summercms/.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-06-PLAN.md

phase: 06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting plan: 06 type: execute wave: 5 depends_on: ["06-05"] files_modified: - fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes.go - fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_isolation_test.go autonomous: true gap_closure: true requirements: [HTTP-04] must_haves: truths: - "An unauthenticated request to GET /api/v1/fonoteka/genres passes through inv_token, then throttle:fonoteka-api-token, then inv.scope:read; InvScope can no longer short-circuit before the limiter consumes the request" - "The first 60 same-IP requests without credentials retain the PHP-compatible 401 Invalid token response, while request 61 returns HTTP 429 with exactly {"message":"Too Many Attempts."}" - "A valid personal token is still resolved before the limiter, so the fonoteka-api-token bucket can retain its tok: key instead of collapsing valid credentials onto the IP fallback" artifacts: - path: "fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes.go" provides: "Correct live personal-token middleware declaration" contains: 'surf.Use("inv_token", "throttle:fonoteka-api-token", "inv.scope:read")' - path: "fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_isolation_test.go" provides: "Assembled-route unauthenticated deny-path rate-limit regression" contains: "TestPersonalTokenGenresUnauthenticatedRequestsAreRateLimited" key_links: - from: "fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes.go" to: "summercms.go/surf/router.go" via: "surf.Use declaration consumed by Router.wrap's last-to-first middleware composition" pattern: 'inv_token.*throttle:fonoteka-api-token.*inv.scope:read' - from: "fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_isolation_test.go" to: "/api/v1/fonoteka/genres" via: "surf.Assemble of the real golem15.user and golem15.fonoteka plugins followed by 61 same-IP requests" pattern: "surf.Assemble|/api/v1/fonoteka/genres" Close the HTTP-04 verification gap by correcting the live personal-token genres middleware onion and proving the unauthenticated deny path consumes the 60/minute bucket.

Purpose: remove the rate-limit bypass that currently allows unlimited missing/invalid personal-token requests to reach InvScope's 401 path without incrementing the limiter. Output: the exact inv_token -> throttle:fonoteka-api-token -> inv.scope:read declaration and an isolated assembled-router regression proving request 61 is denied with the PHP-compatible 429 body.

<execution_context> @/home/jin/.codex/get-shit-done/workflows/execute-plan.md @/home/jin/.codex/get-shit-done/templates/summary.md </execution_context>

@.planning/PROJECT.md @.planning/ROADMAP.md @.planning/REQUIREMENTS.md @.planning/STATE.md @.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-CONTEXT.md @.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-RESEARCH.md @.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-VERIFICATION.md @.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-REVIEW.md @.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-02-SUMMARY.md @.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-05-SUMMARY.md From `summercms.go/surf/router.go`: - `Router.wrap` iterates `rt.middleware` from the last name to the first, so the first listed middleware becomes the outermost runtime wrapper. - `Assemble(app, plugins) (http.Handler, error)` calls `BuildRouter`, which creates a new `FixedWindowLimiter` and `MemoryStore` for that assembled handler.

From summercms.go/bouncer/registry.go:

• A guard error without UnauthorizedWriter continues the chain without bouncer.User or bouncer.Credential, allowing InvScope to own the exact 401 body per D-08.

From fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/plugin.go:

• fonoteka-api-token uses tok:<id> when bouncer.Credential contains *models.ApiToken; otherwise it falls back to surf.ClientIP and enforces Max 60 over one minute.

Task 1: Repair the personal-token middleware onion and prove the unauthenticated 61st request is throttled fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes.go, fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_isolation_test.go fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes.go (the live `/api/v1/fonoteka` genres group and its current middleware declaration) fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_isolation_test.go (real-plugin activation and BuildRouter isolation pattern) fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_cors_test.go (`stubInvToken` and fresh assembled-router test setup patterns) fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/plugin.go (`fonoteka-api-token` Max/Decay/Key closure) fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/middleware/token_scope.go (InvScope 401/403 short-circuit behavior) summercms.go/surf/router.go (`Router.wrap` reverse loop and `Assemble`/`BuildRouter` fresh limiter construction) summercms.go/surf/limiter.go (`TooManyAttempts` before `Hit`, 60th-allowed/61st-denied semantics, exact 429 body) summercms.go/bouncer/registry.go (guard-error continuation and request-context behavior) .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-CONTEXT.md (D-01, D-02, D-05, D-06, D-08) .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-RESEARCH.md (Common Pitfall 5) .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-VERIFICATION.md (HTTP-04 failed truth and required target order) .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-REVIEW.md (CR-01) In `Plugin.Routes`, change only the live personal-token genres group's `surf.Use` arguments from `inv_token`, `inv.scope:read`, `throttle:fonoteka-api-token` to `inv_token`, `throttle:fonoteka-api-token`, `inv.scope:read`. This exact source order is required because `surf.Router.wrap` composes last-to-first: `inv_token` remains outermost and resolves a valid credential before the bucket key is computed (preserving `tok:` per D-01/D-06), the throttle then consumes both authenticated and unauthenticated traffic (D-02), and `InvScope` remains the innermost scope/401/403 gate (D-08). Do not move throttle before `inv_token`, do not alter bucket limits or key logic, and do not address unrelated REVIEW.md warnings.

In `routes_isolation_test.go`, add `TestPersonalTokenGenresUnauthenticatedRequestsAreRateLimited` using the existing real-plugin activation pattern: create a fresh `bootConfig` and `backpack.App`, publish a fresh `bouncer.Registry`, activate exactly `golem15.user` and `golem15.fonoteka`, and register a test-local `inv_token` guard that always returns unauthenticated without implementing `UnauthorizedWriter`. Assemble once with `surf.Assemble`; this construction must be local to the test and not shared or parallelized, so `BuildRouter` supplies a fresh `FixedWindowLimiter`/`MemoryStore` and no other test can consume its bucket.

Send 61 independent `httptest.NewRequest` calls to `GET /api/v1/fonoteka/genres` through that assembled handler, with no Authorization header and the same explicit `RemoteAddr` on every request. Use a fresh recorder for every call. Assert requests 1 through 60 return 401 and, after `strings.TrimSpace`, the existing `{"error":"Invalid token"}` body, proving the throttle does not replace the normal deny response before exhaustion. Assert request 61 returns 429 and its raw body is exactly `{"message":"Too Many Attempts."}`, with `X-RateLimit-Limit: 60` and `X-RateLimit-Remaining: 0`. The test must exercise the production route, real middleware factory, real named bucket, and real limiter; do not hand-compose middleware or call `FixedWindowLimiter` directly.

Search production route declarations under `fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka` for any other route containing both `inv.scope:` and `throttle:`. Apply this same order only if another live production route exists in the current tree; do not change test-only boot probes, empty future groups, or unrelated route stacks speculatively.

cd /media/nvme/dev/golem15/summercms.io/summercms/fonoteka.go && go test ./plugins/golem15/fonoteka -run 'TestPersonalTokenGenresUnauthenticatedRequestsAreRateLimited|TestFullRouteTableAuthGroupMutualExclusivity' -count=1 -short - `routes.go` contains `surf.Use("inv_token", "throttle:fonoteka-api-token", "inv.scope:read")` on the live `/api/v1/fonoteka/genres` group and does not contain the old `inv_token`, `inv.scope:read`, `throttle:fonoteka-api-token` order. - `TestPersonalTokenGenresUnauthenticatedRequestsAreRateLimited` calls the handler returned by `surf.Assemble` for the real two-plugin set; it does not construct a limiter or middleware chain directly. - The test uses one fresh assembled handler and a stable explicit RemoteAddr for all 61 requests, with no `t.Parallel`, global handler, or shared limiter state. - Requests 1-60 assert HTTP 401 plus trimmed body `{"error":"Invalid token"}`; request 61 asserts HTTP 429 plus raw body exactly `{"message":"Too Many Attempts."}`, `X-RateLimit-Limit: 60`, and `X-RateLimit-Remaining: 0`. - The targeted command exits 0 under `-short`, proving the regression does not require Docker, Postgres, or shared test state. The live personal-token genres route consumes unauthenticated requests in the 60/minute bucket before InvScope short-circuits, while valid tokens remain resolvable to tok:; an assembled-route regression fails if the middleware order is inverted again.

<threat_model>

Trust Boundaries

Boundary	Description
unauthenticated client -> personal-token route	Missing or invalid bearer traffic is attacker-controlled and must consume a bounded per-IP budget before credential/scope denial returns
inv_token context -> limiter key resolver	Valid credentials must be available before rate limiting so users receive independent tok: budgets; unauthenticated traffic must safely fall back to ClientIP

STRIDE Threat Register

Threat ID	Category	Component	Disposition	Mitigation Plan
T-06-21	Denial of Service	/api/v1/fonoteka/genres middleware chain	mitigate	Put throttle:fonoteka-api-token between inv_token and inv.scope:read; the assembled-route 61-request regression proves missing credentials cannot bypass the 60/minute deny-path budget
T-06-22	Denial of Service	fonoteka-api-token key selection	mitigate	Keep inv_token outermost so valid credentials populate bouncer.Credential before the bucket key closure runs and retain per-token tok:<id> isolation rather than sharing an IP bucket
T-06-SC	Tampering	package supply chain	accept	This gap closure performs no npm, pip, cargo, or Go module install and changes no dependency manifest; it uses only already-audited Phase 6 code
</threat_model>

<source_coverage_audit>

Source	ID	Coverage	Status
GOAL	Phase 6 success criterion 2	Plans 06-01 through 06-05 provide the limiter/buckets; this plan repairs the failed live deny path	COVERED
REQ	HTTP-04	Task 1 makes the live named bucket enforceable on unauthenticated traffic and adds regression proof	COVERED
REQ	HTTP-03, HTTP-05, HTTP-06, HTTP-07, HTTP-08, HTTP-09	Already satisfied by executed Plans 06-01 through 06-05; no verification gap requests further work	COVERED (existing)
RESEARCH	Common Pitfall 5	Exact inv_token -> throttle -> InvScope order plus no-double-lookup assembled behavior	COVERED
CONTEXT	D-01, D-02, D-05, D-06, D-08	Exact named bucket, 429 body, parameterized middleware, credential context, and InvScope ownership preserved in Task 1	COVERED
CONTEXT	D-03, D-04, D-07, D-09 through D-18	Already implemented by executed Plans 06-01 through 06-05 and not reopened by the authoritative gap	COVERED (existing)
CONTEXT	Deferred Ideas	Explicitly excluded from this gap plan	EXCLUDED
</source_coverage_audit>

From `fonoteka.go`, run `go test ./plugins/golem15/fonoteka -run 'TestPersonalTokenGenresUnauthenticatedRequestsAreRateLimited|TestFullRouteTableAuthGroupMutualExclusivity' -count=1 -short`, then `go test ./plugins/golem15/fonoteka/... -count=1 -short`. Confirm a source grep shows only the target live order for the personal-token genres route.

<success_criteria>

• The live personal-token genres group declares inv_token, throttle:fonoteka-api-token, inv.scope:read in that exact order.
• A fresh assembled-router test proves requests 1-60 without credentials return the existing 401 body and request 61 from the same IP returns the exact PHP-compatible 429 body and exhausted-limit headers.
• The regression runs under -short with no database or external service and cannot inherit limiter counters from another test.
• HTTP-04's verification blocker and REVIEW CR-01 are directly closed without changing unrelated warnings or deferred work. </success_criteria>

Create `.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-06-SUMMARY.md` when done.