Files
msd-core/scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh
Tom Boucher 835dd6ab44 test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654)
* test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite

Adds `tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs` and a fixtures
directory at `tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/` covering the
attack classes enumerated in #3596:

  - Command substitution / backticks / heredoc payloads in workstream
    names — sentinel-file probes prove no shell is spawned, slugifier
    neutralises the input.
  - Path traversal through `--ws` and slash-bearing workstream names —
    rejected with structured `--json-errors` payload, no stack trace,
    no filesystem mutation outside the project root.
  - Fake `<system>` / `[SYSTEM]` / `<<SYS>>` / `[INST]` boundary tags —
    sanitizeForPrompt neutralises every form; structural negative
    property locked across all six styles in one place.
  - Zero-width / bidi-override codepoints — stripped per the documented
    codepoint set; asserted via codePoint inspection, not regex
    literals.
  - Hostile read of CONTEXT.md / PLAN.md / ROADMAP.md fixtures —
    `gsd-read-injection-scanner.js` surfaces the advisory; excluded
    paths and non-Read tools stay silent; malformed JSON does not
    crash the hook.
  - Hostile write of `.planning/` files — `gsd-prompt-guard.js` emits
    a `PreToolUse` advisory; non-Write/Edit tools stay silent.
  - Fake `ghp_*` / `sk-*` env tokens — never echoed in CLI stdout or
    stderr under hostile inputs; covered under
    `// allow-test-rule: structural-regression-guard` because the only
    way to assert byte-level absence is `.includes(token)` against the
    captured streams.
  - `validatePath`, `validateShellArg`, `validatePhaseNumber`,
    `validateFieldName` — focused negative-input contract pins.

Pinned behavior gaps (documented, NOT fixed in this PR):

  - `<instructions>` is intentionally whitelisted by both the scanner
    and the sanitiser (GSD's own prompt scaffolding). Two REGRESSION
    GUARD tests lock that contract.
  - The current `scanForInjection` does NOT flag malicious markdown
    links (javascript:/data:/embedded-credentials URLs). PINNED with
    negative-proof so any future scope extension fails the assertion
    and forces a deliberate update to the acceptance map.
  - `prompt-builder.ts` does not yet wrap plan/context markdown in an
    "untrusted data" envelope. That seam lives on the TS side and is
    covered by `sdk/src/prompt-builder.test.ts`; out of scope for a
    CJS test file. Mentioned in the file header.

Verification:

  - `node --test tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs` → 73 tests
    pass.
  - `node scripts/lint-no-source-grep.cjs` → 0 violations across
    546 test files (one `allow-test-rule: structural-regression-guard`
    annotation on this file for the token-absence assertions).
  - `node scripts/run-tests.cjs` → 9730 tests pass, 0 fail.

Refs #3596

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(3596): allow adversarial fixtures in scan + harden graphify status parse

* fix(3596): skip adversarial security fixtures in secret scan

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# prompt-injection-scan.sh — Scan files for prompt injection patterns
#
# Usage:
# scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh --diff origin/main # CI mode: scan changed .md files
# scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh --file path/to/file # Scan a single file
# scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh --dir agents/ # Scan all files in a directory
#
# Exit codes:
# 0 = clean
# 1 = findings detected
# 2 = usage error
set -euo pipefail
# ─── Patterns ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Each pattern is a POSIX extended regex. Keep alphabetized by category.
PATTERNS=(
# Instruction override
'ignore[[:space:]]+(all[[:space:]]+)?(previous|prior|above|earlier|preceding)[[:space:]]+(instructions|prompts|rules|directives|context)'
'disregard[[:space:]]+(all[[:space:]]+)?(previous|prior|above)[[:space:]]+(instructions|prompts|rules)'
'forget[[:space:]]+(all[[:space:]]+)?(previous|prior|above)[[:space:]]+(instructions|prompts|rules|context)'
'override[[:space:]]+(all[[:space:]]+)?(system|previous|safety)[[:space:]]+(instructions|prompts|rules|checks|filters|guards)'
'override[[:space:]]+(system|safety|security)[[:space:]]'
# Role manipulation
'you[[:space:]]+are[[:space:]]+now[[:space:]]+(a|an|my)[[:space:]]'
'from[[:space:]]+now[[:space:]]+on[[:space:]]+(you|pretend|act|behave)'
'pretend[[:space:]]+(you[[:space:]]+are|to[[:space:]]+be)[[:space:]]'
'act[[:space:]]+as[[:space:]]+(a|an|if|my)[[:space:]]'
'roleplay[[:space:]]+as[[:space:]]'
'assume[[:space:]]+the[[:space:]]+role[[:space:]]+of[[:space:]]'
# System prompt extraction
'output[[:space:]]+(your|the)[[:space:]]+(system[[:space:]]+)?(prompt|instructions)'
'reveal[[:space:]]+(your|the)[[:space:]]+(system[[:space:]]+)?(prompt|instructions)'
'show[[:space:]]+me[[:space:]]+(your|the)[[:space:]]+(system[[:space:]]+)?(prompt|instructions)'
'print[[:space:]]+(your|the)[[:space:]]+(system[[:space:]]+)?(prompt|instructions)'
'what[[:space:]]+(is|are)[[:space:]]+(your|the)[[:space:]]+(system[[:space:]]+)?(prompt|instructions)'
'repeat[[:space:]]+(your|the|all)[[:space:]]+(system[[:space:]]+)?(prompt|instructions|rules)'
# Fake message boundaries
'</?system>'
'</?assistant>'
'</?human>'
'\[SYSTEM\]'
'\[/SYSTEM\]'
'\[INST\]'
'\[/INST\]'
'<<SYS>>'
'<</SYS>>'
# Tool call injection / code execution in markdown
'eval[[:space:]]*\([[:space:]]*["\x27]'
'exec[[:space:]]*\([[:space:]]*["\x27]'
'Function[[:space:]]*\([[:space:]]*["\x27].*return'
# Jailbreak / DAN patterns
'do[[:space:]]+anything[[:space:]]+now'
'DAN[[:space:]]+mode'
'developer[[:space:]]+mode[[:space:]]+(enabled|output|activated)'
'jailbreak'
'bypass[[:space:]]+(safety|content|security)[[:space:]]+(filter|check|rule|guard)'
)
# ─── Allowlist ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Files that legitimately discuss injection patterns (security docs, tests, this script)
ALLOWLIST=(
'scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh'
'scripts/base64-scan.sh'
'scripts/secret-scan.sh'
'tests/security-scan.test.cjs'
'tests/security.test.cjs'
'tests/prompt-injection-scan.test.cjs'
'tests/verify.test.cjs'
'get-shit-done/bin/lib/security.cjs'
'hooks/gsd-prompt-guard.js'
'hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js'
'tests/read-injection-scanner.test.cjs'
'tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs'
'tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/'
'SECURITY.md'
)
is_allowlisted() {
local file="$1"
for allowed in "${ALLOWLIST[@]}"; do
if [[ "$file" == *"$allowed"* ]]; then
return 0
fi
done
return 1
}
# ─── File Collection ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
collect_files() {
local mode="$1"
shift
case "$mode" in
--diff)
local base="${1:-origin/main}"
# Get changed files in the diff, filter to scannable extensions
git diff --name-only --diff-filter=ACMR "$base"...HEAD 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '\.(md|cjs|js|json|yml|yaml|sh)$' || true
;;
--file)
if [[ -f "$1" ]]; then
echo "$1"
else
echo "Error: file not found: $1" >&2
exit 2
fi
;;
--dir)
local dir="$1"
if [[ ! -d "$dir" ]]; then
echo "Error: directory not found: $dir" >&2
exit 2
fi
find "$dir" -type f \( -name '*.md' -o -name '*.cjs' -o -name '*.js' -o -name '*.json' -o -name '*.yml' -o -name '*.yaml' -o -name '*.sh' \) \
! -path '*/node_modules/*' ! -path '*/.git/*' ! -path '*/dist/*' 2>/dev/null || true
;;
--stdin)
cat
;;
*)
echo "Usage: $0 --diff [base] | --file <path> | --dir <path> | --stdin" >&2
exit 2
;;
esac
}
# ─── Scanner ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
scan_file() {
local file="$1"
local found=0
if is_allowlisted "$file"; then
return 0
fi
for pattern in "${PATTERNS[@]}"; do
# Use grep -iE for case-insensitive extended regex
# -n for line numbers, -c for count mode first to check
local matches
matches=$(grep -inE -e "$pattern" "$file" 2>/dev/null || true)
if [[ -n "$matches" ]]; then
if [[ $found -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $file"
found=1
fi
echo "$matches" | while IFS= read -r line; do
echo " $line"
done
fi
done
return $found
}
# ─── Main ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
main() {
if [[ $# -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "Usage: $0 --diff [base] | --file <path> | --dir <path>" >&2
exit 2
fi
local mode="$1"
shift
local files
files=$(collect_files "$mode" "$@")
if [[ -z "$files" ]]; then
echo "prompt-injection-scan: no files to scan"
exit 0
fi
local total=0
local failed=0
while IFS= read -r file; do
[[ -z "$file" ]] && continue
total=$((total + 1))
if ! scan_file "$file"; then
failed=$((failed + 1))
fi
done <<< "$files"
echo ""
echo "prompt-injection-scan: scanned $total files, $failed with findings"
if [[ $failed -gt 0 ]]; then
exit 1
fi
exit 0
}
main "$@"