Files
msd-core/hooks/gsd-read-guard.js
Tom Boucher 91d5fdff6f chore(#3546): migrate hook advisory assertions onto typed output surfaces (#4167)
* chore(#3546): migrate hook advisory assertions onto typed output surfaces

Add additive typed fields to 5 hook scripts' PreToolUse/PostToolUse
advisory output alongside the existing additionalContext prose:

- gsd-read-guard.js: code ('READ_BEFORE_EDIT'), fileName
- gsd-context-monitor.js: severity ('warning'|'critical')
- gsd-prompt-guard.js: findings ([{ruleId, match}], module-local RULE_IDS
  + renderFinding mapper mirroring gsd-read-injection-scanner.js's #3523
  pattern)
- gsd-read-injection-scanner.js: severity ('LOW'|'HIGH'), source (its
  findings array already existed from #3523)
- gsd-workflow-guard.js: code ('WORKFLOW_ADVISORY') on the advisory leg,
  distinct from the existing force-add block leg's code

additionalContext stays byte-identical in every hook (verified per-hook
against the pristine HEAD version across a spread of payload shapes).

Migrates all 20 assertion sites named in the issue off
additionalContext.includes(...)/assert.match(...) substring-matching
onto the new typed fields, per CONTRIBUTING.md's prohibition on raw
text matching on test outputs.

Closes #3546

* test: fix undersized commit-class timeout in gsd-statusline.test.cjs's commitN helper

Surfaced by gsd-test on the #3546 checkpoint: `commitN()`'s loop called
gitOrThrow(['add','-A']/['commit',...]) without a timeoutMs override, so
each call used DEFAULT_GIT_TIMEOUT_MS (15s) -- a bound git-fixture.cjs's
own doc comment says is sized for plumbing reads (rev-parse/branch/log),
not write-heavy add/commit spawns. That file already documents the exact
same defect class from a prior incident (PR #3323) and exports
GIT_FIXTURE_TIMEOUT_MS (60s) for fixture-construction call sites -
commitN just wasn't using it. Observed failure: `git commit -m filler 9`
timed out under normal bench load, unrelated to any of this PR's own
diff (hooks/*.js + 5 other test files).

Not a flake: root-caused to the timeout bound being sized for the wrong
call class, per this repo's no-flakes rule.

* chore(#3546): backfill changeset PR number (#4167)

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-09-01 22:32:54 -04:00

211 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
// gsd-hook-version: {{GSD_VERSION}}
// GSD Read Guard — PreToolUse hook
// Injects advisory guidance when Write/Edit targets an existing file,
// reminding the model to Read the file first.
//
// Background: Non-Claude models (e.g. MiniMax M2.5 on OpenCode) don't
// natively follow the read-before-edit pattern. When they attempt to
// Write/Edit an existing file without reading it, the runtime rejects
// with "You must read file before overwriting it." The model retries
// without reading, creating an infinite loop that burns through usage.
//
// This hook prevents that loop by injecting clear guidance BEFORE the
// tool call reaches the runtime. The model sees the advisory and can
// issue a Read call on the next turn.
//
// Triggers on: Write and Edit tool calls
// Action: Advisory (does not block) — injects read-first guidance
// Only fires when the target file already exists on disk.
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const { HOOK_ON_CRASH, allow, crash } = require('./lib/hook-exit.js');
// This guard is pure advisory UX — a reminder to Read before Write/Edit on
// non-Claude-Code runtimes. A crash here must not block a legitimate Write/
// Edit; the worst outcome of failing open is the model hitting the runtime's
// own read-before-edit rejection it was trying to help avoid (#3911).
const ON_CRASH = HOOK_ON_CRASH.ALLOW;
// #2304: Kimi's native hook bus delivers Kimi's tool vocabulary in the payload
// (Write → WriteFile, Edit/MultiEdit → StrReplaceFile) while the [[hooks]]
// matcher is registered pre-translated (runtime-hooks-surface.cts
// buildKimiHooksTomlBlock) — so without normalizing the payload too, the
// matcher fires but the tool_name check below exits 0 and the guard is dormant
// on Kimi. The tool_input field names differ as well (kimi-cli
// src/kimi_cli/tools/file/{write,replace}.py): WriteFile takes `path`/`content`,
// StrReplaceFile takes `path` + `edit: Edit | list[Edit]` with `old`/`new` —
// kimi-cli's hooks/events.py forwards tool_input verbatim, so both layers need
// mapping. Accepts bare and module-qualified ('kimi_cli.tools.file:WriteFile')
// names; unknown names fall through untouched. Inlined per guard (not
// hooks/lib/): hook scripts are staged as standalone files, and a sibling
// require is a staging dependency that can fail silently.
// A Map, not an object literal: bare bracket lookup resolves prototype keys
// ('constructor', '__proto__', 'toString') to truthy functions/objects, so the
// !mapped fall-through never fires for them; Map.get returns undefined (same
// shape as canonicalizeRuntimeName in src/runtime-name-policy.cts).
const KIMI_TOOL_NAMES = new Map([['WriteFile', 'Write'], ['StrReplaceFile', 'Edit'], ['ReadFile', 'Read'], ['Shell', 'Bash']]);
function normalizeKimiPayload(data) {
// #2595 (review nit): `JSON.parse('null')` is null, and null/primitive
// payloads reached the `data.tool_name` read below and threw — falsifying
// this function's own "total over the inputs JSON can express" claim, which
// property (e) now tests directly. Harmless in practice (a null payload has
// nothing to guard, and the throw landed in the same fail-open catch as the
// exit-0 it now takes deliberately) but the claim should be true as stated.
if (data === null || typeof data !== 'object') return data;
const raw = data.tool_name;
if (typeof raw !== 'string') return data;
const mapped = KIMI_TOOL_NAMES.get(raw.slice(raw.lastIndexOf(':') + 1));
if (!mapped) return data;
data.tool_name = mapped;
if (data.tool_response === undefined && data.tool_output !== undefined) {
data.tool_response = data.tool_output;
}
const input = data.tool_input;
if (input && typeof input === 'object') {
// #2547 (review): Kimi's `path` is AUTHORITATIVE — it must win outright,
// not merely fill in when `file_path` happens to be absent. kimi-cli's file
// tools carry no `file_path` field at all (src/kimi_cli/tools/file/write.py,
// replace.py, @ 4a550ef — the SHA #2547 pins), and soul/toolset.py hands the
// model's raw json-parsed
// arguments to PreToolUse verbatim, doing typed validation only later inside
// tool.call() — after the hook has already decided. So a `file_path` in a
// Kimi payload is ALWAYS model-supplied, and under the old `=== undefined`
// condition it SHADOWED the field kimi-cli actually executes on. A payload
// pairing a cross-root `path` with a spurious `file_path: ""` left every
// guard reading an empty string and exiting 0, while the identical write
// without the extra key blocked — a bypass needing no crash at all. The same
// shadowing also preserved a NON-STRING `file_path` (`[]`), which threw
// inside gsd-worktree-path-guard's path.isAbsolute() and reached its outer
// `catch { process.exit(0) }`: the same crash-to-allow this fix closes
// elsewhere, reached through the guard's own read rather than through
// normalization. Overwriting can only ever narrow what a guard inspects to
// the path that will actually be written, so it cannot under-block.
if (typeof input.path === 'string') {
input.file_path = input.path;
}
const edits = Array.isArray(input.edit) ? input.edit
: (input.edit && typeof input.edit === 'object') ? [input.edit] : [];
if (edits.length) {
// #2547: `e?.old`, not `e.old` — `??` guards the value, not the
// dereference, so a NULLISH entry (`edit: [null]`) threw a TypeError
// here. normalizeKimiPayload runs before any tool dispatch, so that throw
// reached each guard's outer `catch { process.exit(0) }` and silently
// downgraded a should-BLOCK call into an allow. (A string/number entry
// never threw — `('x').old` is a legal read yielding undefined.)
//
// The String() coercion is guarded for the same reason: `{"toString":
// null}` is valid JSON that throws "Cannot convert object to primitive
// value", which is the identical crash-to-allow with a different
// trigger. Degrading only the non-coercible entry to '' keeps
// stringification intact for every value that CAN coerce (numbers,
// arrays, plain objects), so nothing downstream — including
// gsd-prompt-guard's scan of new_string — loses content it saw before.
const editText = (v) => { try { return String(v ?? ''); } catch { return ''; } };
// #2595 (review Major 2): reconstruct UNCONDITIONALLY, mirroring the
// `path` decision above rather than merely filling in when the field
// happens to be absent. kimi-cli's StrReplaceFile schema is `path` +
// `edit` only (src/kimi_cli/tools/file/replace.py @ 4a550ef) — it carries
// no `old_string`/`new_string` at all, so either field appearing in a
// Kimi payload is ALWAYS model-supplied, exactly like `file_path`. Under
// the old `=== undefined` condition a model-supplied `new_string: ""`
// SHADOWED the reconstruction, leaving gsd-prompt-guard's injection scan
// reading '' and exiting at its `if (!content)` before it ever saw the
// real `edit[].new` — a one-key bypass of the very scan this fix's
// guarded coercion exists to keep fed. A `typeof` test would NOT close
// it: a benign non-empty string shadows just as effectively as ''.
input.old_string = edits.map((e) => editText(e?.old)).join('\n');
input.new_string = edits.map((e) => editText(e?.new)).join('\n');
}
}
return data;
}
let input = '';
const stdinTimeout = setTimeout(() => allow(undefined), 3000);
process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
process.stdin.on('data', chunk => input += chunk);
process.stdin.on('end', () => {
clearTimeout(stdinTimeout);
try {
const data = normalizeKimiPayload(JSON.parse(input));
const toolName = data.tool_name;
// Only intercept Write and Edit tool calls
if (toolName !== 'Write' && toolName !== 'Edit') {
allow(undefined);
}
// Claude Code natively enforces read-before-edit — skip the advisory (#1984, #2344, #2520).
//
// Detection signals, in priority order:
// 1. `data.session_id` on the hook's stdin payload — part of Claude
// Code's documented PreToolUse hook-input schema, always present.
// Reliable across Claude Code versions because it's schema, not env.
// 2. `CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT` / `CLAUDE_CODE_SSE_PORT` — env vars that
// Claude Code does propagate to hook subprocesses (verified on
// Claude Code CLI 2.1.116).
// 3. `CLAUDE_SESSION_ID` / `CLAUDECODE` — kept for back-compat and in
// case future Claude Code versions propagate them to hook
// subprocesses. On 2.1.116 they reach Bash tool subprocesses but
// not hook subprocesses, which is why checking them alone is
// insufficient (regression of #2344 fixed here as #2520).
const isClaudeCode =
(typeof data.session_id === 'string' && data.session_id.length > 0) ||
process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT ||
process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_SSE_PORT ||
process.env.CLAUDE_SESSION_ID ||
process.env.CLAUDECODE;
if (isClaudeCode) {
allow(undefined);
}
// #2595 (review Major 3, sibling sweep): typed read — same class as the
// worktree guard's, advisory-only here (no exit(2) path in this hook).
const filePath = typeof data.tool_input?.file_path === 'string'
? data.tool_input.file_path
: '';
if (!filePath) {
allow(undefined);
}
// Only inject guidance when the file already exists.
// New files don't need a prior Read — the runtime allows creating them directly.
let fileExists = false;
try {
fs.accessSync(filePath, fs.constants.F_OK);
fileExists = true;
} catch {
// File does not exist — no guidance needed
}
if (!fileExists) {
allow(undefined);
}
const fileName = path.basename(filePath);
// Advisory guidance — does not block the operation
const output = {
hookSpecificOutput: {
hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
additionalContext:
`READ-BEFORE-EDIT REMINDER: You are about to modify "${fileName}" which already exists. ` +
'If you have not already used the Read tool to read this file in the current session, ' +
'you MUST Read it first before editing. The runtime will reject edits to files that ' +
'have not been read. Use the Read tool on this file path, then retry your edit.',
code: 'READ_BEFORE_EDIT',
fileName,
},
};
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(output));
} catch {
// Silent fail — never block tool execution.
// ON_CRASH is declared ALLOW at module top: this preserves today's
// exit(0) fail-open behavior exactly (#3911).
crash(ON_CRASH, undefined);
}
});