Files

Colin cd5db1f8db test(suites): seed security/slow/integration suites via measured retags

Renames (git mv) with all references updated (ci-test-scope RULES,
windows-parity allowlist, test-file-count allowlist, docs in 6 locales):

- 5 scanner tests -> *.security.test.cjs — the 'Run security tests' CI step
  ran zero files since the suite taxonomy landed; it is now honest.
- graphify-auto-update -> *.slow.test.cjs (36s, slowest file in the suite;
  e2e gsd-tools spawns) — runs on full-matrix lanes and push to next.
- installer-migration-install-integration -> *.integration.test.cjs
  (13s; an integration test by its own name).

Coverage gate measured after retags: 88.55% lines (gate 70%).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-06-09 23:50:41 -04:00

context-instruction-override.md

test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654 )

2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00

context-invisible-unicode.md

test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654 )

2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00

context-malicious-markdown-link.md

feat(113): detect javascript:/data:/userinfo/token-in-query in markdown links (#133 )

2026-05-23 10:15:03 -04:00

plan-fake-frontmatter.md

test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654 )

2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00

plan-fake-system-tags.md

test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654 )

2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00

README.md

test(suites): seed security/slow/integration suites via measured retags

2026-06-09 23:50:41 -04:00

roadmap-heredoc-breakout.md

test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654 )

2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00

README.md

Adversarial security fixtures (#3596)

Reusable hostile payloads consumed by tests/security-prompt-injection.security.test.cjs.

The fixtures here are pure data — they are loaded by the test as input to the production code under test (hooks, validators, sanitizers, CLI). They are not executed and contain no real secrets.

File	Attack class	Consumed by
`context-instruction-override.md`	Fake instruction override + role manipulation	gsd-read-injection-scanner.js, gsd-prompt-guard.js
`plan-fake-system-tags.md`	`<system>`/`<assistant>` boundary mimicry	sanitizeForPrompt, gsd-prompt-guard.js
`roadmap-heredoc-breakout.md`	Heredoc-shaped payload inside a planning doc	gsd-read-injection-scanner.js
`plan-fake-frontmatter.md`	Frontmatter fields that try to override intent	gsd-read-injection-scanner.js
`context-malicious-markdown-link.md`	Markdown links with `javascript:` and embedded creds	gsd-read-injection-scanner.js
`context-invisible-unicode.md`	Zero-width chars hiding instructions	gsd-read-injection-scanner.js, sanitizeForPrompt

The fake-token values used in CLI redaction probes (ghp_AAAA…, sk-AAAA…) are constructed inline by the test, not stored here, so an editor or grep that scans this directory does not surface plausible-looking credentials.