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| 20-demo-instance-with-every-shared-plugin | 2026-11-01T23:50:42Z | standard | 105 |
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Phase 20: Code Review Report
Reviewed: 2026-11-01T23:50:42Z Depth: standard Files Reviewed: 105 (the 86 listed files, plus the layer components, libs and deploy files the SUMMARYs under-listed) Status: issues_found
Summary
The review covered the phase's code in its sibling repositories. That is the chat and forum pre-save seams (git diff v0.1.4..main and v0.1.0..main; both tags exist), the new sm-moderation-plugin, the sm-demo-app host plugin, deploy files and scripts (commits since 2026-10-28), vue-demo-app since 44a5229, and the four new layers.
Areas that held up when traced:
- Pre-save seams. Both are additive and silent without a listener, and they map
contracts.Rejectionto 422 on every chat and forum write path (send, reply, ReplyTo, edit; thread, reply, edit). - Core plugins. The phase changed no core plugin (user, journal/blog, pages, payment). sm-user-plugin is consumed by tag and unchanged.
- XSS.
renderChatTextescapes everything before it adds tags, placeholders cannot be forged (\u0000is stripped), andsafeUrlrefusesjavascript:,data:and////\paths. Forumcontent_htmlcomes from goldmark plus bluemonday. Attachments download as octet-stream with thedownloadattribute. No XSS was found. - Realtime authorization. Every Centrifugo namespace goes through the subscribe proxy. The
user,chat,videoandpresentationsauthorizers each check their own rule, so giving every member a connection token does not widen channel access. LiveKit tokens are scoped to one room, with noroomAdmin. - Runbook secrets. The runbooks keep secrets out of argv and logs.
Three defects need fixing before more traffic reaches the demo:
- Call race (CR-01). The call composable connects to LiveKit and publishes the camera and microphone after the user has already left or navigated away.
- Link filter bypass (CR-02). The banned-link filter misses URL forms that browsers normalise to the banned host. The chat then renders them as working links and link cards.
- Word filter bypass (CR-03). The banned-word filter misses invisible characters, non-breaking spaces and forum Markdown that renders to the banned word.
Each bypass was confirmed by running classes.Match against the probes; all of them returned flagged=false.
Critical Issues
CR-01: Leaving or unmounting during start/join still connects and publishes camera and microphone
File: ../vue-chatvideo-layer/app/composables/useCall.ts:177-231 (also 258-266, 274-276; Leave is enabled while starting/connecting in ../vue-chatvideo-layer/app/components/Chatvideo/Call.vue:72,91)
Issue: begin() never re-checks the state or leaving after its awaits (client.start/client.join at line 184, import('livekit-client') at line 193). It also assigns room only after the import. leave() sees room === null, so it cannot disconnect anything.
- Caller: Leave is clicked while the status shows "Connecting…" (the state is
starting).leave()dispatchesended, postsend(404, because the session does not exist yet) and navigates away. Thenstartresolves.beginsubscribesvideo:session:{id}, loads livekit-client, creates aRoom, connects, and runssetCameraEnabled(true)andsetMicrophoneEnabled(true). The server session was created and the callee is ringing. If they accept, they see and hear a caller who believes they hung up. Nothing on the page can stop it, and the channel handle leaks. - Callee: this path is worse.
begin(false)dispatches nothing beforeawait client.join(), so the state staysidle. Navigating away during the join runsonBeforeUnmount → leave(), which returns early onstatus === 'idle'(line 259). Then the join resolves:transitionletsjoinedmoveidle → connecting, and the callee is live in the room with camera and microphone, with no UI and no leave posted. - Second join: the same missing guard lets a second
begin(false)start while the first is pending. That creates two Rooms, and the first is never disconnected.
Fix: Add a per-attempt token and bail out after every await. Mark the attempt live before the first await. Make leave() work from the pre-room states.
let attempt = 0
async function begin(start: boolean) {
if (state.value.status !== 'idle' && isLive(state.value)) return
const mine = ++attempt
leaving = false
dispatch({ type: 'start' }) // also for the callee: leaves 'idle' before any await
const stale = () => mine !== attempt || leaving || !isLive(state.value)
let join: VideoJoin
try { join = start ? (takeStart(conversationId) ?? (await client.start(conversationId))) : await client.join(conversationId) }
catch (e) { if (!stale()) dispatch({ type: 'error', code: e instanceof VideoApiError ? e.status : 0, message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : '' }); return }
if (stale()) { void (start ? client.end(conversationId) : client.leave(conversationId)).catch(() => {}); return }
// ...same checks after import('livekit-client'), after r.connect(), and before each setXEnabled:
// if (stale()) { await r.disconnect(true); return }
}
async function leave() {
if (leaving || !isLive(state.value)) return // no early return on 'idle' while an attempt is pending
leaving = true; attempt++ // invalidates the in-flight begin
// ...
}
Add useCall.test.ts cases: "leave while start is pending" and "unmount while join is pending". Both must assert that Room.connect and setCameraEnabled are never called.
CR-02: Banned-link filter bypass through URL forms the browser normalises, rendered as working links
File: ../sm-moderation-plugin/classes/filter.go:50,122-135; ../sm-moderation-plugin/models/settings.go:137-168; rendering in ../vue-chat-layer/app/lib/chatText.ts:87-93, ../vue-chat-layer/app/lib/linkEmbeds.ts:40-47,69-83 and ../vue-chat-layer/app/components/Chat/LinkEmbed.vue:13
Issue: hostPattern matches the literal text and compares hosts and paths byte for byte. The WHATWG URL parser (browsers, and new URL in linkEmbeds.ts) percent-decodes and IDNA-maps the host, so each form below reaches the banned host. Every probe returned flagged=false against Match(["viagra",...], ["bit.ly","example.com/promo"], …). With node, new URL() resolves each one to bit.ly:
| Text sent | What the browser opens |
|---|---|
https://bit%2Ely/x |
https://bit.ly/x |
https://bit.l%79/x |
https://bit.ly/x |
https://bit.ly/x (fullwidth) |
https://bit.ly/x |
https://bit。ly/x (U+3002) |
https://bit.ly/x |
https://example.com:443/promo |
path rule skipped: the port stops the path group |
https://example.com/%70romo, //promo, https://example.com./promo |
path-prefix rules skipped |
https://sub.example.com/promo |
path rules never cover subdomains |
punycode xn--… vs. Unicode host |
either spelling of an IDN bypasses the other |
The chat then renders the bypass as a clickable <a href="https://bit%2Ely/x">. ChatLinkEmbed makes it worse: its card shows the normalised host bit.ly and links to https://bit.ly/x. The forum renders the same through goldmark autolinks. Spammers can post any banned link, which defeats D-17 for links.
Fix: Normalise both sides the way the browser does before comparing. In the filter, find every candidate URL or host, then:
// for each candidate: s := found[0]; if no scheme, s = "http://" + s
u, err := url.Parse(s) // then:
host, _ := url.PathUnescape(u.Hostname()) // %2E -> .
host = strings.Map(func(r rune) rune { // ideographic/fullwidth dots
switch r { case '。', '.', '。': return '.' }; return r }, host)
host, err = idna.Lookup.ToASCII(norm.NFKC.String(host)) // fullwidth -> ASCII, Unicode -> punycode (x/net/idna)
host = strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(strings.ToLower(host), "www."), ".")
path := path.Clean("/" + mustUnescape(u.EscapedPath())) // //promo, /./promo, %70romo
Apply the same idna.Lookup.ToASCII and NFKC to entries in LinkEntry. Let path rules also match subdomains, as host rules do. Widen hostPattern so its host class takes %, . and 。, or tokenise on whitespace and parse each token. Add these probes to filter_test.go. golang.org/x/net/idna and x/text are already transitive dependencies of the framework; note them per the dependency rule.
CR-03: Banned-word filter bypass through invisible characters, Unicode spaces and forum Markdown
File: ../sm-moderation-plugin/classes/filter.go:45,91,94,115; seams ../sm-forum-plugin/classes/forum_service.go:284,341 and ../sm-forum-plugin/classes/lifecycle.go:235; listener ../sm-demo-app/plugins/demo/moderation.go:65,86
Issue: The word regexp uses [^\p{L}\p{N}_] as its boundary and RE2's ASCII-only \s+ between the words of a phrase. Confirmed with classes.Match:
- Invisible characters.
viagra(zero-width space) andviagra(soft hyphen) display as "viagra" and are not flagged. Format characters (\p{Cf}) count as boundaries. - Unicode spaces.
buy followers(NBSP; likewise U+2009, U+3000) is not flagged. - NFD text. Polish diacritics typed in decomposed (NFD) form do not match an NFC entry, and the combining mark counts as a boundary.
- Forum Markdown. The forum seam passes the raw Markdown body and title, but members see
breakwater.Renderoutput.via**gra**renders "viagra" as one word,viagrarenders "viagra", and[x](https://bit.ly/a)renders a link tobit.lybecause CommonMark decodes entities in link destinations. None of them are flagged.
Moderation is therefore cosmetic against anyone who tries once.
Fix: Normalise the text before matching, in Filter.Check (and Match):
t := norm.NFKC.String(text)
t = strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
if unicode.Is(unicode.Cf, r) { return -1 } // ZWSP, ZWJ, soft hyphen, BOM...
if unicode.IsSpace(r) { return ' ' } // NBSP, thin, ideographic spaces
return r
}, t)
Use [\p{Z}\s]+ in place of \s+ between phrase words. Normalise entries with the same function in ParseList.
For the forum, check the rendered text too. In the demo's checkPost, run the filter on html.UnescapeString of breakwater.Render(body) with tags stripped, and on the hrefs it contains. Alternatively, have forum's PostSaving carry the rendered HTML (an additive field) so every host gets it.
Warnings
WR-01: Logout leaves the chat store and the realtime socket of the previous user running
File: ../sm-demo-app/vue-demo-app/app/composables/useDemoAuth.ts:83-92, ../sm-demo-app/vue-demo-app/app/components/SiteHeader.vue:12-15, ../sm-demo-app/vue-demo-app/app/utils/communityAuth.ts:57; reset() in ../vue-chat-layer/app/composables/useChat.ts:1514-1516
Issue: logout() blacklists the JWT and clears the cookie. Nothing calls useChat().reset() or the realtime disconnect(), and the floating panel just unmounts. start() is the only caller of reset(), and it runs only when a chat view mounts again. After logout the tab therefore keeps:
- the Centrifugo connection and the
user:{me}subscription, which deliver the old user's DM and call events until the connection token expires; - the old user's messages and DMs in
useState; - a pending incoming-call prompt in
chatvideo:incoming.
$chatAuth.unauthorized() has the same gap: it only clears the cookie. The layer's own comment says reset exists so that a second account never sees the first one's chat, but the host never wires it.
Fix: In logout() (and in unauthorized), after clearing the token, call useChat().reset() (it disconnects the shared client) and clear useState('chatvideo:incoming'). Alternatively, watch(loggedIn) in plugins/auth.ts and reset when it turns false. Add a vitest case for the logout path.
WR-02: Any member can pin or unpin any message in every public channel; the message is not checked against the channel
File: ../sm-demo-app/plugins/demo/classes/chat_context.go:259-269 (the policy) reaching ../sm-chatchannels-plugin/classes/channel_service.go:1332-1353 and ../sm-chatchannels-plugin/api/pins.go:31-52
Issue: chatchannels gates PinMessage and UnpinMessage only with requireChannelAccess. The demo's ChatAccess.CanAccessContext answers true for every member, so any registered visitor can unpin the seeded welcome pins in #general, #announcements and #ogólny, or flood the pins panel. PinMessage also never checks that messageID belongs to the channel's conversation, so pins can point at another conversation's (DM) message ids. Contents do not leak, because the client's GET /messages/{id} needs participation, but the rows are bogus. Plan 03 noted "the visitor was allowed to pin … the pin succeeded" without treating it as a gap.
Fix: Make pinning a manage action, for example additively in chatchannels: PinMessage/UnpinMessage require CanManageContext, or an optional contracts.PinPolicy the host implements. The demo then answers it from the moderator group. Also verify message.conversation_id == *ch.ConversationID before creating the pin. Until then, the demo layer can hide pin actions for non-moderators (pinAllowed), but the server must enforce the rule.
WR-03: Member-visible text outside the chat and forum seams is never moderated
File: ../sm-demo-app/plugins/demo/moderation.go:28-44
Issue: The filter runs only on MessageSaving.Content and the PostSaving title and body. Members write other text that other members see:
- Profile name and surname. They appear in
/chat/membersfor every member, in mention chips, in DM headers, as forumauthor_name, and ascaller_namein the incoming-call prompt. - userfriends group names and descriptions. They are shown to invitees in the code preview.
- Chat attachment filenames.
A member registering as "free crypto bit.ly/x" puts that text in front of everyone, including in a ringing prompt. D-17 states that banned words and links are refused on every write path.
Fix: Run Filter.Check on the profile name and surname at registration and profile update. Use a user-plugin saving event if one exists, otherwise the demo's own registration route, without changing the core user plugin. Do the same for userfriends group create and update if a seam exists, or add an additive GroupSaving seam, and for attachment filenames (chat MessageSaving could carry them additively). Record any path left out as an explicit, documented exception.
WR-04: A link opens a call and turns the camera and microphone on with no confirmation
File: ../vue-chatvideo-layer/app/components/Chatvideo/Call.vue:34-36, ../sm-demo-app/vue-demo-app/app/pages/call/[conversation].vue:17,30; same-tab site links in ../vue-chat-layer/app/lib/markdown.ts:22
Issue: ChatvideoCall calls begin() on mount. /call/{id}?start=1 starts a call (and rings the other side), and /call/{id} joins a live one. The chat renders site paths such as /call/45?start=1 as same-tab links. One member can DM another [see this](/call/45?start=1), where 45 is their shared DM. A click puts the victim in a call that publishes camera and microphone at once; once the origin has the media permission there is no prompt. A forged ?start=1 also bypasses the call button's intent.
Fix: Require an explicit action on the call page. Render a "Start call" or "Join" button and call begin() from its click. Keep auto-start only for a takeStart() handoff, which proves the click came from ChatvideoCallButton, and drop the ?start=1 trigger for direct loads.
WR-05: A failed LiveKit connect posts leave, not end, leaving an empty ringing session behind
File: ../vue-chatvideo-layer/app/composables/useCall.ts:204-208
Issue: When r.connect() fails, the caller posts client.leave(). As the starter and only connected participant, the session stays pending or active with nobody in it:
- the callee keeps ringing for up to 45 s, and Accept joins an empty room;
- Retry (
begin(true)) gets the existing session back (Created: false), so it never rings again until the reconcile job runs.
This is the "left-open session never rings again" bug that leave() itself fixed with "last one out ends".
Fix: Use the same rule as leave(): void (start || r.remoteParticipants.size === 0 ? client.end(conversationId) : client.leave(conversationId)).catch(() => {}).
WR-06: The forum and friends clients have no 401 refresh; an expired token shows "not found"
File: ../vue-forum-layer/app/utils/forumClient.ts:139-159, ../vue-forum-layer/app/components/Forum/Thread.vue:41, ../vue-userfriends-layer/app/utils/friendsClient.ts:135
Issue: The chat and video clients refresh once on 401 through $chatAuth.refresh(). $forumAuth and $userfriendsAuth are bare token getters, and neither client retries. After the JWT expires, a member on /forum/t/{id} sees "thread not found", because Thread.vue maps 401 to forum.error.notFound. Posting fails the same way. /chat keeps working in the same tab.
Fix: Give both hooks the {token, refresh, unauthorized} shape (the demo can pass chatAuth), and add the chat client's single-flight refresh-and-retry to request(). Map 401 to its own "signed out" message rather than not-found.
Info
IN-01: Group calls in public channels are blocked only by the seeded participant count
File: ../sm-demo-app/config/golem15.chatvideo.yaml:13-18, ../sm-chatvideo-plugin/classes/video_service.go:91,109-112
Issue: The server has no DM-only rule (D-23 is UI only, as documented). Channel calls are refused today only because the four personas plus any visitor exceed max_participants: 4. If the cap is raised, or a channel is created with fewer seeded participants, any member can start a call that rings everyone who opened that channel.
Fix: Add a host hook in chatvideo (for example an optional CanStartCall(conversationType)), or check conversation.type == dm in the demo, so the rule does not depend on seed data.
IN-02: chatvideo checks participant rows, not live membership
File: ../sm-chatvideo-plugin/classes/video_service.go:425-443, ../sm-chatvideo-plugin/classes/authorizer.go:54-79
Issue: A ban revokes the user's JWTs, so new calls are blocked. A LiveKit join token already minted (900 s) and an open video:session subscription still survive the ban, because chatvideo never consults contracts.LiveMembership as chat does.
Fix: Optional: have chatvideo honour LiveMembership (via chat's Service.IsParticipant) in requireParticipant and the authorizer, and remove the participant from the LiveKit room on a ban.
IN-03: check-local passes member JWTs to curl in argv
File: ../sm-demo-app/scripts/check-local.sh:452,514,601 (and the friends checks)
Issue: The LiveKit join token is passed carefully through a curl config on stdin, but the member JWTs go into -H "Authorization: Bearer $jwt" arguments, which other local users can read in /proc/*/cmdline. This is local and uses throwaway users, but it is inconsistent with the stated pattern.
Fix: Reuse the curl -K - approach with header = "Authorization: Bearer …".
IN-04: A chat message that starts with "/" can never be posted
File: ../vue-chat-layer/app/composables/useChat.ts:825-829
Issue: Every text starting with / (for example "/r/golang is great", or a path) is dispatched as a slash command and refused as unknown.
Fix: Dispatch only when the first token matches a known trigger from commands, or support a // escape.
IN-05: demo:seed brings back the default moderation lists after an admin empties them
File: ../sm-demo-app/plugins/demo/console/seed_friends.go:117-122
Issue: seedModerationLists refills both lists whenever both are empty, and every release runs demo:seed. An admin who deliberately clears both lists gets the defaults back at the next deploy.
Fix: Seed only on the first run, for example by inserting the lists in a row-creation step or recording a seeded flag.
IN-06: nginx /livekit/ exposes LiveKit's whole HTTP surface
File: ../sm-demo-app/deploy/nginx/demo.summercms.io.conf:363-375
Issue: Browsers need only /rtc (and /rtc/validate). The location also exposes LiveKit's Twirp RoomService on the public origin. That service is protected by admin JWTs signed with the API secret, so exposing it publicly is unnecessary.
Fix: location ^~ /livekit/rtc { proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:7890/rtc; … }, and answer 404 for the rest of /livekit/. Adjust check-deploy.
IN-07: The incoming-call runtime can leak a session handle and survives logout
File: ../vue-chatvideo-layer/app/composables/useIncomingCalls.ts:41-56,58-70
Issue: Two video:call:incoming events for the same session, both pending in subscribe, both pass the pending.value?.sessionId === call.sessionId check. The second overwrites rt.channel and the first handle is never closed. pending is also never cleared on logout (see WR-01).
Fix: Keep a sequence number per watchSession and close the handle unless it is the latest. Clear pending from the logout path.
IN-08: The VAPID runbook pipeline runs without pipefail
File: ../sm-demo-app/DEPLOY.md:533-540
Issue: The remote script uses set -e without pipefail. If herald:vapid-generate fails, jq emits nothing and tee -a appends nothing, but the SUBJECT line is still appended. The re-run guard (grep -c "^…VAPID__" = 0) then refuses ("already in .env") although no key pair exists, and recovery needs a hand edit of .env. The keys were already applied on rome; this matters for a rebuild.
Fix: Use set -eo pipefail, generate into a variable first, check both keys are non-empty, then append all three lines in one tee.
IN-09: GET /chat/members writes, and builds an unbounded IN list
File: ../sm-demo-app/plugins/demo/chat_api.go:338-358
Issue: A GET assigns handles (AssignHandle) to members without one. Two concurrent first loads race on the same rows. It also expands every member id into id IN ?, which fails with 500 past Postgres' 65535 bind-parameter limit. The production reset schedule is off, so users accumulate.
Fix: Select with the memberWhere subquery (WHERE id <> ? AND <memberWhere>) instead of an id list. Assign missing handles at registration or in demo:seed, not in a GET.
Reviewed: 2026-11-01T23:50:42Z Reviewer: Claude (msd-code-reviewer) Depth: standard