fix(32.2): WR-06 check the consent provider's redirect against the request's redirect URI

cabana loads the pending request on both decisions and refuses (500) a Decide answer whose scheme, user info, host, path or opaque part differ from the registered redirect URI. The admin SPA also refuses blob:, file:, about: and filesystem: and a destination that does not return to the host the consent card showed. Regenerated the admin OpenAPI document and rebuilt modules/boardwalk/dist.
This commit is contained in:
Jakub Zych
2026-11-21 09:32:54 +01:00
parent 60bc6ee68f
commit 0ade662a04
17 changed files with 212 additions and 49 deletions

View File

@@ -5316,7 +5316,7 @@
]
},
"post": {
"description": "Allows or denies a pending MCP authorization request for the signed-in admin and answers the client redirect URI. Submitted scopes that were not requested or that the admin cannot grant are dropped, * collapses as for personal tokens, and 422 no_grantable_scopes answers when nothing is left. Needs X-Requested-With; the body is capped at 16 KiB and unknown fields are refused (400). Personal API tokens are refused (403 interactive_only).",
"description": "Allows or denies a pending MCP authorization request for the signed-in admin and answers the client redirect URI. Submitted scopes that were not requested or that the admin cannot grant are dropped, * collapses as for personal tokens, and 422 no_grantable_scopes answers when nothing is left. Both decisions load the request first; a provider redirect that does not go back to the request's redirect URI (same scheme, host and path) is refused (500). Needs X-Requested-With; the body is capped at 16 KiB and unknown fields are refused (400). Personal API tokens are refused (403 interactive_only).",
"parameters": [
{
"description": "Pending request id",

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@@ -1705,7 +1705,7 @@ export interface paths {
put?: never;
/**
* Allow or deny an MCP consent request
* @description Allows or denies a pending MCP authorization request for the signed-in admin and answers the client redirect URI. Submitted scopes that were not requested or that the admin cannot grant are dropped, * collapses as for personal tokens, and 422 no_grantable_scopes answers when nothing is left. Needs X-Requested-With; the body is capped at 16 KiB and unknown fields are refused (400). Personal API tokens are refused (403 interactive_only).
* @description Allows or denies a pending MCP authorization request for the signed-in admin and answers the client redirect URI. Submitted scopes that were not requested or that the admin cannot grant are dropped, * collapses as for personal tokens, and 422 no_grantable_scopes answers when nothing is left. Both decisions load the request first; a provider redirect that does not go back to the request's redirect URI (same scheme, host and path) is refused (500). Needs X-Requested-With; the body is capped at 16 KiB and unknown fields are refused (400). Personal API tokens are refused (403 interactive_only).
*/
post: {
parameters: {

View File

@@ -188,7 +188,41 @@ function scopeDisabled(name: string): boolean {
return starChecked.value && name !== '*'
}
/** The server-issued redirect, refused when its scheme could run script (T-32.2-09). */
/** Schemes a consent redirect never uses: script, inline content and local files. */
const FORBIDDEN_PROTOCOLS = new Set(['javascript:', 'data:', 'vbscript:', 'blob:', 'file:', 'about:', 'filesystem:'])
/**
* Whether url returns to the place the consent screen showed: the
* redirect host (with its port) for a URI with a host, or the URI without
* query and fragment for one without (a custom scheme). Both sides go
* through the URL parser, so case and default ports compare as the browser
* sees them.
*/
function returnsTo(url: URL, host: string): boolean {
if (host === '') {
return false
}
try {
if (url.host !== '') {
return new URL(`${url.protocol}//${host}`).host === url.host
}
const want = new URL(host)
const got = new URL(url.href)
for (const u of [want, got]) {
u.search = ''
u.hash = ''
}
return want.href === got.href
} catch {
return false
}
}
/**
* The server-issued redirect, refused when its scheme could run script or
* open local content, or when it leaves for another place than the one the
* screen named (T-32.2-09).
*/
function safeDestination(uri: string): string | null {
let url: URL
try {
@@ -196,7 +230,7 @@ function safeDestination(uri: string): string | null {
} catch {
return null
}
if (url.protocol === 'javascript:' || url.protocol === 'data:' || url.protocol === 'vbscript:') {
if (FORBIDDEN_PROTOCOLS.has(url.protocol) || !returnsTo(url, redirectHost.value)) {
return null
}
return uri

View File

@@ -258,13 +258,22 @@ describe('no auto-allow and the decision navigation (UI backstop)', () => {
expect(wrapper.find('[data-action="allow"]').exists()).toBe(false)
expect(document.activeElement).toBe(card.find('h1').element)
const custom = await open('/connect?request=req1', routes(consentView(), ok({ redirect_uri: 'myagent:/callback?code=1' })))
const customView = consentView({ client: { id: 'client-1', name: 'Acme Agent', redirect_host: 'myagent:/callback', logo_url: '' } })
const custom = await open('/connect?request=req1', routes(customView, ok({ redirect_uri: 'myagent:/callback?code=1' })))
await custom.wrapper.find('[data-connect-state="ready"]').trigger('submit')
await flushPromises()
expect(assign).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith('myagent:/callback?code=1')
const returning = custom.wrapper.find('[data-connect-state="returning"]')
expect(returning.find('[data-connect-continue]').exists()).toBe(false)
expect(returning.find('h1').text()).toBe('Returning to agent.example.test')
expect(returning.find('h1').text()).toBe('Returning to myagent:/callback')
})
it('leaves for a redirect whose host matches the shown one as the browser compares hosts', async () => {
const view = consentView({ client: { id: 'client-1', name: 'Acme Agent', redirect_host: 'Agent.Example.Test:443', logo_url: '' } })
const { wrapper } = await open('/connect?request=req1', routes(view))
await wrapper.find('[data-connect-state="ready"]').trigger('submit')
await flushPromises()
expect(assign).toHaveBeenCalledWith(REDIRECT)
})
it('disables both buttons and the scopes while a decision is in flight', async () => {
@@ -290,7 +299,21 @@ describe('no auto-allow and the decision navigation (UI backstop)', () => {
})
describe('submit failures', () => {
it.each(['javascript:alert(1)', 'data:text/html,<script>x</script>', 'vbscript:msgbox(1)', 'JavaScript:alert(1)', 'not a uri'])(
it.each([
'javascript:alert(1)',
'data:text/html,<script>x</script>',
'vbscript:msgbox(1)',
'JavaScript:alert(1)',
'not a uri',
'blob:https://agent.example.test/0b7c',
'file:///etc/passwd',
'about:blank',
'filesystem:https://agent.example.test/temporary/x',
'https://evil.example.test/callback?code=abc123',
'https://agent.example.test.evil.example/callback?code=abc123',
'https://agent.example.test:8443/callback?code=abc123',
'myagent:/callback?code=1',
])(
'treats the redirect %j as a submit failure',
async (uri) => {
const { wrapper, push, replace } = await open('/connect?request=req1', routes(consentView(), ok({ redirect_uri: uri })))