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+---
+phase: "12.1"
+slug: "user-plugin-admin-screens"
+status: verified
+# threats_open = count of OPEN threats at or above workflow.security_block_on severity (the blocking gate)
+threats_open: 0
+asvs_level: 1
+block_on: high
+register_authored_at_plan_time: true
+created: "2026-10-12"
+---
+
+# Phase 12.1 — Security
+
+> Per-phase security contract: threat register, accepted risks, and audit trail.
+
+The detailed evidence (production code, named tests, 27 removal checks, the T-12-18 write-path review, the D-30 boundary and five findings for decision) is in `12.1-SECURITY-REVIEW.md` (2026-10-05). This file is the contract summary; its register was re-checked against the tree on 2026-10-12, after phases 13 to 17 had landed.
+
+Repositories: `summercms.go` (framework: `modules/cabana`, `admin/src`) and sm-user-plugin (mounted at `fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/user`).
+
+---
+
+## Trust Boundaries
+
+| Boundary | Description | Data Crossing |
+|----------|-------------|---------------|
+| Admin browser → admin API (bulk and record action routes, save bodies) | Untrusted ids, action names, field values, virtual values, permission maps and relation ids; cookie auth needs the CSRF header | admin input, privileged writes |
+| cabana → plugin hooks, actions and providers | The framework hands over only records loaded through the controller's scope and only validated values | records, virtual values |
+| Plugin code and partials → admin browser | Action labels, confirm texts, messages, row states and the status hint are rendered in the SPA | display text |
+| Admin with the users permission → frontend accounts, including privileged-group members | Activate, ban, password, email, delete; membership of a privileged group makes a site admin | credentials, privilege |
+| Backend admin → users_groups and user_groups codes | The user form's groups field and group codes decide who is a site admin | privilege |
+| User plugin → user API payloads | New model fields must not reach the Nuxt contract | PII, permissions, groups |
+| Plugin → mail transport | An admin-triggered invitation leaves the system | email |
+| Repositories → consumers (tag v0.1.3, shared plugin push) | A tag or push publishes the contract, migrations and permission codes | release |
+| Test evidence → release decision | The gate's result is what the phase is verified against | — |
+
+---
+
+## Threat Register
+
+| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation | Status |
+|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|------------|--------|
+| T-12.1-01 | Elevation of Privilege | bulk action ids (IDOR) | high | mitigate | `CRUDService.BulkAction` resolves ids with `lockScoped`, `partialSelection` 409 (`modules/cabana/crud.go`); RC-01, RC-02 | closed |
+| T-12.1-02 | Elevation of Privilege | undeclared action or action without its permission | high | mitigate | `bulkActionOf`, `recordActionOf`, `allowAction` (`modules/cabana/actions.go`); per-principal schema filtering; RC-03 | closed |
+| T-12.1-03 | Tampering | CSRF on the two new POST routes | high | mitigate | `requireAjax` on `bulk/{action}` and `{id}/actions/{action}` (`modules/cabana/http.go`); RC-04, RC-05 | closed |
+| T-12.1-04 | Elevation of Privilege | record action outside form scope or wrong state | high | mitigate | `RecordAction` uses `loadRecord` (form scope, row lock), `Applies` re-checked in the transaction; RC-06, RC-07 | closed |
+| T-12.1-05 | Tampering | half-applied bulk mutation | medium | mitigate | one transaction per bulk action; `TestBulkActionRollback` | closed |
+| T-12.1-06 | Information Disclosure | internal error text in 403/500 bodies | medium | mitigate | `actionFailure`, `lifecycleFailure` opaque 500; only `ForbiddenError`/`ValidationError` carry text | closed |
+| T-12.1-07 | Tampering | row state or label as markup/CSS class | low | mitigate | fixed state set on server (`ListMeta.RowStates`) and in the SPA; text interpolation | closed |
+| T-12.1-08 | Repudiation | actions leave no trace | low | mitigate | one `slog.Info` line per run | closed |
+| T-12.1-09 | Tampering | mass assignment through virtual or password fields | high | mitigate | `BindWritableFields` skips `FormVirtualFields`; `liftVirtualValues` honours context; RC-08, RC-09 | closed |
+| T-12.1-10 | Information Disclosure | password value in response, log or URL | high | mitigate | password field must be virtual (`checkVirtualFields`, `extension.go`); never projected; RC-10 | closed |
+| T-12.1-11 | Elevation of Privilege | protected FK written through a relation field | high | mitigate | `WritableForeignKey` opt-in plus scoped options query (`relation_field.go`); RC-11 | closed |
+| T-12.1-12 | Elevation of Privilege | locked relation ids changed by a crafted request | high | mitigate | `checkRelationLocks` before any row write on create and update; RC-12 | closed |
+| T-12.1-13 | Tampering | permission code injection or out-of-range value | high | mitigate | offered-code, mode-set and locked-code checks (`field_permission.go`); RC-13, RC-14 | closed |
+| T-12.1-14 | Tampering | preview-only field written by a crafted body | medium | mitigate | `contextAllows` excludes it from create/update binding; `TestPreviewFieldNeverWritten` | closed |
+| T-12.1-15 | Elevation of Privilege | script/markup through status hint or callout classes | medium | mitigate | partials served as an allowlisted node tree (`partial_render.go`); SPA builds elements from nodes | closed |
+| T-12.1-16 | Tampering | open redirect through `preview/:id` | medium | mitigate | `mapWinterUrl` (`admin/src/app/winterUrl.ts`): current controller only, digits only | closed |
+| T-12.1-17 | Tampering | unreviewed contract published by the tag | high | mitigate | blocking decision checkpoint (plan 02 Task 5); tag cut on a green head; NR-01 (process control) | closed |
+| T-12.1-18 | Elevation of Privilege | Users screens/actions without the users permission | high | mitigate | `RequiredPermissions` on the three controllers and every action; RC-15 | closed |
+| T-12.1-19 | Information Disclosure | hash, plain password or reset codes in admin responses | high | mitigate | virtual password fields; no secret column in YAML; response bodies scanned; RC-16 | closed |
+| T-12.1-20 | Tampering | mass assignment of is_activated, permissions, organisation_id | high | mitigate | protected fill keys; dedicated validated paths; `FormBeforeCreate` forces `is_activated` false; RC-17 | closed |
+| T-12.1-21 | Spoofing | tokens valid after admin password reset | medium | mitigate | `FormBeforeUpdate` stamps `tokens_valid_after`; `TestAdminUserPassword` | closed |
+| T-12.1-22 | Denial of Service | invitation mail abuse | low | mitigate | one mail per create, after commit, no bulk invite | closed |
+| T-12.1-23 | Tampering | permanent delete leaves orphans | medium | mitigate | `ForceDeleteCleanup` in the delete transaction; blobs after commit | closed |
+| T-12.1-24 | Information Disclosure | last_seen, permissions, timestamps, groups in user API | high | mitigate | `json:"-"` on `LastSeen`, `Permissions`, `Groups` (`models/user.go`); field-by-field payloads; RC-18, RC-27 | closed |
+| T-12.1-25 | Denial of Service | last_seen write on the auth path | low | mitigate | `classes.TouchLastSeen` at most once per five minutes, errors logged and ignored | closed |
+| T-12.1-26 | Elevation of Privilege | deactivated site admin re-enabled by restore/activate | medium | accept | see AR-01 | closed |
+| T-12.1-27 | Elevation of Privilege | wrong port of the permission merge | medium | mitigate | `classes.MergedPermissions`, `HasPermission`; `TestMergedPermissions` table | closed |
+| T-12.1-28 | Elevation of Privilege | privileged group added/removed via the groups field (T-12-18) | critical | mitigate | `AdminRelationLocks` plus framework `checkRelationLocks`; RC-19 | closed |
+| T-12.1-29 | Elevation of Privilege | create, re-code or delete a privileged group code | high | mitigate | `requirePrivilegedPermission` in the groups controller hooks; RC-20 | closed |
+| T-12.1-30 | Elevation of Privilege | second unguarded writer of users_groups | high | mitigate | no groups relation manager; actions pinned not to write the table; RC-21 | closed |
+| T-12.1-31 | Tampering | privileged list cached, mis-compared or NULL-bypassed | medium | mitigate | `classes/privileged.go`: read per call, case-sensitive, NULL never privileged | closed |
+| T-12.1-32 | Tampering | organisation members manager moves users | low | accept | see AR-02 | closed |
+| T-12.1-33 | Tampering | app pointer / plugin / framework published out of order | low | mitigate | no push in plans 03–05; ordering governed by T-12.1-40 | closed |
+| T-12.1-34 | Information Disclosure | group membership in user API payload | high | mitigate | `User.Groups` `json:"-"`; payload writes `groups` as an empty list; RC-22 | closed |
+| T-12.1-35 | Repudiation | gate passes without measuring | medium | mitigate | `detect` refuses failures, skips, zero tests, missing names; `--self-test` | closed |
+| T-12.1-36 | Information Disclosure | consuming-application name in framework files | low | mitigate | `check-phase12.1.sh --hygiene` name scan | closed |
+| T-12.1-37 | Tampering | mitigation silently removed later | medium | mitigate | `TestPhase121Threats` in both repos (present 2026-10-12), `--security`, removal harness | closed |
+| T-12.1-38 | Elevation of Privilege | takeover of a privileged-group member (email/password change) | critical | mitigate | `guardCredentials` at the top of `FormBeforeUpdate`, `classes.IsPrivilegedMember` in the write transaction (D-30); RC-23, RC-25 | closed |
+| T-12.1-39 | Tampering | permanent delete of a privileged-group member | high | mitigate | `guardPrivilegedMember` in `FormBeforeDelete`, per record in the bulk transaction; RC-24 | closed |
+| T-12.1-40 | Tampering | shared plugin published before review or before its framework tag | medium | mitigate | single push point after gate and review, only with v0.1.3 on origin; v0.1.3 is now on origin | closed |
+| T-12.1-SC | Tampering | npm/pip/cargo installs | high | mitigate | no manifest changed within the phase (diff against v0.1.3 at phase close); NR-02 | closed |
+
+*Status: open · closed · open — below high threshold (non-blocking)*
+*Severity: critical > high > medium > low — only open threats at or above workflow.security_block_on count toward threats_open*
+*Disposition: mitigate (implementation required) · accept (documented risk) · transfer (third-party)*
+
+---
+
+## Accepted Risks Log
+
+| Risk ID | Threat Ref | Rationale | Accepted By | Date |
+|---------|------------|-----------|-------------|------|
+| AR-01 | T-12.1-26 | PHP behaves the same (the membership survives a soft delete); restore and activate need `golem15.users.access_users`. Deactivate and ban of a privileged member also stay at that permission (D-30 boundary); whether to guard them is open as FD-5 in `12.1-SECURITY-REVIEW.md`. | Owner, at plan 12.1-03 (RESEARCH T-12-18 path 8) | 2026-10-05 |
+| AR-02 | T-12.1-32 | PHP's add and remove behave the same; the routes need `golem15.users.access_users`, write only `organisation_id` and are scoped by the relation contract. `organisation_role` outliving the membership is FD-1. | Owner, at plan 12.1-04 (RESEARCH T-12-18 path 6) | 2026-10-05 |
+
+*Accepted risks do not resurface in future audit runs.*
+
+---
+
+## Observations (non-blocking)
+
+- **Gate drift, `scripts/check-phase12.1.sh --hygiene`.** On 2026-10-12 the stage refuses, for reasons that come from later phases, not from regressions of this register:
+  - raw-HTML sinks added by phase 17 (`RichEditorField.vue` `v-html="display"`, `richeditor/html.ts` and `richeditor/lossy.ts` `innerHTML`). The stage allowlists only `MarkdownField.vue`. These sinks are covered by phase 17's register (T-17-10, T-17-32: server-sanitized HTML). T-12.1-15's own surface (partials as an allowlisted node tree) is unchanged.
+  - `go.mod`, `go.sum`, `admin/package.json` and `admin/package-lock.json` changed since v0.1.3. These are later phases' dependency decisions; within phase 12.1 the manifests stayed the same (T-12.1-SC).
+  - committed files in `modules/cabana` (`account_tokens.go`, `account_tokens_test.go`, `token_*_test.go`) are not gofmt-clean. They come from later token work, not this phase; the problem is formatting only.
+  
+  Suggested follow-up: scope the 12.1 hygiene stage to the phase's own files and the tag window, or retire it in favour of later phase gates, and run `gofmt -w` on the token files.
+- **Findings for decision FD-1 to FD-5** in `12.1-SECURITY-REVIEW.md` remain the owner's to decide. None is an open threat of this register.
+- **sm-user-plugin** at `fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/user` is one commit ahead of its origin (later phase work). It doesn't affect T-12.1-40, whose precondition (v0.1.3 on origin) now holds.
+
+---
+
+## Security Audit Trail
+
+| Audit Date | Threats Total | Closed | Open | Run By |
+|------------|---------------|--------|------|--------|
+| 2026-10-05 | 41 | 41 | 0 | gsd-executor, plan 12.1-05 (`12.1-SECURITY-REVIEW.md`, 27 removal checks) |
+| 2026-10-12 | 41 | 41 | 0 | /msd-secure-phase 12.1 (orchestrator, L1 grep re-check of every mitigation anchor in both repos; short-circuit: register authored at plan time, ASVS 1) |
+
+## Security Audit 2026-10-12
+| Metric | Count |
+|--------|-------|
+| Threats found | 41 |
+| Closed | 41 |
+| Open | 0 |
+
+---
+
+## Sign-Off
+
+- [x] All threats have a disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer)
+- [x] Accepted risks documented in Accepted Risks Log
+- [x] `threats_open: 0` confirmed
+- [x] `status: verified` set in frontmatter
+
+**Approval:** verified 2026-10-12