fix(35): WR-01 strip whitespace before the list, meta, CSS and comment scheme checks

Single-URL attributes removed ASCII whitespace and control characters
before looking for a scheme, the list-valued, meta content, style and
comment checks did not, so values="java	script:..." and a tab-split
meta refresh passed. The stripping is factored out as stripURLSpace and
used by every scheme check.
This commit is contained in:
Jakub Zych
2026-11-14 17:32:14 +01:00
parent 1d481bb02d
commit baba524caf
4 changed files with 36 additions and 14 deletions

View File

@@ -63,7 +63,8 @@ var urlAttributes = map[string]bool{
}
// urlListAttributes hold several URLs (or values that can be URLs). Their
// decoded value is refused when dangerousScheme matches anywhere in it.
// decoded value is refused when containsDangerousScheme finds a scheme
// anywhere in it.
var urlListAttributes = map[string]bool{
"srcset": true,
"ping": true,
@@ -71,11 +72,10 @@ var urlListAttributes = map[string]bool{
"values": true,
}
// hasDangerousScheme reports whether a decoded URL attribute value starts
// with javascript:, vbscript: or data:, after every ASCII whitespace and
// control character is removed and the value is lower-cased, the way
// browsers read it ("java\tscript:" is javascript:).
func hasDangerousScheme(val string) bool {
// stripURLSpace removes every ASCII whitespace and control character
// (U+0000 to U+0020 and U+007F) from val and lower-cases it, the way
// browsers read a URL ("java\tscript:" is javascript:).
func stripURLSpace(val string) string {
var b strings.Builder
b.Grow(len(val))
for i := 0; i < len(val); i++ {
@@ -88,10 +88,25 @@ func hasDangerousScheme(val string) bool {
}
b.WriteByte(c)
}
v := b.String()
return b.String()
}
// hasDangerousScheme reports whether a decoded URL attribute value starts
// with javascript:, vbscript: or data:, once stripURLSpace has removed
// whitespace and control characters.
func hasDangerousScheme(val string) bool {
v := stripURLSpace(val)
return strings.HasPrefix(v, "javascript:") || strings.HasPrefix(v, "vbscript:") || strings.HasPrefix(v, "data:")
}
// containsDangerousScheme reports whether dangerousScheme matches anywhere
// in a decoded value (a URL list, CSS, meta content or a comment) once
// stripURLSpace has removed whitespace and control characters, so a
// tab-split "java&#9;script:" is found as in a single-URL attribute.
func containsDangerousScheme(val string) bool {
return dangerousScheme.MatchString(stripURLSpace(val))
}
// rawTextElements are the elements whose content x/net/html's tokenizer
// reads as one text token (raw text or RCDATA). A mail client may parse that
// content as markup: it renders with scripting off, so noscript content is
@@ -172,9 +187,9 @@ func unsafeMarkupAt(doc string, depth int) error {
case strings.HasPrefix(key, "on"):
return &unsafeError{msg: "rendered HTML contains event handlers", snippet: snippetAt(doc, loc)}
case urlAttributes[key] && hasDangerousScheme(a.Val),
urlListAttributes[key] && dangerousScheme.MatchString(a.Val),
key == "style" && dangerousScheme.MatchString(a.Val),
t.Data == "meta" && key == "content" && dangerousScheme.MatchString(a.Val):
urlListAttributes[key] && containsDangerousScheme(a.Val),
key == "style" && containsDangerousScheme(a.Val),
t.Data == "meta" && key == "content" && containsDangerousScheme(a.Val):
return &unsafeError{msg: "rendered HTML contains a dangerous URL scheme", snippet: snippetAt(doc, loc)}
}
}
@@ -191,7 +206,7 @@ func unsafeMarkupAt(doc string, depth int) error {
inStyle = false
}
case xhtml.TextToken:
if inStyle && dangerousScheme.MatchString(t.Data) {
if inStyle && containsDangerousScheme(t.Data) {
return &unsafeError{msg: "rendered HTML contains a dangerous URL scheme", snippet: snippetAt(doc, loc)}
}
// The raw source, not the decoded text: RCDATA (title,
@@ -203,7 +218,7 @@ func unsafeMarkupAt(doc string, depth int) error {
}
}
case xhtml.CommentToken:
if dangerousScheme.MatchString(t.Data) {
if containsDangerousScheme(t.Data) {
return &unsafeError{msg: "rendered HTML contains a dangerous URL scheme", snippet: snippetAt(doc, loc)}
}
if err := unsafeMarkupAt(t.Data, depth+1); err != nil {