The tokenizer-only walk read noscript, title, textarea, style, xmp and the
other raw-text elements as one text token and never looked inside, so an
unencoded javascript: link in <noscript> or <svg><title> passed the check
and was sent. A mail client renders with scripting off and parses svg
children as markup, so the raw content of those elements, and comment
data (Outlook conditional comments), is now checked again as markup;
nesting deeper than eight levels is refused.
- postcard.UnsafeText: a text a layout prints is unsafe when, escaped,
it fails the rendered-HTML checks or holds a script or data URL at a
scheme boundary ("Big Data: Summit" is safe)
- siteNameFrom/layoutSiteName: an unsafe Branding name falls back to the
mail.from display name, an unsafe one of those gives no name; one
rate-limited warning per source (site_name:branding, site_name:mail.from),
never the value; file version, override, fallback and editor alike
- the Branding preview of an unsafe draft name renders without it
- MailBrandSetting.BeforeValidate: 422 on site_name with
backend::lang.mail.brand.site_name_unsafe (en/pl)
- settings Put localizes a BeforeValidate refusal's phrase keys, as a
controller save does
- TestMailSafetySmoke/unsafe_site_name, TestMailBrandSiteName/unsafe_name_refused
- validateHTML keeps the raw tag and handler regexes and reads the rest
through unsafeMarkup: x/net/html tokenizer, decoded attribute values,
prefix check on URL attributes, whole-value check on CSS, list
attributes, meta content and comments; any on* attribute is refused
- text is not a URL: "Metadata: Weekly" or "Big Data: Summit" as a site
name or body text no longer stops a send (CR-01)
- entity-encoded javascript: is refused whether or not the layout
opts out of inlining (WR-05)
- draft layout CSS is checked as a style element
- fixtures that pinned prose as unsafe now carry markup-level URLs;
the 35-07 subtest pinning an unsafe stored name is removed
- TestMailSafetySmoke prose_site_name and encoded_scheme