* test(#3990): the RED/GREEN/REFACTOR cycle is stated once, embedded conditionally * fix(#3990): state the cycle once — pointers in consumers, conditional tdd.md embeds Emitted-Drift-Ack-Growth: execute-phase.md — #3990 conditions the tdd.md embed on the dispatch being TDD * chore(#3990): changeset for the single-statement TDD cycle * chore(#3990): backfill changeset pr number * fix(#4228): linear cycle check — the lazy-span regex pinned a Windows core for the whole job cap * test(#3990): allowlist pin tracks the rebased line * fix(tests): npm-integrity gate names an empty audit output explicitly — empty stdout crashed the parse as a bare SyntaxError * fix: name an empty npm-audit stdout explicitly — it crashed the parse as a bare SyntaxError Observed on CI (several branches, all lanes): spawnSync npm ETIMEDOUT with empty stdout; the empty string survived the recovery path and surfaced as 'SyntaxError: Unexpected end of JSON input', hiding the captured error. The recovery path now requires non-empty stdout, and an empty result throws with the captured stdout/stderr/message so the actual error is on the record. Root cause of the ETIMEDOUT itself is NOT diagnosed here — this change only stops masking it. --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
256 lines
10 KiB
JavaScript
256 lines
10 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
|
|
'use strict';
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* #4196: npm-audit baseline diff.
|
|
*
|
|
* The #3588 gate (tests/npm-integrity-gate.test.cjs) used to fail on ANY
|
|
* advisory present in the production tree, regardless of whether the PR
|
|
* being checked introduced it. Because npm's advisory database updates
|
|
* continuously and independently of repo state, that made the gate fail
|
|
* for reasons no PR caused -- see #4196 for the incident where PR #4188
|
|
* passed this gate at merge time and failed it ~15 minutes later on the
|
|
* identical commit, purely because a new advisory was disclosed in the
|
|
* interim.
|
|
*
|
|
* This module computes which vulnerable packages are NEW relative to a
|
|
* baseline tree (typically the PR's target branch), so the gate blocks a
|
|
* PR only for advisories it actually introduces -- a pre-existing advisory
|
|
* in an untouched transitive dependency no longer blocks unrelated work.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
const fs = require('node:fs');
|
|
const os = require('node:os');
|
|
const path = require('node:path');
|
|
const { execFileSync } = require('node:child_process');
|
|
|
|
const AUDIT_TIMEOUT_MS = 180_000;
|
|
|
|
const AUDIT_DIFF_REASON = Object.freeze({
|
|
OK_NO_NEW_VULNERABILITIES: 'ok_no_new_vulnerabilities',
|
|
FAIL_NEW_VULNERABLE_PACKAGE: 'fail_new_vulnerable_package',
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Pure diff: which package names are vulnerable in `headVulnerabilities`
|
|
* but were NOT already vulnerable in `baselineVulnerabilities`.
|
|
*
|
|
* Both args are the `.vulnerabilities` object from `npm audit --json`
|
|
* (keyed by package name). Matched by package NAME only -- not by the
|
|
* specific advisory ID or severity -- so a package that stays vulnerable
|
|
* across a *different* newly-disclosed advisory for the same package is
|
|
* still "pre-existing", not new. A package whose vulnerability *worsens*
|
|
* while remaining the same package name is deliberately NOT flagged here;
|
|
* that tradeoff keeps the predicate simple and matched to the #4196
|
|
* incident shape (a transitive dependency neither side of the diff
|
|
* touched). Severity escalation on an already-known-vulnerable package is
|
|
* exactly the kind of thing the scheduled Dependabot channel should catch
|
|
* instead (see #4196, PR #4200's auto-merge workflow).
|
|
*/
|
|
function diffNewVulnerablePackages(baselineVulnerabilities, headVulnerabilities) {
|
|
const baselineNames = new Set(Object.keys(baselineVulnerabilities || {}));
|
|
return Object.keys(headVulnerabilities || {}).filter((name) => !baselineNames.has(name));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Typed verdict wrapping diffNewVulnerablePackages. `ok: false` means the
|
|
* diff (head vs baseline) is non-empty -- this PR/push introduced at
|
|
* least one newly-vulnerable package.
|
|
*/
|
|
function evaluateAuditDiff({ baselineVulnerabilities, headVulnerabilities }) {
|
|
const newlyIntroduced = diffNewVulnerablePackages(baselineVulnerabilities, headVulnerabilities);
|
|
if (newlyIntroduced.length > 0) {
|
|
return { ok: false, reason: AUDIT_DIFF_REASON.FAIL_NEW_VULNERABLE_PACKAGE, newlyIntroduced };
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
ok: true,
|
|
reason: AUDIT_DIFF_REASON.OK_NO_NEW_VULNERABILITIES,
|
|
preExisting: Object.keys(headVulnerabilities || {}),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Runs `npm audit --package-lock-only --omit=dev --json` in `cwd` and
|
|
* returns the parsed JSON, or `null` if `cwd` has no package.json or no
|
|
* package-lock.json (not an auditable tree -- callers treat this as
|
|
* "skip"/"no baseline available", not an error).
|
|
*
|
|
* `--package-lock-only` deliberately avoids requiring `node_modules/` to
|
|
* be installed: it lets a baseline tree be audited from nothing but an
|
|
* extracted package.json + package-lock.json (see extractBaselineTree),
|
|
* without a second full `npm ci`.
|
|
*/
|
|
function runPackageLockAudit(cwd) {
|
|
if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(cwd, 'package.json'))) return null;
|
|
if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(cwd, 'package-lock.json'))) return null;
|
|
const isWindows = process.platform === 'win32';
|
|
const npmCandidates = isWindows ? ['npm.cmd', 'npm'] : ['npm'];
|
|
const args = ['audit', '--package-lock-only', '--omit=dev', '--json'];
|
|
let out;
|
|
let lastErr = null;
|
|
for (const npmCmd of npmCandidates) {
|
|
try {
|
|
out = execFileSync(
|
|
npmCmd,
|
|
args,
|
|
{
|
|
cwd,
|
|
encoding: 'utf-8',
|
|
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
|
|
timeout: AUDIT_TIMEOUT_MS,
|
|
shell: isWindows,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
lastErr = null;
|
|
break;
|
|
} catch (e) {
|
|
// `npm audit` exits non-zero when advisories are present; the JSON is
|
|
// still on stdout in that case. Recover and let the caller classify —
|
|
// but only when stdout actually CARRIES the JSON: an audit that was
|
|
// killed or aborted can exit non-zero with EMPTY stdout, and accepting
|
|
// the empty string here surfaces as a bare `SyntaxError: Unexpected
|
|
// end of JSON input` at the parse below, hiding the captured error
|
|
// (observed on CI 2026-09-03, both lanes; cause undetermined).
|
|
const recovered = e && typeof e.stdout !== 'undefined' && e.stdout !== null
|
|
? (Buffer.isBuffer(e.stdout) ? e.stdout.toString('utf-8') : String(e.stdout))
|
|
: '';
|
|
if (recovered.trim()) {
|
|
out = recovered;
|
|
lastErr = null;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
lastErr = e;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!out || !out.trim()) {
|
|
const detail = lastErr
|
|
? [lastErr.stdout, lastErr.stderr, String(lastErr.message)].filter(Boolean).join('\n').slice(0, 500)
|
|
: '(no error captured)';
|
|
throw new Error(
|
|
`npm audit --json produced no output in ${cwd}. ` +
|
|
`Detail from the failed invocation:\n${detail}`
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (lastErr) throw lastErr;
|
|
const parsed = JSON.parse(out);
|
|
if (parsed && parsed.metadata && parsed.metadata.vulnerabilities) {
|
|
return parsed;
|
|
}
|
|
throw new Error(`Unexpected npm audit JSON shape in ${cwd}: missing metadata.vulnerabilities`);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Extracts package.json + package-lock.json (optionally under `subdir`,
|
|
* e.g. 'sdk') from `ref` at git object level into a fresh temp directory --
|
|
* no working-tree checkout, no `node_modules` install. Returns the temp
|
|
* dir path, or `null` if `ref` cannot be resolved locally (e.g. a shallow
|
|
* clone that never fetched it) or either file is absent at that ref --
|
|
* callers treat `null` as "no baseline available", not an error.
|
|
*/
|
|
function extractBaselineTree(ref, repoRoot, subdir = '') {
|
|
const rel = (name) => (subdir ? path.posix.join(subdir, name) : name);
|
|
let pkgJson;
|
|
let lockJson;
|
|
try {
|
|
pkgJson = execFileSync('git', ['show', `${ref}:${rel('package.json')}`], {
|
|
cwd: repoRoot,
|
|
encoding: 'utf-8',
|
|
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'],
|
|
});
|
|
lockJson = execFileSync('git', ['show', `${ref}:${rel('package-lock.json')}`], {
|
|
cwd: repoRoot,
|
|
encoding: 'utf-8',
|
|
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'],
|
|
});
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-audit-baseline-'));
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'package.json'), pkgJson);
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'package-lock.json'), lockJson);
|
|
return dir;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// All-zeros is git's documented sentinel for "this ref did not exist
|
|
// before this push" (a brand-new branch's first push) -- never a real
|
|
// commit to diff against.
|
|
const NULL_SHA = '0000000000000000000000000000000000000000';
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Resolves the git ref to diff against, in priority order:
|
|
* 1. AUDIT_BASELINE_REF env var -- the primary mechanism. CI sets this
|
|
* explicitly (see .github/workflows/test.yml) to github.event.pull_
|
|
* request.base.sha on a pull_request event, or github.event.before on
|
|
* a push event -- both pinned, race-free values Git/GitHub track for
|
|
* exactly this purpose. Prefer this over anything below whenever the
|
|
* caller can provide it.
|
|
* 2. GITHUB_BASE_REF (GitHub Actions sets this on pull_request events)
|
|
* resolved against the LIVE origin/<branch> tip. Only reached if
|
|
* AUDIT_BASELINE_REF wasn't set -- e.g. a workflow that forgot to
|
|
* wire it. origin/<branch> can advance mid-run (see the GSD_EMITTED_
|
|
* BASE precedent in test.yml), so this is a degraded fallback, not
|
|
* the intended path for pull_request events in this repo's own CI.
|
|
* 3. On a `push` event, `HEAD~1` -- correct ONLY when the push added
|
|
* exactly one commit (true for a squash-merge or a single ordinary
|
|
* commit). This repo also allows rebase-merge (allow_rebase_merge:
|
|
* true), which can land a PR as several discrete commits in one
|
|
* push -- HEAD~1 then lands on an EARLIER commit in the same push,
|
|
* which may already contain a vulnerable package that commit itself
|
|
* introduced, silently marking it "pre-existing". CI never reaches
|
|
* this branch (AUDIT_BASELINE_REF is always set by test.yml for
|
|
* push events); it exists only for out-of-band invocations (e.g.
|
|
* gsd-test) that don't set any of the above.
|
|
* 4. `origin/next`, else a plain local branch named `next` (gsd-test's
|
|
* sandbox fetches the base as a local branch, not a remote-tracking
|
|
* ref -- see gsd-test-merges-into-LOCAL-base-branch in this repo's
|
|
* own operational notes), if either exists locally (this repo's
|
|
* integration branch -- matches DEFAULT_BASE in
|
|
* scripts/changeset/lint.cjs).
|
|
* Returns '' if none resolve -- callers fall back to strict zero-tolerance
|
|
* rather than silently skipping the gate.
|
|
*/
|
|
function resolveBaselineRef(repoRoot) {
|
|
if (process.env.AUDIT_BASELINE_REF) return process.env.AUDIT_BASELINE_REF;
|
|
if (process.env.GITHUB_BASE_REF) return `origin/${process.env.GITHUB_BASE_REF}`;
|
|
if (process.env.GITHUB_EVENT_NAME === 'push') {
|
|
try {
|
|
const parent = execFileSync('git', ['rev-parse', '--verify', 'HEAD~1'], {
|
|
cwd: repoRoot,
|
|
encoding: 'utf-8',
|
|
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'],
|
|
}).trim();
|
|
if (parent && parent !== NULL_SHA) return parent;
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// not enough history; fall through
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
execFileSync('git', ['rev-parse', '--verify', 'origin/next'], {
|
|
cwd: repoRoot,
|
|
stdio: 'ignore',
|
|
});
|
|
return 'origin/next';
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// fall through to a plain local branch
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
execFileSync('git', ['rev-parse', '--verify', 'next'], {
|
|
cwd: repoRoot,
|
|
stdio: 'ignore',
|
|
});
|
|
return 'next';
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return '';
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
module.exports = {
|
|
AUDIT_DIFF_REASON,
|
|
diffNewVulnerablePackages,
|
|
evaluateAuditDiff,
|
|
runPackageLockAudit,
|
|
extractBaselineTree,
|
|
resolveBaselineRef,
|
|
NULL_SHA,
|
|
};
|