Files
msd-core/docs
Tom Boucher bc5619dd27 docs(#3247): record the capability instruction-surface trust model (#3249)
* docs(#3247): record the capability instruction-surface trust model

ADR-2363 records the trust posture for third-party capability SKILL.md
bodies, which #2322/#2340 made agent-invocable without any content-level
control. The path-level protections that fix shipped are all present; no
content scanner exists, and external-descriptor-trust.cts never had one.
Nothing was bypassed - the control did not exist and the boundary was
never written down.

D1 records the posture: skill bodies are trusted, unscanned agent
instructions. D2 rejects content scanning on Kerckhoffs (a shipped rule
set is readable by the adversary who installs it), on threat-model
non-transfer from ADR-1577 (there, instructions are anomalous inside
data; here they are the payload's legitimate form), and on Goodhart (a
scanned-OK line displaces the judgment the consent prompt exists to
provoke). D3 replaces the executable/non-executable binary with three
classes, adding instruction surface.

D4 keeps instruction surfaces out of the v1 disclosureSignature. The
signature is NOT the activation binding - hasProjectConsent compares
contentHash only, and a global install carries no consent record at all.
What re-encoding would do is perturb the signature of every skill-bearing
capability and fire a spurious re-consent prompt on its next upgrade,
which is what ADR-2782 D4 rule 5 already forbids. If instruction surfaces
ever need to be signature-bound, that lands as a versioned v2 signature
with a migration, never an in-place re-encoding.

Corrects capability-trust-model.md, which claimed skills get lighter
consent because they do not execute code - true, and not the relevant
property, since the agent is the interpreter. Adds the author-side
boundary to develop-a-capability.md and links it from
publish-a-capability.md. Both state that per-skill disclosure at the
consent prompt lands with #3248 and does not happen today.

Docs-only. No behavior change; no consent record perturbed. D5's
mechanism is Phase 1 (#3248), which is why the ADR is Proposed.

Refs #2363

* chore(#3247): backfill changeset pr number to 3249

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Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-09 11:47:54 -04:00
..

GSD Core documentation

Documentation is organised into four quadrants: tutorials help you learn by doing, how-to guides solve specific tasks, reference states authoritative facts, and explanation explores concepts and design decisions.

Language versions: English · Português (pt-BR) · 日本語 · 简体中文


Tutorials


How-to guides


Reference

  • Commands — every command with flags and examples
  • Configuration — full config schema, model profiles, git branching strategies
  • CLI tools — gsd-tools.cjs programmatic API for workflows and agents
  • Features — complete feature index
  • Inventory — installed skills and surface map
  • STATE.md schema — field-by-field reference for .planning/STATE.md
  • CONTEXT.md schema — field-by-field reference for .planning/phases/<N>/CONTEXT.md
  • PLAN.md schema — field-by-field reference for .planning/phases/<N>/PLAN.md
  • Planning artifacts — all .planning/ files and their roles
  • Review and verification capabilities — code review, security, and Nyquist capability ownership and hook contracts
  • Gate predicates — canonical specification of the phase-gate predicate vocabulary
  • Capability matrix — generated catalogue of every capability's role, tier, extension points, hook kinds, and engines.gsd
  • Capability manifest — the full capability.json schema and validation rules
  • gsd capability command — install / update / remove / list reference for third-party capabilities
  • Workflow fragments — in-file <!-- gsd:section --> marker grammar for fragmentizing workflow markdown at emission time
  • Reviewer Lane Registry — generated catalogue of third-party reviewer lanes, with their flags, transport, and install commands

Explanation