Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jakub Zych
846087db45 fix: a /refresh carried by the auth.cookie session cookie rewrites that cookie, so an HttpOnly session survives the rotation
8e4b863 answered a cookie-carried refresh in the body only and blacklisted the old jti, so an HttpOnly cookie (golem15.sociallogin token_cookie) kept a dead token. Now the cookie named auth.cookie.name gets the rotated token and the body is {}; bearer and auth_token refreshes are unchanged, and refusals write no cookie.
2026-10-22 23:39:18 +02:00
Jakub Zych
8e4b863a3f fix: /fetch, /refresh, /update and /change-password accept the session cookies the jwt guard reads
The four routes (and the other signed-in routes through authenticate) read the bearer header, then the token and auth_token cookies, through classes.SessionToken and one cookie-aware guard.
A bearer header still wins and no credentials stays 401 with the old bodies.
A cookie-carried /refresh answers the rotated token in the body and writes no cookie.
2026-10-22 21:45:52 +02:00