Files
msd-core/tests/secure-phase.test.cjs
Tom Boucher 463cffd894 chore(#604): rename get-shit-done/ runtime directory to gsd-core/ (#615)
* chore(#604): rename get-shit-done/ runtime directory to gsd-core/

Renames the installed runtime directory `get-shit-done/` to `gsd-core/` so the
on-disk name matches the package (`@opengsd/gsd-core`), repo, and binary
(`gsd-tools`). The npm package name and binary are unchanged; npx/npm consumers
are unaffected.

Mechanical (bulk, ~90% of the diff):
- `git mv get-shit-done gsd-core`
- Swept path/identifier references across the repo via
  `perl -pe 's/get-shit-done(?!-\w)/gsd-core/g'`. The negative lookahead
  preserves the five legitimate slug variants that are NOT the directory:
  get-shit-done-{OLD,cc,classic,cli,redux} (old package/repo names).
- Build/manifest wiring: package.json (bin, files, coverage globs),
  tsconfig.build.json (outDir), ~86 .gitignore build-output entries,
  stryker.config.mjs, scan-ignore files, install.js path strings.
- Frozen (not rewritten): CHANGELOG.md history; translated docs
  (README.<locale>.md and docs/{ja-JP,ko-KR,pt-BR,zh-CN}/).

New logic (review here):
- src/installer-migrations/003-rename-get-shit-done-to-gsd-core.cts: a proper
  ADR-0008 installer migration. On upgrade it walks the legacy
  `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` tree, classifies each file via the prior install
  manifest, and emits remove-managed / backup-and-remove for managed files
  while PRESERVING unknown user-added files. Symlink-safe (skips a symlinked
  root and symlinked entries; bounds-checks every path under configDir). The
  framework rolls back on install failure. Emptied dirs may remain (framework
  has no recursive dir-removal primitive) — documented.
- scripts/lint-legacy-dir-name.cjs: CI regression guard forbidding the bare
  `get-shit-done` directory token (split token to avoid self-match; case-
  insensitive; `(?!-\w)` lookahead allows the slug variants; allowlists
  CHANGELOG, translated docs, and `gsd-allow-legacy-name` marker lines).
  Wired into the lint-tests CI job.
- Restored scripts/lint-package-identity-drift.cjs detection regexes (the
  mechanical sweep had wrongly rewritten the old-name patterns it exists to
  detect) and marked them as intentional legacy references.
- TDD tests for the migration and the guard; do.md slash-command guard regex
  tightened so a `/gsd-core/bin` path segment is not mistaken for a command;
  changeset + docs/installer-migrations.md row added.

Breaking: the installed runtime path moves `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` ->
`~/.claude/gsd-core/`. Migration 003 removes the stale legacy dir's managed
files (preserving user files) on upgrade. Users with custom hooks/configs
hardcoding the old path must update them.

Closes #604

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): unsweep pending changesets + allowlist injection-example docs

CI fixes for the rename PR:
- Do not sweep pending .changeset/*.md (ephemeral release-note fragments,
  like CHANGELOG); reverted those body edits so 5 pre-existing malformed
  fragments (missing type/pr) no longer enter the PR diff and trip docs-lint.
  Allowlisted .changeset/ in the legacy-name guard accordingly.
- Allowlisted TEST-EXAMPLES.md and docs/explanation/security-model.md in
  prompt-injection-scan.sh: they contain intentional injection examples /
  security-model prose; the path-reference rewrites are kept.

CodeQL alerts on this PR are pre-existing (alert lines unchanged by this PR;
none in the new migration/guard) and are out of scope for the rename.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): resolve CodeQL alerts surfaced on this PR

The rename diff touched files carrying pre-existing CodeQL findings; per the
no-pre-existing-dismissal rule, fixing every surfaced alert rather than waving
them off. All behavior-preserving:

- scripts/ci-test-scope.cjs: build the config-path match from string
  .includes() instead of a RegExp over an arg-derived value (js/regex-injection).
- src/profile-output.cts: escape backslashes before pipe-escaping desc/safeName
  so the table-cell escape is complete (js/incomplete-sanitization).
- tests/{bug-2643,bug-2808,docs-parity-live-registry}: two-pass HTML-comment
  strip so a bare/unclosed `<!--` cannot survive (js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization).
- tests/inline-plan-threshold: drop the no-op `\s`->`\s` identity replace,
  keep the meaningful POSIX-class conversion (js/identity-replacement).

Verified: build:lib green; the touched test files + ci-test-scope + profile-output
suites pass; lint:legacy-name clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): correctly resolve remaining CodeQL alerts (regex-injection + sanitization)

The prior commit's fixes for two alerts were ineffective:
- ci-test-scope.cjs js/regex-injection: the alert is the CLI-arg-derived `file`
  reaching static regex `.test(file)` calls (not the config rule). Removed ALL
  regex over file/t — startsWith/includes/=== string checks + an isWindowsHint
  helper — so there is no regex sink for the tainted value.
- js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization (3 test files): a single
  `.replace(/<!--...-->/g,'')` can let `<!--` re-form. Replaced with a fixpoint
  loop (replace until stable) plus a final bare-opener strip.

Verified: no regex over file/t remains; ci-test-scope + the 3 test suites pass;
lint:legacy-name clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): make ci-test-scope + comment-strippers regex-free to clear CodeQL

CodeQL flags the regex PATTERNS syntactically (regex-injection on the
--files arg split; incomplete-multi-character-sanitization on the <!--...-->
replace), so loop fixes do not satisfy it. Made these paths regex-free:
- ci-test-scope.cjs splitFiles: char-by-char separator tokenizer (no /[,\\s]+/).
- 3 test files: indexOf/slice HTML-comment stripper (no .replace(/<!--/)).
Behavior preserved; ci-test-scope + the 3 suites pass; guard clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): unblock security base64 scan on the large rename diff

The security job hit its 10m timeout: base64-scan.sh choked on the binary
test fixture tests/feat-3594-parser-property-style.test.cjs (embedded NUL/
non-UTF8 bytes -> thousands of bogus blobs + "ignored null byte" warnings),
and the ~800-file rename diff is slow to scan regardless.

- scripts/base64-scan.sh: skip binary-by-content files (grep -Iq .) — they
  can't carry base64-obfuscated *text* and feeding NUL bytes through the
  per-line scanner is pathologically slow. collect_files already filtered
  binary *extensions*; this catches binary *content* in text extensions.
- .github/workflows/security-scan.yml: raise the security job timeout 10m->30m
  to accommodate very large diffs (the scan itself is unchanged).

Verified locally: scan skips the fixture, 0 "ignored null byte" warnings,
0 findings, exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): sweep get-shit-done refs introduced by merging next

The branch was updated with next (#614/#384/#618 etc.), which reference the
get-shit-done/ dir (still named that on next). Swept the stale references in
the merged files to gsd-core so the rename stays consistent and lint:legacy-name
passes:
- commands/gsd/discuss-phase.md (runtime-launcher shim paths)
- src/core.cts (getAgentsDir layout comments)
- tests/bug-384-agents-runtime-aware.test.cjs (require path to runtime lib)

Verified: guard 0 violations; build green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): exclude gsd-core/ path segments from bug-3683 command cross-ref invariant

The #614 runtime-launcher shim added to discuss-phase.md references
`${_GSD_RUNTIME_ROOT}/gsd-core/bin/...`. bug-3683's REF_PATTERN excluded path-y
refs only via lookbehind, but `}` precedes `/gsd-core/` in the shim, so it
mis-read the directory path as a dangling `/gsd-core` command ref (same class as
the #604 bug-2954 fix). Added a trailing `(?![\w-]*\/)` so `/gsd-<x>/...` path
segments are not treated as slash-command references.

Verified locally on BOTH platforms before pushing:
- mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures
- gsd-test-runner (linux, node22 image) full suite: 0 failures
- bug-3683 + bug-2954 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): lazily resolve findProjectRoot in gsd-tools (harden flaky CI)

CI intermittently failed state.test's gsd-tools subprocess with
"findProjectRoot is not a function" (flip-flopping across legs; not reproducible
on mac full suite, gsd-test linux full suite, test:unit, or state.test x8).
findProjectRoot is a re-export from core.cjs (sourced from project-root.cjs);
binding it via destructure at module-load can be undefined under a load-ordering
edge. Resolve it lazily at call time via a small wrapper so the lookup happens
after core.cjs is fully initialized.

Verified green on BOTH platforms before pushing:
- mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures
- gsd-test-runner (linux, node22) full suite: 0 failures
- state.test.cjs: 106/106; gsd-tools loads cleanly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): allowlist verification-patterns.md placeholder examples in secret scan

The rename git-mv'd references/verification-patterns.md into gsd-core/, pulling
it into the secret-scan diff. It documents stub/placeholder RED-FLAG env-var
examples (illustrative Stripe test-key / database-URL / API-key placeholders) —
not real credentials. Added it to .secretscanignore with the strict annotation,
mirroring the existing gsd-core/workflows/plan-phase.md exception.

Verified locally: secret-scan-lint --strict OK; secret-scan --diff origin/next
exits 0 with 0 findings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 18:35:29 -04:00

446 lines
16 KiB
JavaScript

// allow-test-rule: source-text-is-the-product
// Workflow .md / agent .md / command .md / reference .md files — their text
// IS what the runtime loads. Testing text content tests the deployed contract.
// Per CONTRIBUTING.md exception matrix.
/**
* GSD Secure-Phase Tests
*
* Validates the security-first enforcement layer:
* - gsd-security-auditor agent frontmatter and structure
* - secure-phase command file
* - secure-phase workflow file
* - SECURITY.md template
* - config.json security defaults
* - VALIDATION.md security columns
* - Threat-model-anchored behaviour (structural)
*/
const { test, describe } = require('node:test');
const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const REPO_ROOT = path.join(__dirname, '..');
const AGENTS_DIR = path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'agents');
const COMMANDS_DIR = path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'commands', 'gsd');
const WORKFLOWS_DIR = path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'gsd-core', 'workflows');
const TEMPLATES_DIR = path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'gsd-core', 'templates');
// ─── 1. Agent frontmatter — gsd-security-auditor.md ─────────────────────────
describe('SECURE: gsd-security-auditor agent', () => {
const agentPath = path.join(AGENTS_DIR, 'gsd-security-auditor.md');
test('agent file exists', () => {
assert.ok(
fs.existsSync(agentPath),
'gsd-security-auditor.md must exist in agents/'
);
});
test('has valid frontmatter with name, description, tools, color', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(agentPath, 'utf-8');
const frontmatter = content.split('---')[1] || '';
assert.ok(frontmatter.includes('name:'), 'missing name:');
assert.ok(frontmatter.includes('description:'), 'missing description:');
assert.ok(frontmatter.includes('tools:'), 'missing tools:');
assert.ok(frontmatter.includes('color:'), 'missing color:');
});
test('name is gsd-security-auditor', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(agentPath, 'utf-8');
const frontmatter = content.split('---')[1] || '';
assert.ok(
frontmatter.includes('name: gsd-security-auditor'),
'name must be gsd-security-auditor'
);
});
test('tools include Read, Write, Bash, Glob, Grep', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(agentPath, 'utf-8');
const requiredTools = ['Read', 'Write', 'Bash', 'Glob', 'Grep'];
for (const tool of requiredTools) {
assert.ok(
content.includes(`- ${tool}`),
`tools must include ${tool}`
);
}
});
test('has <role> section', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(agentPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(content.includes('<role>'), 'must have <role> section');
assert.ok(content.includes('</role>'), 'must close <role> section');
});
test('has <execution_flow> section', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(agentPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(content.includes('<execution_flow>'), 'must have <execution_flow> section');
assert.ok(content.includes('</execution_flow>'), 'must close <execution_flow> section');
});
test('has <structured_returns> with SECURED, OPEN_THREATS, ESCALATE', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(agentPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(content.includes('<structured_returns>'), 'must have <structured_returns> section');
assert.ok(content.includes('## SECURED'), 'must have SECURED return type');
assert.ok(content.includes('## OPEN_THREATS'), 'must have OPEN_THREATS return type');
assert.ok(content.includes('## ESCALATE'), 'must have ESCALATE return type');
});
test('has <success_criteria> section', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(agentPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(content.includes('<success_criteria>'), 'must have <success_criteria> section');
assert.ok(content.includes('</success_criteria>'), 'must close <success_criteria> section');
});
test('has READ-ONLY rule — does NOT modify implementation files', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(agentPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('READ-ONLY'),
'must contain READ-ONLY rule for implementation files'
);
});
});
// ─── 2. Command file — secure-phase.md ──────────────────────────────────────
describe('SECURE: secure-phase command file', () => {
const cmdPath = path.join(COMMANDS_DIR, 'secure-phase.md');
test('command file exists', () => {
assert.ok(
fs.existsSync(cmdPath),
'secure-phase.md must exist in commands/gsd/'
);
});
test('has valid frontmatter with name gsd:secure-phase', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(cmdPath, 'utf-8');
const frontmatter = content.split('---')[1] || '';
assert.ok(
frontmatter.includes('name: gsd:secure-phase'),
'name must be gsd:secure-phase'
);
});
test('has allowed-tools list', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(cmdPath, 'utf-8');
const frontmatter = content.split('---')[1] || '';
assert.ok(
frontmatter.includes('allowed-tools:'),
'must have allowed-tools in frontmatter'
);
});
test('contains reference to secure-phase.md workflow', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(cmdPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('secure-phase.md'),
'must reference secure-phase.md workflow'
);
});
test('has <objective> section mentioning states A, B, C', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(cmdPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(content.includes('<objective>'), 'must have <objective> section');
assert.ok(content.includes('(A)'), 'must mention state A');
assert.ok(content.includes('(B)'), 'must mention state B');
assert.ok(content.includes('(C)'), 'must mention state C');
});
});
// ─── 3. Workflow file — secure-phase.md ─────────────────────────────────────
describe('SECURE: secure-phase workflow file', () => {
const wfPath = path.join(WORKFLOWS_DIR, 'secure-phase.md');
test('workflow file exists', () => {
assert.ok(
fs.existsSync(wfPath),
'secure-phase.md must exist in gsd-core/workflows/'
);
});
test('contains gsd-security-auditor reference', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(wfPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('gsd-security-auditor'),
'must reference gsd-security-auditor agent'
);
});
test('contains threats_open enforcement logic', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(wfPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('threats_open'),
'must contain threats_open enforcement logic'
);
});
test('contains security_enforcement config check', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(wfPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('security_enforcement'),
'must check security_enforcement config setting'
);
});
test('contains SECURITY.md template reference', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(wfPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('SECURITY.md'),
'must reference SECURITY.md template'
);
});
test('has success_criteria section', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(wfPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('<success_criteria>'),
'must have <success_criteria> section'
);
assert.ok(
content.includes('</success_criteria>'),
'must close <success_criteria> section'
);
});
});
// ─── 4. SECURITY.md template ────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('SECURE: SECURITY.md template', () => {
const tplPath = path.join(TEMPLATES_DIR, 'SECURITY.md');
test('template exists', () => {
assert.ok(
fs.existsSync(tplPath),
'SECURITY.md must exist in gsd-core/templates/'
);
});
test('has YAML frontmatter with required fields', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(tplPath, 'utf-8');
const frontmatter = content.split('---')[1] || '';
const requiredFields = ['phase', 'slug', 'status', 'threats_open', 'asvs_level', 'created'];
for (const field of requiredFields) {
assert.ok(
frontmatter.includes(`${field}:`),
`frontmatter must have ${field}: field`
);
}
});
test('has ## Trust Boundaries section', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(tplPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('## Trust Boundaries'),
'must have ## Trust Boundaries section'
);
});
test('has ## Threat Register table with required columns', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(tplPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(content.includes('## Threat Register'), 'must have ## Threat Register section');
const requiredColumns = ['Threat ID', 'Category', 'Component', 'Disposition', 'Mitigation', 'Status'];
for (const col of requiredColumns) {
assert.ok(
content.includes(col),
`Threat Register table must have ${col} column`
);
}
});
test('has ## Accepted Risks Log section', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(tplPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('## Accepted Risks Log'),
'must have ## Accepted Risks Log section'
);
});
test('has ## Security Audit Trail section', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(tplPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('## Security Audit Trail'),
'must have ## Security Audit Trail section'
);
});
test('has sign-off checklist', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(tplPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('## Sign-Off'),
'must have ## Sign-Off section'
);
assert.ok(
content.includes('- [ ]'),
'sign-off must have checklist items'
);
});
test('threats_open field is present (terminal condition field)', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(tplPath, 'utf-8');
const frontmatter = content.split('---')[1] || '';
assert.ok(
frontmatter.includes('threats_open:'),
'threats_open must be present in frontmatter as terminal condition field'
);
});
});
// ─── 5. Config defaults ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('SECURE: config.json security defaults', () => {
const configPath = path.join(TEMPLATES_DIR, 'config.json');
test('config template exists', () => {
assert.ok(
fs.existsSync(configPath),
'config.json must exist in gsd-core/templates/'
);
});
test('has workflow.security_enforcement set to true', () => {
const config = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf-8'));
assert.strictEqual(
config.workflow.security_enforcement,
true,
'security_enforcement must default to true'
);
});
test('has workflow.security_asvs_level set to 1', () => {
const config = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf-8'));
assert.strictEqual(
config.workflow.security_asvs_level,
1,
'security_asvs_level must default to 1'
);
});
test('has workflow.security_block_on set to "high"', () => {
const config = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf-8'));
assert.strictEqual(
config.workflow.security_block_on,
'high',
'security_block_on must default to "high"'
);
});
test('security_enforcement appears after nyquist_validation (opt-out pattern parity)', () => {
const raw = fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf-8');
const nyquistPos = raw.indexOf('nyquist_validation');
const securityPos = raw.indexOf('security_enforcement');
assert.ok(nyquistPos > -1, 'nyquist_validation must exist in config');
assert.ok(securityPos > -1, 'security_enforcement must exist in config');
assert.ok(
securityPos > nyquistPos,
'security_enforcement must appear after nyquist_validation for opt-out pattern parity'
);
});
});
// ─── 6. VALIDATION.md template security columns ────────────────────────────
describe('SECURE: VALIDATION.md security columns', () => {
const valPath = path.join(TEMPLATES_DIR, 'VALIDATION.md');
test('VALIDATION.md template exists', () => {
assert.ok(
fs.existsSync(valPath),
'VALIDATION.md must exist in gsd-core/templates/'
);
});
test('contains Threat Ref column header', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(valPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('Threat Ref'),
'must have Threat Ref column in Per-Task Verification Map'
);
});
test('contains Secure Behavior column header', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(valPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('Secure Behavior'),
'must have Secure Behavior column in Per-Task Verification Map'
);
});
test('both columns appear in the Per-Task Verification Map table', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(valPath, 'utf-8');
// Find the table header row containing both columns
const lines = content.split('\n');
const headerLine = lines.find(
line => line.includes('Threat Ref') && line.includes('Secure Behavior')
);
assert.ok(
headerLine,
'Threat Ref and Secure Behavior must appear in the same table header row'
);
// Verify this is in the Per-Task Verification Map section
const mapIdx = content.indexOf('## Per-Task Verification Map');
const threatRefIdx = content.indexOf('Threat Ref');
assert.ok(mapIdx > -1, 'must have Per-Task Verification Map section');
assert.ok(
threatRefIdx > mapIdx,
'Threat Ref column must appear after Per-Task Verification Map heading'
);
});
});
// ─── 7. Threat-model-anchored behaviour (structural) ────────────────────────
describe('SECURE: threat-model-anchored behaviour', () => {
const agentPath = path.join(AGENTS_DIR, 'gsd-security-auditor.md');
const wfPath = path.join(WORKFLOWS_DIR, 'secure-phase.md');
test('agent does NOT contain "scan for vulnerabilities" (verifies, not scans)', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(agentPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
!content.toLowerCase().includes('scan for vulnerabilities'),
'agent must NOT scan for vulnerabilities — it verifies threat mitigations'
);
});
test('agent does NOT contain "find vulnerabilities" (verifies, not scans)', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(agentPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
!content.toLowerCase().includes('find vulnerabilities'),
'agent must NOT find vulnerabilities — it verifies threat mitigations'
);
});
test('agent contains mitigate, accept, transfer disposition types', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(agentPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(content.includes('mitigate'), 'must contain mitigate disposition');
assert.ok(content.includes('accept'), 'must contain accept disposition');
assert.ok(content.includes('transfer'), 'must contain transfer disposition');
});
test('agent contains OPEN and CLOSED status values', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(agentPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(content.includes('OPEN'), 'must contain OPEN status');
assert.ok(content.includes('CLOSED'), 'must contain CLOSED status');
});
test('workflow contains enforcing gate (threats_open + block pattern)', () => {
const content = fs.readFileSync(wfPath, 'utf-8');
assert.ok(
content.includes('threats_open'),
'workflow must reference threats_open for enforcement'
);
assert.ok(
content.includes('BLOCKED') || content.includes('blocked'),
'workflow must contain a blocking pattern when threats are open'
);
// Verify it does NOT emit next-phase routing when blocked
assert.ok(
content.includes('Do NOT emit next-phase routing'),
'workflow must explicitly prevent next-phase routing when blocked'
);
});
});