Boot started a ticker goroutine inside lagoon.OnDatabase that nothing
stopped, so every booting process (serve, each console command, each test
boot) leaked one and swept the blacklist once per process. The sweep is
now the console command user:jwt-blacklist-sweep, which the conga
scheduler runs on the job worker every
golem15.user.jwt.blacklist_sweep_interval (default 10m, 0 for none), once
per period across instances. An interval the scheduler cannot run
(unparsable, negative, under 1s, not dividing 24h) now fails boot.
After the mailed code verifies, ActivateByCode consults the login gates
with source password, as Login does. A gate answer (for example a
second-factor challenge) replaces the token response and sets no session
cookie; a gate error answers the opaque 500. The account is activated
either way. Without a gate, or when every gate allows, the answer is
unchanged. With require_activation off an account can enable a second
factor before it activates, so the mailed code no longer stands in for it.
- preferred_locale and the request locale are normalised (comma lists,
q-weights, region subtags, case) to pl or en by NormalizeMailLocale, so a
raw Accept-Language such as en-GB,en;q=0.9 selects the -en templates
- new golem15.user.mail.fallback_locale (default pl) is used when neither
names a supported language; ResolveMailLocaleFor applies it, and Boot
rejects any value other than pl or en
- activate, reactivate and restore Polish templates get Polish subjects
- no template, route or payload changes; MailTemplate and
ResolveMailLocale keep their signatures
- A personal token keeps its scopes and its credential TokenID
- A write grant does not satisfy Implies read, and a present name is not duplicated
- Document Implies and the pact.MemberTokenScopeCatalog publish
A refusal by user.scope:<scope> now answers 403 with missing_scope and a
refusal by user.permission:<code> with missing_permission, next to the
unchanged error (true) and message, so a plain-HTTP script or a personal
token client learns what it lacks. user_me says it needs scope read.
MCPUserGuard.MCPDispatch now sets the in-memory credential's ID to the
subject's TokenID when the subject came from a personal usr_ token (no
ClientID), so a handler running under MCP dispatch can record which
token made a change. An OAuth subject's TokenID names the OAuth
server's token row, so its credential keeps ID 0. The credential is
still never saved.
golem15.user.device_auth.auth_url gains a {short_code} placeholder and
defaults to {frontend_url}/device/scan/{short_code}; POST
/devices/authorize accepts the short code in its token field, so a scan
page that posts what its URL carries keeps working. The status poll hands
the session token over only to a client with the User-Agent the device
initiated with; another client sees the session confirmed and takes
nothing.
The device hand-over now refuses a session authorized before the user's
tokens_valid_after, and every AccessRevokedEvent revokes the user's
pending and confirmed device sessions inside the write's transaction
(classes.RevokeDeviceSessions).
Resetting the second factors of a privileged-group member now needs
golem15.users.manage_privileged_groups, as changing their password or
deleting them does; without it the action answers 403 before Reset.
The revoke now reads the device's jti with UPDATE ... RETURNING under the
row lock, and the refresh's hand-over (classes.FollowDeviceJTI) reports a
session revoked meanwhile, so the refresh answers the blacklisted-token
401 without a token. A hand-over error fails the refresh closed instead
of leaving the session on a stale jti.
- TestLoginGates: registry order, first result or error wins, nil gates,
concurrent Add and Check, CheckLoginGates without a registry
- TestLoginGateOrder: refused first factors never reach a gate, rehash
before a challenge, restore and reactivate mail only after the gates,
gate answers pass through, refresh never asks a gate
- TestPasswordChangedSources: reset, change and admin set fire once inside
the write's transaction; rehash and registration fire none
- TestResetTwoFactorAction: offered only with a service and a factor,
danger, permission, transaction and rollback
GET /devices lists the caller's confirmed and used device sessions (PHP's
fields, device_name from the stored name or the user agent, is_current
for the session the request's token belongs to). DELETE /devices/{id}
marks the session revoked and blacklists the device token's jti for its
whole refresh window in one transaction. POST /refresh hands a used
session's jwt_jti over to the refreshed token (classes.HandOverDeviceJTI),
so a device that refreshed before the revoke is signed out too.
PHP's device flow on golem15_user_device_auth_sessions (PHP's columns,
the token stored as its SHA-256, plus jwt_jti): POST /devices/initiate
answers a 64-character token, an XXXX-XXXX short code, the configurable
auth_url (golem15.user.device_auth.auth_url) and the expiry; a signed-in
user authorizes it with POST /devices/authorize (short_code or token,
one guarded pending-to-confirmed UPDATE); the device's first poll of
GET /devices/status/{token} after that receives a session JWT through one
guarded confirmed-to-used UPDATE, so exactly one poll gets it. Used and
revoked sessions never turn into expired; each initiate deletes a bounded
batch of stale sessions.
The D-07 password-change hook is the existing AccessRevokedEvent, fired
inside the write's transaction by a reset, the user's own change and an
administrator's password; (*AccessRevokedEvent).PasswordChanged reports
those three reasons, and the login rehash fires nothing.
The Users screen declares the record action reset_two_factor (danger)
behind the new permission golem15.users.reset_two_factor, which no role
has by default. It is offered only when a two-factor plugin publishes a
classes.TwoFactorAdmin and the user has a second factor; Run calls the
service's Reset in the action's transaction.
Register publishes a *classes.LoginGates registry. POST /login consults
it through controllers.CheckLoginGates after the password, activation and
throttle checks and the bcrypt rehash, and before the restore of a
deactivated account, last_seen and the mint: a gate result replaces the
token response, a gate error answers the opaque 500. The restore and its
reactivate mail now run after the gates, so a password alone cannot
reactivate an account a second factor protects. Without a gate /login
answers as before; refresh never consults the gates.
classes.LoginEvent (golem15.user.login) fires after every password login
that minted a token; controllers.FireLoginEvent lets other plugins fire it.
TestOrganisationLogo asserted only that the system_files rows go; it now
also waits for the commit and asserts the logo's and avatar's originals and
thumbnails are gone from the bucket. The Postgres tests of the gap closure
call t.Skip under -short instead of returning, so -short runs report them
as skipped, not passed.
When the thumbnail fails, AvatarURL and OrganisationLogoURL answered
"/" + the blob key, which skips storage.uploads.public_path_prefix and
public_url (a 404 with the WinterCMS layout). They now answer the
original's attach.File.URL.
readFields falls back to r.Form, which includes the query string, so
POST /backend-link/show?code=... and /confirm?code=... worked and put the
code into access logs. Both routes now read the code from the body only
(JSON or a form body).
ChangePassword fired the access-revoked event with Before = the calling
session's iat, so an OAuth/MCP grant whose client refreshed it after that
instant kept working. Before is now the instant of the request; the stored
tokens_valid_after still keeps the calling session.
- TestMemberTokenScopes walks E-2's acceptance list item by item, plus the
per-application catalog and the legacy MintAPIToken fallback;
TestMemberTokenScopesBoot (no Docker) the boot refusals
- TestBackendLinkAuthTime (C-CR-02), TestBackendLinkShowPost (C-WR-01,
C-IN-06), TestAccessRevocation (C-CR-01), TestUserMCPGuardClientIP
(C-IN-04), TestAPITokenRevokeEvent (C-IN-02), TestOrganisationLogo (E-1)
- README Testing section names them
The Organisations screen's delete left the organisation's system_files
rows and blobs behind. FormBeforeDelete now deletes them in the delete's
transaction (attach.DeleteForOwner) and removes the blobs once it
commits, as the user delete does.
- Organisation gains the public attachOne logo (OrganisationLogoField),
editable as an image upload on the Organisations form; avatar unchanged
- OrganisationLogoURL and OrganisationLogoFields give applications the
has_logo, logo and logo_url keys for their organisation payloads
- no migration: attachments live in system_files
- CompileAPITokenScopes builds the catalog from the built-ins and the
activated plugins' declarations; a bad name, a redeclared built-in, a
duplicate, an empty label or a missing phrase key fails boot
- POST /tokens, user:token:create and MintAPITokenFor check the
application's own catalog (422 text unchanged); MintAPIToken keeps its
signature with a process-wide fallback for declared scopes
- GET /_user/api/v1/tokens/scopes lists the built-ins and the declared
scopes with translated labels
- built-in scope labels in en and pl; TestMemberTokenScopesSmoke
- AccessRevokedEvent and FireAccessRevoked: fired in the write's transaction
by the ban action (newly banned users only), the password reset, an
administrator setting a password and the self-service password change;
a revoked subject event per user after commit
- LinkedBackendUser answers no administrator for a banned user
- FireSubjectEvent / FireSubjectEventAfterCommit carry TokenID or ClientID;
DELETE /tokens/{id} ends only that token's MCP sessions
- the MCP personal-token path stamps last_used_ip from towel.ClientIP
- BackendLinksFor replaces the duplicate lookups; requestUsable uses
IsUsableAt
- BackendLinkConfirm reads the session's auth_time (bouncer.VerifyAuthTime);
a token without it, or a refreshed old session, answers 409 stale_session
- POST /_user/api/v1/backend-link/show takes the code in the body; GET
/backend-link/{code} stays, deprecated; both answer Cache-Control no-store
- My account answers <frontend_url><page_path>#code=<code>; new key
golem15.user.backend_links.page_path (default /link-admin)
- TestBackendLink now crafts auth_time tokens; TestBackendLinkAuthTimeSmoke
The key defaults to true, so the route table is unchanged. False skips only
those three registrations: they get the router's own 404, with no custom
handler and no framework change. /register keeps allow_registration and the
turnstile guard. The key is read at boot, and a value other than true or
false fails boot like golem15.user.turnstile.
Default off, so body-token clients are unchanged. When on, the cookie carries the auth.cookie attributes via bouncer.LoadCookieConfig and the body keeps user (and message); SameSite stays Lax, with no CSRF token; personal API tokens are untouched.
8e4b863 answered a cookie-carried refresh in the body only and blacklisted the old jti, so an HttpOnly cookie (golem15.sociallogin token_cookie) kept a dead token. Now the cookie named auth.cookie.name gets the rotated token and the body is {}; bearer and auth_token refreshes are unchanged, and refusals write no cookie.
Behind a reverse proxy every visitor had the proxy's RemoteAddr, so one client's failed logins locked the account for all. The throttle key is now surf.ClientIP with http.trusted_proxies, the expression /register uses; X-Forwarded-For from an untrusted peer is still ignored. RemoteIP is unchanged.
Boot runs before summer serve publishes the database, so the plugin's GORM
hooks, the Postgres jwt_blacklist store and its sweep now go through
lagoon.OnDatabase, and the jwt guard resolves the published store on every
request. A logged-out token is refused on jwt.auth, /fetch and /refresh.
The jwt guard reads the cookie names from classes.SessionCookieNames().
The four routes (and the other signed-in routes through authenticate) read the bearer header, then the token and auth_token cookies, through classes.SessionToken and one cookie-aware guard.
A bearer header still wins and no credentials stays 401 with the old bodies.
A cookie-carried /refresh answers the rotated token in the body and writes no cookie.
The refusal is the same 401 invalid-login answer as a wrong password and is counted by the login throttle.
The activation is checked after the password and before the deactivation restore, so a refused account stays deactivated.
require_activation false keeps the previous behaviour.
POST /logout read the token from the Authorization header only, while the
jwt guard also accepts the token and auth_token cookies. A session carried
by a cookie (golem15.sociallogin's token_cookie sets an httpOnly one that
the browser cannot turn into a bearer header) was answered 401, nothing was
revoked and the cookie kept authenticating jwt.auth routes until the access
token expired (golem15.user.jwt.ttl, 60 minutes). Logout never cleared a
cookie either, and it and EndRequestSession kept the jwt_blacklist row only
until the access token's exp, so once the sweep removed the row POST
/refresh revived the logged-out token for the rest of its refresh window.
classes.EndSession, which Logout now runs, revokes every session token the
request carries (the bearer header, the token and auth_token cookies) that
verifies, an expired one too while it could still be refreshed, until the
later of exp and iat plus refresh_ttl, plus a minute, as bouncer.Refresh
and the admin logout do. The answer, a 401 included, expires the
auth.cookie token cookie and any other session cookie the request carries,
with that cookie's path, domain, SameSite and Secure. EndRequestSession is
its best-effort form. Response bodies are unchanged; an expired but still
refreshable token now logs out with 200 instead of 401.
The members relation manager and the organisation field of the Users form
declare cabana ClearOnChange on organisation_role: adding or removing a
member, and a form save that moves a user to another organisation or to
none, clear the role unless the same save writes it. Needs a SummerCMS
release with ClearOnChange.
classes.RevokeUserAccess stamps users.tokens_valid_after (whole seconds) and
revokes the users' personal API tokens; DeactivateUsers and BanUsers call
it for every selected user. Restore and unban revive nothing, and a
deactivated user who signs in again gets a fresh working token.
POST /refresh now loads the token's subject after bouncer.Refresh and
refuses a missing, deactivated or banned user and a token issued before
tokens_valid_after with the existing 401 body; a refused refresh stamps no
last_seen. Suspension is deliberately not checked.
User.RegisterFillable lists what a registration body may set: name,
surname, email, password, preferred_locale and marketing_consent.
RegisterUser fills from it instead of Fillable, so organisation_id,
organisation_role, is_onboarded and must_change_password can no longer be
mass-assigned through POST /register, and created_ip_address and
last_ip_address come only from RegisterOptions.IP. Fillable is unchanged
for the admin form and trusted application code.
Every command gets long help and examples, descriptions in imperative
sentence case, and a warn-only TestCommandsDocumented over bonfire.CheckDocs.
The plugin logs through a diary component logger instead of the process
default logger. Requires SummerCMS v0.4.0; command names and flags unchanged.
user:token:create and user:token:list gain --json, user:backfill-handles a
progress bar; planning IDs leave the descriptions.
- /update clears email_verified_at in the same write when the email changes (case-only changes keep it)
- the admin Users form clears it in FormBeforeUpdate; storedEmail helper shared with guardCredentials
- README: the proof follows the address, never mass-assigned, no backfill
- additive migration 202610210001_add_users_email_verified_at (ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS, no backfill, no-op rollback)
- User.EmailVerifiedAt (json:"-", not fillable)
- VerifyActivationCode and ResetPassword stamp it in the write that activates or stores the password
- without a published *gorm.DB the command opens one with lagoon.OpenFromApp
for its run and closes it, as the plugin's other commands do (withDB)
- TestBackfillHandlesOpensFromConfigWhenUnpublished; README CLI note
- OAuthIdentitiesDestroy locks the users row (SELECT ... FOR UPDATE) and runs
the PHP guarded DELETE in one transaction: a self-set password or another
identity allows the unlink; otherwise 409 with the unchanged body
- the default allow-list adds microsoft, and an OAuthProviderSource's known
names are used when the host passes no Providers
- TestOAuthIdentitiesDestroyLastIdentityWithPassword (204),
TestOAuthIdentitiesDestroyConcurrentSmoke; README
- gofmt of the forgotPasswordBody line touched in the previous commit
- classes.OAuthProvider and classes.OAuthProviderSource; GET /oauth-providers
looks the source up per request and keeps the empty body without one
- exported RegistrationSettings, RegistrationsFromIP, RefreshTTL, RemoteIP
- RegisterOptions.PasswordLess (has_self_set_password=false) and FinishLogin
(restore + reactivate mail, last_ip_address, last_seen; no event)
- TestOAuthProvidersSourceSmoke, TestSocialHooksSmoke; README