Boot started a ticker goroutine inside lagoon.OnDatabase that nothing
stopped, so every booting process (serve, each console command, each test
boot) leaked one and swept the blacklist once per process. The sweep is
now the console command user:jwt-blacklist-sweep, which the conga
scheduler runs on the job worker every
golem15.user.jwt.blacklist_sweep_interval (default 10m, 0 for none), once
per period across instances. An interval the scheduler cannot run
(unparsable, negative, under 1s, not dividing 24h) now fails boot.
The refusal is the same 401 invalid-login answer as a wrong password and is counted by the login throttle.
The activation is checked after the password and before the deactivation restore, so a refused account stays deactivated.
require_activation false keeps the previous behaviour.
- permissions (the four Winter codes and manage_privileged_groups),
the user navigation item and the embedded admin YAML
- Users controller: list with deactivated users, row states, the
groups, created date and activated filters, and the form's name,
surname and email
- a member of a group in golem15.user.privileged_groups (default
admin) keeps their email, password and row unless the administrator
holds golem15.users.manage_privileged_groups; the refusal is a 403
that saves nothing
Prefix replacement of the old application-nested module path in go.mod
and every import. No identifier, string, table, migration ID, config key
or comment changes.
Match PHP payloads, already-activated Winter 500 HTML, and direct-DB
seeding so the corpus can flip those routes to ported without onboarding.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Wire the user API session loop to the JWT blacklist and a pre-password throttle gate so a logged-out token cannot be fetched again.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>