diff --git a/modules/postcard/safety_test.go b/modules/postcard/safety_test.go
index 0e284192..561cec24 100644
--- a/modules/postcard/safety_test.go
+++ b/modules/postcard/safety_test.go
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import (
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
+
+ xhtml "golang.org/x/net/html"
)
// schemeFiller surrounds a case's markup, so a snippet that points at the
@@ -15,7 +17,9 @@ var schemeFiller = strings.Repeat("plain words here ", 6)
// rendered HTML (WR-05): prose and URLs that merely contain a scheme word
// pass; every URL-bearing attribute, CSS, meta refresh and every
// character-reference or whitespace-split spelling of a script or data URL
-// is refused, on a send with inlining on and off and in the editor.
+// is refused, on a send with inlining on and off and in the editor. A
+// raw-text end tag or a comment's end inside a quoted attribute does not hide
+// the rest of the tag (CR-02 residual).
func TestURLSchemeCheck(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -34,6 +38,16 @@ func TestURLSchemeCheck(t *testing.T) {
{"footer_handler_shaped_name", `
`},
{"title_escaped_handler", ``},
{"outlook_conditional_vml", ``},
+ // The tag reading, where quoting decides where a tag ends, refuses
+ // nothing mail uses (CR-02 residual).
+ {"conditional_comment_quoted_attrs", ``},
+ {"conditional_comment_not_mso_safe_link", `x`},
+ {"style_css_quoted_strings", ``},
+ {"title_escaped_end_in_attr", ``},
+ {"noscript_safe_link_end_in_attr", ``},
+ // Only the "<" of a comment opener is blanked, so a literal "" href="javascript:alert(1)">x`, `href="javascript:alert(1)"`, schemeMsg},
// Whitespace-split schemes in list, meta, CSS and comment values
// (WR-01).
{"values_tab_split", ``, `values="java script:alert(1)"`, schemeMsg},
@@ -128,8 +149,12 @@ func TestURLSchemeCheck(t *testing.T) {
{"noscript", ``},
{"xmp", `x`},
// An end tag inside a quoted attribute does not hide the rest of the
- // tag (CR-02 residual).
+ // tag (CR-02 residual). html/template escapes literal title and
+ // textarea text, so the svg title and textarea variants are sent as
+ // escaped text and checked by escaped_send below, not as fallbacks.
{"svg_style_end_in_attr", ``},
+ {"noscript_href_end_in_attr", ``},
+ {"noscript_handler_end_in_attr", ``},
}
file := fileWelcome(t)
if strings.Contains(file.HTML, "javascript") {
@@ -161,6 +186,52 @@ func TestURLSchemeCheck(t *testing.T) {
}
}
+ // The svg title and textarea variants are escaped by html/template: the
+ // override is sent, and a conforming parser, with scripting on and off,
+ // builds no element with a handler or a script or data URL from it.
+ escaped := []struct{ name, link string }{
+ {"svg_title_end_in_attr", ``},
+ {"svg_textarea_end_in_attr", ``},
+ }
+ for _, l := range escaped {
+ for _, optOut := range []bool{false, true} {
+ name := "escaped_send/" + l.name + "/inline"
+ if optOut {
+ name = "escaped_send/" + l.name + "/opt_out"
+ }
+ t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+ t.Parallel()
+ drv := NewMemoryDriver()
+ m := NewMailer(cat, drv, Options{Overrides: fakeOverrides{ov: Overrides{
+ Template: &TemplateOverride{Subject: "Hello {{ .name }}", Body: "Hi **{{ .name }}**.", Layout: "encoded"},
+ Layouts: map[string]LayoutOverride{"encoded": {
+ HTML: `
{{ .Content }}` + l.link + `
`,
+ Text: "{{ .Content }}",
+ CSS: "p { color: #123456; }",
+ DisableAutoInlineCSS: optOut,
+ }},
+ }}})
+ sendWelcome(t, m, "")
+ got := lastMessage(t, drv)
+ if got.HTML == file.HTML {
+ t.Fatalf("the override was refused; the file version was sent")
+ }
+ if !strings.Contains(got.HTML, "<a title=") {
+ t.Errorf("the link was not sent as escaped text:\n%s", got.HTML)
+ }
+ for _, scripting := range []bool{true, false} {
+ doc, err := xhtml.ParseWithOptions(strings.NewReader(got.HTML), xhtml.ParseOptionEnableScripting(scripting))
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("parse (scripting %v): %v", scripting, err)
+ }
+ if live := liveUnsafeElements(doc); len(live) > 0 {
+ t.Errorf("scripting %v: live unsafe attributes %v in:\n%s", scripting, live, got.HTML)
+ }
+ }
+ })
+ }
+ }
+
// The editor refuses the same layout draft on content_html, and a
// layout's CSS with a script URL on content_css; prose in a template
// body validates.
@@ -206,6 +277,29 @@ func TestURLSchemeCheck(t *testing.T) {
}
}
+// liveUnsafeElements lists, as "element key=value", every attribute of an
+// element in the parsed tree n that is an event handler or a single-URL
+// attribute with a script or data URL, with the namespace prefix
+// unsafeMarkup builds.
+func liveUnsafeElements(n *xhtml.Node) []string {
+ var live []string
+ if n.Type == xhtml.ElementNode {
+ for _, a := range n.Attr {
+ key := a.Key
+ if a.Namespace != "" {
+ key = a.Namespace + ":" + a.Key
+ }
+ if strings.HasPrefix(key, "on") || urlAttributes[key] && hasDangerousScheme(a.Val) {
+ live = append(live, n.Data+" "+key+"="+a.Val)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for c := n.FirstChild; c != nil; c = c.NextSibling {
+ live = append(live, liveUnsafeElements(c)...)
+ }
+ return live
+}
+
// TestInlineUnsafeOutput covers an inlined result that fails the safety
// check (WR-05): the send succeeds with the checked, un-inlined HTML and its
// style block, and one warning per layout per minute names the layout.