* feat(#3970): per-task external-tracker content-resolution seam Implements ADR-3646 (Phase 1, #3970): a `<task tracker-id="...">` attribute plus a new optional `taskContentResolver` capability-manifest field let a capability resolve a task's action/verify/acceptance-criteria/read_first/done content from an external issue tracker instead of PLAN.md's inline body. - src/plan-document.cts: parses the `tracker-id` attribute into `PlanTask.trackerId` - src/task-content-resolution.cts: new leaf module — split/find/build/resolve, with a hard-halt (throw) contract on ambiguous/failed/timeout/malformed resolution, never a silent fallback to possibly-stale inline text - src/task-command-router.cts: new `task resolve-content --plan --task-id --raw` CLI verb wiring the module into a real process exit code - gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-validator.cjs: validates the new `taskContentResolver` manifest field (feature-role only, cross-capability trackerPrefix uniqueness) - gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md, gsd-core/references/loop-hook-dispatch.md, docs/reference/capability-manifest.md: wire the seam into the per-task loop and document it as a new `execute:task` point outside the existing contribution/step/gate vocabulary (unconditional in autonomous mode) Closes #3970 * fix(#3970): gate checkpoint tasks out of content resolution, close trackerPrefix grammar parity gap, cover path-traversal guard Standards/Spec code-review pass on the task-content-resolution seam (ADR-3646 Phase 1) found three defects: 1. execute-plan.md's task-content-resolution bullet fired on any tracker-id-bearing task with no check that it wasn't type="checkpoint:*", contradicting ADR-3646 Decision 1 (a checkpoint task must never enter resolve-content). plan-document.cts already parses trackerId: null unconditionally for checkpoint tasks; only the workflow prose needed the fix, so the bullet now explicitly excludes checkpoint tasks. 2. task-content-resolution.cts's parseResolverDeclaration accepted any non-empty trackerPrefix with no grammar check, while capability- validator.cjs's KEBAB_RE enforces kebab-case at install time — a Generative Fix Divergence gap. Added the same grammar (as a literal regex, documented as intentionally not shared across the .cts/.cjs build boundary) plus a parity test asserting the two surfaces agree across a valid/invalid trackerPrefix table. 3. task-command-router.cts's routeResolveContent path-traversal guard on --plan had zero test coverage. Added a test exercising a ../../../etc/passwit-shaped path and asserting the USAGE rejection names the offending path. * fix(#3970): sanitize resolver diagnostics and cap resolver timeoutMs Two findings caught by an isolated security-review pass on the task content resolution seam: - ResolverFailedError/ResolverMalformedOutputError embedded raw, unsanitized subprocess stderr/stdout (attacker/model-influenced via the tracker-id argv token) into .message. A hostile or buggy resolver could smuggle a newline plus a forged "Error: " line, or terminal escape sequences, into a diagnostic io.cjs's error() writes verbatim to stderr. Fixed at the constructor (task-content-resolution.cts) via io.cjs's existing formatDiagnosticToken(), so every caller of resolveTaskContent gets a safe .message by construction. - capability-validator.cjs's validateTaskContentResolverFields had no upper bound on taskContentResolver.invoke.timeoutMs, letting a manifest declare an effectively unbounded value and defeat the "bounded subprocess" design intent. Added a 120000ms ceiling specific to this field, without touching the shared isPositiveIntegerMs() helper (still used unbounded by the reviewer lane's timeoutFloorMs and probe timeoutMs). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#3970): fix gsd-test failures — stale prose allowlist line and stderr-vs-message assertion gsd-test (remote dockerized matrix) came back red with 5 failures on this PR; all five are real defects, fixed here. - tests/no-bare-gsd-tools-command-position.test.cjs: PROSE_ALLOWLIST's execute-plan.md entry pointed at line 415, which ffc190df4's checkpoint-exclusion caveat (added near line 221) shifted down by one line. The actual "validated downstream by gsd-tools uat classify-coverage" descriptive mention now sits at line 416. Updated the allowlist entry's line number to match. - tests/task-command-router-resolve-content.test.cjs: the path-traversal test asserted the outside-project-scope diagnostic against the thrown ExitError's own .message. io.cts's error() (ADR-3889) writes its human-readable message to fd 2 via writeAllSync and then throws a bare `new ExitError(1)` with no message argument — by design, so the exception carries no duplicate text and the thrown ExitError's message defaults to "process exit 1" (cli-exit.cts's ExitError constructor). Root cause was the test, not the source: task-command-router.cjs's outside-project-scope rejection already calls error() correctly and the diagnostic text is genuinely emitted, just on fd 2, not on the exception. Fixed the test to capture fd-2 writes (mirroring tests/estimate-calibrate.test.cjs's runCalibrateExpectError and this same file's own captureStdout for fd 1) and assert against the captured stderr text instead of err.message. This was masked locally because a manual `node -e` sanity check that only inspects the caught exception's .message cannot see what the real node:test run actually failed on. Emitted-Drift-Ack-Growth: execute-plan.md — adds the ADR-3646 task-content-resolution bullet and checkpoint-exclusion caveat to the per-task execute loop; a real behavioral prose addition, not incidental bloat. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(#3970): backfill changeset PR number (pr:0 -> pr:4000) --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
6.2 KiB
Loop Hook Dispatch Contract
Generic reference for consuming the --raw JSON output of gsd_run loop render-hooks <point>
in any host-loop workflow. This document is point-agnostic — it applies to every loop
extension point (discuss:pre, discuss:post, plan:pre, plan:post, execute:pre, execute:wave:pre,
execute:wave:post, execute:post, verify:pre, verify:post, ship:pre, ship:post).
Envelope shape
{
"point": "discuss:pre",
"activeHooks": [
{ "kind": "contribution", "into": "orchestrator", "fragment": { "inline": "..." } },
{ "kind": "step", "ref": { "skill": "my-skill" } },
{ "kind": "gate", "check": { "query": "..." }, "blocking": true, "onError": "skip" }
],
"rendered": "..."
}
activeHooks is an array of enabled hook entries for the named point. It is empty (or absent)
when no capability has registered an active hook at this point — treat that as a no-op.
Dispatch rules by kind
contribution
Inject fragment.inline verbatim into the context for the role named in into
(e.g. orchestrator, planner). Do not paraphrase — the text is the product.
step
Dispatch the referenced unit. Exactly one of ref.skill, ref.agent, or ref.command is set.
-
ref.skillpresent → dispatch via the Skill tool with skill idgsd-<ref.skill>. -
ref.agentpresent → dispatch via the Agent tool withsubagent_type=ref.agent. Before dispatching an agent, print the canonical liveness banner so users know silence is expected and do not kill a healthy agent:◆ Spawning <agent>... (runs in a subagent — no output until it returns; expected, not a freeze) -
ref.commandpresent → validate it IN-CONTEXT first, before any shell use. It comes from a capability manifest, which may be third-party. Check the value you read fromactiveHooksagainst^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*( [a-z][a-z0-9-]*)*$yourself — never by pasting it into a shell command to be tested there, because a value carrying a quote,;,`,$(, or a newline would terminate the assignment and run as its own statement before any shell-side check could execute. A value that fails is a malformed manifest: record a warning, skip that hook, continue to the next entry. Only a value that has passed is run, with the phase number appended:gsd_run ${ref.command} --phase "${PHASE_NUMBER}" --raw
Wait for the result before continuing to the next hook or the next step.
A step is advisory by construction: it never blocks or redirects the host workflow —
that is what a gate is for. Each dispatch is best-effort; on error record a warning and
continue, honoring onError.
A point whose workflow hand-rolls one kind does not implement this contract. Several
host workflows historically matched a single hook (e.g. execute:post matched only
ref.skill == "code-review"), so any other step registered there was declared and silently
never run. When a workflow defers to this file, it dispatches every active step entry,
not one shape of one.
gate
Validate check before any shell use. check.query and check.predicate come from a
capability manifest, which may be third-party — and gates[].check is not one of the
executable surfaces the install consent prompt discloses (hooks, command modules,
mcpServers, reviewer lanes), so a capability can be consented to as declarative-only and
still reach a shell through a gate. Check the query value you read from activeHooks against
^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*( [a-z][a-z0-9-]*)*$ yourself, IN-CONTEXT — never by pasting it into a
shell command to be tested there, because a value carrying a quote, ;, a `, $(, or a
newline would terminate the assignment and run as its own statement before any shell-side
check could execute. A value that fails is a malformed manifest: record a warning, route it
per the gate's onError, and do not run it. Pass check.predicate as a single argv
element for the same reason — never re-quote it into a shell string, where an apostrophe
would close the literal. This is the identical requirement step → ref.command carries
above; it was stated there and omitted here, which is the gap #3559 closed.
Evaluate check (one of query, predicate, or agentVerdict). Then honor blocking:
blocking: true→ if the check returnsblock: true, surfacecheck.messageto the user and stop the current step. Do not continue.blocking: false→ advisory only; surface the message but continue regardless of outcome.
Honor onError if the check itself errors: skip means treat as non-blocking and continue;
halt means surface the error and stop.
Empty / absent activeHooks
If activeHooks is absent, null, or an empty array, skip silently and continue to the next
step in the workflow. No output to the user is needed.
The execute:task point (a different shape)
execute:task exists below wave granularity — it is evaluated once per task, inside the
execute:wave:pre / execute:wave:post bracket, immediately before that task's read_first
gate. It is not one of the 12 points documented above, does not appear in steps /
contributions / gates, and is never dispatched through gsd_run loop render-hooks <point> or
this file's activeHooks envelope.
Instead, a capability declares task-content resolution directly in its manifest body via
taskContentResolver (trackerPrefix + a bounded invoke) — see
Capability manifest reference. execute-plan.md's
per-task loop calls gsd_run task resolve-content --plan <path> --task-id <tracker-id> --raw
directly, an unconditional, required subprocess invocation with a real, binding exit code —
never a prose-dispatched step/gate entry chosen from an activeHooks array.
This point always runs — there is no when config gate and no autonomous-mode elision. That is
deliberate, not an oversight: the twelve points above are best-effort prose dispatch, which
execute:task's hard-halt safety property cannot be built on top of (a missed dispatch is
indistinguishable from a legitimate resolver-empty fallback). See
ADR-3646 for the full rationale,
including why a kind: "gate" shape was rejected outright.