docs(16.1): record translation and duplicate-attribute sanitizing; close audit warnings

.planning/notes/journal-html-sanitizing-bluemonday.md

@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ Everything else that UGC refuses is refused: `script`, `style`, `iframe`, `objec
 - **Byte-stable when nothing is stripped.** `sanitizeHTML` returns the goldmark output unchanged when that output and bluemonday's output tokenize to the same tokens: the same type, tag name, decoded text and set of decoded attributes. Otherwise it returns bluemonday's output. bluemonday re-escapes `"` as `"` and `'` as `'`, so storing its output every time would rewrite every imported post on its next save. Returning the original bytes is safe only on that token-level equality. Any element, attribute or comment that the policy drops makes the tokens differ, and then the sanitized output is stored.
 - **Category content refuses.** `classes.CheckHTML` keeps its exported signature and its 422 contract. D-21 stores category content exactly as submitted, and `TestCategoriesAdminContent` asserts a 422 for unsafe content. CheckHTML now uses the same policy and comparison, and refuses whenever the policy would change the HTML.
 
+- **Translations follow the same rule (2026-10-10, audit W-1).** `classes.FormatTranslation` runs on every locale of every API and import write: a non-blank `content` re-derives `content_html` with `FormatHTML` (a supplied `content_html` is replaced, as for the host column); a `content_html` sent alone goes through `classes.SanitizeHTML`, the same policy. A translation keyed on the default locale, which `translate.SetTranslated` writes straight into the host column, is covered too. PHP stored a client-supplied translated `content_html` as-is on the API and import paths; the port follows the PHP admin widget, which always derived it.
+- **Duplicate attributes count as a change (audit W-2).** `golang.org/x/net/html` drops a repeated attribute while tokenizing, so the byte-stable comparison could not see `href="https://x" href="javascript:..."`. `htmlTokens` compares the raw attribute names of each start tag (`rawAttrNames`) with the attributes the tokenizer kept; any difference stores the sanitized output and makes `CheckHTML` refuse.
+
 ## Rationale
 
 The regex blocklist could be bypassed once raw HTML passed through. These payloads came back unchanged with no error: `<img src="x"onerror=...>` (no space before the attribute), `<svg/onload=...>`, `javascript&#58;`, `javascript&colon;`, `&#106;avascript:`, `java<TAB>script:`, MathML `xlink:href`, and the inert-looking but dangerous `<base>`, `<meta http-equiv=refresh>` and `<form>`. The `data:` pattern also matched ordinary text, so "Data: 12 maja 2024" and "metadata:" were refused (WR-01). A sanitizer that tokenizes the HTML checks attributes and URL values in the same way a browser parses them, so it does not depend on any text pattern.
@@ -51,6 +54,6 @@ The regex blocklist could be bypassed once raw HTML passed through. These payloa
 
 ## Follow-ups
 
-- Move the post 64 author-footer CSS (`.author-footer`, `.author-info`, `.author-photo`, `.author-details`) into the public theme before the post is re-saved.
-- `vue-journal-layer/app/utils/htmlGate.ts` still uses the same three regexes, so it has the same bypasses and the same `data:` false positive. It gives no defence in depth. Replace it with DOMPurify (with a decision note) in that repository.
+- Done: the post 64 author-footer CSS moved into vue-grzybyfunkcjonalne-app `app/assets/css/base.css` (2c46185).
+- Done: `vue-journal-layer` replaced its regex gate with sanitize-html 2.18.0 mirroring this policy (5beb1c5; decision note `docs/decisions/0001-sanitize-html.md` in that repository, which explains why not DOMPurify).
 - If editors need `target="_blank"` links, `rel`, or `title` values with quotes or `&`, extend the policy deliberately. These are not allowed now because no imported content uses them.