Files
msd-core/scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh
Tom Boucher b238baddbf fix(#663): resolve open CodeQL/Dependabot security alerts (ReDoS, prototype pollution, workflow perms, qs DoS) (#665)
* fix(#663): resolve open CodeQL/Dependabot security alerts

- ReDoS: collapse ambiguous nested quantifiers in phase-heading regexes
  (verify/validate/commands) and the plan-filename lookahead (phase) to
  provably-equivalent non-backtracking forms
- prototype pollution: guard __proto__/constructor/prototype in setConfigValue
- remove dead no-op .replace(/-/g,'-') in phase.cts
- escape all regex metachars in bug-2839 test
- add contents:read permissions to security-scan + install-smoke workflows
- pin qs >= 6.15.2 via overrides (DoS GHSA)
- broaden prompt-injection allowlist to translated security-model docs

Closes #663

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(#663): regression tests for prototype-pollution guard and roadmap-phase ReDoS

Behavioral test that config-set rejects __proto__/constructor/prototype keys
without polluting Object.prototype, plus a ReDoS guard (timing-bound) and
behavior-preservation assertions for the collapsed phase-heading regexes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(#663): make ReDoS regression assert structured result, not elapsed time

Replace elapsed-time assertions (which tripped local/no-elapsed-assertion
ESLint rule and were unsound for synchronous ReDoS) with structured-result
assertions on adversarial inputs: assert that malformed phase headings/
unchecked-item lines without a terminating colon/space yield an empty Set,
which is both the correct behavior and an exercise of the fixed linear regex
on the catastrophic-backtracking input shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(#663): add Security changeset fragment for #665

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(#663): fold prototype-pollution regression into config.test.cjs

The standalone bug-663-config-prototype-pollution.test.cjs was a 9th
config-module test file, tripping lint-test-file-count (the allowlist is
ratcheted and must not grow). Consolidated into config.test.cjs instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 08:54:15 -04:00

208 lines
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# prompt-injection-scan.sh — Scan files for prompt injection patterns
#
# Usage:
# scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh --diff origin/main # CI mode: scan changed .md files
# scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh --file path/to/file # Scan a single file
# scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh --dir agents/ # Scan all files in a directory
#
# Exit codes:
# 0 = clean
# 1 = findings detected
# 2 = usage error
set -euo pipefail
# ─── Patterns ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Each pattern is a POSIX extended regex. Keep alphabetized by category.
PATTERNS=(
# Instruction override
'ignore[[:space:]]+(all[[:space:]]+)?(previous|prior|above|earlier|preceding)[[:space:]]+(instructions|prompts|rules|directives|context)'
'disregard[[:space:]]+(all[[:space:]]+)?(previous|prior|above)[[:space:]]+(instructions|prompts|rules)'
'forget[[:space:]]+(all[[:space:]]+)?(previous|prior|above)[[:space:]]+(instructions|prompts|rules|context)'
'override[[:space:]]+(all[[:space:]]+)?(system|previous|safety)[[:space:]]+(instructions|prompts|rules|checks|filters|guards)'
'override[[:space:]]+(system|safety|security)[[:space:]]'
# Role manipulation
'you[[:space:]]+are[[:space:]]+now[[:space:]]+(a|an|my)[[:space:]]'
'from[[:space:]]+now[[:space:]]+on[[:space:]]+(you|pretend|act|behave)'
'pretend[[:space:]]+(you[[:space:]]+are|to[[:space:]]+be)[[:space:]]'
'act[[:space:]]+as[[:space:]]+(a|an|if|my)[[:space:]]'
'roleplay[[:space:]]+as[[:space:]]'
'assume[[:space:]]+the[[:space:]]+role[[:space:]]+of[[:space:]]'
# System prompt extraction
'output[[:space:]]+(your|the)[[:space:]]+(system[[:space:]]+)?(prompt|instructions)'
'reveal[[:space:]]+(your|the)[[:space:]]+(system[[:space:]]+)?(prompt|instructions)'
'show[[:space:]]+me[[:space:]]+(your|the)[[:space:]]+(system[[:space:]]+)?(prompt|instructions)'
'print[[:space:]]+(your|the)[[:space:]]+(system[[:space:]]+)?(prompt|instructions)'
'what[[:space:]]+(is|are)[[:space:]]+(your|the)[[:space:]]+(system[[:space:]]+)?(prompt|instructions)'
'repeat[[:space:]]+(your|the|all)[[:space:]]+(system[[:space:]]+)?(prompt|instructions|rules)'
# Fake message boundaries
'</?system>'
'</?assistant>'
'</?human>'
'\[SYSTEM\]'
'\[/SYSTEM\]'
'\[INST\]'
'\[/INST\]'
'<<SYS>>'
'<</SYS>>'
# Tool call injection / code execution in markdown
'eval[[:space:]]*\([[:space:]]*["\x27]'
'exec[[:space:]]*\([[:space:]]*["\x27]'
'Function[[:space:]]*\([[:space:]]*["\x27].*return'
# Jailbreak / DAN patterns
'do[[:space:]]+anything[[:space:]]+now'
'DAN[[:space:]]+mode'
'developer[[:space:]]+mode[[:space:]]+(enabled|output|activated)'
'jailbreak'
'bypass[[:space:]]+(safety|content|security)[[:space:]]+(filter|check|rule|guard)'
)
# ─── Allowlist ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Files that legitimately discuss injection patterns (security docs, tests, this script)
ALLOWLIST=(
'scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh'
'scripts/base64-scan.sh'
'scripts/secret-scan.sh'
'tests/security-scan.test.cjs'
'tests/security.test.cjs'
'tests/prompt-injection-scan.test.cjs'
'tests/verify.test.cjs'
'gsd-core/bin/lib/security.cjs'
'hooks/gsd-prompt-guard.js'
'hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js'
'tests/read-injection-scanner.test.cjs'
'tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs'
'tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/'
'SECURITY.md'
# These files contain intentional injection examples / security-model prose
# and are not attack vectors — they explain/demonstrate injection patterns.
'TEST-EXAMPLES.md'
'explanation/security-model.md'
)
is_allowlisted() {
local file="$1"
for allowed in "${ALLOWLIST[@]}"; do
if [[ "$file" == *"$allowed"* ]]; then
return 0
fi
done
return 1
}
# ─── File Collection ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
collect_files() {
local mode="$1"
shift
case "$mode" in
--diff)
local base="${1:-origin/main}"
# Get changed files in the diff, filter to scannable extensions
git diff --name-only --diff-filter=ACMR "$base"...HEAD 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '\.(md|cjs|js|json|yml|yaml|sh)$' || true
;;
--file)
if [[ -f "$1" ]]; then
echo "$1"
else
echo "Error: file not found: $1" >&2
exit 2
fi
;;
--dir)
local dir="$1"
if [[ ! -d "$dir" ]]; then
echo "Error: directory not found: $dir" >&2
exit 2
fi
find "$dir" -type f \( -name '*.md' -o -name '*.cjs' -o -name '*.js' -o -name '*.json' -o -name '*.yml' -o -name '*.yaml' -o -name '*.sh' \) \
! -path '*/node_modules/*' ! -path '*/.git/*' ! -path '*/dist/*' 2>/dev/null || true
;;
--stdin)
cat
;;
*)
echo "Usage: $0 --diff [base] | --file <path> | --dir <path> | --stdin" >&2
exit 2
;;
esac
}
# ─── Scanner ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
scan_file() {
local file="$1"
local found=0
if is_allowlisted "$file"; then
return 0
fi
for pattern in "${PATTERNS[@]}"; do
# Use grep -iE for case-insensitive extended regex
# -n for line numbers, -c for count mode first to check
local matches
matches=$(grep -inE -e "$pattern" "$file" 2>/dev/null || true)
if [[ -n "$matches" ]]; then
if [[ $found -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $file"
found=1
fi
echo "$matches" | while IFS= read -r line; do
echo " $line"
done
fi
done
return $found
}
# ─── Main ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
main() {
if [[ $# -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "Usage: $0 --diff [base] | --file <path> | --dir <path>" >&2
exit 2
fi
local mode="$1"
shift
local files
files=$(collect_files "$mode" "$@")
if [[ -z "$files" ]]; then
echo "prompt-injection-scan: no files to scan"
exit 0
fi
local total=0
local failed=0
while IFS= read -r file; do
[[ -z "$file" ]] && continue
total=$((total + 1))
if ! scan_file "$file"; then
failed=$((failed + 1))
fi
done <<< "$files"
echo ""
echo "prompt-injection-scan: scanned $total files, $failed with findings"
if [[ $failed -gt 0 ]]; then
exit 1
fi
exit 0
}
main "$@"