value. - js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization (3 test files): a single `.replace(/<!--...-->/g,'')` can let `<!--` re-form. Replaced with a fixpoint loop (replace until stable) plus a final bare-opener strip. Verified: no regex over file/t remains; ci-test-scope + the 3 test suites pass; lint:legacy-name clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): make ci-test-scope + comment-strippers regex-free to clear CodeQL CodeQL flags the regex PATTERNS syntactically (regex-injection on the --files arg split; incomplete-multi-character-sanitization on the <!--...--> replace), so loop fixes do not satisfy it. Made these paths regex-free: - ci-test-scope.cjs splitFiles: char-by-char separator tokenizer (no /[,\\s]+/). - 3 test files: indexOf/slice HTML-comment stripper (no .replace(/<!--/)). Behavior preserved; ci-test-scope + the 3 suites pass; guard clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): unblock security base64 scan on the large rename diff The security job hit its 10m timeout: base64-scan.sh choked on the binary test fixture tests/feat-3594-parser-property-style.test.cjs (embedded NUL/ non-UTF8 bytes -> thousands of bogus blobs + "ignored null byte" warnings), and the ~800-file rename diff is slow to scan regardless. - scripts/base64-scan.sh: skip binary-by-content files (grep -Iq .) — they can't carry base64-obfuscated *text* and feeding NUL bytes through the per-line scanner is pathologically slow. collect_files already filtered binary *extensions*; this catches binary *content* in text extensions. - .github/workflows/security-scan.yml: raise the security job timeout 10m->30m to accommodate very large diffs (the scan itself is unchanged). Verified locally: scan skips the fixture, 0 "ignored null byte" warnings, 0 findings, exit 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): sweep get-shit-done refs introduced by merging next The branch was updated with next (#614/#384/#618 etc.), which reference the get-shit-done/ dir (still named that on next). Swept the stale references in the merged files to gsd-core so the rename stays consistent and lint:legacy-name passes: - commands/gsd/discuss-phase.md (runtime-launcher shim paths) - src/core.cts (getAgentsDir layout comments) - tests/bug-384-agents-runtime-aware.test.cjs (require path to runtime lib) Verified: guard 0 violations; build green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): exclude gsd-core/ path segments from bug-3683 command cross-ref invariant The #614 runtime-launcher shim added to discuss-phase.md references `${_GSD_RUNTIME_ROOT}/gsd-core/bin/...`. bug-3683's REF_PATTERN excluded path-y refs only via lookbehind, but `}` precedes `/gsd-core/` in the shim, so it mis-read the directory path as a dangling `/gsd-core` command ref (same class as the #604 bug-2954 fix). Added a trailing `(?![\w-]*\/)` so `/gsd-<x>/...` path segments are not treated as slash-command references. Verified locally on BOTH platforms before pushing: - mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures - gsd-test-runner (linux, node22 image) full suite: 0 failures - bug-3683 + bug-2954 pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): lazily resolve findProjectRoot in gsd-tools (harden flaky CI) CI intermittently failed state.test's gsd-tools subprocess with "findProjectRoot is not a function" (flip-flopping across legs; not reproducible on mac full suite, gsd-test linux full suite, test:unit, or state.test x8). findProjectRoot is a re-export from core.cjs (sourced from project-root.cjs); binding it via destructure at module-load can be undefined under a load-ordering edge. Resolve it lazily at call time via a small wrapper so the lookup happens after core.cjs is fully initialized. Verified green on BOTH platforms before pushing: - mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures - gsd-test-runner (linux, node22) full suite: 0 failures - state.test.cjs: 106/106; gsd-tools loads cleanly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): allowlist verification-patterns.md placeholder examples in secret scan The rename git-mv'd references/verification-patterns.md into gsd-core/, pulling it into the secret-scan diff. It documents stub/placeholder RED-FLAG env-var examples (illustrative Stripe test-key / database-URL / API-key placeholders) — not real credentials. Added it to .secretscanignore with the strict annotation, mirroring the existing gsd-core/workflows/plan-phase.md exception. Verified locally: secret-scan-lint --strict OK; secret-scan --diff origin/next exits 0 with 0 findings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
419 lines
17 KiB
JavaScript
419 lines
17 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* Filesystem fault-injection coverage for the canonical atomic-write
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* seam (#3595).
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*
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* `platformWriteSync` in `gsd-core/bin/lib/shell-command-projection.cjs`
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* is the shared seam every config/state/generated-artifact writer in
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* the CJS layer routes through. Its contract:
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*
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* 1. mkdirSync(dirname, { recursive: true }) — ensure parent exists.
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* 2. writeFileSync(<tmpPath>, content) — write to a sibling tmpfile
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* named `<filePath>.tmp.<pid>`.
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* 3. renameSync(<tmpPath>, filePath) — atomic publish.
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* 4. On any error in steps 2-3: unlinkSync(<tmpPath>) (best-effort)
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* then writeFileSync(filePath, content) directly as a fallback.
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*
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* Per CONTRIBUTING.md §"QA Matrix Requirements / Filesystem writes and
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* installers" the tests below use `mock.method()` against the real `fs`
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* seam to drive each fault mode, restore mocks with `t.after()`, and
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* assert on observable post-conditions (file existence, content,
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* presence/absence of orphan tmp files, propagated error code) — not
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* on prose.
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*
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* Pre-existing behavior gaps surfaced and PINNED (not fixed in this
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* PR — #3595 is test coverage, fixes belong in separate issues):
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*
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* - The "fall back to direct write" branch silently swallows the
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* ORIGINAL error from the tmp+rename path. If the fallback ALSO
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* fails, the operator only sees the fallback's error — not the
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* original cause. Tests document this.
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* - On EACCES against the parent directory mkdir, the error
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* escapes (no try/catch around mkdirSync). Pinned.
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*/
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'use strict';
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const { test, mock } = require('node:test');
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const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
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const fs = require('node:fs');
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const path = require('node:path');
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const os = require('node:os');
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const {
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platformWriteSync,
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platformEnsureDir,
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} = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/shell-command-projection.cjs');
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/**
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* Create a fresh real-fs scratch dir per test so no two faults share
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* state. Returns the directory; caller must clean up.
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*/
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const { createTempDir, cleanup } = require('./helpers.cjs');
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const mkScratch = (name) => createTempDir(`fs-fault-${name}-`);
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/**
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* Enumerate orphan tmp files left behind by platformWriteSync. The
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* tmp shape is `<filename>.tmp.<pid>`; we match that pattern strictly
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* so a test that happens to write a real `*.tmp.123` doesn't get a
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* false positive.
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*/
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function orphanTmpFiles(dir) {
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if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) return [];
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return fs.readdirSync(dir).filter((n) => /\.tmp\.\d+$/.test(n));
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}
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// ─── Happy path baseline ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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test('platformWriteSync happy path writes content atomically (baseline for fault tests)', (t) => {
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const dir = mkScratch('happy');
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t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
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const file = path.join(dir, 'config.json');
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platformWriteSync(file, '{"k":"v"}\n');
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assert.equal(fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf-8'), '{"k":"v"}\n');
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assert.deepEqual(orphanTmpFiles(dir), [], 'happy path must leave no orphan tmp file');
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});
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// ─── Rename failure → falls back to direct write ────────────────────────────
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test('platformWriteSync recovers when renameSync fails (EXDEV cross-device fallback)', (t) => {
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const dir = mkScratch('exdev');
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t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
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const file = path.join(dir, 'config.json');
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// Simulate rename failing once (e.g. cross-device move on a CI runner
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// with overlayfs). The fallback path must write the content directly.
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let renameCalls = 0;
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const renameMock = mock.method(fs, 'renameSync', (src, dest) => {
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renameCalls++;
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const err = new Error('EXDEV: cross-device link not permitted');
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err.code = 'EXDEV';
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throw err;
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});
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t.after(() => renameMock.mock.restore());
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platformWriteSync(file, 'fallback content\n');
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// File exists and has the new content — fallback wrote it directly.
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assert.equal(fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf-8'), 'fallback content\n');
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assert.equal(renameCalls, 1, 'renameSync was called exactly once before falling back');
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// The tmp file was unlinked by the fallback path's best-effort cleanup.
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assert.deepEqual(orphanTmpFiles(dir), [], 'tmp file must be cleaned up after rename failure');
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});
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// ─── Tmp write failure → falls back to direct write ─────────────────────────
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test('platformWriteSync falls back when initial tmp writeFileSync fails (ENOSPC)', (t) => {
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const dir = mkScratch('enospc');
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t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
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const file = path.join(dir, 'config.json');
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// Make the FIRST writeFileSync (to .tmp.<pid>) fail with ENOSPC. The
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// SECOND writeFileSync (the fallback, direct to filePath) succeeds.
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let writeCalls = 0;
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const realWrite = fs.writeFileSync;
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const writeMock = mock.method(fs, 'writeFileSync', function (target, data, opts) {
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writeCalls++;
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if (writeCalls === 1) {
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// First call is to the tmp path.
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assert.match(String(target), /\.tmp\.\d+$/, 'first write must be to the tmp path');
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const err = new Error('ENOSPC: no space left on device');
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err.code = 'ENOSPC';
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throw err;
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}
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// Second call is the fallback to the real target.
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assert.equal(target, file, 'fallback write must target the original file path');
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return realWrite.call(fs, target, data, opts);
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});
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t.after(() => writeMock.mock.restore());
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platformWriteSync(file, 'recovered\n');
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assert.equal(writeCalls, 2, 'expected exactly 2 writeFileSync calls (tmp fail + fallback)');
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assert.equal(fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf-8'), 'recovered\n');
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// The fallback path tries unlinkSync on the tmp; the tmp never
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// existed (its write failed), so unlink throws ENOENT and is
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// swallowed by the inner catch. Either way: no orphan.
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assert.deepEqual(orphanTmpFiles(dir), []);
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});
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// ─── Both attempts fail → error propagates (pinned current behavior) ────────
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test('platformWriteSync propagates the FALLBACK error when both tmp and fallback writes fail', (t) => {
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const dir = mkScratch('double-fail');
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t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
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const file = path.join(dir, 'config.json');
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let writeCalls = 0;
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const writeMock = mock.method(fs, 'writeFileSync', function () {
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writeCalls++;
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const err = new Error(
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writeCalls === 1
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? 'ENOSPC: original failure on tmp write'
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: 'EACCES: permission denied on fallback write',
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);
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err.code = writeCalls === 1 ? 'ENOSPC' : 'EACCES';
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throw err;
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});
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t.after(() => writeMock.mock.restore());
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// The current implementation does NOT chain the original cause; the
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// fallback's error is what surfaces. This test pins that behavior so a
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// future "preserve original error in .cause" fix is a visible change
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// (open follow-up).
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let caught;
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try {
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platformWriteSync(file, 'wont-write\n');
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} catch (err) {
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caught = err;
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}
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assert.ok(caught, 'double-failure must throw');
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assert.equal(caught.code, 'EACCES', 'currently the fallback error wins (open: should chain via .cause)');
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// The original file was never created.
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assert.equal(fs.existsSync(file), false);
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// No orphan tmp left because the tmp write failed before any file was created.
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assert.deepEqual(orphanTmpFiles(dir), []);
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});
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// ─── mkdirSync failure → escapes immediately (no try/catch upstream) ────────
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test('platformWriteSync propagates mkdirSync failure unchanged (no swallowed parent-dir errors)', (t) => {
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const dir = mkScratch('mkdir-fail');
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t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
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const file = path.join(dir, 'deep', 'nested', 'config.json');
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const mkdirMock = mock.method(fs, 'mkdirSync', () => {
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const err = new Error('EACCES: permission denied creating directory');
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err.code = 'EACCES';
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throw err;
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});
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t.after(() => mkdirMock.mock.restore());
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let caught;
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try {
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platformWriteSync(file, 'never-reached\n');
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} catch (err) {
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caught = err;
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}
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assert.ok(caught, 'mkdir failure must propagate');
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assert.equal(caught.code, 'EACCES', 'mkdir error code must be preserved');
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// No partial write happened.
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assert.equal(fs.existsSync(file), false);
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});
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// ─── Target path is a directory (writing OVER a dir is undefined) ──────────
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test('platformWriteSync against a target path that is an existing directory fails cleanly', (t) => {
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const dir = mkScratch('target-is-dir');
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t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
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const file = path.join(dir, 'collides');
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// Pre-create the target AS a directory so the rename step would
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// collide with a directory at the destination.
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fs.mkdirSync(file);
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let caught;
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try {
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platformWriteSync(file, 'shouldnt-overwrite-dir\n');
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} catch (err) {
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caught = err;
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}
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assert.ok(caught, 'writing over an existing directory must fail');
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// We don't pin the exact code (Node varies: EISDIR on rename, EPERM on
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// some platforms). We pin: a real error code (string starting with E)
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// surfaces, AND the directory was not replaced by a file.
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assert.equal(typeof caught.code, 'string');
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assert.match(caught.code, /^E[A-Z]+$/, `expected an errno-style code, got ${caught.code}`);
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assert.equal(fs.statSync(file).isDirectory(), true, 'pre-existing directory must remain a directory');
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});
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// ─── Path with spaces, unicode, newline characters ─────────────────────────
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test('platformWriteSync handles paths with spaces, unicode, and newline characters', (t) => {
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const dir = mkScratch('weird-path');
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t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
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const cases = [
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'has spaces in name.json',
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'unicode-日本語-name.json',
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];
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
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// Tab (0x09) and newline (0x0A) in filenames are POSIX-valid but
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// Windows-illegal (NTFS forbids control characters 0x00–0x1F). Append
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// both only on POSIX so cross-platform CI stays green.
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cases.push('with\ttab.json');
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cases.push('with\nnewline.json');
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}
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for (const name of cases) {
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const file = path.join(dir, name);
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platformWriteSync(file, `payload for ${name}\n`);
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assert.equal(
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fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf-8'),
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`payload for ${name}\n`,
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`roundtrip failed for path "${JSON.stringify(name)}"`,
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);
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}
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assert.deepEqual(orphanTmpFiles(dir), [], 'no tmp orphans across the corpus');
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});
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// ─── Orphan-tmp cleanup invariant ──────────────────────────────────────────
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test('platformWriteSync never leaks a tmp file after a successful happy-path write', (t) => {
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const dir = mkScratch('no-orphan-happy');
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t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
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for (let i = 0; i < 25; i++) {
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platformWriteSync(path.join(dir, `f-${i}.json`), `{"i":${i}}\n`);
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}
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// 25 real files, 0 tmp orphans.
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const entries = fs.readdirSync(dir);
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const tmpCount = entries.filter((n) => /\.tmp\.\d+$/.test(n)).length;
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const realCount = entries.length - tmpCount;
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assert.equal(realCount, 25);
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assert.equal(tmpCount, 0);
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});
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// ─── platformEnsureDir is idempotent and chains errors ─────────────────────
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test('platformEnsureDir is idempotent on an existing directory', (t) => {
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const dir = mkScratch('ensure-idem');
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t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
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const target = path.join(dir, 'a', 'b', 'c');
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// First call creates; subsequent calls must not throw EEXIST.
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platformEnsureDir(target);
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assert.equal(fs.statSync(target).isDirectory(), true);
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// Repeat.
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platformEnsureDir(target);
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platformEnsureDir(target);
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assert.equal(fs.statSync(target).isDirectory(), true);
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});
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test('platformEnsureDir propagates EACCES when parent dir is unwritable', (t) => {
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const dir = mkScratch('ensure-fail');
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t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
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const mkdirMock = mock.method(fs, 'mkdirSync', () => {
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const err = new Error('EACCES: permission denied');
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err.code = 'EACCES';
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throw err;
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});
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t.after(() => mkdirMock.mock.restore());
|
||
|
||
let caught;
|
||
try {
|
||
platformEnsureDir(path.join(dir, 'cannot-create'));
|
||
} catch (err) {
|
||
caught = err;
|
||
}
|
||
assert.ok(caught);
|
||
assert.equal(caught.code, 'EACCES');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// ─── Symlink-following / escape behavior ────────────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
test('platformWriteSync REPLACES a symlink with a regular file rather than following it (safe behavior)', (t) => {
|
||
// Security-relevant invariant: if the destination path is a symlink
|
||
// pointing somewhere the user did not intend the writer to touch
|
||
// (e.g. an attacker-planted symlink in `.planning/` pointing at
|
||
// `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`), the writer must NOT follow it and
|
||
// clobber the target. The rename-based atomic-write pattern delivers
|
||
// this property: `renameSync(tmp, symlinkPath)` replaces the symlink
|
||
// entry in the parent directory with the regular file at `tmp`.
|
||
// After the call:
|
||
// - `linkPath` is a regular file with the new content.
|
||
// - The original `realTarget` is UNTOUCHED.
|
||
// This test pins that property so a future refactor (e.g. switching
|
||
// to `fs.writeFileSync(linkPath, ...)` which follows symlinks) is a
|
||
// visible regression.
|
||
if (process.platform === 'win32') {
|
||
t.skip('symlinks on Win32 need admin');
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const dir = mkScratch('symlink-replace');
|
||
t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
|
||
|
||
const realTarget = path.join(dir, 'real-target.json');
|
||
fs.writeFileSync(realTarget, 'original — must not be touched\n');
|
||
const linkPath = path.join(dir, 'link.json');
|
||
fs.symlinkSync(realTarget, linkPath);
|
||
|
||
platformWriteSync(linkPath, 'new content\n');
|
||
|
||
// The real target is UNTOUCHED — the safety property.
|
||
assert.equal(
|
||
fs.readFileSync(realTarget, 'utf-8'),
|
||
'original — must not be touched\n',
|
||
'symlink target must be preserved when writer writes "through" the link',
|
||
);
|
||
// The link entry is now a regular file with the new content.
|
||
const stat = fs.lstatSync(linkPath);
|
||
assert.equal(stat.isSymbolicLink(), false, 'symlink entry replaced by a regular file (atomic rename semantics)');
|
||
assert.equal(stat.isFile(), true);
|
||
assert.equal(fs.readFileSync(linkPath, 'utf-8'), 'new content\n');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('platformWriteSync against a broken symlink replaces it with the intended file', (t) => {
|
||
if (process.platform === 'win32') {
|
||
t.skip('symlinks on Win32 need admin');
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
const dir = mkScratch('symlink-broken');
|
||
t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
|
||
const link = path.join(dir, 'dangling.json');
|
||
fs.symlinkSync(path.join(dir, 'does-not-exist'), link);
|
||
assert.equal(fs.lstatSync(link).isSymbolicLink(), true, 'pre-check: link is dangling');
|
||
|
||
platformWriteSync(link, 'real content\n');
|
||
|
||
assert.equal(fs.readFileSync(link, 'utf-8'), 'real content\n');
|
||
assert.equal(fs.lstatSync(link).isSymbolicLink(), false, 'broken link replaced with regular file');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// ─── Concurrent-write collision ────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
test('platformWriteSync survives a concurrent collision on the same target path', (t) => {
|
||
// Two consecutive writes to the same path with DIFFERENT contents,
|
||
// separated by a setImmediate boundary so the second can interleave
|
||
// a mock-injected error mid-flight. The contract pinned here: after
|
||
// both writes complete, the file is parseable and contains ONE of the
|
||
// two contents — never a half-written corrupt blob.
|
||
//
|
||
// (True parallel writes from separate processes are out of scope —
|
||
// the writer is sync. This exercises mid-flight error recovery, which
|
||
// is the same concurrency hazard at a lower granularity.)
|
||
const dir = mkScratch('concurrent');
|
||
t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
|
||
const file = path.join(dir, 'race.json');
|
||
|
||
// First write completes normally.
|
||
platformWriteSync(file, '{"writer":"first"}\n');
|
||
// Second write: inject a transient rename failure on the first
|
||
// attempt, then succeed via fallback. Capture the real renameSync
|
||
// BEFORE installing the mock so subsequent calls (defensive — the
|
||
// fallback path bypasses rename, so the second call shouldn't fire)
|
||
// delegate to the real implementation. The previous form referenced
|
||
// a non-existent `fs.renameSync.wrapped` property — that branch
|
||
// would silently no-op instead of delegating.
|
||
let renameCalls = 0;
|
||
const originalRename = fs.renameSync;
|
||
const renameMock = mock.method(fs, 'renameSync', (src, dest) => {
|
||
renameCalls++;
|
||
if (renameCalls === 1) {
|
||
const err = new Error('EBUSY: file is locked');
|
||
err.code = 'EBUSY';
|
||
throw err;
|
||
}
|
||
return originalRename.call(fs, src, dest);
|
||
});
|
||
t.after(() => renameMock.mock.restore());
|
||
|
||
platformWriteSync(file, '{"writer":"second"}\n');
|
||
|
||
// The fallback path wrote 'second' content directly.
|
||
const final = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf-8');
|
||
// Must be valid JSON — never a half-merged corruption.
|
||
assert.doesNotThrow(() => JSON.parse(final), 'file must remain parseable after the contested write');
|
||
// Must be the SECOND writer's content (it called platformWriteSync
|
||
// after the first, and the fallback completed).
|
||
assert.equal(final, '{"writer":"second"}\n');
|
||
assert.deepEqual(orphanTmpFiles(dir), [], 'no tmp orphans after the contested write');
|
||
});
|