- postcard.UnsafeText: a text a layout prints is unsafe when, escaped,
it fails the rendered-HTML checks or holds a script or data URL at a
scheme boundary ("Big Data: Summit" is safe)
- siteNameFrom/layoutSiteName: an unsafe Branding name falls back to the
mail.from display name, an unsafe one of those gives no name; one
rate-limited warning per source (site_name:branding, site_name:mail.from),
never the value; file version, override, fallback and editor alike
- the Branding preview of an unsafe draft name renders without it
- MailBrandSetting.BeforeValidate: 422 on site_name with
backend::lang.mail.brand.site_name_unsafe (en/pl)
- settings Put localizes a BeforeValidate refusal's phrase keys, as a
controller save does
- TestMailSafetySmoke/unsafe_site_name, TestMailBrandSiteName/unsafe_name_refused
146 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
146 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
package postcard
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"html"
|
|
"regexp"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
|
|
xhtml "golang.org/x/net/html"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// scriptURLText finds a script URL in text: javascript: or vbscript: at a
|
|
// scheme boundary, or data: at a scheme boundary directly followed by a
|
|
// non-space character (a data URL). A boundary is the start of the text or a
|
|
// character that cannot belong to a URL scheme, so "Metadata: Weekly" and
|
|
// "Big Data: Summit" do not match.
|
|
var scriptURLText = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(?:^|[^a-z0-9+.\-])(?:(?:javascript|vbscript):|data:\S)`)
|
|
|
|
// UnsafeText reports whether a text that a layout prints, such as the site
|
|
// name of the built-in layouts, must be kept out of mail. A text is unsafe
|
|
// when, HTML-escaped as html/template prints text, it fails the rendered-HTML
|
|
// safety checks (for example event-handler-shaped text such as
|
|
// "Shop onclick=x"), or when it holds a script URL: javascript: or vbscript:
|
|
// at a scheme boundary, or a data: URL. "Big Data: Summit" is safe;
|
|
// "javascript: Acme" is not.
|
|
func UnsafeText(s string) bool {
|
|
return validateHTML(html.EscapeString(s)) != nil || scriptURLText.MatchString(s)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// urlAttributes are the attributes that hold one URL. Their decoded value is
|
|
// refused when it starts with a script or data scheme.
|
|
var urlAttributes = map[string]bool{
|
|
"action": true,
|
|
"background": true,
|
|
"cite": true,
|
|
"codebase": true,
|
|
"data": true,
|
|
"dynsrc": true,
|
|
"formaction": true,
|
|
"href": true,
|
|
"icon": true,
|
|
"longdesc": true,
|
|
"lowsrc": true,
|
|
"manifest": true,
|
|
"poster": true,
|
|
"profile": true,
|
|
"src": true,
|
|
"usemap": true,
|
|
"xlink:href": true,
|
|
// SVG animation targets can set an href.
|
|
"from": true,
|
|
"to": true,
|
|
"by": true,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// urlListAttributes hold several URLs (or values that can be URLs). Their
|
|
// decoded value is refused when dangerousScheme matches anywhere in it.
|
|
var urlListAttributes = map[string]bool{
|
|
"srcset": true,
|
|
"ping": true,
|
|
"archive": true,
|
|
"values": true,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// hasDangerousScheme reports whether a decoded URL attribute value starts
|
|
// with javascript:, vbscript: or data:, after every ASCII whitespace and
|
|
// control character is removed and the value is lower-cased, the way
|
|
// browsers read it ("java\tscript:" is javascript:).
|
|
func hasDangerousScheme(val string) bool {
|
|
var b strings.Builder
|
|
b.Grow(len(val))
|
|
for i := 0; i < len(val); i++ {
|
|
c := val[i]
|
|
if c <= 0x20 || c == 0x7f {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' {
|
|
c += 'a' - 'A'
|
|
}
|
|
b.WriteByte(c)
|
|
}
|
|
v := b.String()
|
|
return strings.HasPrefix(v, "javascript:") || strings.HasPrefix(v, "vbscript:") || strings.HasPrefix(v, "data:")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// unsafeMarkup checks the markup of rendered HTML: event-handler attributes
|
|
// and javascript:, vbscript: or data: URLs. It reads doc with x/net/html's
|
|
// tokenizer, which lower-cases attribute names and decodes character
|
|
// references in attribute values, so href="javascript:x" is read as a
|
|
// mail client reads it.
|
|
//
|
|
// URL schemes are looked for only where a URL can be: single-URL attributes
|
|
// (urlAttributes, by prefix), list-valued attributes (urlListAttributes),
|
|
// style attributes, the content of meta elements, the text of style
|
|
// elements and comments (anywhere in the value). Text content is not a URL,
|
|
// so prose such as "metadata:" or "Big Data: Summit" is not checked. Any
|
|
// attribute whose name starts with "on" is an event handler, with or
|
|
// without whitespace before it.
|
|
func unsafeMarkup(doc string) error {
|
|
z := xhtml.NewTokenizer(strings.NewReader(doc))
|
|
offset := 0
|
|
inStyle := false
|
|
for {
|
|
tt := z.Next()
|
|
if tt == xhtml.ErrorToken {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
start := offset
|
|
offset += len(z.Raw())
|
|
loc := []int{start, offset}
|
|
t := z.Token()
|
|
switch tt {
|
|
case xhtml.StartTagToken, xhtml.SelfClosingTagToken:
|
|
for _, a := range t.Attr {
|
|
key := a.Key
|
|
if a.Namespace != "" {
|
|
key = a.Namespace + ":" + a.Key
|
|
}
|
|
switch {
|
|
case strings.HasPrefix(key, "on"):
|
|
return &unsafeError{msg: "rendered HTML contains event handlers", snippet: snippetAt(doc, loc)}
|
|
case urlAttributes[key] && hasDangerousScheme(a.Val),
|
|
urlListAttributes[key] && dangerousScheme.MatchString(a.Val),
|
|
key == "style" && dangerousScheme.MatchString(a.Val),
|
|
t.Data == "meta" && key == "content" && dangerousScheme.MatchString(a.Val):
|
|
return &unsafeError{msg: "rendered HTML contains a dangerous URL scheme", snippet: snippetAt(doc, loc)}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if tt == xhtml.StartTagToken && t.Data == "style" {
|
|
inStyle = true
|
|
}
|
|
case xhtml.EndTagToken:
|
|
if t.Data == "style" {
|
|
inStyle = false
|
|
}
|
|
case xhtml.TextToken:
|
|
if inStyle && dangerousScheme.MatchString(t.Data) {
|
|
return &unsafeError{msg: "rendered HTML contains a dangerous URL scheme", snippet: snippetAt(doc, loc)}
|
|
}
|
|
case xhtml.CommentToken:
|
|
if dangerousScheme.MatchString(t.Data) {
|
|
return &unsafeError{msg: "rendered HTML contains a dangerous URL scheme", snippet: snippetAt(doc, loc)}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|