diff --git a/.planning/phases/19.5-social-login-in-sm-user-plugin/19.5-UAT.md b/.planning/phases/19.5-social-login-in-sm-user-plugin/19.5-UAT.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d8e6892c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/19.5-social-login-in-sm-user-plugin/19.5-UAT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+status: testing
+phase: 19.5-social-login-in-sm-user-plugin
+source: [19.5-VERIFICATION.md]
+started: 2026-10-21T00:24:54.347Z
+updated: 2026-10-21T00:24:54.347Z
+---
+
+## Current Test
+
+number: 1
+name: Decide on the residual pre-account-takeover path left open by the T-19.5-38 fix. ownerVerifiedEmail treats has_self_set_password=true as proof the owner controls the address, but POST /register with golem15.user activation.activate_mode=auto (the default) creates an activated account with has_self_set_password=true and no email check. An attacker who registers victim@example.com with a password before the victim's first Google/GitHub sign-in gets the victim's verified identity auto-linked onto the attacker's account, and keeps password access.
+expected: |
+  Either accept it explicitly (it is exactly PHP's D-10 behaviour, and the variant T-19.5-38 closed was the social-created one), or schedule a follow-up (for example: auto-link only when the account was activated by mail or set its password through the reset code, or require activate_mode=user for apps mounting sociallogin). Also correct 19.5-SECURITY-REVIEW.md / README wording that a self-set password means the owner 'proved the address'.
+awaiting: user response
+
+## Tests
+
+### 1. Decide on the residual pre-account-takeover path left open by the T-19.5-38 fix. ownerVerifiedEmail treats has_self_set_password=true as proof the owner controls the address, but POST /register with golem15.user activation.activate_mode=auto (the default) creates an activated account with has_self_set_password=true and no email check. An attacker who registers victim@example.com with a password before the victim's first Google/GitHub sign-in gets the victim's verified identity auto-linked onto the attacker's account, and keeps password access.
+expected: Either accept it explicitly (it is exactly PHP's D-10 behaviour, and the variant T-19.5-38 closed was the social-created one), or schedule a follow-up (for example: auto-link only when the account was activated by mail or set its password through the reset code, or require activate_mode=user for apps mounting sociallogin). Also correct 19.5-SECURITY-REVIEW.md / README wording that a self-set password means the owner 'proved the address'.
+result: [pending]
+
+### 2. Walk the bm callback view in a browser (see behavior_unverified_items).
+expected: As in behavior_unverified_items.
+result: [pending]
+
+### 3. Review the judgment-tier prohibition verdicts in the 'Prohibitions' section of this report (non-authoritative LLM-judge verdicts).
+expected: Confirm or dispute each verdict; all are recorded as no violation found.
+result: [pending]
+
+## Summary
+
+total: 3
+passed: 0
+issues: 0
+pending: 3
+skipped: 0
+blocked: 0
+
+## Gaps