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summercms/.planning/phases/20-demo-instance-with-every-shared-plugin/20-SECURITY.md
2026-11-05 10:17:05 +01:00

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phase, slug, status, threats_open, asvs_level, created
phase slug status threats_open asvs_level created
20 demo-instance-with-every-shared-plugin verified 0 1 2026-11-05

Phase 20 — Security

Per-phase security contract: threat register, accepted risks, and audit trail. Static audit of repository contents (no SSH, no ls-remote, no host contact). Audited: sm-demo-app da03c06 with plugin submodules on their tags (chat v0.1.5, forum v0.1.2, moderation v0.1.1, chatvideo/herald/userfriends v0.1.1, chatchannels/chatbots v0.1.0); vue-demo-app pins vue-chat-layer v0.1.1, vue-chatvideo-layer v0.1.1, vue-forum-layer v0.1.0, vue-userfriends-layer v0.1.0. Paths are relative to ../ (the meta repo). One medium threat (T-20-32) is open and non-blocking.


Trust Boundaries

Boundary Description Data Crossing
chat/forum HTTP clients → plugin APIs message and post bodies untrusted; the saving seam runs before storage message content, thread title, Markdown, JWT (high)
host listeners → plugin services the host decides refusals; listener errors must not leak internals saving events, Rejection, errors (medium)
admin settings → moderation filter admins edit lists every message is matched against banned word/link entries (medium)
build machine → git.golem15.com / proxies / origin tags become immutable inputs of every consumer tags, pushes, go.sum, pnpm lock (medium)
browser → /_demo, /_chat, /_chatchannels, /_chatbots, /_chatvideo, /_forum, /_userfriends every request untrusted; actor only from the JWT JWT, JSON, uploads ≤5 MiB (high)
Centrifugo subscribe proxy → Go / browser → Centrifugo client channel names, authorized server-side channel names, connection tokens, X-Centrifugo-Secret (high)
seed/reset commands → DB trusted operator commands; persona accounts must stay unusable persona rows, random bcrypt hashes (medium)
Go → LiveKit RoomService (loopback) / browser → LiveKit admin calls signed with the API secret; WebRTC with short-lived join token admin JWT, join token (TTL 900), media, ICE (high)
members' content → other members' browsers untrusted text, links, cards, content_html, names rendered content (high)
realtime events → incoming-call prompt server payloads about other users session_id, conversation_id, caller_name (low)
npm / git → layers third-party (livekit-client) and own layers packages, lockfile integrity (medium)
internet → nginx (Cloudflare) / rome public 7891/tcp, 7892/udp six API prefixes plus /livekit/; WebRTC media straight to LiveKit HTTP, WS, SRTP, ICE (high)
build machine → rome (SSH) secrets generated on rome; releases and rsync binaries, configs (high)
demo services ↔ WavePath on the same host must stay isolated ports, supervisor programs, LiveKit config (high)
test harnesses / browser checks → local and live demo throwaway accounts, visitor creds, live JWT files JWTs (0600 files), probe content (medium)
build machine → summercms.io journal token publishing changelog posts g15_ token (high)

Threat Register

Threat ID Category Component Severity Disposition Mitigation Status
T-20-01 Tampering chat write paths that skip the seam high mitigate MessageSaving fired on the only message insert and content update (sm-chat-plugin classes/service.go:314-337, writes.go:267-276); forum equivalents; TestMessageSavingTracer/Rejects. Chatbots announce path inserts without the seam but is unreachable on the demo (Ephemeral commands) closed
T-20-02 Information disclosure listener errors in API bodies medium mitigate only Rejection → 422, everything else opaque 500 (chat/forum api/errors.go) on every write handler closed
T-20-03 Denial of service filter matching cost medium mitigate QuoteMeta + RE2, recompile only on list change; 500 entries / 200 chars enforced in BeforeValidate closed
T-20-04 Elevation of privilege moderation settings screen medium mitigate PermissionManageSettings, role developer, enforced by cabana closed
T-20-05 Tampering one-way module tags medium mitigate all family tags annotated, on origin/main, monotonic closed
T-20-06 Elevation of privilege channel creation by members high mitigate CanManageContext always false (plugins/demo/classes/chat_context.go:272-274); tests refuse member and moderator closed
T-20-07 Information disclosure subscribing to other conversations high mitigate chat/user/video authorizers admit only own or participant channels; all namespaces via subscribe proxy. Residual IN-02 closed
T-20-08 Spoofing persona accounts medium mitigate personas.demo.invalid emails, random bcrypt hashes never printed; reset reseeds closed
T-20-09 Elevation of privilege moderator rights medium mitigate group conversations only, member + moderator group, banned users excluded, live membership required; group seeded empty closed
T-20-10 Tampering spam/abuse in chat and forum high mitigate moderation listeners on both seams; rate buckets (chat 120/min, DM 10/min, forum, video-initiate 5/min); Turnstile closed; manual demo:reset (schedule off in production). Residual WR-03 closed
T-20-11 Denial of service realtime token minting low mitigate JWT + membership guard, 120/min per user closed
T-20-12 Information disclosure LiveKit and VAPID secrets (local) high mitigate dev.sh umask 077, names only echoed; empty examples; CHANGE_ME placeholders enforced by check-deploy.sh:391-399 closed
T-20-13 Denial of service stale chat-family rows after reset low mitigate reset lists chat-family tables before users; reset tests closed
T-20-14 Tampering stored XSS (text, names, URLs) high mitigate vue-chat-layer v-html only through the escaping renderer; safeUrl, rel noopener noreferrer nofollow; linkify on escaped text with honestHttpUrl closed
T-20-15 Information disclosure JWT handling in the layer medium mitigate token from auth.token() as Bearer to same-origin bases; no web storage or cookie use closed
T-20-16 Information disclosure attachment downloads medium mitigate bearer download, object URL; server checks CanView closed
T-20-17 Spoofing slash command answers low mitigate / text dispatched, never posted; local ephemeral row marked "only you" closed
T-20-18 Tampering layer supply chain medium mitigate exact pins; layers pinned by tag and locked to commits closed
T-20-19 Denial of service realtime connections low mitigate single Centrifuge client; bounded polling closed
T-20-20 Tampering forum stored XSS high mitigate v-html only on server-rendered content_html; breakwater.Render (bluemonday) on write; server-side preview closed
T-20-21 Spoofing call joins high mitigate requireParticipant on start/join, token TTL 900, max 4 participants; layer never builds tokens closed
T-20-22 Information disclosure camera and microphone medium mitigate media only after handoff/click; disconnect stops tracks; leave on pagehide/unmount closed
T-20-23 Tampering incoming-call payloads low mitigate text binding for caller name; positive integer ids only closed
T-20-24 Denial of service call spam medium mitigate video-initiate 5/min, max_duration 900, reconcile job; DM-only slot in the UI. Residual IN-01 closed
T-20-25 Information disclosure friend enumeration low mitigate generic 422 shown as is; directory = chat picker set closed
T-20-26 Information disclosure VAPID private key high mitigate never printed; empty example; no /_herald route in Nuxt or nginx, enforced by check-deploy.sh:405-409 closed
T-20-27 Elevation of privilege LiveKit co-tenancy with WavePath high mitigate own supervisor program, config, user, ports, key pair; WavePath config untouched (DEPLOY.md:355-410). Host state live-only closed
T-20-28 Information disclosure LiveKit, VAPID, Centrifugo secrets (rome) high mitigate generated on rome, install -m 0640 root:summercms-demo, written via stdin, unset; placeholders enforced. File modes live-only closed
T-20-29 Denial of service open media ports medium mitigate only 7891/tcp and 7892/udp via Vuurmuur; participant and timeout limits. Firewall live-only closed
T-20-30 Information disclosure origin IP in ICE candidates low accept AR-20-01 closed
T-20-31 Elevation of privilege unintended Go routes medium mitigate six chat-family locations + /livekit/, no /_herald, /backend 404; check-deploy.sh. Residual IN-06 closed
T-20-32 Tampering firewall drift medium mitigate Vuurmuur change and removal documented (DEPLOY.md:467-490), but no dated rules.conf backup; DEPLOY.md:475-476 points to a "Probed on rome on 2026-10-31" section (:94-102) that lists no rules open — below high threshold (non-blocking)
T-20-33 Denial of service a release breaking the live demo medium mitigate .prev binary and site kept, rollback documented, check-live after release; clean-tree builds closed
T-20-34 Spoofing signalling WebSocket low mitigate tokens only after requireParticipant (TTL 900); /rtc/validate 401 without token closed
T-20-35 Information disclosure credentials in tests and check output medium mitigate visitor password read from .env, never printed; failures name keys only. Residual IN-03 (argv) closed
T-20-36 Tampering regressions behind skipped tests medium mitigate check-all.sh runs suites without -short; container start failure fails tests; PLAN verifies count --- PASS lines closed
T-20-37 Denial of service throwaway accounts on the live demo low accept AR-20-02 (rationale corrected) closed
T-20-38 Spoofing banned-link matching high mitigate sm-moderation-plugin normalize.go canonical links (dots, percent-decode, last @, port, IDNA, path); TestMatchBypassLinks closed
T-20-39 Tampering banned-word matching high mitigate entity decode, NFKC, Cf/Cc drop, space folding, diacritics, markup strip; two passes; TestMatchBypassWords closed
T-20-40 Tampering forum Markdown rendered after the check high mitigate PostSaving.HTML carries rendered HTML; demo runs CheckHTML on it; forum, moderation and demo tests closed
T-20-41 Denial of service normalising and matching large texts low accept AR-20-03 closed
T-20-42 Information disclosure useCall: media after leave critical mitigate per-attempt stale() checks at every await; stale branch drops the Room; tests cover seven moments closed
T-20-43 Elevation of privilege /call/{id} opened from a link high mitigate confirmation unless an in-memory 60 s single-use handoff exists closed
T-20-44 Information disclosure chat store, socket, call prompt after logout high mitigate isolated sign-out steps; reset, disconnect, dismiss wired; communityAuth tests; check-chat.cjs requires /ws closed in 5 s closed
T-20-45 Denial of service empty ringing session after a failed connect medium mitigate closeFailed ends sessions with ≤1 participant; tests closed
T-20-46 Spoofing deceptive hosts in anchors and cards high mitigate honestHttpUrl (vue-chat-layer urlGuard.ts:28-48) on every link path; tests closed
T-20-47 Tampering release tags high mitigate annotated, on origin/main, monotonic; ls-remote and fast-forward recorded in 20-09-SUMMARY closed
T-20-48 Information disclosure live member JWTs high mitigate mode 600/400 required, header via curl -K - stdin; delete afterwards documented and recorded. Deletion live-only closed
T-20-49 Tampering probe content on the live demo medium mitigate scope limited to own DM and seeded thread; stored probes deleted and reported; controls refused first closed
T-20-50 Information disclosure journal token high mitigate changelog-post.py own token file, refuses readable-by-others, never printed closed
T-20-51 Denial of service the shared host during a release medium mitigate restarts only the demo programs; rollback; pids recorded. Pid check live-only closed
T-20-52 Tampering temporary integration leaking into a release medium mitigate clean-tree builds, GOWORK=off, frozen lockfile; tag-only pins; no go.mod replace closed
T-20-SC Tampering npm / Go installs (plans 01-09) high mitigate every new module matches an already-vetted version (sitemap or framework); livekit-client 2.23.0 exact with lock integrity and human checkpoint; protobufjs: false; later plans change only golem15 modules and layer tags closed

Status: open · closed · open — below high threshold (non-blocking) Severity: critical > high > medium > low — only open threats at or above workflow.security_block_on count toward threats_open Disposition: mitigate (implementation required) · accept (documented risk) · transfer (third-party)


Accepted Risks Log

Risk ID Threat Ref Rationale Accepted By Date
AR-20-01 T-20-30 rome already exposes services on its public address; the ICE candidates show it (DEPLOY.md:367-369). 20-05 PLAN 2026-11-05
AR-20-02 T-20-37 check-live registers no accounts (its token-less register expects 422). Corrected: the plan said the reset job removes the human UAT account, but the reset schedule is off in production (DEPLOY.md:945-946, 1006-1009), so UAT accounts stay until someone runs demo:reset --force by hand. 20-09 PLAN (corrected by audit) 2026-11-05
AR-20-03 T-20-41 RE2 is linear, lists are bounded by max_entries and max_entry_length, and the work is two passes over a message the plugins already cap in size. 20-07 PLAN 2026-11-05

Accepted risks do not resurface in future audit runs.


Open Below Threshold

Threat Severity Gap To close (any one)
T-20-32 medium no dated rules.conf backup before the Vuurmuur change; DEPLOY.md's substitute reference points at a section without the rules take a dated rules.conf.bak-<date> on rome, record the 15 pre-change RULE lines in DEPLOY.md's "Probed on rome" section, or record an accepted risk

Unregistered Flags and Residual Risk (non-blocking)

  • Unregistered (20-02): GET /_demo/api/v1/chat/members (sm-demo-app/plugins/demo/chat_api.go) lists every member's name, surname and handle to any member; IN-09 adds that the GET writes handles and builds an unbounded IN list (500 above 65535 members). Todo demo-chat-members-read-only.md.
  • Deferred review items, each with a pending todo: WR-02 (any member can pin/unpin in public channels), WR-03 (profile names, friend-group names and attachment filenames are not moderated), WR-06 (forum/friends clients lack 401 refresh), IN-01 (no server-side DM-only call rule), IN-02 (video join token survives a ban up to 900 s), IN-03 (member JWTs and — found by this audit — the visitor password at check-local.sh:333 in curl argv), IN-04, IN-05, IN-06 (nginx /livekit/ exposes LiveKit's whole HTTP surface incl. admin-JWT-protected RoomService), IN-07, IN-08 (VAPID runbook without pipefail).
  • Untracked: the 19.4.1 Centrifugo secrets runbook (DEPLOY.md:327-328) passes secrets as sed arguments on rome (not echoed; noted in 20-05 deviation 3, not fixed).

Host-only checks (not verifiable from the repos)

WavePath LiveKit untouched and pid unchanged (T-20-27, T-20-51); file modes of livekit.yaml, .env, centrifugo.json (T-20-28); the applied Vuurmuur rule (T-20-29, T-20-32); live JWT files deleted (T-20-48); RESET__ENABLED count 0.


Security Audit Trail

Audit Date Threats Total Closed Open Run By
2026-11-05 53 52 1 (medium, non-blocking) msd-security-auditor (ASVS L1, block_on high; static, repo contents only)

Sign-Off

  • All threats have a disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer)
  • Accepted risks documented in Accepted Risks Log
  • threats_open: 0 confirmed
  • status: verified set in frontmatter
  • T-20-32 closed (backup or recorded rules) or accepted
  • Host-only checks confirmed on rome

Approval: verified 2026-11-05 (ASVS L1; T-20-32 open below threshold)