Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
f604e6de64 fix(19.7): RA-WR-02 stop a shared stateless server flapping its tool set
The identity fingerprint no longer includes token ids: guards decide on
scopes, subjects and the ceiling, and an OAuth access token's id changes on
every refresh, so a rotation alone no longer re-filters a cached server.

The stateless path's refresh only adds tools and prompts for a fingerprint
new to the entry (remembered until a fan-out recompute) and never removes:
one server serves every live token of a binding, and removing on each
alternation between a wider and a narrower token pulled a tool from under
the wider token's call. The receiving middleware still filters every list
and call per request; fan-out recomputes still narrow. The stateful path
keeps its exact widen, a session serves one client.

TestFingerprintIgnoresTokenID pins the fingerprint; TestStatelessSharedBinding
blocks the wide token's call after its server was chosen, sends a request
of the narrow token and asserts the call still succeeds (it failed with
"unknown tool" before).
2026-10-23 20:05:08 +02:00
Jakub Zych
240457291f fix(pier): widen returning identities, warm the Redis store, end stateless listen streams, refuse personal tokens without a TokenID
- Identity.fingerprint covers scopes, both subjects, the ceiling and the
  token kind; a stateful lookup or stateless hit whose fingerprint changed
  re-filters the server with the event diff under its own mutex (A-WR-04)
- Mount warms a Redis store in the background with a 1 s to 30 s backoff
  and every request kicks a pending open without waiting, so stateless-only
  instances subscribe to fan-out (A-WR-05)
- a stateless subscriptions/listen POST re-verifies its bearer every
  recheck interval; an LRU-evicted stateless server closes its sessions
  (A-WR-06)
- resolvePersonalToken refuses a subject with TokenID 0, and the
  pact.MCPPersonalTokenResolver contract says one resolver per application,
  false means unauthorized and TokenID keys the binding (A-WR-09, A-IN-03)
2026-10-23 15:59:54 +02:00
Jakub Zych
8c6c0a3654 feat(19.7-02): identity kinds, ceilings, prompts and the MCP services page
- personal tokens only behind mcp.allow_personal_tokens (401 without a
  lookup otherwise); an admin token yields a backend-only identity with
  its scope limit per dispatched method, a user token a frontend-only one
- read/write ceiling and prompts proven by the tracer's subtests; the
  audit line asserted to carry the tool and never the arguments or token
- the mounted *pier.Pier is published on the application (test seams in
  export_test.go)
- docs/services/mcp.md with the tested acme.blog example, site.yaml note,
  cross-links from authentication.md, registration.md and the surf README
2026-10-22 18:34:39 +02:00
Jakub Zych
cfdbaf0e47 feat(19.7-02): pier MCP module tracer with in-process dispatch and sessions
- modules/pier: Host contract, mcp.* config, catalog compiled from
  pact.HasMCP (prefixing, route binding, guard resolution, schema
  reflection, annotations), per-request identity through the published
  verifier and resolvers, built-in backend guard provider, in-process
  dispatch with the bouncer marker, per-identity SDK server with the
  per-request re-filter, stateful session router with rehydration over a
  memory store, audit lines
- modules/surf/pier_on.go: the summercms_mcp hook adapting the router to
  pier.Host; the untagged hello binary carries no SDK
- go.mod: go-sdk v1.8.0 and jsonschema-go v0.4.3 (decision note committed
  before this change)
- TestPierTracerSmoke: SDK client lists and calls acme_echo end to end
  through surf's compiled guard chain; README and root table row
2026-10-22 18:15:59 +02:00