* chore(#3546): migrate hook advisory assertions onto typed output surfaces Add additive typed fields to 5 hook scripts' PreToolUse/PostToolUse advisory output alongside the existing additionalContext prose: - gsd-read-guard.js: code ('READ_BEFORE_EDIT'), fileName - gsd-context-monitor.js: severity ('warning'|'critical') - gsd-prompt-guard.js: findings ([{ruleId, match}], module-local RULE_IDS + renderFinding mapper mirroring gsd-read-injection-scanner.js's #3523 pattern) - gsd-read-injection-scanner.js: severity ('LOW'|'HIGH'), source (its findings array already existed from #3523) - gsd-workflow-guard.js: code ('WORKFLOW_ADVISORY') on the advisory leg, distinct from the existing force-add block leg's code additionalContext stays byte-identical in every hook (verified per-hook against the pristine HEAD version across a spread of payload shapes). Migrates all 20 assertion sites named in the issue off additionalContext.includes(...)/assert.match(...) substring-matching onto the new typed fields, per CONTRIBUTING.md's prohibition on raw text matching on test outputs. Closes #3546 * test: fix undersized commit-class timeout in gsd-statusline.test.cjs's commitN helper Surfaced by gsd-test on the #3546 checkpoint: `commitN()`'s loop called gitOrThrow(['add','-A']/['commit',...]) without a timeoutMs override, so each call used DEFAULT_GIT_TIMEOUT_MS (15s) -- a bound git-fixture.cjs's own doc comment says is sized for plumbing reads (rev-parse/branch/log), not write-heavy add/commit spawns. That file already documents the exact same defect class from a prior incident (PR #3323) and exports GIT_FIXTURE_TIMEOUT_MS (60s) for fixture-construction call sites - commitN just wasn't using it. Observed failure: `git commit -m filler 9` timed out under normal bench load, unrelated to any of this PR's own diff (hooks/*.js + 5 other test files). Not a flake: root-caused to the timeout bound being sized for the wrong call class, per this repo's no-flakes rule. * chore(#3546): backfill changeset PR number (#4167) --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
211 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript
211 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
|
|
// gsd-hook-version: {{GSD_VERSION}}
|
|
// GSD Read Guard — PreToolUse hook
|
|
// Injects advisory guidance when Write/Edit targets an existing file,
|
|
// reminding the model to Read the file first.
|
|
//
|
|
// Background: Non-Claude models (e.g. MiniMax M2.5 on OpenCode) don't
|
|
// natively follow the read-before-edit pattern. When they attempt to
|
|
// Write/Edit an existing file without reading it, the runtime rejects
|
|
// with "You must read file before overwriting it." The model retries
|
|
// without reading, creating an infinite loop that burns through usage.
|
|
//
|
|
// This hook prevents that loop by injecting clear guidance BEFORE the
|
|
// tool call reaches the runtime. The model sees the advisory and can
|
|
// issue a Read call on the next turn.
|
|
//
|
|
// Triggers on: Write and Edit tool calls
|
|
// Action: Advisory (does not block) — injects read-first guidance
|
|
// Only fires when the target file already exists on disk.
|
|
|
|
const fs = require('fs');
|
|
const path = require('path');
|
|
const { HOOK_ON_CRASH, allow, crash } = require('./lib/hook-exit.js');
|
|
|
|
// This guard is pure advisory UX — a reminder to Read before Write/Edit on
|
|
// non-Claude-Code runtimes. A crash here must not block a legitimate Write/
|
|
// Edit; the worst outcome of failing open is the model hitting the runtime's
|
|
// own read-before-edit rejection it was trying to help avoid (#3911).
|
|
const ON_CRASH = HOOK_ON_CRASH.ALLOW;
|
|
|
|
// #2304: Kimi's native hook bus delivers Kimi's tool vocabulary in the payload
|
|
// (Write → WriteFile, Edit/MultiEdit → StrReplaceFile) while the [[hooks]]
|
|
// matcher is registered pre-translated (runtime-hooks-surface.cts
|
|
// buildKimiHooksTomlBlock) — so without normalizing the payload too, the
|
|
// matcher fires but the tool_name check below exits 0 and the guard is dormant
|
|
// on Kimi. The tool_input field names differ as well (kimi-cli
|
|
// src/kimi_cli/tools/file/{write,replace}.py): WriteFile takes `path`/`content`,
|
|
// StrReplaceFile takes `path` + `edit: Edit | list[Edit]` with `old`/`new` —
|
|
// kimi-cli's hooks/events.py forwards tool_input verbatim, so both layers need
|
|
// mapping. Accepts bare and module-qualified ('kimi_cli.tools.file:WriteFile')
|
|
// names; unknown names fall through untouched. Inlined per guard (not
|
|
// hooks/lib/): hook scripts are staged as standalone files, and a sibling
|
|
// require is a staging dependency that can fail silently.
|
|
// A Map, not an object literal: bare bracket lookup resolves prototype keys
|
|
// ('constructor', '__proto__', 'toString') to truthy functions/objects, so the
|
|
// !mapped fall-through never fires for them; Map.get returns undefined (same
|
|
// shape as canonicalizeRuntimeName in src/runtime-name-policy.cts).
|
|
const KIMI_TOOL_NAMES = new Map([['WriteFile', 'Write'], ['StrReplaceFile', 'Edit'], ['ReadFile', 'Read'], ['Shell', 'Bash']]);
|
|
function normalizeKimiPayload(data) {
|
|
// #2595 (review nit): `JSON.parse('null')` is null, and null/primitive
|
|
// payloads reached the `data.tool_name` read below and threw — falsifying
|
|
// this function's own "total over the inputs JSON can express" claim, which
|
|
// property (e) now tests directly. Harmless in practice (a null payload has
|
|
// nothing to guard, and the throw landed in the same fail-open catch as the
|
|
// exit-0 it now takes deliberately) but the claim should be true as stated.
|
|
if (data === null || typeof data !== 'object') return data;
|
|
const raw = data.tool_name;
|
|
if (typeof raw !== 'string') return data;
|
|
const mapped = KIMI_TOOL_NAMES.get(raw.slice(raw.lastIndexOf(':') + 1));
|
|
if (!mapped) return data;
|
|
data.tool_name = mapped;
|
|
if (data.tool_response === undefined && data.tool_output !== undefined) {
|
|
data.tool_response = data.tool_output;
|
|
}
|
|
const input = data.tool_input;
|
|
if (input && typeof input === 'object') {
|
|
// #2547 (review): Kimi's `path` is AUTHORITATIVE — it must win outright,
|
|
// not merely fill in when `file_path` happens to be absent. kimi-cli's file
|
|
// tools carry no `file_path` field at all (src/kimi_cli/tools/file/write.py,
|
|
// replace.py, @ 4a550ef — the SHA #2547 pins), and soul/toolset.py hands the
|
|
// model's raw json-parsed
|
|
// arguments to PreToolUse verbatim, doing typed validation only later inside
|
|
// tool.call() — after the hook has already decided. So a `file_path` in a
|
|
// Kimi payload is ALWAYS model-supplied, and under the old `=== undefined`
|
|
// condition it SHADOWED the field kimi-cli actually executes on. A payload
|
|
// pairing a cross-root `path` with a spurious `file_path: ""` left every
|
|
// guard reading an empty string and exiting 0, while the identical write
|
|
// without the extra key blocked — a bypass needing no crash at all. The same
|
|
// shadowing also preserved a NON-STRING `file_path` (`[]`), which threw
|
|
// inside gsd-worktree-path-guard's path.isAbsolute() and reached its outer
|
|
// `catch { process.exit(0) }`: the same crash-to-allow this fix closes
|
|
// elsewhere, reached through the guard's own read rather than through
|
|
// normalization. Overwriting can only ever narrow what a guard inspects to
|
|
// the path that will actually be written, so it cannot under-block.
|
|
if (typeof input.path === 'string') {
|
|
input.file_path = input.path;
|
|
}
|
|
const edits = Array.isArray(input.edit) ? input.edit
|
|
: (input.edit && typeof input.edit === 'object') ? [input.edit] : [];
|
|
if (edits.length) {
|
|
// #2547: `e?.old`, not `e.old` — `??` guards the value, not the
|
|
// dereference, so a NULLISH entry (`edit: [null]`) threw a TypeError
|
|
// here. normalizeKimiPayload runs before any tool dispatch, so that throw
|
|
// reached each guard's outer `catch { process.exit(0) }` and silently
|
|
// downgraded a should-BLOCK call into an allow. (A string/number entry
|
|
// never threw — `('x').old` is a legal read yielding undefined.)
|
|
//
|
|
// The String() coercion is guarded for the same reason: `{"toString":
|
|
// null}` is valid JSON that throws "Cannot convert object to primitive
|
|
// value", which is the identical crash-to-allow with a different
|
|
// trigger. Degrading only the non-coercible entry to '' keeps
|
|
// stringification intact for every value that CAN coerce (numbers,
|
|
// arrays, plain objects), so nothing downstream — including
|
|
// gsd-prompt-guard's scan of new_string — loses content it saw before.
|
|
const editText = (v) => { try { return String(v ?? ''); } catch { return ''; } };
|
|
// #2595 (review Major 2): reconstruct UNCONDITIONALLY, mirroring the
|
|
// `path` decision above rather than merely filling in when the field
|
|
// happens to be absent. kimi-cli's StrReplaceFile schema is `path` +
|
|
// `edit` only (src/kimi_cli/tools/file/replace.py @ 4a550ef) — it carries
|
|
// no `old_string`/`new_string` at all, so either field appearing in a
|
|
// Kimi payload is ALWAYS model-supplied, exactly like `file_path`. Under
|
|
// the old `=== undefined` condition a model-supplied `new_string: ""`
|
|
// SHADOWED the reconstruction, leaving gsd-prompt-guard's injection scan
|
|
// reading '' and exiting at its `if (!content)` before it ever saw the
|
|
// real `edit[].new` — a one-key bypass of the very scan this fix's
|
|
// guarded coercion exists to keep fed. A `typeof` test would NOT close
|
|
// it: a benign non-empty string shadows just as effectively as ''.
|
|
input.old_string = edits.map((e) => editText(e?.old)).join('\n');
|
|
input.new_string = edits.map((e) => editText(e?.new)).join('\n');
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let input = '';
|
|
const stdinTimeout = setTimeout(() => allow(undefined), 3000);
|
|
process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
|
|
process.stdin.on('data', chunk => input += chunk);
|
|
process.stdin.on('end', () => {
|
|
clearTimeout(stdinTimeout);
|
|
try {
|
|
const data = normalizeKimiPayload(JSON.parse(input));
|
|
const toolName = data.tool_name;
|
|
|
|
// Only intercept Write and Edit tool calls
|
|
if (toolName !== 'Write' && toolName !== 'Edit') {
|
|
allow(undefined);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Claude Code natively enforces read-before-edit — skip the advisory (#1984, #2344, #2520).
|
|
//
|
|
// Detection signals, in priority order:
|
|
// 1. `data.session_id` on the hook's stdin payload — part of Claude
|
|
// Code's documented PreToolUse hook-input schema, always present.
|
|
// Reliable across Claude Code versions because it's schema, not env.
|
|
// 2. `CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT` / `CLAUDE_CODE_SSE_PORT` — env vars that
|
|
// Claude Code does propagate to hook subprocesses (verified on
|
|
// Claude Code CLI 2.1.116).
|
|
// 3. `CLAUDE_SESSION_ID` / `CLAUDECODE` — kept for back-compat and in
|
|
// case future Claude Code versions propagate them to hook
|
|
// subprocesses. On 2.1.116 they reach Bash tool subprocesses but
|
|
// not hook subprocesses, which is why checking them alone is
|
|
// insufficient (regression of #2344 fixed here as #2520).
|
|
const isClaudeCode =
|
|
(typeof data.session_id === 'string' && data.session_id.length > 0) ||
|
|
process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT ||
|
|
process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_SSE_PORT ||
|
|
process.env.CLAUDE_SESSION_ID ||
|
|
process.env.CLAUDECODE;
|
|
if (isClaudeCode) {
|
|
allow(undefined);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// #2595 (review Major 3, sibling sweep): typed read — same class as the
|
|
// worktree guard's, advisory-only here (no exit(2) path in this hook).
|
|
const filePath = typeof data.tool_input?.file_path === 'string'
|
|
? data.tool_input.file_path
|
|
: '';
|
|
if (!filePath) {
|
|
allow(undefined);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Only inject guidance when the file already exists.
|
|
// New files don't need a prior Read — the runtime allows creating them directly.
|
|
let fileExists = false;
|
|
try {
|
|
fs.accessSync(filePath, fs.constants.F_OK);
|
|
fileExists = true;
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// File does not exist — no guidance needed
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!fileExists) {
|
|
allow(undefined);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const fileName = path.basename(filePath);
|
|
|
|
// Advisory guidance — does not block the operation
|
|
const output = {
|
|
hookSpecificOutput: {
|
|
hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
|
|
additionalContext:
|
|
`READ-BEFORE-EDIT REMINDER: You are about to modify "${fileName}" which already exists. ` +
|
|
'If you have not already used the Read tool to read this file in the current session, ' +
|
|
'you MUST Read it first before editing. The runtime will reject edits to files that ' +
|
|
'have not been read. Use the Read tool on this file path, then retry your edit.',
|
|
code: 'READ_BEFORE_EDIT',
|
|
fileName,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(output));
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// Silent fail — never block tool execution.
|
|
// ON_CRASH is declared ALLOW at module top: this preserves today's
|
|
// exit(0) fail-open behavior exactly (#3911).
|
|
crash(ON_CRASH, undefined);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|