diff --git a/wristband/token.go b/wristband/token.go
index 15541cc..bad6969 100644
--- a/wristband/token.go
+++ b/wristband/token.go
@@ -288,14 +288,99 @@ func (s *Server) exchangeAuthorizationCode(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request,
 	return result, nil
 }
 
-// rotateRefreshToken is a RED-verification placeholder (08-06-PLAN.md Task
-// 1): it deliberately has not yet implemented rotation/replay-kill so
-// TestPhase8RedLifecycleFramework fails fail-closed via
-// scripts/check-phase8-red.sh before the real implementation lands.
+// rotateRefreshToken ports OAuthCodeManager::rotateRefresh inside one
+// WithinTx callback (D-04/D-05/D-07): the presented refresh secret is row-
+// locked, validated (not expired, not revoked, bound to the authenticated
+// client), and then either rotated (mint a new access token, revoke the old
+// one, create and link a successor refresh row) or -- if it was already
+// rotated once before -- treated as a replay: the entire lineage (every
+// rotated-to successor and each linked access token) is revoked and the
+// callback still returns nil so that revocation commits (T-08-REFRESH-
+// REPLAY). Token then maps the recorded "replayed" outcome to invalid_grant
+// outside the transaction, exactly mirroring PHP's own commit-then-throw
+// shape: the security-relevant kill must land even though the protocol
+// response is an error.
 func (s *Server) rotateRefreshToken(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, client *ClientRecord) (tokenIssueResult, error) {
-	_ = ctx
-	_ = client
-	return tokenIssueResult{}, errInvalidGrant
+	raw := r.Form.Get("refresh_token")
+	if raw == "" {
+		return tokenIssueResult{}, errInvalidGrant
+	}
+
+	var result tokenIssueResult
+	var replayed bool
+	err := s.backend.WithinTx(ctx, func(tx Tx) error {
+		rec, err := tx.ByTokenHashForUpdate(ctx, sha256Hex(raw))
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if rec == nil ||
+			!rec.ExpiresAt.After(s.now()) ||
+			rec.RevokedAt != nil ||
+			rec.ClientID != client.ClientID {
+			return errInvalidGrant
+		}
+
+		if rec.RotatedToID != nil {
+			// T-08-REFRESH-REPLAY: a spent (already-rotated) refresh token
+			// was presented again. Kill the whole lineage and commit that
+			// kill; the caller maps replayed -> invalid_grant afterward.
+			if err := tx.RevokeLineage(ctx, rec.ID); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			replayed = true
+			return nil
+		}
+
+		if rec.APITokenID != nil {
+			if err := tx.Revoke(ctx, *rec.APITokenID); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+
+		name := truncateRunes(client.ClientName, 120)
+		expiresAt := s.now().Add(s.opts.AccessTokenTTL)
+		minted, err := tx.Mint(ctx, rec.UserID, name, rec.Scopes, expiresAt, rec.CollectionIDs, client.ClientID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		rawNew, err := s.randomBytes(32)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		accessTokenID := minted.ID
+		successor := &RefreshTokenRecord{
+			TokenHash:     sha256Hex(rawNew),
+			APITokenID:    &accessTokenID,
+			ClientID:      client.ClientID,
+			UserID:        rec.UserID,
+			Scopes:        rec.Scopes,
+			CollectionIDs: rec.CollectionIDs,
+			ExpiresAt:     s.now().Add(s.opts.RefreshTokenTTL),
+			OfflineAccess: rec.OfflineAccess,
+		}
+		if err := tx.Create(ctx, successor); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := tx.MarkRotated(ctx, rec.ID, successor.ID); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		result = tokenIssueResult{
+			AccessToken:   minted.Secret,
+			RefreshToken:  rawNew,
+			Scopes:        rec.Scopes,
+			OfflineAccess: rec.OfflineAccess,
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return tokenIssueResult{}, err
+	}
+	if replayed {
+		return tokenIssueResult{}, errInvalidGrant
+	}
+	return result, nil
 }
 
 // Revoke atomically kills an OAuth-issued access token and its entire