Files

Tom Boucher 75287effb9 feat(115): secret-scan exclusion governance + --strict reduced-scan mode (#134 )

* test(115): add failing tests for secret-scan exclusion lint + strict mode

Adds tests/secret-scan-lint.test.cjs covering all 7 acceptance criteria
for issue #115 (secret-scan exclusion governance):

  1. Lint exits 0 on fully-annotated .secretscanignore fixture
  2. Lint exits 1 on fixture missing required key (reason/owner/expires)
  3. Lint exits 1 on fixture with expires date in the past
  4. Lint exits 1 on wildcard pattern without rule-id
  5. Lint exits 0 on grandfathered entry (default mode), exits 1 under --strict
  6. secret-scan --strict does not honour grandfathered exclusions
     (temp workspace fixture: file with real AWS-key pattern excluded by a
     grandfathered entry → default exits 0, strict exits 1)
  7. secret-scan default mode behaviour unchanged for existing .secretscanignore
     entries (regression test)

All 24 tests confirmed RED on origin/main before any implementation.
Test helpers use spawnSync throughout so both stdout and stderr are always
captured regardless of exit code (fixes the execFileSync/stderr gap from
the existing security-scan.test.cjs pattern).

Design references cited in test file:
  - GitGuardian exclusion annotation convention:
    https://docs.gitguardian.com/internal-repositories-monitoring/integrations/cli/secrets
  - CNCF Security TAG threat-model exception lifecycle:
    https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/community/working-groups/threat-modeling/templates/threats.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(115): add secret-scan-lint.sh + --strict mode + annotation parser

Implements secret-scan exclusion governance for issue #115.

## secret-scan-lint.sh (new script)

Exit codes (match secret-scan.sh convention):
  0 = all exclusions valid (or grandfathered with warning)
  1 = annotation violation: missing key, expired date, wildcard without rule-id,
      or (under --strict) any grandfathered entry
  2 = config error (file not found, bad args)

Annotation format (sidecar comment, immediately preceding the path):
  # allow: <pattern>  reason="..."  owner="..."  expires="YYYY-MM-DD"  [rule-id="..."]
  <pattern>

Required keys: reason, owner, expires
Optional key:  rule-id — required when pattern contains * wildcards

Grandfathered entries (plain comment, no structured keys):
  - Default mode: exit 0 + deprecation warning to stderr
  - --strict mode: exit 1

## secret-scan.sh (modified: --strict flag)

--strict flag for release/security-review CI lanes:
  - Grandfathered entries are NOT applied (file is scanned, not skipped)
  - Exclusions whose expires date is past are NOT applied
  - Default mode behaviour is fully preserved

load_ignorelist() now parses annotations:
  - Reads prev_comment to determine annotation status per entry
  - Uses date comparison (YYYY-MM-DD lexicographic) for expires checks
  - Emits DEPRECATION WARNING to stderr for grandfathered entries in default mode
  - Emits WARNING under --strict when skipping a grandfathered entry

Design references:
  - GitGuardian exclusion annotation convention:
    https://docs.gitguardian.com/internal-repositories-monitoring/integrations/cli/secrets
  - CNCF Security TAG threat-model exception lifecycle:
    https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/community/working-groups/threat-modeling/templates/threats.md
  - TruffleHog / GitLeaks wildcard-exclusion risk informed the rule-id requirement
    for wildcard entries (unguarded wildcards can accidentally suppress real findings)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(115): annotate existing .secretscanignore entries + wire CI lint step

## .secretscanignore migration

Existing entry `get-shit-done/workflows/plan-phase.md` has been migrated
from a bare plain comment to a fully-structured annotation:

  # allow: get-shit-done/workflows/plan-phase.md
  #   reason="contains illustrative DATABASE_URL/REDIS_URL example strings
  #           used as documentation placeholders — not real credentials"
  #   owner="@open-gsd/maintainers"
  #   expires="2027-06-30"

This entry now passes lint (exit 0) in both default and --strict modes.
The expiration date of 2027-06-30 gives the team ~13 months to review
whether the file still needs to be excluded before the entry expires.

## CI workflow change (.github/workflows/security-scan.yml)

Added step "Secret scan exclusion lint" immediately before the existing
"Planning directory check" step:

  - name: Secret scan exclusion lint
    run: |
      chmod +x scripts/secret-scan-lint.sh
      scripts/secret-scan-lint.sh --file .secretscanignore

The step has no ${{ }} context interpolation in its run block (no
injection surface). It runs on every PR targeting main, release/**, hotfix/**.

This implements CI acceptance criterion from issue #115:
"CI lint fails for unmanaged wildcard exclusions"
"CI enforces policy format"

## Header added to .secretscanignore

Added governance documentation block explaining annotation format,
required/optional keys, and references to design sources:
  - GitGuardian exclusion annotation convention:
    https://docs.gitguardian.com/internal-repositories-monitoring/integrations/cli/secrets
  - CNCF Security TAG threat-model exception lifecycle:
    https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/community/working-groups/threat-modeling/templates/threats.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(115): document exclusion governance + periodic reduced-scan procedure

Updates SECURITY.md with a new section "Secret-Scan Exclusion Governance"
covering:

  1. Annotation format (required/optional keys, wildcard rule)
  2. Local lint command
  3. Periodic reduced-exclusion scan procedure using --strict mode

The procedure section explicitly states when to run (every release +
scheduled security review), what --strict does differently, and what to do
when --strict finds findings that default mode does not.

No runbooks/security-audit*.md exists in this repo. SECURITY.md is the
correct location as it is what secret-scan.sh references in its header
docstring (via the "See SECURITY.md" note pattern common in this codebase).

References cited:
  - GitGuardian exclusion annotation convention:
    https://docs.gitguardian.com/internal-repositories-monitoring/integrations/cli/secrets
  - CNCF Security TAG threat-model exception lifecycle:
    https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/community/working-groups/threat-modeling/templates/threats.md

Closes #115 (together with feat and chore commits on this branch)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#115): exclude scanner's own test fixtures from diff-mode scan

Add */secret-scan-lint.test.cjs to should_skip_file(), consistent with
the existing exclusions for security-scan.test.cjs and
security-prompt-injection.test.cjs. The test fixture at line 465
contains a DATABASE_URL credential-shaped string that exercises the
Env Variable Leak detector — scanning it as live code is a false positive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-05-23 10:58:14 -04:00

2.8 KiB

Raw Blame History

Security Policy

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.

Instead, please report them via email to: security@gsd.build (or DM @glittercowboy on Discord/Twitter if email bounces)

Include:

Description of the vulnerability
Steps to reproduce
Potential impact
Any suggested fixes (optional)

Response Timeline

Acknowledgment: Within 48 hours
Initial assessment: Within 1 week
Fix timeline: Depends on severity, but we aim for:
- Critical: 24-48 hours
- High: 1 week
- Medium/Low: Next release

Scope

Security issues in the GSD codebase that could:

Execute arbitrary code on user machines
Expose sensitive data (API keys, credentials)
Compromise the integrity of generated plans/code

Recognition

We appreciate responsible disclosure and will credit reporters in release notes (unless you prefer to remain anonymous).

Org-level security baseline

This file covers how to report individual vulnerabilities. For the broader org-wide security posture — scanner controls, incident-audit checklists, ownership model, and rollout plan — see:

docs/security/baseline.md

Secret-Scan Exclusion Governance

Secret-scanning exclusions (.secretscanignore) require structured annotations. Bare paths are accepted in default mode with a deprecation warning but are rejected in strict mode. The lint runs on every PR.

Annotation format

# allow: <pattern>  reason="..."  owner="..."  expires="YYYY-MM-DD"  [rule-id="..."]
<pattern>

Required keys: reason, owner, expires. Wildcard patterns (**, *.ext) also require rule-id.

Lint locally: scripts/secret-scan-lint.sh --file .secretscanignore

Periodic reduced-exclusion scan (release and security-review lanes)

Run this during every release and scheduled security review:

scripts/secret-scan.sh --diff origin/main --strict

The --strict flag:

Does not honour grandfathered (un-annotated) exclusions — those files are scanned.
Skips any exclusion whose expires date is in the past — those files are scanned.
Is intended to surface accumulated exclusion debt that default mode masks.

If --strict finds findings that default mode does not, those findings represent either (a) an entry that should have been annotated and renewed, or (b) an actual secret that was only hidden by a stale exclusion. In both cases: investigate, remediate, and update the exclusion annotation.

References:

GitGuardian exclusion annotation convention: https://docs.gitguardian.com/internal-repositories-monitoring/integrations/cli/secrets
CNCF Security TAG threat-model exception lifecycle: https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/community/working-groups/threat-modeling/templates/threats.md

2.8 KiB Raw Blame History