fix(classes): sanitize content_html with bluemonday instead of regex checks

- FormatHTML sanitizes the goldmark output with a bluemonday UGC policy extended only with what goldmark and the imported posts and categories use; unsafe markup is stripped, as Winter's Html::clean strips it - HTML the policy keeps whole is stored byte for byte (token comparison) - CheckHTML keeps its signature and 422 contract, refusing HTML the policy would change - the three regexes are gone: the CR-01 bypasses are neutralized and "Data:" or "metadata:" text is no longer refused (WR-01)
2026-10-09 23:35:23 +02:00
parent 03907ee387
commit a3551f2bdf
7 changed files with 367 additions and 73 deletions
--- a/classes/check_html_test.go
+++ b/classes/check_html_test.go
@@ -11,14 +11,29 @@ func TestCheckHTML(t *testing.T) {
 		{"empty", "", true},
 		{"heading and link", `<h2>Cordyceps</h2><p>Plain <a href="https://example.test/a">link</a></p>`, true},
 		{"table", `<table><thead><tr><th>A</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>`, true},
+		{"polish date label", `<p>Data: 12 maja 2024</p>`, true},
+		{"metadata text", `<p>Some metadata: here</p>`, true},
+		{"quotes, apostrophes and nbsp", `<h2>Co to jest Lion's Mane?&nbsp;</h2><p>"superior herb" &amp; inne</p>`, true},
+		{"pasted chat transcript", `<div data-message-author-role="assistant" data-message-id="cf51192a-db36-4816-8d29-b0606b53d289" dir="auto"><p>x</p></div>`, true},
 		{"script", `<script>alert(1)</script>`, false},
 		{"iframe", `<iframe src="https://example.test/"></iframe>`, false},
 		{"object", `<object data=x>`, false},
 		{"embed", `<embed src=x>`, false},
 		{"event handler", `<img src=x onerror="alert(1)">`, false},
+		{"event handler without a space", `<p><img src="x"onerror="alert(1)"></p>`, false},
+		{"slash-separated svg onload", "<div>\n<svg/onload=alert(1)>\n</div>", false},
 		{"javascript url", `<a href="javascript:alert(1)">`, false},
+		{"numeric entity colon", `<a href="javascript&#58;alert(1)">x</a>`, false},
+		{"named entity colon", `<a href="javascript&colon;alert(1)">x</a>`, false},
+		{"entity inside the scheme", `<a href="&#106;avascript:alert(1)">x</a>`, false},
+		{"tab inside the scheme", "<a href=\"java\tscript:alert(1)\">x</a>", false},
 		{"vbscript url mixed case", `<a href="VBScript:x">`, false},
 		{"data url", `<img src="">`, false},
+		{"base", `<base href="https://evil.test/">`, false},
+		{"meta refresh", `<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=https://evil.test">`, false},
+		{"form", `<form action="https://evil.test"><input type=password></form>`, false},
+		{"style element", `<style>p { color: red }</style>`, false},
+		{"comment", `<p>a</p><!-- hidden -->`, false},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -31,4 +46,16 @@ func TestCheckHTML(t *testing.T) {
 			}
 		})
 	}
+
+	// Every stored-XSS payload FormatHTML strips is refused by CheckHTML.
+	for _, tc := range unsafePayloads {
+		if tc.src[0] != '<' {
+			continue // markdown, not HTML
+		}
+		t.Run("payload "+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if err := CheckHTML(tc.src); err == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("CheckHTML(%q) = nil, want an error", tc.src)
+			}
+		})
+	}
 }
--- a/classes/format_html.go
+++ b/classes/format_html.go
@@ -2,14 +2,19 @@ package classes

 import (
 	"bytes"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"io"
 	"regexp"
+	"slices"
 	"strings"

+	"github.com/microcosm-cc/bluemonday"
 	"github.com/yuin/goldmark"
 	"github.com/yuin/goldmark/extension"
 	"github.com/yuin/goldmark/parser"
 	"github.com/yuin/goldmark/renderer/html"
+	xhtml "golang.org/x/net/html"
 )

 var (
@@ -17,49 +22,105 @@ var (
 		goldmark.WithExtensions(extension.Footnote, extension.Table),
 		goldmark.WithParserOptions(parser.WithAttribute()),
 		// Winter's Markdown::parse passes raw HTML through, so imported HTML
-		// bodies round-trip unchanged (D-03, PHP parity); rejectUnsafe gates
-		// the rendered result on every write path.
+		// bodies round-trip (D-03, PHP parity); htmlPolicy then sanitizes the
+		// rendered result on every write path.
 		goldmark.WithRendererOptions(html.WithUnsafe()),
 	)

-	markdownUnsafeTag    = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)<(?:script|iframe|object|embed)\b`)
-	markdownEventHandler = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\son[a-z]+\s*=`)
-	markdownDangerousURL = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(?:javascript|vbscript|data):`)
+	// htmlPolicy is the allow-list for stored journal HTML.
+	htmlPolicy = newHTMLPolicy()
 )

+// newHTMLPolicy extends bluemonday's UGC policy only with what goldmark
+// renders and what the imported posts and categories use.
+func newHTMLPolicy() *bluemonday.Policy {
+	p := bluemonday.UGCPolicy()
+	// Winter neither adds nor requires rel="nofollow", so links keep their
+	// stored form.
+	p.RequireNoFollowOnLinks(false)
+	// Imported author footers: <footer class=... itemscope itemtype=...>.
+	p.AllowElements("footer")
+	p.AllowAttrs("class").Matching(bluemonday.SpaceSeparatedTokens).Globally()
+	p.AllowAttrs("itemscope").Matching(regexp.MustCompile(`^(|itemscope)$`)).Globally()
+	p.AllowAttrs("itemtype").Matching(regexp.MustCompile(`^https?://schema\.org/[A-Za-z]+$`)).Globally()
+	p.AllowAttrs("itemprop").Matching(bluemonday.SpaceSeparatedTokens).Globally()
+	// Inline styles in imported footers and goldmark's table cell alignment.
+	// bluemonday validates each property value.
+	p.AllowStyles("color", "font-size", "font-weight", "text-align").Globally()
+	// goldmark's footnote markup.
+	p.AllowAttrs("role").Matching(regexp.MustCompile(`^doc-(noteref|endnotes|backlink)$`)).OnElements("a", "div")
+	// Pasted chat transcripts in imported category bodies: dir="auto" (the
+	// UGC policy allows only ltr and rtl) and two data attributes.
+	p.AllowAttrs("dir").Matching(regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)^(ltr|rtl|auto)$`)).Globally()
+	p.AllowAttrs("data-message-author-role", "data-message-id").
+		Matching(regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$`)).OnElements("div")
+	return p
+}
+
 // FormatHTML converts journal post markdown to stored HTML using goldmark
 // footnote, table, and attribute extensions. Raw HTML in the source passes
-// through unchanged; the result then goes through the same rejectUnsafe gate
-// as cabana.RenderMarkdown. It does not call cabana.RenderMarkdown, whose
-// admin preview stays without unsafe HTML.
+// through the renderer, as it does in Winter's Markdown::parse. The result is
+// then sanitized with a bluemonday allow-list that strips, as Winter's
+// Html::clean does, what it does not allow: script, style, iframe, object,
+// embed, form, base and meta elements, event handler attributes, and URLs
+// other than http, https, mailto and relative ones. HTML that the policy
+// keeps whole is returned byte for byte, so imported bodies round-trip. It
+// does not call cabana.RenderMarkdown, whose admin preview stays without
+// unsafe HTML.
 func FormatHTML(src string) (string, error) {
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	if err := markdownEngine.Convert([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(src)), &buf); err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("journal: markdown: %w", err)
 	}
-	out := buf.String()
-	if err := rejectUnsafe(out); err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
+	out, _ := sanitizeHTML(buf.String())
 	return out, nil
 }

-// CheckHTML applies the FormatHTML safety gate to HTML that is stored as is,
-// such as category content. It refuses raw script, iframe, object and embed
-// tags, event handler attributes and javascript, vbscript or data URL schemes.
+// CheckHTML gates HTML that is stored as is, such as category content. It
+// uses the FormatHTML allow-list but refuses instead of stripping: doc is
+// refused when the policy would remove or change any element, attribute or
+// text in it.
 func CheckHTML(doc string) error {
-	return rejectUnsafe(doc)
-}
-
-func rejectUnsafe(doc string) error {
-	if markdownUnsafeTag.MatchString(doc) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("journal: rendered HTML contains raw unsafe tags")
-	}
-	if markdownEventHandler.MatchString(doc) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("journal: rendered HTML contains event handlers")
-	}
-	if markdownDangerousURL.MatchString(doc) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("journal: rendered HTML contains a dangerous URL scheme")
+	if _, changed := sanitizeHTML(doc); changed {
+		return errors.New("journal: HTML contains elements, attributes or URLs that are not allowed")
 	}
 	return nil
 }
+
+// sanitizeHTML returns doc unchanged when htmlPolicy keeps all of it, and the
+// policy's output with changed set otherwise. Keeping all of it means doc and
+// the policy output tokenize to the same HTML tokens, so an output that only
+// re-escapes text or attribute values is not a change.
+func sanitizeHTML(doc string) (string, bool) {
+	clean := htmlPolicy.Sanitize(doc)
+	if clean == doc || sameTokens(doc, clean) {
+		return doc, false
+	}
+	return clean, true
+}
+
+// sameTokens reports whether a and b tokenize to the same sequence of HTML
+// tokens: type, tag name or decoded text, and the set of decoded attributes.
+func sameTokens(a, b string) bool {
+	ta, oka := htmlTokens(a)
+	tb, okb := htmlTokens(b)
+	return oka && okb && slices.Equal(ta, tb)
+}
+
+func htmlTokens(doc string) ([]string, bool) {
+	var out []string
+	z := xhtml.NewTokenizer(strings.NewReader(doc))
+	for {
+		tt := z.Next()
+		if tt == xhtml.ErrorToken {
+			return out, errors.Is(z.Err(), io.EOF)
+		}
+		t := z.Token()
+		attrs := make([]string, 0, len(t.Attr))
+		for _, a := range t.Attr {
+			attrs = append(attrs, a.Namespace+":"+a.Key+"="+a.Val)
+		}
+		slices.Sort(attrs)
+		out = append(out, fmt.Sprintf("%d|%s|%q", tt, t.Data, attrs))
+	}
+}
--- a/classes/format_html_test.go
+++ b/classes/format_html_test.go
@@ -3,76 +3,192 @@ package classes
 import (
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+
+	xhtml "golang.org/x/net/html"
 )

-// TestFormatHTMLRejectsUnsafeHTML substitutes JOURNAL-003/004 Twig XSS
-// templates (Phase 16). Script, iframe, event handlers, and javascript /
-// vbscript / data schemes must fail the reject gate. Footnotes and tables
-// from goldmark extensions still pass.
-func TestFormatHTMLRejectsUnsafeHTML(t *testing.T) {
+// unsafePayloads are the stored-XSS inputs FormatHTML and CheckHTML must
+// neutralize: the JOURNAL-003/004 Twig XSS templates (Phase 16) and the
+// regex-gate bypasses from the Phase 16.1 code review (CR-01).
+var unsafePayloads = []struct {
+	name string
+	src  string
+}{
+	{"script", "<script>alert(1)</script>"},
+	{"mixed-case script", "<ScRiPt>alert(1)</sCrIpT>"},
+	{"script inside an HTML block", "<div>\n<p>Intro</p>\n<script>alert(1)</script>\n</div>"},
+	{"script after markdown", "# Title\n\nText.\n\n<script src=\"https://evil.test/x.js\"></script>"},
+	{"iframe", `<iframe src="https://evil.test"></iframe>`},
+	{"upper-case iframe", `<IFRAME SRC="https://evil.test"></IFRAME>`},
+	{"object", `<object data="https://evil.test/x.swf"></object>`},
+	{"embed", `<embed src="https://evil.test/x.swf">`},
+	{"event", `<img src=x onerror="alert(1)">`},
+	{"svg onload", `<svg onload="alert(1)"><circle r="1"/></svg>`},
+	{"mixed-case event handler", `<p OnClick="alert(1)">Click</p>`},
+	{"event handler in an inline element", "Text with <span onmouseover=\"alert(1)\">hover</span>."},
+	{"event handler without a space", `<p><img src="x"onerror="alert(1)"></p>`},
+	{"slash-separated svg onload", "<div>\n<svg/onload=alert(1)>\n</div>"},
+	{"markdown attribute event handler", "# Title {onclick=\"alert(1)\"}"},
+	{"javascript", "[x](javascript:alert(1))"},
+	{"mixed-case javascript href", `<a href="JaVaScRiPt:alert(1)">x</a>`},
+	{"numeric entity colon", `<a href="javascript&#58;alert(1)">x</a>`},
+	{"named entity colon", `<a href="javascript&colon;alert(1)">x</a>`},
+	{"entity inside the scheme", `<a href="&#106;avascript:alert(1)">x</a>`},
+	{"tab inside the scheme", "<a href=\"java\tscript:alert(1)\">x</a>"},
+	{"newline inside the scheme", "<p><a href=\"java\nscript:alert(1)\">x</a></p>"},
+	{"leading space and control characters", "<p><a href=\" \x01javascript:alert(1)\">x</a></p>"},
+	{"mathml xlink href", "<div>\n<math><maction actiontype=statusline xlink:href=\"javascript&#58;alert(1)\">x</maction></math>\n</div>"},
+	{"vbscript", "[x](vbscript:msgbox(1))"},
+	{"raw vbscript href", `<a href="VBScript:msgbox(1)">x</a>`},
+	{"data", "[x](data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==)"},
+	{"raw data URL attribute", `<img src="">`},
+	{"markdown image with a data URL", "![x]()"},
+	{"base", `<base href="https://evil.test/">`},
+	{"meta refresh", `<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=https://evil.test">`},
+	{"form", `<form action="https://evil.test"><input type=password name=p><button formaction="javascript:alert(1)">go</button></form>`},
+	{"style element", "<style>body { background: url(https://evil.test/x) }</style>"},
+	{"link stylesheet", `<link rel="stylesheet" href="https://evil.test/x.css">`},
+	{"html comment", "<p>a</p><!-- <script>alert(1)</script> -->"},
+}
+
+// forbiddenElements must never appear in sanitized journal HTML.
+var forbiddenElements = map[string]bool{
+	"script": true, "iframe": true, "object": true, "embed": true, "base": true,
+	"meta": true, "form": true, "input": true, "button": true, "style": true,
+	"link": true, "svg": true, "math": true, "maction": true, "frame": true,
+	"frameset": true, "applet": true, "textarea": true, "select": true,
+}
+
+// assertNoActiveContent tokenizes doc and fails on forbidden elements, event
+// handler attributes, any style other than the allowed properties, and
+// javascript, vbscript or data URLs after entity decoding and after removing
+// ASCII whitespace and control characters, as a browser's URL parser does.
+func assertNoActiveContent(t *testing.T, doc string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	z := xhtml.NewTokenizer(strings.NewReader(doc))
+	for {
+		tt := z.Next()
+		if tt == xhtml.ErrorToken {
+			return
+		}
+		if tt == xhtml.CommentToken {
+			t.Fatalf("comment survived: %q", doc)
+		}
+		if tt != xhtml.StartTagToken && tt != xhtml.SelfClosingTagToken && tt != xhtml.EndTagToken {
+			continue
+		}
+		tok := z.Token()
+		if forbiddenElements[tok.Data] {
+			t.Fatalf("element <%s> survived: %q", tok.Data, doc)
+		}
+		for _, a := range tok.Attr {
+			key := strings.ToLower(a.Key)
+			if strings.HasPrefix(key, "on") {
+				t.Fatalf("event handler %s survived: %q", a.Key, doc)
+			}
+			if key == "action" || key == "formaction" || key == "srcdoc" || key == "http-equiv" {
+				t.Fatalf("attribute %s survived: %q", a.Key, doc)
+			}
+			var b strings.Builder
+			for _, r := range strings.ToLower(a.Val) {
+				if r > 0x20 {
+					b.WriteRune(r)
+				}
+			}
+			v := b.String()
+			for _, scheme := range []string{"javascript:", "vbscript:", "data:"} {
+				if strings.Contains(v, scheme) {
+					t.Fatalf("%s URL survived in %s: %q", scheme, a.Key, doc)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestFormatHTMLSanitizesUnsafeHTML pins CR-01: every payload is rendered
+// without an error and with all active content stripped, as Winter's
+// Html::clean strips rather than refuses. Footnotes and tables from goldmark
+// extensions still render.
+func TestFormatHTMLSanitizesUnsafeHTML(t *testing.T) {
 	html, err := FormatHTML("# Hello")
 	if err != nil || !strings.Contains(html, "<h1>") {
 		t.Fatalf("safe heading: html=%s err=%v", html, err)
 	}

-	table, err := FormatHTML("| a | b |\n| - | - |\n| 1 | 2 |")
+	table, err := FormatHTML("| a | b |\n|:- | -:|\n| 1 | 2 |")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("table markdown: %v", err)
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(table, "<table") {
-		t.Fatalf("table did not render: %s", table)
+	if !strings.Contains(table, "<table") || !strings.Contains(table, "text-align: right") {
+		t.Fatalf("table or its alignment did not render: %s", table)
 	}

 	fn, err := FormatHTML("See footnote.[^1]\n\n[^1]: note")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("footnote markdown: %v", err)
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(fn), "footnote") && !strings.Contains(fn, "<sup") {
-		t.Fatalf("footnote did not render: %s", fn)
+	for _, want := range []string{`<sup id="fnref:1">`, `href="#fn:1"`, `role="doc-noteref"`, `role="doc-endnotes"`, `role="doc-backlink"`} {
+		if !strings.Contains(fn, want) {
+			t.Fatalf("footnote lacks %s: %s", want, fn)
+		}
 	}

-	// With unsafe rendering the gate is the only defence, so every case
-	// must be refused with an error, not merely rendered harmless.
+	attrs, err := FormatHTML("# Title {#intro .lead}")
+	if err != nil || !strings.Contains(attrs, `<h1 id="intro" class="lead">Title</h1>`) {
+		t.Fatalf("markdown attributes: html=%s err=%v", attrs, err)
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range unsafePayloads {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			out, err := FormatHTML(tc.src)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("FormatHTML(%q) = %v, want sanitized output", tc.src, err)
+			}
+			assertNoActiveContent(t, out)
+		})
+	}
+
+	t.Run("safe parts of a payload survive", func(t *testing.T) {
+		out, err := FormatHTML(`<p>Zdjęcie: <img src="https://cdn.example.test/a.jpg" alt="a"onerror="alert(1)"></p>`)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if want := `<p>Zdjęcie: <img src="https://cdn.example.test/a.jpg" alt="a"></p>`; out != want {
+			t.Fatalf("got %q, want %q", out, want)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestFormatHTMLKeepsSchemeLikeText pins WR-01: text that merely contains
+// "data:", "javascript:" or "vbscript:" is not a URL and passes unchanged.
+func TestFormatHTMLKeepsSchemeLikeText(t *testing.T) {
 	cases := []struct {
-		name string
-		src  string
+		name, src, want string
 	}{
-		{"script", "<script>alert(1)</script>"},
-		{"mixed-case script", "<ScRiPt>alert(1)</sCrIpT>"},
-		{"script inside an HTML block", "<div>\n<p>Intro</p>\n<script>alert(1)</script>\n</div>"},
-		{"script after markdown", "# Title\n\nText.\n\n<script src=\"https://evil.test/x.js\"></script>"},
-		{"iframe", `<iframe src="https://evil.test"></iframe>`},
-		{"upper-case iframe", `<IFRAME SRC="https://evil.test"></IFRAME>`},
-		{"object", `<object data="https://evil.test/x.swf"></object>`},
-		{"embed", `<embed src="https://evil.test/x.swf">`},
-		{"event", `<img src=x onerror="alert(1)">`},
-		{"svg onload", `<svg onload="alert(1)"><circle r="1"/></svg>`},
-		{"mixed-case event handler", `<p OnClick="alert(1)">Click</p>`},
-		{"event handler in an inline element", "Text with <span onmouseover=\"alert(1)\">hover</span>."},
-		{"javascript", "[x](javascript:alert(1))"},
-		{"mixed-case javascript href", `<a href="JaVaScRiPt:alert(1)">x</a>`},
-		{"vbscript", "[x](vbscript:msgbox(1))"},
-		{"raw vbscript href", `<a href="VBScript:msgbox(1)">x</a>`},
-		{"data", "[x](data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==)"},
-		{"raw data URL attribute", `<img src="">`},
-		{"markdown image with a data URL", "![x]()"},
+		{"polish date label", "<p>Data: 12 maja 2024</p>", "<p>Data: 12 maja 2024</p>"},
+		{"markdown date label", "Data publikacji: 12 maja 2024", "<p>Data publikacji: 12 maja 2024</p>\n"},
+		{"metadata", "Some metadata: here", "<p>Some metadata: here</p>\n"},
+		{"big data in html", "<p>Big data: trends</p>", "<p>Big data: trends</p>"},
+		{"scheme names in prose", "<p>Pisze się javascript: i vbscript: w tekście.</p>", "<p>Pisze się javascript: i vbscript: w tekście.</p>"},
+		{"quotes and apostrophes", "<p>Lion's Mane, \"superior herb\" &amp; inne</p>", "<p>Lion's Mane, \"superior herb\" &amp; inne</p>"},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			out, err := FormatHTML(tc.src)
-			if err == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("FormatHTML accepted unsafe input %q: %s", tc.src, out)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("FormatHTML(%q): %v", tc.src, err)
 			}
-			if out != "" {
-				t.Fatalf("FormatHTML returned HTML with its error: %s", out)
+			if out != tc.want {
+				t.Fatalf("got %q, want %q", out, tc.want)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }

 // TestFormatHTMLKeepsRawHTML pins D-03: raw HTML in content passes through
-// unchanged, as Winter's Markdown::parse does, so an imported HTML body
-// survives an admin save, an import or an API write.
+// the renderer, as Winter's Markdown::parse does, and HTML the policy allows
+// is stored byte for byte, so an imported HTML body survives an admin save,
+// an import or an API write.
 func TestFormatHTMLKeepsRawHTML(t *testing.T) {
 	const paragraphs = "<p>Grzyby rosną w lesie.</p>\n<p>Druga <b>część</b>.</p>"
 	out, err := FormatHTML(paragraphs)
@@ -98,10 +214,13 @@ func TestFormatHTMLKeepsRawHTML(t *testing.T) {
 	}{
 		{"paragraphs", "<p>Pierwszy akapit.</p>\n<p>Drugi akapit z <em>kursywą</em>.</p>\n<p>Trzeci.</p>"},
 		{"class attributes", `<div class="post-body"><p class="lead">Wstęp</p></div>`},
-		{"https link", `<p>Zobacz <a href="https://example.test/grzyby?a=1" class="ext" target="_blank" rel="noopener">źródło</a>.</p>`},
+		{"https link", `<p>Zobacz <a href="https://example.test/grzyby?a=1" class="ext" title="Źródło">źródło</a>.</p>`},
+		{"relative and mailto links", `<p><a href="/blog/grzyby">blog</a> <a href="#przypisy">przypisy</a> <a href="mailto:kontakt@example.test">mail</a></p>`},
 		{"https image", `<p><img src="https://cdn.example.test/img/fungi.jpg" alt="Grzyby" width="640" height="480"></p>`},
-		{"entity in an attribute", `<p><a href="https://example.test/?a=1&amp;b=2" title="Tom &amp; Jerry &quot;quoted&quot;">link</a></p>`},
+		{"entity in an attribute", `<p><a href="https://example.test/?a=1&amp;b=2" title="Tom i Jerry">link</a> <img src="https://cdn.example.test/a.jpg?w=1&amp;h=2" alt="Tom i Jerry"></p>`},
 		{"table", "<table>\n<tr><td>A</td><td>B</td></tr>\n</table>"},
+		{"headings", "<h2>Co to jest Lion's Mane?</h2>\n<h3>Właściwości&nbsp;</h3>"},
+		{"pasted chat transcript", `<div data-message-author-role="assistant" data-message-id="a13366a9-f96b-4d6f-aaa5-0e433176381a" dir="auto"><p>Tekst</p></div>`},
 		{"surrounding whitespace", "\n\n  <p>Trimmed.</p>  \n"},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range bodies {
@@ -132,16 +251,53 @@ func TestFormatHTMLKeepsRawHTML(t *testing.T) {
 			"<strong>pogrubieniem</strong>",
 			`<a href="https://example.test">linkiem</a>`,
 			footer,
-			style,
 		} {
 			if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
 				t.Fatalf("output lacks %q:\n%s", want, out)
 			}
 		}
+		// The style element is stripped with its content, as Html::clean
+		// strips <style>.
+		if strings.Contains(out, "<style") || strings.Contains(out, ".source {") {
+			t.Fatalf("style element survived:\n%s", out)
+		}
 		if strings.Contains(out, "raw HTML omitted") {
 			t.Fatalf("goldmark placeholder in output: %s", out)
 		}
 	})
+
+	t.Run("imported author footer with microdata and inline styles", func(t *testing.T) {
+		src := "Tekst.\n\n<footer class=\"author-footer\" itemscope itemtype=\"https://schema.org/Person\">\n" +
+			"  <div class=\"author-info\">\n" +
+			"    <img src=\"https://cdn.example.test/autor.png\" alt=\"Autor\" class=\"author-photo\" itemprop=\"image\">\n" +
+			"    <div style=\"font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;\" itemprop=\"name\">Jan Kowalski</div>\n" +
+			"    <span style=\"color: #138c74;\" itemprop=\"jobTitle\">Ekspert</span>\n" +
+			"  </div>\n</footer>"
+		out, err := FormatHTML(src)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		for _, want := range []string{
+			`<footer class="author-footer" itemscope="" itemtype="https://schema.org/Person">`,
+			`<img src="https://cdn.example.test/autor.png" alt="Autor" class="author-photo" itemprop="image">`,
+			`<div style="font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold" itemprop="name">Jan Kowalski</div>`,
+			`<span style="color: #138c74" itemprop="jobTitle">Ekspert</span>`,
+		} {
+			if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
+				t.Fatalf("output lacks %q:\n%s", want, out)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("disallowed styles and attributes are stripped", func(t *testing.T) {
+		out, err := FormatHTML(`<p style="position: fixed; color: red" target="_blank" itemtype="https://evil.test/x">x</p>`)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if want := `<p style="color: red">x</p>`; out != want {
+			t.Fatalf("got %q, want %q", out, want)
+		}
+	})
 }

 // TestJournalEndToEnd keeps `go test ./... -run TestJournalEndToEnd`