Merge pull request #1475 from open-gsd/fix/1461-overlay-crash-dos
This commit is contained in:
Tom Boucher
7
.changeset/fix-1461-overlay-crash-dos.md
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7
.changeset/fix-1461-overlay-crash-dos.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
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---
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type: Fixed
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pr: 1475
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---
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**The capability loader never crashes on a single malformed overlay, and untrusted manifest/tar reads are size-bounded (ADR-1244 D2 invariant)** — `loadRegistry` now makes the WHOLE per-candidate overlay-processing body total: ANY throw from ANY validator or step (including the committed `validateCapability`, which dereferences a malformed array entry such as `gates: [null]` / `steps: [null]` / `contributions: [null]` before its shape check) drops just that one overlay with a skip-warning instead of escaping the loader, while `gatePointsOf` is hardened to be total over null/non-array/malformed gates. The final canonical `buildRegistry` compose stays guarded: a throw on the merged set falls back to the frozen first-party registry plus a warning, records each dropped gate-declaring overlay's declared gate as blocked (`incompatibleGateCapIds` / `blockedGates`) so a dropped blocking gate FAILS CLOSED, AND now clears `_overlay.commandRoots` in the fallback so no dropped overlay retains a stale command root. Previously a malformed-array throw or a compose throw escaped the loader and crashed every consumer (loop-resolver, config-loader, surface, capability-state, gsd-tools). On the source side, the capability resolver/staging now reads every untrusted `capability.json` (tarball / npm / git / local) via the shared bounded fd-reader (regular-file + 8 MiB cap) instead of a raw `fs.readFileSync`, so an oversized or FIFO/non-regular extracted-or-local manifest can no longer OOM or hang the resolver; the fetch (`realHttpsGet`) bounds the downloaded response to 64 MiB; and `stageValidated` now enforces ONE uniform aggregate byte-budget (`MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES`, 128 MiB) over the STAGED bundle directory via a bounded streaming walk (cumulative byte + entry counters; symlink / non-regular entries rejected) at the common staging chokepoint — AFTER staging and BEFORE validation/promotion — so a huge source tree, git repo, npm package, or gzip/tar bomb is rejected (and its staging dir cleaned up) before promotion, uniformly bounding the RESULT of `copyDirRecursive` / `git clone` / `npm pack` / `tar -x` that were previously only timeout-bounded. `copyDirRecursive` itself is now STREAMING and BUDGETED: it enumerates each directory via `fs.opendirSync` + `dir.readSync()` (one entry at a time) and threads CUMULATIVE entry (`MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES`, 100k) and byte (`MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES`) counters through the recursion, failing closed the MOMENT either cap is exceeded DURING the copy — closing a residual where the former `fs.readdirSync(src, { withFileTypes: true })` materialized the ENTIRE directory-entry array into memory at staging time (BEFORE the post-copy budget walk), so a hostile source whose tree held a directory of millions of tiny files (fetch < 64 MiB, but a colossal dirent array) could OOM the process during the copy before the budget could fail closed; the post-copy walk is retained as a cheap belt-and-suspenders re-verification on what actually landed in staging. The spoofable per-member `tar`-header size parse (`parseTarMemberSize`, which mis-anchored on BSD `tar -tv` owner/group columns such as a `Jan` group → fail-open) was REMOVED in favor of that non-spoofable staged-dir budget; `assertSafeTarMembers` keeps its unambiguous traversal / symlink / hardlink NAME and TYPE guards. (#1461)
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<!-- docs-exempt: internal robustness hardening of the runtime capability loader/source seams (capability-loader.cts / capability-source.cts) — no user-visible API change; the never-crash + bounded-fetch guarantees are ADR-1244 D2 internal invariants -->
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@@ -170,6 +170,26 @@ function errMessage(e: unknown): string {
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return e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e);
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Test seams (#1461). The validator and generator are normally `require()`d
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// fresh inside loadRegistry. These optional overrides let a test inject a
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// validator whose cross-capability check THROWS (OVL-1) or a generator whose
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// buildRegistry THROWS (OVL-2), to prove the loader still NEVER crashes the
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// loop — it skips the offending overlay with a warning / falls back to the
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// frozen first-party registry. Pass null to restore the real module.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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let _validatorOverride: ValidatorModule | null = null;
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let _generatorOverride: GeneratorModule | null = null;
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/** Test seam: override the capability validator module. Pass null to restore. */
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function _setValidatorForTest(v: ValidatorModule | null): void {
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_validatorOverride = v;
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}
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/** Test seam: override the registry generator module. Pass null to restore. */
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function _setGeneratorForTest(g: GeneratorModule | null): void {
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_generatorOverride = g;
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}
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/** Resolve the running GSD version; fail-closed to '0.0.0' if it cannot be read. */
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function readHostVersion(): string {
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try {
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@@ -406,6 +426,32 @@ function withOverlayMeta(reg: Registry, meta: OverlayMeta): Registry {
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return Object.assign({}, reg, { _overlay: meta });
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}
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/**
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* Loop extension points a capability declares a gate at (the `point` strings off `cap.gates`).
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* SINGLE source of truth shared by BOTH the per-candidate `skip()` closure AND the OVL-2
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* buildRegistry-failure fallback (#1461) so a dropped gate-declaring overlay fails CLOSED via the
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* SAME extraction the per-candidate path uses — never one path blocking and the other failing open.
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*
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* #1461 finding 1 (HIGH): this MUST be TOTAL over an UNTRUSTED, possibly-malformed manifest — it
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* runs on a candidate BEFORE per-candidate validation has confirmed the shape. A null `cap`, a
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* non-object `cap`, a non-array `cap.gates` (e.g. `gates: {}` / `gates: null`), or a malformed gate
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* ENTRY (`gates: [null]` / `gates: ["x"]` / a gate with a non-string `point`) must NEVER throw: it
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* returns only the extractable `point` strings, filtering null/non-object/malformed entries. A
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* `null` gate has no extractable point, so it contributes nothing (no spurious fail-closed block).
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*/
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function gatePointsOf(cap: unknown): string[] {
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if (!cap || typeof cap !== 'object') return [];
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const gates = (cap as { gates?: unknown }).gates;
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if (!Array.isArray(gates)) return [];
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return (gates as unknown[])
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.map((g) =>
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g && typeof g === 'object' && typeof (g as Record<string, unknown>).point === 'string'
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? ((g as Record<string, unknown>).point as string)
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: null,
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)
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.filter((p): p is string => typeof p === 'string');
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}
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/**
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* Load the capability registry, optionally composing the installed overlay.
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*
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@@ -420,7 +466,7 @@ export function loadRegistry(options: LoadRegistryOptions = {}): Registry {
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if (!options.includeInstalled) return base;
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-assignment
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const validator: ValidatorModule = require('./capability-validator.cjs');
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const validator: ValidatorModule = _validatorOverride ?? require('./capability-validator.cjs');
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-assignment
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const semver: SemverModule = require('./semver-compare.cjs');
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-assignment
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@@ -467,7 +513,7 @@ export function loadRegistry(options: LoadRegistryOptions = {}): Registry {
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const getGenerator = (): GeneratorModule => {
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if (generatorMod) return generatorMod;
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-assignment
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const mod: GeneratorModule = require('../../../scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs');
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const mod: GeneratorModule = _generatorOverride ?? require('../../../scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs');
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generatorMod = mod;
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return mod;
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};
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@@ -526,11 +572,7 @@ export function loadRegistry(options: LoadRegistryOptions = {}): Registry {
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// Points at which this capability declares a gate — used to fail CLOSED if
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// the capability is skipped (a skipped deploy gate must block, not pass).
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const gatePoints: string[] = Array.isArray(cap.gates)
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? (cap.gates as Array<Record<string, unknown>>)
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.map((g) => (g && typeof g === 'object' && typeof g.point === 'string' ? g.point : null))
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.filter((p): p is string => typeof p === 'string')
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: [];
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const gatePoints: string[] = gatePointsOf(cap);
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const declaresGate = gatePoints.length > 0;
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const skip = (reason: string): void => {
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warnings.push({ id, scope: root.scope, reason });
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@@ -540,6 +582,21 @@ export function loadRegistry(options: LoadRegistryOptions = {}): Registry {
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}
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};
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// #1461 finding 1 (HIGH): make the ENTIRE per-candidate processing body TOTAL. The committed
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// validator is NOT total for malformed ARRAY entries — validateGate/validateStep/
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// validateContribution dereference an entry (`.point`, `.into`, …) BEFORE any shape check, so a
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// manifest with `gates: [null]` (or `steps: [null]` / `contributions: [null]`) makes
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// validateCapability THROW `Cannot read properties of null (reading 'point')`. That throw was
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// OUTSIDE any per-candidate guard → it escaped loadRegistry and crashed EVERY consumer
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// (loop-resolver, config-loader, surface, capability-state, gsd-tools). ADR-1244 D2 mandates a
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// malformed overlay is SKIPPED with a warning, never crashes the loop. Wrapping the whole body
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// (manifest already parsed above) means ANY throw from ANY validator/step becomes a structured
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// `skip()` + continue to the next candidate — which ALSO fail-closes a declared gate (the `skip`
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// closure records incompatibleGateCapIds/blockedGates for the extractable gate points). The
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// existing structured skip/continue paths inside are unchanged; this is a fail-safe BACKSTOP for
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// a validator/step that THROWS rather than returning errors. `continue` inside this try simply
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// advances the `for` loop (there is no finally to interfere).
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try {
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// 1. Reserved namespace — third-party may not impersonate first-party.
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if (RESERVED_ID_PREFIX.test(id)) {
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skip('id uses a reserved first-party prefix (gsd-/gsd-core-/anthropic-)');
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@@ -666,11 +723,25 @@ export function loadRegistry(options: LoadRegistryOptions = {}): Registry {
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// owner-uniqueness, config-key exclusivity vs central schema, requires acyclicity
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// + tier-monotone. Incremental: add the candidate, validate, drop on any error.
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acceptedMap.set(id, cap);
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const crossErrs = [
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...validator.validateAgainstContract(cap, id),
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...validator.validateConsumesGlobal(acceptedMap),
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...validator.validateCrossCapability(acceptedMap, getCentralKeys()),
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];
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// #1461 OVL-1 (HIGH): these validators are CONTRACTED to RETURN error arrays, but one can THROW
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// (e.g. validateConsumesGlobal asserting on a duplicate producer). An unguarded throw here
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// escapes loadRegistry and crashes EVERY consumer (loop-resolver, config-loader, surface,
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// capability-state, gsd-tools). ADR-1244 D2: a malformed overlay is SKIPPED with a warning,
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// never crashes the loop. So a throwing validator is treated EXACTLY like a validation failure:
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// drop this one candidate (with a warning) and continue — the rest of the overlay set is
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// unaffected. (The returns-errors path below is unchanged.)
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let crossErrs: string[];
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try {
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crossErrs = [
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...validator.validateAgainstContract(cap, id),
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...validator.validateConsumesGlobal(acceptedMap),
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...validator.validateCrossCapability(acceptedMap, getCentralKeys()),
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];
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} catch (e) {
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acceptedMap.delete(id);
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skip('cross-capability validation error: ' + errMessage(e));
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continue;
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}
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if (crossErrs.length) {
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acceptedMap.delete(id);
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skip('cross-capability validation failed: ' + crossErrs.slice(0, 3).join('; '));
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@@ -692,6 +763,17 @@ export function loadRegistry(options: LoadRegistryOptions = {}): Registry {
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// dispatchable. (Project-scope ledgers live in the repo tree and are thus only as trustworthy
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// as the repo — see docs/explanation/capability-trust-model.md.)
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if (families.length > 0 && committedIds.has(id)) commandRoots[id] = capDir;
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} catch (e) {
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// #1461 finding 1 (HIGH): ANY throw from ANY validator/step in the per-candidate body lands
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// here — drop just THIS candidate with a structured skip-warning and continue with the rest of
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// the overlay set (the loop is never crashed). `skip()` ALSO fail-closes the candidate's
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// declared gates (incompatibleGateCapIds/blockedGates) so a malformed gate-declaring overlay
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// blocks rather than silently passing. Remove any half-committed acceptedMap entry so the
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// partially-processed candidate cannot leak into the final buildRegistry compose.
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acceptedMap.delete(id);
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skip('overlay processing error: ' + errMessage(e));
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continue;
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -706,8 +788,38 @@ export function loadRegistry(options: LoadRegistryOptions = {}): Registry {
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// Compose via the canonical builder so every derived view matches first-party.
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// acceptedMap already holds first-party ∪ accepted overlays (validated above).
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const merged = getGenerator().buildRegistry(acceptedMap);
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return withOverlayMeta(merged, meta);
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//
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// #1461 OVL-2 (HIGH): an overlay can pass every per-candidate step yet trip a STRICTER whole-build
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// check inside buildRegistry (config-slice shape, topo cycle across the merged set, configFormat
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// parity). An unguarded buildRegistry throw escapes loadRegistry and crashes the loop. ADR-1244 D2
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// mandates NEVER-CRASH: on a compose failure, fall back to the frozen FIRST-PARTY registry plus a
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// warning recording why — the loop still gets a usable registry, just without the overlay surfaces.
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try {
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const merged = getGenerator().buildRegistry(acceptedMap);
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return withOverlayMeta(merged, meta);
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} catch (e) {
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const reason = 'buildRegistry failed composing overlays: ' + errMessage(e) + '; falling back to first-party';
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meta.warnings.push({ id: '*', scope: 'global', reason });
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// #1461 finding 3 (LOW): the fallback DROPS every accepted overlay, so NO dropped overlay may
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// retain a command root. A stale `commandRoots[capId]` would let a runtime dispatcher require()/
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// run a third-party command family FROM the install root of a capability the fallback decided NOT
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// to load. Clear the map (the first-party base never lists overlay commandRoots — first-party
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// command modules ship in bin/lib/, not via _overlay.commandRoots).
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meta.commandRoots = {};
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// #1461 OVL-2 fail-CLOSED on compose failure (HIGH): the fallback DROPS every accepted overlay,
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// so any accepted overlay that DECLARED a gate would have its gate silently vanish → a blocking
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// gate FAILS OPEN, violating ADR-1244 (a skipped capability declaring a gate must FAIL CLOSED).
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// Record each dropped gate-declaring overlay's gate as blocked using the SAME extraction the
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// per-candidate `skip()` closure uses (gatePointsOf), so loop-resolver injects the synthetic
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// blocking gate at each declared point exactly as it would for a per-candidate skip.
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for (const cap of overlayCaps) {
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const gatePoints = gatePointsOf(cap);
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if (gatePoints.length === 0) continue;
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meta.incompatibleGateCapIds.push(cap.id);
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for (const point of gatePoints) meta.blockedGates.push({ point, capId: cap.id, reason });
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}
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return withOverlayMeta(base, meta);
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}
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}
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module.exports = { loadRegistry };
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module.exports = { loadRegistry, _setValidatorForTest, _setGeneratorForTest };
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@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@
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*
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* ADR-457 build-at-publish: authored as TypeScript .cts → emits .cjs via tsc.
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*
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* Exports: resolveCapabilitySource, parseSpec, _setCapabilitySourceHttpGet
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* Exports: resolveCapabilitySource, parseSpec, _setCapabilitySourceHttpGet,
|
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* _setHttpsGetImpl, _readManifestBounded, MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES,
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* MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES, MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES, MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES
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*/
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import fs from 'node:fs';
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@@ -42,6 +44,12 @@ const semverMod = require('./semver-compare.cjs') as {
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semverSatisfies: (version: unknown, range: unknown) => boolean;
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};
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|
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
|
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const ledgerMod = require('./capability-ledger.cjs') as {
|
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/** Shared fd-based bounded reader: content, null for ENOENT, or THROWS (non-regular/oversized/IO). */
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readSmallRegularFile: (filePath: string, maxBytes: number) => string | null;
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};
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Types
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@@ -129,19 +137,115 @@ interface HttpResponse {
|
||||
|
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type HttpGetFn = (url: string) => Promise<HttpResponse>;
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||||
|
||||
/**
|
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* DOS-1 (#1461): GENEROUS but BOUNDED cap on a fetched capability source response. `realHttpsGet`
|
||||
* previously accumulated `res.on('data')` chunks with NO ceiling, so a hostile or accidental
|
||||
* oversized tarball (e.g. an HTTP endpoint streaming gigabytes) would buffer unbounded into memory
|
||||
* and OOM the process. A real capability bundle is a few hundred KiB of declarative JSON + small
|
||||
* artifacts; 64 MiB is far more than any legitimate bundle yet still a hard ceiling. Enforced two
|
||||
* ways: (1) a `content-length` header over the cap is rejected BEFORE buffering any body; (2) the
|
||||
* cumulative streamed byte count is tracked across `data` events and the request is destroyed +
|
||||
* rejected the instant it exceeds the cap (covers chunked / missing-content-length responses).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* #1461 finding 2 (HIGH): GENEROUS but BOUNDED cap on an UNTRUSTED `capability.json` read during
|
||||
* resolve/staging. Every untrusted manifest (tarball / npm / git / local staging) MUST be read via
|
||||
* the SHARED bounded reader (`readSmallRegularFile`: open → fstat → require-regular-file → size-cap →
|
||||
* read-exactly-size), NOT a raw `fs.readFileSync`. A raw read of an oversized extracted-or-local
|
||||
* `capability.json` reads unbounded into memory (OOM), and a FIFO/device/non-regular manifest BLOCKS
|
||||
* the resolver forever. A legitimate manifest is a few KiB of declarative JSON; 8 MiB is far more than
|
||||
* any real capability.json yet a hard ceiling. The reader returns null for a genuinely-missing file
|
||||
* (ENOENT) and THROWS for non-regular/oversized/IO — both are mapped to a clear "manifest not
|
||||
* found / refused" rejection (fail-closed: the source never resolves).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* #1461 finding 1 (HIGH): ONE uniform aggregate byte-budget over the STAGED bundle directory. The HTTP
|
||||
* fetch is capped (MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES), but `copyDirRecursive` / `fs.copyFileSync`, `git clone`,
|
||||
* `npm pack`, and `tar -x` were only TIMEOUT-bounded — so a huge local source tree, a giant git repo, a
|
||||
* large npm package, or a gzip/tar bomb that expands far beyond the compressed download cap could fill
|
||||
* disk during staging. This single budget, enforced at the common staging chokepoint (stageValidated,
|
||||
* AFTER the source is copied into staging and BEFORE validation/promotion), uniformly bounds the RESULT
|
||||
* of every adapter: it sums the regular-file bytes of the staged dir via a BOUNDED streaming walk and
|
||||
* fails closed if the total exceeds the cap. 128 MiB is generous for a real capability bundle (a few
|
||||
* hundred KiB of declarative JSON + small artifacts) yet hard-bounds a bomb.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* RESIDUAL (#1461 finding 4): this bounds the staged RESULT — it rejects an oversized install BEFORE
|
||||
* promotion, but a transient disk-fill DURING extraction/clone (before the post-staging walk runs) is a
|
||||
* residual a fully-airtight bound would need a streaming byte-quota DURING extraction/clone (e.g. a
|
||||
* cgroup/disk-quota or a custom streaming extractor) to close. This is a stated, proportionate limit:
|
||||
* this resolver path is USER-INITIATED `install` only (the cloned-repo / loader overlay path does NOT
|
||||
* invoke the resolver and is bounded separately by capability-consent's bundleContentHash caps), and
|
||||
* staging happens under a temp/.staging dir that is rmSync'd on any failure.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES = 128 * 1024 * 1024;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* #1461 finding 1: a cumulative ENTRY-count ceiling for the staged-dir budget walk so the enumeration
|
||||
* ITSELF is bounded (a hostile bundle with millions of tiny files / a very deep tree cannot force
|
||||
* unbounded readdir work before the byte cap trips). 100k entries is far more than any real bundle.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES = 100_000;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The low-level `https.get`-shaped transport. Extracted as an overridable module-level reference so
|
||||
* a test can inject a fake response stream (chunked / oversized / content-length-tagged) to exercise
|
||||
* the MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES enforcement in realHttpsGet WITHOUT real network I/O. Defaults to the real
|
||||
* node:https get. (The higher-level `_httpGet` seam below short-circuits realHttpsGet entirely and is
|
||||
* used by the integrity tests; this seam is specifically for the streaming/size-cap path.)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
type HttpsGetImpl = typeof https.get;
|
||||
let _httpsGetImpl: HttpsGetImpl = https.get;
|
||||
|
||||
/** Test seam: override the low-level https.get transport used by realHttpsGet. Pass null to restore. */
|
||||
function _setHttpsGetImpl(fn: HttpsGetImpl | null): void {
|
||||
_httpsGetImpl = fn ?? https.get;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Injectable HTTP transport (test seam)
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
function realHttpsGet(url: string): Promise<HttpResponse> {
|
||||
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||
const req = https.get(
|
||||
const req = _httpsGetImpl(
|
||||
url,
|
||||
{ headers: { 'User-Agent': 'gsd-core-capability-source/1.0' } },
|
||||
(res) => {
|
||||
// DOS-1: reject early if the server ADVERTISES a body over the cap — no bytes buffered.
|
||||
const contentLength = Number(res.headers?.['content-length']);
|
||||
if (Number.isFinite(contentLength) && contentLength > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES) {
|
||||
req.destroy();
|
||||
res.destroy?.();
|
||||
reject(
|
||||
new Error(
|
||||
`response exceeds ${MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES} bytes (content-length ${contentLength}) fetching ${url}`
|
||||
)
|
||||
);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
|
||||
res.on('data', (c: Buffer) => chunks.push(c));
|
||||
let received = 0;
|
||||
let aborted = false;
|
||||
res.on('data', (c: Buffer) => {
|
||||
if (aborted) return;
|
||||
received += c.length;
|
||||
// DOS-1: enforce the ceiling on the ACTUAL streamed bytes (covers chunked / lying or
|
||||
// absent content-length). Destroy the request/response and reject — never keep buffering.
|
||||
if (received > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES) {
|
||||
aborted = true;
|
||||
req.destroy();
|
||||
res.destroy?.();
|
||||
reject(new Error(`response exceeds ${MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES} bytes fetching ${url}`));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
chunks.push(c);
|
||||
});
|
||||
res.on('end', () => {
|
||||
if (aborted) return;
|
||||
const body = Buffer.concat(chunks);
|
||||
if (res.statusCode !== 200) {
|
||||
reject(new Error(`HTTP ${res.statusCode ?? 0} fetching ${url}`));
|
||||
@@ -204,6 +308,42 @@ function verifyIntegrity(buf: Buffer, expected: string): void {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* #1461 finding 2 (HIGH): read an UNTRUSTED `capability.json` (extracted or local) via the SHARED
|
||||
* bounded reader and parse it as a JSON object, failing CLOSED on every untrusted-input condition.
|
||||
* Replaces the raw `fs.readFileSync(manifestPath,'utf8')` at each resolve/staging site so an oversized
|
||||
* manifest cannot read unbounded (OOM) and a FIFO/device/non-regular manifest cannot BLOCK forever.
|
||||
* - ENOENT (reader returns null) → throw `<notFoundMessage>` (genuinely missing).
|
||||
* - non-regular / oversized / IO (reader THROWS) → throw `<notFoundMessage>: <reason>` (refused).
|
||||
* - not valid JSON → throw the caller's invalid-JSON message.
|
||||
* - not a JSON object → throw the caller's not-an-object message.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function readManifestBounded(
|
||||
manifestPath: string,
|
||||
notFoundMessage: string,
|
||||
): Record<string, unknown> {
|
||||
let raw: string | null;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
raw = ledgerMod.readSmallRegularFile(manifestPath, MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES);
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
// Non-regular (FIFO/device/dir), oversized, or IO error — fail closed with a clear message.
|
||||
throw new Error(`${notFoundMessage}: ${(err as Error).message}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (raw === null) {
|
||||
throw new Error(notFoundMessage); // genuinely missing (ENOENT).
|
||||
}
|
||||
let cap: unknown;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
cap = JSON.parse(raw);
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
throw new Error('capability.json is not valid JSON');
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (typeof cap !== 'object' || cap === null || Array.isArray(cap)) {
|
||||
throw new Error('capability.json must be a JSON object');
|
||||
}
|
||||
return cap as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Reject spec/id values containing path separators or `..`.
|
||||
* Throws if the id is unsafe.
|
||||
@@ -242,28 +382,170 @@ function assertSafeGitUrl(url: string): void {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Copy a directory tree recursively into destDir.
|
||||
* Copy a directory tree recursively into destDir — STREAMING and BUDGETED.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* SECURITY: symlinks are REJECTED (fail closed). A fetched bundle could otherwise
|
||||
* smuggle a symlink (e.g. `id_rsa -> ~/.ssh/id_rsa`) that fs.copyFileSync would
|
||||
* FOLLOW, copying an arbitrary host file's bytes into the staged capability dir.
|
||||
* Dirent.isSymbolicLink() reflects the entry itself (lstat semantics), so this
|
||||
* catches both file and directory symlinks before any copy.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* #1461 finding 1 (HIGH, ROUND 2): the copy ITSELF is bounded. The former
|
||||
* `fs.readdirSync(src, { withFileTypes: true })` materialized the ENTIRE directory-entry
|
||||
* array into memory BEFORE any budget could run — and copyDirRecursive runs at staging time
|
||||
* BEFORE the post-copy assertStagedBundleWithinBudget walk. So a hostile local/git/npm/tar
|
||||
* source whose tree has a directory holding millions of tiny files (fetch < 64 MiB, but a
|
||||
* colossal dirent array) OOMs the process during the COPY, before the post-copy budget can
|
||||
* fail closed. We now STREAM each directory via fs.opendirSync + dir.readSync() (one entry at
|
||||
* a time, never the whole array) and thread CUMULATIVE counters across the recursion — total
|
||||
* entries (cap MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES) and total regular-file bytes (cap
|
||||
* MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES) — throwing the MOMENT either is exceeded, DURING the copy, before
|
||||
* reading/copying the rest. The shared mutable `budget` object mirrors bundleContentHash's
|
||||
* cumulative walk in capability-consent. The throw propagates to stageValidated's catch, which
|
||||
* rmSync's the staging dir (fail closed, no partial bundle promoted).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function copyDirRecursive(src: string, dest: string): void {
|
||||
function copyDirRecursive(
|
||||
src: string,
|
||||
dest: string,
|
||||
budget: { entries: number; bytes: number } = { entries: 0, bytes: 0 },
|
||||
): void {
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(dest, { recursive: true });
|
||||
for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(src, { withFileTypes: true })) {
|
||||
const srcPath = path.join(src, entry.name);
|
||||
const destPath = path.join(dest, entry.name);
|
||||
if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Refusing to stage symlink in capability bundle: ${entry.name}`);
|
||||
} else if (entry.isDirectory()) {
|
||||
copyDirRecursive(srcPath, destPath);
|
||||
} else if (entry.isFile()) {
|
||||
fs.copyFileSync(srcPath, destPath);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Non-regular entries (sockets, fifos, devices) are silently skipped.
|
||||
let dir: fs.Dir;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
dir = fs.opendirSync(src);
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Cannot read source directory "${src}": ${(err as Error).message}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
try {
|
||||
for (;;) {
|
||||
let entry: fs.Dirent | null;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
entry = dir.readSync();
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Cannot read source directory "${src}": ${(err as Error).message}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (entry === null) break;
|
||||
|
||||
// BOUND THE ENUMERATION ITSELF: count this entry and fail closed BEFORE it is processed,
|
||||
// so a huge directory (or deep tree) is never read in full into memory first.
|
||||
budget.entries++;
|
||||
if (budget.entries > MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES) {
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
`Refusing to stage bundle: entry count exceeds the maximum of ${MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES}`
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const srcPath = path.join(src, entry.name);
|
||||
const destPath = path.join(dest, entry.name);
|
||||
if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Refusing to stage symlink in capability bundle: ${entry.name}`);
|
||||
} else if (entry.isDirectory()) {
|
||||
copyDirRecursive(srcPath, destPath, budget);
|
||||
} else if (entry.isFile()) {
|
||||
// Cumulative byte budget: lstat the entry (NOT stat — a symlink is already rejected above,
|
||||
// but lstat is the authoritative size of the regular file being copied) and fail closed the
|
||||
// MOMENT the running total crosses the cap, BEFORE copying the oversized file's bytes.
|
||||
let st: fs.Stats;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
st = fs.lstatSync(srcPath);
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Cannot lstat source entry "${srcPath}": ${(err as Error).message}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
budget.bytes += st.size;
|
||||
if (budget.bytes > MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES) {
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
`Refusing to stage bundle: total staged size exceeds the maximum of ` +
|
||||
`${MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES} bytes (possible oversized source tree, git repo, npm package, or tar bomb)`
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
fs.copyFileSync(srcPath, destPath);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Non-regular entries (sockets, fifos, devices) are silently skipped.
|
||||
}
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
try { dir.closeSync(); } catch { /* best-effort: no fd leak per opened Dir */ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* #1461 finding 1 (HIGH): sum the total regular-file bytes under `stagedDir` via a BOUNDED streaming
|
||||
* walk and fail closed if the total exceeds MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES. This is the SINGLE uniform bound on
|
||||
* the RESULT of staging for EVERY adapter (local copy / git clone / npm pack / tar extraction) — placed
|
||||
* at the common chokepoint in stageValidated AFTER copyDirRecursive and BEFORE validation/promotion.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Bounded like capability-consent.bundleContentHash's enumeration: each level is STREAMED via
|
||||
* fs.opendirSync + dir.readSync() with a CUMULATIVE entry counter (`count.n`) that throws the moment it
|
||||
* exceeds MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES — BEFORE the rest of a huge/deep level is read — so a hostile bundle
|
||||
* with millions of tiny files or a very deep tree cannot force unbounded readdir/memory work before the
|
||||
* byte cap trips. Per-entry: lstat (NOT stat) so a symlink is detected as itself; symlinks and other
|
||||
* non-regular entries are REJECTED (fail closed — copyDirRecursive already refuses symlinks at copy time,
|
||||
* but a fresh lstat here is the authoritative check on what actually landed in staging). Regular-file
|
||||
* st.size is accumulated and the walk throws the moment the running total crosses the cap.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function assertStagedBundleWithinBudget(stagedDir: string): void {
|
||||
const total = { bytes: 0 };
|
||||
const count = { n: 0 };
|
||||
const walk = (absDir: string): void => {
|
||||
let dir: fs.Dir;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
dir = fs.opendirSync(absDir);
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Cannot read staged directory "${absDir}": ${(err as Error).message}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const levelEntries: fs.Dirent[] = [];
|
||||
try {
|
||||
for (;;) {
|
||||
let ent: fs.Dirent | null;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
ent = dir.readSync();
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Cannot read staged directory "${absDir}": ${(err as Error).message}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ent === null) break;
|
||||
// BOUND THE ENUMERATION ITSELF: fail closed before this entry is retained, so a huge directory
|
||||
// (or deep tree) cannot be loaded in full first.
|
||||
count.n++;
|
||||
if (count.n > MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES) {
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
`Refusing to stage bundle: entry count exceeds the maximum of ${MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES}`
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
levelEntries.push(ent);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
try { dir.closeSync(); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (const ent of levelEntries) {
|
||||
const abs = path.join(absDir, ent.name);
|
||||
let st: fs.Stats;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
st = fs.lstatSync(abs);
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Cannot lstat staged entry "${abs}": ${(err as Error).message}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (st.isSymbolicLink()) {
|
||||
// Defense in depth: copyDirRecursive already refuses symlinks, but the budget walk is the
|
||||
// authoritative re-check on what actually landed in staging.
|
||||
throw new Error(`Refusing to stage symlink in capability bundle: ${abs}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (st.isDirectory()) {
|
||||
walk(abs);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!st.isFile()) {
|
||||
// Sockets / FIFOs / devices are not part of a real capability bundle.
|
||||
throw new Error(`Refusing to stage non-regular file in capability bundle: ${abs}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
total.bytes += st.size;
|
||||
if (total.bytes > MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES) {
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
`Refusing to stage bundle: total staged size exceeds the maximum of ` +
|
||||
`${MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES} bytes (possible oversized source tree, git repo, npm package, or tar bomb)`
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
walk(stagedDir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -271,6 +553,14 @@ function copyDirRecursive(src: string, dest: string): void {
|
||||
* an absolute path or a `..` segment BEFORE extraction (system tar mostly guards
|
||||
* this, but the hard contract is "traversal rejected", so we verify explicitly).
|
||||
* Symlink members that survive extraction are caught later by copyDirRecursive.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* #1461 finding 2 (MED): the former per-member declared-size parse (parseTarMemberSize) was REMOVED.
|
||||
* It scanned the verbose listing for a date-looking token and treated the previous token as the size,
|
||||
* but on BSD `tar -tv` the owner/group columns PRECEDE the size, so a member owner/group like "Jan"
|
||||
* mis-anchored the scan → fail-OPEN (a bomb's real size column skipped). The staged-dir aggregate
|
||||
* budget (assertStagedBundleWithinBudget, #1461 finding 1) is now the real, non-spoofable bound on the
|
||||
* extracted RESULT, so the fragile header parse is redundant. This function keeps only the NAME and
|
||||
* TYPE guards (traversal / symlink / hardlink), which are unambiguous and not size-dependent.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function assertSafeTarMembers(execTar: TarExecFn, tgzPath: string): void {
|
||||
// (1) Member NAMES — reject path traversal (absolute / "..").
|
||||
@@ -340,26 +630,37 @@ function stageValidated(opts: {
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(stagingDir, { recursive: true });
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
// Copy source into staging.
|
||||
// Copy source into staging — STREAMING + BUDGETED (#1461 finding 1, ROUND 2). copyDirRecursive now
|
||||
// enforces BOTH the entry-count and aggregate-byte budget DURING the copy (per-entry, via opendirSync
|
||||
// + readSync, never readdirSync of the whole array), so a hostile source with millions of tiny files
|
||||
// or an oversized artifact fails closed IN-PROCESS before the whole directory is materialized — it can
|
||||
// no longer OOM the process before a post-copy walk runs. The catch below rmSync's the staging dir on
|
||||
// throw, so an over-budget bundle never lands at the final location.
|
||||
copyDirRecursive(sourceDir, stagingDir);
|
||||
|
||||
// Read and parse the capability manifest.
|
||||
// #1461 finding 1 (HIGH): belt-and-suspenders aggregate byte-budget re-verification on what ACTUALLY
|
||||
// landed in staging. copyDirRecursive (above) is now the PRIMARY in-process bound — it fails closed
|
||||
// DURING the copy — so this post-copy walk is no longer the sole guard, but it is kept as a cheap
|
||||
// authoritative re-lstat of the staged RESULT at the common chokepoint AFTER staging and BEFORE
|
||||
// validation/promotion: it re-checks the entry/byte caps and re-rejects any symlink / non-regular
|
||||
// entry on the real staged tree (every staging path here flows through copyDirRecursive — there is no
|
||||
// in-place-dir staging path — so the copy already bounds it; this is defense in depth).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// RESIDUAL (#1461 finding 4): the copy and this walk bound the staged RESULT (rejects an oversized
|
||||
// install before promotion); a transient disk-fill DURING extraction/clone (system tar/git/npm write
|
||||
// to a temp dir BEFORE copyDirRecursive streams it into staging) is a residual a fully-airtight bound
|
||||
// would need a streaming byte-quota DURING extraction/clone to close. Proportionate: this resolver
|
||||
// path is USER-INITIATED `install` only (the cloned-repo / loader overlay path does NOT invoke the
|
||||
// resolver and is bounded separately), and the temp/.staging dirs are removed on any failure.
|
||||
assertStagedBundleWithinBudget(stagingDir);
|
||||
|
||||
// Read and parse the capability manifest via the SHARED bounded reader (#1461 finding 2): an
|
||||
// oversized/non-regular staged capability.json is refused (fail-closed) rather than read unbounded.
|
||||
const manifestPath = path.join(stagingDir, 'capability.json');
|
||||
let rawManifest: string;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
rawManifest = fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf8');
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
throw new Error(`capability.json not found in staged directory: ${stagingDir}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let cap: Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
cap = JSON.parse(rawManifest) as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
throw new Error('capability.json is not valid JSON');
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (typeof cap !== 'object' || cap === null || Array.isArray(cap)) {
|
||||
throw new Error('capability.json must be a JSON object');
|
||||
}
|
||||
const cap = readManifestBounded(
|
||||
manifestPath,
|
||||
`capability.json not found in staged directory: ${stagingDir}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// engines.gsd pre-check — reject before staging finalizes (unless the caller owns the gate).
|
||||
const engines = cap['engines'];
|
||||
@@ -516,14 +817,13 @@ function resolveLocal(
|
||||
if (!fs.existsSync(absPath)) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Local capability path does not exist: ${absPath}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Read id from capability.json to know the staging dest.
|
||||
// Read id from capability.json to know the staging dest — via the SHARED bounded reader (#1461
|
||||
// finding 2): an oversized/non-regular local capability.json is refused, never read unbounded.
|
||||
const manifestPath = path.join(absPath, 'capability.json');
|
||||
let cap: Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
cap = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf8')) as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Cannot read capability.json from local path: ${manifestPath}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const cap = readManifestBounded(
|
||||
manifestPath,
|
||||
`Cannot read capability.json from local path: ${manifestPath}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const id = typeof cap['id'] === 'string' ? cap['id'] : '';
|
||||
if (!id) throw new Error('capability.json missing "id" field');
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -558,14 +858,13 @@ function resolveGit(
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Read id from capability.json.
|
||||
// Read id from capability.json via the SHARED bounded reader (#1461 finding 2): a cloned repo's
|
||||
// oversized/non-regular capability.json is refused, never read unbounded.
|
||||
const manifestPath = path.join(cloneDir, 'capability.json');
|
||||
let cap: Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
cap = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf8')) as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
throw new Error(`capability.json not found in cloned repo: ${parsed.target}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const cap = readManifestBounded(
|
||||
manifestPath,
|
||||
`capability.json not found in cloned repo: ${parsed.target}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const id = typeof cap['id'] === 'string' ? cap['id'] : '';
|
||||
if (!id) throw new Error('capability.json missing "id" field');
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -620,14 +919,13 @@ function resolveNpm(
|
||||
const packageDir = path.join(extractDir, 'package');
|
||||
const sourceDir = fs.existsSync(path.join(packageDir, 'capability.json')) ? packageDir : extractDir;
|
||||
|
||||
// Read id from capability.json.
|
||||
// Read id from capability.json via the SHARED bounded reader (#1461 finding 2): an extracted
|
||||
// oversized/non-regular capability.json is refused, never read unbounded.
|
||||
const manifestPath = path.join(sourceDir, 'capability.json');
|
||||
let cap: Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
cap = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf8')) as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
throw new Error(`capability.json not found after npm pack extraction from: ${parsed.target}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const cap = readManifestBounded(
|
||||
manifestPath,
|
||||
`capability.json not found after npm pack extraction from: ${parsed.target}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const id = typeof cap['id'] === 'string' ? cap['id'] : '';
|
||||
if (!id) throw new Error('capability.json missing "id" field');
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -674,14 +972,13 @@ async function resolveTarball(
|
||||
const packageDir = path.join(extractDir, 'package');
|
||||
const sourceDir = fs.existsSync(path.join(packageDir, 'capability.json')) ? packageDir : extractDir;
|
||||
|
||||
// Read id from capability.json.
|
||||
// Read id from capability.json via the SHARED bounded reader (#1461 finding 2): an extracted
|
||||
// oversized/non-regular capability.json is refused, never read unbounded.
|
||||
const manifestPath = path.join(sourceDir, 'capability.json');
|
||||
let cap: Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
cap = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf8')) as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
throw new Error(`capability.json not found in tarball from: ${parsed.target}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const cap = readManifestBounded(
|
||||
manifestPath,
|
||||
`capability.json not found in tarball from: ${parsed.target}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const id = typeof cap['id'] === 'string' ? cap['id'] : '';
|
||||
if (!id) throw new Error('capability.json missing "id" field');
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -737,4 +1034,12 @@ export = {
|
||||
resolveCapabilitySource,
|
||||
parseSpec,
|
||||
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet,
|
||||
_setHttpsGetImpl,
|
||||
// #1461 finding 3 test seam: the exact bounded reader stageValidated uses on the COPIED manifest, so
|
||||
// a test can exercise the staged re-read directly (not just the local pre-read that shadows it).
|
||||
_readManifestBounded: readManifestBounded,
|
||||
MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES,
|
||||
MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES,
|
||||
MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES,
|
||||
MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ const os = require('node:os');
|
||||
const path = require('node:path');
|
||||
|
||||
const { cleanup } = require('./helpers.cjs');
|
||||
const { loadRegistry } = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-loader.cjs');
|
||||
const { loadRegistry, _setValidatorForTest, _setGeneratorForTest } = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-loader.cjs');
|
||||
const baseRegistry = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-registry.cjs');
|
||||
const { buildRegistry } = require('../scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs');
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1063,3 +1063,286 @@ describe('loadRegistry — convergence: gate-before-materialize + realpath fail-
|
||||
assert.ok(reg.capabilities['f1r6-ctl-global'], 'a distinct real global cap stays trusted-active (both realpaths OK and differ)');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// #1461 OVL-1 — a THROWING cross-capability validator drops ONE candidate
|
||||
// (skip-with-warning), never crashes loadRegistry. ADR-1244 D2 invariant:
|
||||
// "invalid/incompatible overlays are skipped with a warning at load, never
|
||||
// crash the loop." The per-candidate cross-validation (validateAgainstContract
|
||||
// / validateConsumesGlobal / validateCrossCapability) is assumed to RETURN
|
||||
// error arrays, but a validator can THROW (e.g. a duplicate-producer assertion).
|
||||
// An unguarded throw escapes loadRegistry and crashes EVERY consumer.
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
const realValidator = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-validator.cjs');
|
||||
|
||||
describe('loadRegistry — #1461 OVL-1: a throwing cross-capability validator skips one candidate, never crashes', () => {
|
||||
test('validateConsumesGlobal THROWING for one overlay drops it (warning) and a second valid overlay still loads', (t) => {
|
||||
// Two valid overlays on disk. A wrapper validator delegates everything to the real validator
|
||||
// EXCEPT validateConsumesGlobal, which THROWS the moment the poison candidate is in the merged
|
||||
// map (mimics a validator that asserts rather than returning an error array, e.g. on a
|
||||
// duplicate-producer). The throw escapes the unguarded per-candidate cross-validation.
|
||||
const home = makeOverlayHome([
|
||||
featureCap('ovl1-poison', { skills: ['ovl1-poison-skill'] }),
|
||||
featureCap('ovl1-good', { skills: ['ovl1-good-skill'] }),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
t.after(() => { _setValidatorForTest(null); cleanup(home); });
|
||||
|
||||
_setValidatorForTest({
|
||||
...realValidator,
|
||||
validateConsumesGlobal(capMap) {
|
||||
if (capMap.has('ovl1-poison')) {
|
||||
throw new Error('synthetic validator explosion on duplicate producer');
|
||||
}
|
||||
return realValidator.validateConsumesGlobal(capMap);
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: with the per-candidate cross-validation UN-wrapped (no try/catch), this throw
|
||||
// escapes loadRegistry → assert.doesNotThrow fails (loadRegistry throws and crashes the loop).
|
||||
let reg;
|
||||
assert.doesNotThrow(() => {
|
||||
reg = loadRegistry({ includeInstalled: true, gsdHome: home, cwd: home, hostVersion: HOST });
|
||||
}, 'a throwing cross-capability validator must NOT crash loadRegistry');
|
||||
|
||||
// The throwing candidate is dropped with a warning; the second valid overlay still loads.
|
||||
assert.ok(!reg.capabilities['ovl1-poison'], 'the candidate whose validator threw is skipped, not registered');
|
||||
assert.ok(reg._overlay.warnings.some((w) => w.id === 'ovl1-poison' && /cross-capability/i.test(w.reason)),
|
||||
'the dropped candidate carries a cross-capability skip warning');
|
||||
assert.ok(reg.capabilities['ovl1-good'], 'a SECOND valid overlay still loads after the throwing one is dropped');
|
||||
// First-party stays fully intact.
|
||||
assert.ok(Object.keys(reg.capabilities).length >= Object.keys(baseRegistry.capabilities).length + 1,
|
||||
'first-party registry remains intact alongside the surviving overlay');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// #1461 OVL-2 — a THROWING buildRegistry (the final compose) must NOT crash
|
||||
// loadRegistry. An overlay can pass every per-candidate step yet trip a
|
||||
// stricter whole-build check inside buildRegistry (config-slice shape, topo
|
||||
// cycle, configFormat parity). The unguarded final compose would crash the loop.
|
||||
// Required guarantee: NEVER crash → fall back to the frozen first-party
|
||||
// registry + a warning.
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
const realGenerator = require('../scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs');
|
||||
|
||||
describe('loadRegistry — #1461 OVL-2: a throwing buildRegistry falls back to first-party, never crashes', () => {
|
||||
test('buildRegistry THROWING returns the first-party base + a warning (loop consumers still get a usable registry)', (t) => {
|
||||
// A single valid overlay reaches the final compose. The generator wrapper delegates
|
||||
// loadCentralConfigKeys to the real generator but makes buildRegistry THROW — simulating an
|
||||
// overlay that passes per-candidate validation but breaks the full canonical build.
|
||||
const home = makeOverlayHome([
|
||||
featureCap('ovl2-cap', { skills: ['ovl2-skill'] }),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
t.after(() => { _setGeneratorForTest(null); cleanup(home); });
|
||||
|
||||
_setGeneratorForTest({
|
||||
loadCentralConfigKeys: () => realGenerator.loadCentralConfigKeys(),
|
||||
buildRegistry() {
|
||||
throw new Error('synthetic buildRegistry explosion composing overlays');
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: with the final `getGenerator().buildRegistry(acceptedMap)` UN-wrapped, this throw
|
||||
// escapes loadRegistry → assert.doesNotThrow fails (loadRegistry throws and crashes the loop).
|
||||
let reg;
|
||||
assert.doesNotThrow(() => {
|
||||
reg = loadRegistry({ includeInstalled: true, gsdHome: home, cwd: home, hostVersion: HOST });
|
||||
}, 'a throwing buildRegistry must NOT crash loadRegistry');
|
||||
|
||||
// Falls back to the frozen first-party base: every first-party capability is present and the
|
||||
// overlay is absent (the build that would have added it threw).
|
||||
assert.ok(!reg.capabilities['ovl2-cap'], 'the overlay is absent — the compose that would add it failed');
|
||||
for (const id of Object.keys(baseRegistry.capabilities)) {
|
||||
assert.ok(reg.capabilities[id], `first-party capability "${id}" survives the fallback`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// A warning records WHY the loop fell back.
|
||||
assert.ok(reg._overlay.warnings.some((w) => /buildRegistry/i.test(w.reason)),
|
||||
'a warning records the buildRegistry failure + first-party fallback');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a DROPPED gate-declaring overlay still BLOCKS its gate (fail-closed, not fail-open)', (t) => {
|
||||
// An overlay that DECLARES a blocking gate is ACCEPTED per-candidate and reaches the final
|
||||
// compose; buildRegistry then THROWS. Dropping the overlay must NOT silently drop its gate: a
|
||||
// blocking gate that vanishes fails OPEN (ADR-1244: a skipped capability declaring a gate must
|
||||
// FAIL CLOSED). So the fallback must record the dropped overlay's declared gate as blocked —
|
||||
// exactly as the per-candidate `skip()` closure does for `declaresGate`.
|
||||
const home = makeOverlayHome([
|
||||
featureCap('ovl2-gate-cap', {
|
||||
skills: ['ovl2-gate-skill'],
|
||||
config: { 'workflow.ovl2_gate': { type: 'boolean', default: true, description: 'Gate.' } },
|
||||
gates: [{ point: 'execute:wave:post', check: { query: 'x.ovl2_gate' }, blocking: true, onError: 'halt' }],
|
||||
steps: [{ point: 'execute:wave:post', ref: { skill: 'ovl2-gate-skill' }, produces: ['G.md'], consumes: [], when: 'workflow.ovl2_gate', onError: 'skip' }],
|
||||
}),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
t.after(() => { _setGeneratorForTest(null); cleanup(home); });
|
||||
|
||||
_setGeneratorForTest({
|
||||
loadCentralConfigKeys: () => realGenerator.loadCentralConfigKeys(),
|
||||
buildRegistry() {
|
||||
throw new Error('synthetic buildRegistry explosion dropping a gate-declaring overlay');
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
let reg;
|
||||
assert.doesNotThrow(() => {
|
||||
reg = loadRegistry({ includeInstalled: true, gsdHome: home, cwd: home, hostVersion: HOST });
|
||||
}, 'a throwing buildRegistry must NOT crash loadRegistry');
|
||||
|
||||
// Fell back to first-party (the overlay surfaces are gone)...
|
||||
assert.ok(!reg.capabilities['ovl2-gate-cap'], 'the gate-declaring overlay is absent after compose failure');
|
||||
// ...BUT its declared blocking gate is recorded as blocked (fail-closed).
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: without the catch iterating overlayCaps to populate gates, both of these are
|
||||
// empty (the gate silently fails OPEN) → these assertions fail.
|
||||
assert.ok(reg._overlay.incompatibleGateCapIds.includes('ovl2-gate-cap'),
|
||||
'dropped gate-declaring overlay tracked as a fail-closed blocker');
|
||||
assert.ok(
|
||||
reg._overlay.blockedGates.some((g) => g.point === 'execute:wave:post' && g.capId === 'ovl2-gate-cap'),
|
||||
'dropped overlay\'s blocking gate point recorded as blocked (loop injects the synthetic gate)');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// #1461 OVL-2 finding 3 (LOW): on the first-party fallback, the returned meta's commandRoots must be
|
||||
// CLEARED — no dropped overlay may retain a command root in the fallback (a dispatcher reading
|
||||
// _overlay.commandRoots[capId] would otherwise require()/run a command family from a capability that
|
||||
// the fallback decided NOT to load). The base first-party registry never lists overlay commandRoots,
|
||||
// so the fallback meta.commandRoots must be {}.
|
||||
test('the first-party fallback returns an EMPTY _overlay.commandRoots (no stale command root for a dropped overlay)', (t) => {
|
||||
// A committed overlay that ships a command family — so commandRoots[id] is populated BEFORE the
|
||||
// compose step. The committed ledger entry is required for the loader to record the command root.
|
||||
const home = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cap-ovl2-cmdroot-'));
|
||||
t.after(() => { _setGeneratorForTest(null); cleanup(home); });
|
||||
const id = 'ovl2-cmd-cap';
|
||||
const dir = path.join(home, '.gsd', 'capabilities', id);
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(
|
||||
path.join(dir, 'capability.json'),
|
||||
JSON.stringify(featureCap(id, {
|
||||
skills: ['ovl2-cmd-skill'],
|
||||
commands: [{ family: 'ovl2-cmd-family', module: 'router.cjs', router: 'route' }],
|
||||
})),
|
||||
'utf8',
|
||||
);
|
||||
// A committed (non-_pending, structurally-valid per isValidLedgerEntry) ledger entry so the loader
|
||||
// populates commandRoots[id] — requires id/version/source/integrity strings + files[] + sharedEdits[].
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(
|
||||
path.join(home, '.gsd-capabilities.json'),
|
||||
JSON.stringify({ version: 1, updatedAt: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', entries: { [id]: { id, version: '1.0.0', source: 'local', integrity: '', files: [], sharedEdits: [] } } }),
|
||||
'utf8',
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
_setGeneratorForTest({
|
||||
loadCentralConfigKeys: () => realGenerator.loadCentralConfigKeys(),
|
||||
buildRegistry() {
|
||||
throw new Error('synthetic buildRegistry explosion forcing the first-party fallback');
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
let reg;
|
||||
assert.doesNotThrow(() => {
|
||||
reg = loadRegistry({ includeInstalled: true, gsdHome: home, cwd: home, hostVersion: HOST });
|
||||
}, 'a throwing buildRegistry must NOT crash loadRegistry');
|
||||
|
||||
// The overlay is dropped (compose threw) AND its command root is cleared in the fallback meta.
|
||||
assert.ok(!reg.capabilities[id], 'the command-shipping overlay is absent after the compose failure');
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: without `meta.commandRoots = {}` in the OVL-2 catch, commandRoots[id] survives the
|
||||
// fallback (the loader populated it before the throw) → this assertion fails.
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(reg._overlay.commandRoots, {}, 'the fallback meta carries NO stale command roots');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// #1461 finding 1 (HIGH) — a per-candidate validator that THROWS on a malformed
|
||||
// ARRAY entry must NOT crash loadRegistry. The committed validateCapability is
|
||||
// NOT total: validateGate/validateStep/validateContribution dereference the entry
|
||||
// (`.point`, `.into`, …) BEFORE any shape check, so `gates: [null]` (or a
|
||||
// malformed steps/contributions entry) throws `Cannot read properties of null`
|
||||
// from INSIDE validateCapability — which runs OUTSIDE the per-candidate try/catch.
|
||||
// ADR-1244 D2: a malformed overlay is SKIPPED with a warning, never crashes the
|
||||
// loop. The WHOLE per-candidate body must be total.
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
describe('loadRegistry — #1461 finding 1: a throwing per-candidate validator skips one overlay, never crashes', () => {
|
||||
test('an overlay with `gates: [null]` does NOT crash loadRegistry — it is skipped, other valid overlays still load', (t) => {
|
||||
const home = makeOverlayHome([
|
||||
// gates: [null] passes Array.isArray(cap.gates) then validateGate(null) dereferences null.point.
|
||||
featureCap('null-gate-cap', { skills: ['null-gate-skill'], gates: [null] }),
|
||||
featureCap('good-after-null-gate', { skills: ['good-after-null-gate-skill'] }),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
t.after(() => cleanup(home));
|
||||
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: with validateCapability OUTSIDE the per-candidate try/catch, validateGate(null)
|
||||
// throws → loadRegistry throws → assert.doesNotThrow fails (the loop crashes).
|
||||
let reg;
|
||||
assert.doesNotThrow(() => {
|
||||
reg = load(home);
|
||||
}, 'an overlay with `gates: [null]` must NOT crash loadRegistry');
|
||||
|
||||
assert.ok(!reg.capabilities['null-gate-cap'], 'the overlay whose validator threw is skipped, not registered');
|
||||
assert.ok(reg._overlay.warnings.some((w) => w.id === 'null-gate-cap'),
|
||||
'the dropped overlay carries a skip warning');
|
||||
assert.ok(reg.capabilities['good-after-null-gate'], 'a SECOND valid overlay still loads after the throwing one is skipped');
|
||||
// First-party stays fully intact.
|
||||
assert.ok(Object.keys(reg.capabilities).length >= Object.keys(baseRegistry.capabilities).length + 1,
|
||||
'first-party registry remains intact alongside the surviving overlay');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('an overlay with a malformed `steps`/`contributions` entry (null) does NOT crash loadRegistry — skipped', (t) => {
|
||||
const home = makeOverlayHome([
|
||||
featureCap('null-step-cap', { skills: ['null-step-skill'], steps: [null] }),
|
||||
featureCap('null-contrib-cap', { skills: ['null-contrib-skill'], contributions: [null] }),
|
||||
featureCap('good-after-null-step', { skills: ['good-after-null-step-skill'] }),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
t.after(() => cleanup(home));
|
||||
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: validateStep(null)/validateContribution(null) deref null.point → throw escapes the
|
||||
// unguarded validateCapability → loadRegistry throws → assert.doesNotThrow fails.
|
||||
let reg;
|
||||
assert.doesNotThrow(() => {
|
||||
reg = load(home);
|
||||
}, 'an overlay with a null steps/contributions entry must NOT crash loadRegistry');
|
||||
|
||||
assert.ok(!reg.capabilities['null-step-cap'], 'the overlay with a null step is skipped');
|
||||
assert.ok(!reg.capabilities['null-contrib-cap'], 'the overlay with a null contribution is skipped');
|
||||
assert.ok(reg._overlay.warnings.some((w) => w.id === 'null-step-cap'), 'null-step overlay carries a warning');
|
||||
assert.ok(reg._overlay.warnings.some((w) => w.id === 'null-contrib-cap'), 'null-contrib overlay carries a warning');
|
||||
assert.ok(reg.capabilities['good-after-null-step'], 'a valid overlay still loads after the malformed ones are skipped');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a gate entry with a VALID point but otherwise malformed still FAILS CLOSED (gatePointsOf is total)', (t) => {
|
||||
// The gate object HAS a string `point` (so the point is extractable) but is otherwise malformed
|
||||
// (no valid `check`, no `blocking`) → validateCapability returns errors (not a throw) → the cap is
|
||||
// skipped via the structured `skip()` path. Because it declares a gate at an extractable point, that
|
||||
// point must be recorded as fail-closed (incompatibleGateCapIds + blockedGates).
|
||||
const home = makeOverlayHome([
|
||||
featureCap('valid-point-bad-gate', {
|
||||
skills: ['valid-point-bad-gate-skill'],
|
||||
gates: [{ point: 'execute:wave:post' }], // valid point, missing check/blocking → validation errors
|
||||
}),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
t.after(() => cleanup(home));
|
||||
|
||||
let reg;
|
||||
assert.doesNotThrow(() => { reg = load(home); });
|
||||
assert.ok(!reg.capabilities['valid-point-bad-gate'], 'a malformed-but-point-bearing gate cap is skipped');
|
||||
// The extractable point fail-closes (a skipped gate-declaring cap must block, not pass).
|
||||
assert.ok(reg._overlay.incompatibleGateCapIds.includes('valid-point-bad-gate'),
|
||||
'a skipped cap declaring a gate at an extractable point is tracked as a fail-closed blocker');
|
||||
assert.ok(reg._overlay.blockedGates.some((g) => g.point === 'execute:wave:post' && g.capId === 'valid-point-bad-gate'),
|
||||
'the extractable gate point is recorded as blocked');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a `null` gate (no extractable point) is a no-crash SKIP with no spurious blocked gate', (t) => {
|
||||
// gatePointsOf must be TOTAL over `gates: [null]`: a null entry has no extractable `point`, so it
|
||||
// contributes NO blocked gate (declaresGate is false) — but it must not crash either.
|
||||
const home = makeOverlayHome([
|
||||
featureCap('null-gate-no-block', { skills: ['null-gate-no-block-skill'], gates: [null] }),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
t.after(() => cleanup(home));
|
||||
|
||||
let reg;
|
||||
assert.doesNotThrow(() => { reg = load(home); });
|
||||
assert.ok(!reg.capabilities['null-gate-no-block'], 'the null-gate overlay is skipped');
|
||||
assert.ok(!reg._overlay.incompatibleGateCapIds.includes('null-gate-no-block'),
|
||||
'a null gate has no extractable point → no spurious fail-closed block');
|
||||
assert.ok(!reg._overlay.blockedGates.some((g) => g.capId === 'null-gate-no-block'),
|
||||
'a null gate records no blockedGates entry');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +29,13 @@ const {
|
||||
resolveCapabilitySource,
|
||||
parseSpec,
|
||||
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet,
|
||||
_setHttpsGetImpl,
|
||||
MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES,
|
||||
MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES,
|
||||
MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES,
|
||||
MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES,
|
||||
} = capSource;
|
||||
const { EventEmitter } = require('node:events');
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Helpers
|
||||
@@ -73,6 +79,16 @@ function sha512b64(buf) {
|
||||
return 'sha512-' + crypto.createHash('sha512').update(buf).digest('base64');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** A minimal fs.Dirent-shaped object for synthetic streaming-opendir tests. */
|
||||
function makeDirent(name, { file = false, dir = false, symlink = false } = {}) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
name,
|
||||
isSymbolicLink: () => symlink,
|
||||
isDirectory: () => dir,
|
||||
isFile: () => file,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// parseSpec — kind detection
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
@@ -688,3 +704,573 @@ function _fakeTarball(cap) {
|
||||
// We just need a buffer; the injected tar override does the actual "extraction".
|
||||
return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ _fakeTarball: true, id: cap.id }), 'utf8');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// #1461 DOS-1 — realHttpsGet must BOUND the fetched response size. Without a cap,
|
||||
// res.on('data') accumulates chunks and Buffer.concat'd into memory with no
|
||||
// ceiling → a hostile/oversized tarball OOMs the process. Verified by injecting a
|
||||
// fake low-level https.get (the _setHttpsGetImpl seam) that streams a response.
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Build a fake https.get implementation that drives realHttpsGet's streaming path.
|
||||
* @param chunks array of Buffers to emit on the response 'data' events
|
||||
* @param headers response headers (e.g. { 'content-length': '...' })
|
||||
* @param statusCode response status (default 200)
|
||||
* Returns a function matching the https.get(url, opts, cb) shape. It captures whether
|
||||
* req.destroy() / res.destroy() were called so a test can assert the cap aborts the stream.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function makeFakeHttpsGet(chunks, headers = {}, statusCode = 200) {
|
||||
const state = { reqDestroyed: false, resDestroyed: false, emittedBytes: 0, ended: false };
|
||||
const fn = (_url, _opts, cb) => {
|
||||
const req = new EventEmitter();
|
||||
req.setTimeout = () => req;
|
||||
req.destroy = () => { state.reqDestroyed = true; };
|
||||
const res = new EventEmitter();
|
||||
res.statusCode = statusCode;
|
||||
res.headers = headers;
|
||||
res.destroy = () => { state.resDestroyed = true; };
|
||||
// Drive the response on the next tick so realHttpsGet has attached its listeners.
|
||||
setImmediate(() => {
|
||||
cb(res);
|
||||
for (const c of chunks) {
|
||||
if (state.reqDestroyed || state.resDestroyed) break;
|
||||
state.emittedBytes += c.length;
|
||||
res.emit('data', c);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!state.reqDestroyed && !state.resDestroyed) {
|
||||
state.ended = true;
|
||||
res.emit('end');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
return req;
|
||||
};
|
||||
fn.state = state;
|
||||
return fn;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe('#1461 DOS-1 — realHttpsGet bounds the response size (MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES)', () => {
|
||||
let gsdHome = '';
|
||||
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-dos-home-'); });
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
_setHttpsGetImpl(null); // restore the real https.get
|
||||
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(null);
|
||||
cleanup(gsdHome);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES is a sane bounded cap (64 MiB)', () => {
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, 64 * 1024 * 1024, 'cap is generous but bounded');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a streamed body exceeding MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES is rejected and not buffered unboundedly', async () => {
|
||||
// Stream chunks whose cumulative length exceeds the cap. Each chunk is 1 MiB; we emit cap+2
|
||||
// chunks. With the cap in place the stream is destroyed after crossing MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, so
|
||||
// far fewer than all chunks are ever emitted.
|
||||
const ONE_MIB = 1024 * 1024;
|
||||
const chunkCount = MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES / ONE_MIB + 2; // 66 chunks of 1 MiB
|
||||
const chunks = Array.from({ length: chunkCount }, () => Buffer.alloc(ONE_MIB, 0x61));
|
||||
const fake = makeFakeHttpsGet(chunks, {} /* no content-length → exercise the streaming guard */);
|
||||
_setHttpsGetImpl(fake);
|
||||
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: without the per-`data` size guard in realHttpsGet, all chunks are accumulated
|
||||
// and the promise RESOLVES with an oversized body (then proceeds to integrity/extraction) —
|
||||
// assert.rejects below fails because nothing rejected.
|
||||
await assert.rejects(
|
||||
() => resolveCapabilitySource('https://example.com/huge.tgz', { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
||||
/exceeds .*bytes/i,
|
||||
'an oversized streamed body must reject with the size error'
|
||||
);
|
||||
// The stream was aborted: the request/response were destroyed and NOT every chunk was emitted.
|
||||
assert.ok(fake.state.reqDestroyed || fake.state.resDestroyed, 'the request/response is destroyed on overflow');
|
||||
assert.ok(fake.state.emittedBytes <= (MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + ONE_MIB),
|
||||
'streaming stops shortly after crossing the cap (not all chunks buffered)');
|
||||
assert.ok(!fake.state.ended, 'the response never reaches end — it was cut off');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a content-length header over the cap is rejected BEFORE buffering any body', async () => {
|
||||
// Advertise an oversized content-length but emit NO data — the early header check must reject.
|
||||
const fake = makeFakeHttpsGet([], { 'content-length': String(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1) });
|
||||
_setHttpsGetImpl(fake);
|
||||
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: without the content-length pre-check in realHttpsGet, the (empty) stream simply
|
||||
// ends and the promise RESOLVES — assert.rejects fails because nothing rejected.
|
||||
await assert.rejects(
|
||||
() => resolveCapabilitySource('https://example.com/lying.tgz', { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
||||
/exceeds .*bytes|content-length/i,
|
||||
'an over-cap content-length must reject before buffering'
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(fake.state.emittedBytes, 0, 'no body bytes were buffered before rejection');
|
||||
assert.ok(fake.state.reqDestroyed || fake.state.resDestroyed, 'the request/response is destroyed on the header check');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CONTROL: a normal small tarball still fetches + installs through realHttpsGet', async () => {
|
||||
// A small valid body that passes the cap. The high-level _httpGet seam is NOT used here — we go
|
||||
// through the real realHttpsGet via the injected low-level https.get so the size-cap code path is
|
||||
// exercised on the happy path too. A tar override performs the "extraction".
|
||||
const cap = featureCap('dos-control-cap');
|
||||
const tgzBuf = _fakeTarball(cap);
|
||||
const fake = makeFakeHttpsGet([tgzBuf], { 'content-length': String(tgzBuf.length) });
|
||||
_setHttpsGetImpl(fake);
|
||||
|
||||
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource('https://example.com/dos-control-cap.tgz', {
|
||||
gsdHome,
|
||||
hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
||||
execOverrides: {
|
||||
tar: (_prog, args) => {
|
||||
if (args[0] === '-tzf') {
|
||||
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: 'capability.json\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (args[0] === '-tvzf') {
|
||||
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '-rw-r--r-- 0 user group 10 Jan 1 2020 capability.json\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
||||
}
|
||||
const extractDir = args[args.indexOf('-C') + 1];
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(extractDir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(cap), 'utf8');
|
||||
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(result.id, 'dos-control-cap', 'a normal small tarball resolves through the bounded fetch path');
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(result.stagedDir), 'staged dir exists after a normal fetch+install');
|
||||
assert.ok(fake.state.ended, 'a within-cap body streams to completion');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// #1461 finding 2 (HIGH) — the resolver/staging must read every UNTRUSTED
|
||||
// capability.json via the shared bounded reader (regular-file + size cap), NOT a
|
||||
// raw fs.readFileSync. A repo-planted/extracted oversized (or FIFO/non-regular)
|
||||
// manifest would otherwise read unbounded into memory (OOM) or BLOCK the resolver.
|
||||
// A null/oversized/non-regular read → reject the source with a clear error.
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
describe('#1461 finding 2 — untrusted capability.json reads are size-bounded (no OOM/hang)', () => {
|
||||
let gsdHome = '';
|
||||
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-cap-manifest-bound-'); });
|
||||
afterEach(() => { cleanup(gsdHome); });
|
||||
|
||||
test('MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES is a sane bounded cap (8 MiB)', () => {
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES, 8 * 1024 * 1024, 'manifest cap is generous but bounded');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('local: an OVERSIZED capability.json fails closed with a clear error (no OOM)', async () => {
|
||||
// Build a local bundle whose capability.json EXCEEDS the cap. The bounded reader's fstat-size
|
||||
// check refuses it WITHOUT reading the whole file into memory.
|
||||
const dir = createTempDir('gsd-cap-oversized-local-');
|
||||
try {
|
||||
// One byte over the cap is enough for the size check to refuse.
|
||||
const oversized = Buffer.alloc(MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES + 1, 0x20); // spaces (still "JSON-ish" length-wise)
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), oversized);
|
||||
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: with a raw fs.readFileSync of capability.json, the whole oversized file is read
|
||||
// into memory and JSON.parse fails with a SYNTAX error (not the bounded-reader size error). The
|
||||
// bounded reader rejects on the fstat size BEFORE reading — so the error message names the size.
|
||||
await assert.rejects(
|
||||
() => resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
||||
/exceeds|size|maximum|not a regular file|cannot read/i,
|
||||
'an oversized local capability.json must be refused by the bounded reader',
|
||||
);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(dir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities')) ||
|
||||
fs.readdirSync(path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities')).filter((e) => e !== '.staging').length === 0,
|
||||
'no capability is staged after an oversized manifest is refused');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CONTROL: a small valid local capability.json still resolves through the bounded reader', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = makeLocalCap(featureCap('bounded-control-cap'));
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(result.id, 'bounded-control-cap', 'a small valid manifest still resolves');
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(result.stagedDir, 'capability.json')), 'staged manifest present');
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(dir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('local PRE-READ: an oversized capability.json is refused by the bounded reader (before any staging)', async () => {
|
||||
// HONEST SCOPE (#1461 finding 3): for a LOCAL source the adapter's bounded pre-read of
|
||||
// capability.json (to learn the id) runs FIRST and refuses an oversized manifest BEFORE staging —
|
||||
// so this proves the LOCAL PRE-READ bound, NOT the stageValidated staged re-read (an earlier
|
||||
// version of this test falsely claimed to exercise the staged re-read). The staged re-read is
|
||||
// covered directly below via _readManifestBounded.
|
||||
const dir = createTempDir('gsd-cap-oversized-stage-');
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const cap = featureCap('oversized-stage-cap');
|
||||
// A valid manifest padded past the cap via a large filler field — still parseable JSON shape but
|
||||
// over the byte cap, so the bounded reader refuses it on size.
|
||||
const padded = JSON.stringify({ ...cap, _filler: 'x'.repeat(MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES) });
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), padded);
|
||||
await assert.rejects(
|
||||
() => resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
||||
/exceeds|size|maximum|cannot read/i,
|
||||
'an oversized local capability.json must be refused by the bounded pre-read',
|
||||
);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(dir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('staged re-read: the bounded manifest reader refuses an oversized staged capability.json directly', () => {
|
||||
// #1461 finding 3: exercise stageValidated's bounded re-read WITHOUT the local pre-read shadowing
|
||||
// it. _readManifestBounded is the exact reader stageValidated uses on the COPIED manifest; an
|
||||
// oversized staged file is refused on size (fail-closed), not read unbounded.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: with a raw fs.readFileSync in the staged re-read, this would read the whole
|
||||
// oversized file and either OOM or surface a JSON SyntaxError, not the bounded size refusal.
|
||||
const dir = createTempDir('gsd-cap-stagedread-direct-');
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const padded = Buffer.alloc(MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES + 1, 0x20); // spaces — over the cap by one byte.
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), padded);
|
||||
assert.throws(
|
||||
() => capSource._readManifestBounded(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), 'capability.json not found'),
|
||||
/exceeds|size|maximum|not a regular file|cannot read|not found/i,
|
||||
'the bounded staged re-read refuses an oversized manifest on size',
|
||||
);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(dir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// #1461 finding 1 (HIGH) — the STAGED bundle directory is byte-bounded UNIFORMLY.
|
||||
// realHttpsGet is capped, but copyDirRecursive / git clone / npm pack / tar
|
||||
// extraction RESULTS were only TIMEOUT-bounded, so a huge source tree / repo /
|
||||
// package / tar bomb could fill disk during staging. stageValidated now enforces
|
||||
// ONE aggregate byte-budget (MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES) over the staged dir via a
|
||||
// BOUNDED streaming walk AFTER staging and BEFORE validation/promotion — a single
|
||||
// chokepoint that covers EVERY adapter (tar / npm / git / local).
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
describe('#1461 finding 1 — the staged bundle dir is aggregate-byte-bounded (uniform DoS bound)', () => {
|
||||
let gsdHome = '';
|
||||
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-cap-stagebudget-'); });
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(null);
|
||||
cleanup(gsdHome);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES is a sane bounded cap (128 MiB)', () => {
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES, 128 * 1024 * 1024, 'staged-bundle cap is generous but bounded');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('local: a staged bundle whose TOTAL bytes exceed the budget is refused before promotion', async () => {
|
||||
// A valid small manifest (so id/validation pass), plus a sibling artifact whose size pushes the
|
||||
// bundle TOTAL over the budget. The bounded streaming walk in stageValidated sums regular-file
|
||||
// bytes and fails closed BEFORE validation/promotion.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: without the staged-dir aggregate budget, copyDirRecursive copies the oversized
|
||||
// artifact into staging and the source resolves+promotes normally — the oversized bundle lands on
|
||||
// disk. With the budget, the bounded walk throws and the source never resolves.
|
||||
const dir = createTempDir('gsd-cap-stagebudget-local-');
|
||||
try {
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(featureCap('stagebudget-cap')), 'utf8');
|
||||
// One byte over the budget across a single artifact is enough for the cumulative counter to trip.
|
||||
// ftruncate makes a sparse file so we don't actually write 128 MiB of real bytes (st.size still
|
||||
// reports the full length, which is what the budget walk sums).
|
||||
const big = path.join(dir, 'artifact.bin');
|
||||
const fd = fs.openSync(big, 'w');
|
||||
try { fs.ftruncateSync(fd, MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES + 1); } finally { fs.closeSync(fd); }
|
||||
|
||||
await assert.rejects(
|
||||
() => resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
||||
/staged bundle|exceeds|budget|maximum|too large/i,
|
||||
'an over-budget staged bundle must be refused before promotion',
|
||||
);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(dir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const capRoot = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities');
|
||||
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(capRoot) ||
|
||||
fs.readdirSync(capRoot).filter((e) => e !== '.staging').length === 0,
|
||||
'no capability is promoted after an over-budget bundle is refused');
|
||||
// The staging dir for the rejected bundle must be cleaned up (atomicity).
|
||||
const stagingRoot = path.join(capRoot, '.staging');
|
||||
if (fs.existsSync(stagingRoot)) {
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(fs.readdirSync(stagingRoot).length, 0, '.staging must be empty after an over-budget refusal');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('tarball: an extracted bundle over the budget is refused at the common staging chokepoint', async () => {
|
||||
// Drives the budget via the tarball adapter to prove the chokepoint is adapter-agnostic: the tar
|
||||
// override "extracts" an oversized artifact next to a valid manifest; stageValidated's budget walk
|
||||
// (after copyDirRecursive) rejects it.
|
||||
const cap = featureCap('stagebudget-tar-cap');
|
||||
const tgzBuf = _fakeTarball(cap);
|
||||
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(() => Promise.resolve({ statusCode: 200, body: tgzBuf }));
|
||||
await assert.rejects(
|
||||
() => resolveCapabilitySource('https://example.com/big.tgz', {
|
||||
gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
||||
execOverrides: {
|
||||
tar: (_prog, args) => {
|
||||
if (args[0] === '-tzf') {
|
||||
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: 'capability.json\nbomb.bin\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (args[0] === '-tvzf') {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
exitCode: 0,
|
||||
stdout:
|
||||
'-rw-r--r-- 0 user group 10 Jan 1 2020 capability.json\n' +
|
||||
'-rw-r--r-- 0 user group 10 Jan 1 2020 bomb.bin\n',
|
||||
stderr: '', signal: null, error: null,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
// "extraction": write a valid manifest + an oversized (sparse) artifact into extractDir.
|
||||
const extractDir = args[args.indexOf('-C') + 1];
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(extractDir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(cap), 'utf8');
|
||||
const fd = fs.openSync(path.join(extractDir, 'bomb.bin'), 'w');
|
||||
try { fs.ftruncateSync(fd, MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES + 1); } finally { fs.closeSync(fd); }
|
||||
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}),
|
||||
/staged bundle|exceeds|budget|maximum|too large/i,
|
||||
'an over-budget extracted tarball must be refused at the staging chokepoint',
|
||||
);
|
||||
const capRoot = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities');
|
||||
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(capRoot) ||
|
||||
fs.readdirSync(capRoot).filter((e) => e !== '.staging').length === 0,
|
||||
'no capability is promoted after an over-budget tarball is refused');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CONTROL: a within-budget bundle still resolves + promotes normally', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = makeLocalCap(featureCap('stagebudget-control-cap'));
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(result.id, 'stagebudget-control-cap', 'a within-budget bundle resolves');
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(result.stagedDir, 'capability.json')), 'staged manifest present');
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(dir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// #1461 finding 1 (HIGH, ROUND 2) — copyDirRecursive itself is STREAMING +
|
||||
// BUDGETED, so the COPY can never materialize a whole hostile directory.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The post-copy assertStagedBundleWithinBudget walk is bounded, but it runs
|
||||
// AFTER copyDirRecursive. The OLD copyDirRecursive used
|
||||
// `fs.readdirSync(src, { withFileTypes: true })`, which materializes the ENTIRE
|
||||
// directory-entry array into memory BEFORE the budget walk can run — so a
|
||||
// hostile source tree with a directory holding millions of tiny entries
|
||||
// (fetch < 64 MiB, but a colossal dirent array) OOMs the process during the
|
||||
// COPY, before the post-copy budget can fail closed. copyDirRecursive now
|
||||
// streams each directory via fs.opendirSync + dir.readSync() and threads a
|
||||
// cumulative entry + byte counter, throwing the MOMENT either cap is exceeded —
|
||||
// DURING the copy, before reading/copying the rest.
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
describe('#1461 finding 1 (ROUND 2) — copyDirRecursive streams + budgets the copy (no full materialization)', () => {
|
||||
let gsdHome = '';
|
||||
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-cap-copybudget-'); });
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(null);
|
||||
cleanup(gsdHome);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES is exported as a sane bounded cap (100k)', () => {
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES, 100_000, 'staged-bundle entry cap is generous but bounded');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a source dir with more than MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES entries is refused, and the copy NEVER readdirSyncs the source', async () => {
|
||||
// ANTI-VACUOUS, two-pronged:
|
||||
// (1) the bounded entry error fires (fail closed), AND
|
||||
// (2) the COPY enumerated the source via opendirSync/readSync — it did NOT call the
|
||||
// whole-array `fs.readdirSync(src, { withFileTypes:true })` materialization on the source.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// We don't actually create 100k real files (slow + disk). Instead we monkeypatch fs.opendirSync to
|
||||
// return a SYNTHETIC Dir whose readSync() yields lazily-generated tiny-file dirents far past the cap,
|
||||
// while a real on-disk capability.json + a few real files back the source so non-enumeration fs ops
|
||||
// still work. We also spy fs.readdirSync to PROVE the whole-array materialization is never used on
|
||||
// the source during the copy.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: reverting copyDirRecursive to `fs.readdirSync(src, { withFileTypes:true })` makes the
|
||||
// copy call readdirSync on the source (assertion (2) fails) AND would materialize the entire (here
|
||||
// synthetic, effectively unbounded) dirent array before any cap could trip.
|
||||
const src = createTempDir('gsd-cap-copybudget-src-');
|
||||
try {
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(src, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(featureCap('copybudget-cap')), 'utf8');
|
||||
|
||||
const TOTAL_SYNTH = MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES + 50_000; // far past the cap
|
||||
let readSyncCalls = 0;
|
||||
let readdirOnSrc = 0;
|
||||
let opendirOnSrc = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
const realOpendir = fs.opendirSync;
|
||||
const realReaddir = fs.readdirSync;
|
||||
const realLstat = fs.lstatSync;
|
||||
const realCopyFile = fs.copyFileSync;
|
||||
|
||||
// Make any per-entry lstat/copy of a synthetic file a no-op (the files don't exist on disk).
|
||||
fs.lstatSync = function patchedLstat(p, ...rest) {
|
||||
if (typeof p === 'string' && /[/\\]synth-\d+\.txt$/.test(p)) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
isSymbolicLink: () => false,
|
||||
isDirectory: () => false,
|
||||
isFile: () => true,
|
||||
size: 1,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
return realLstat.call(this, p, ...rest);
|
||||
};
|
||||
fs.copyFileSync = function patchedCopyFile(s, d, ...rest) {
|
||||
if (typeof s === 'string' && /[/\\]synth-\d+\.txt$/.test(s)) return undefined;
|
||||
return realCopyFile.call(this, s, d, ...rest);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
fs.readdirSync = function patchedReaddir(p, ...rest) {
|
||||
if (p === src) readdirOnSrc++;
|
||||
return realReaddir.call(this, p, ...rest);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
fs.opendirSync = function patchedOpendir(p, ...rest) {
|
||||
if (p === src) {
|
||||
opendirOnSrc++;
|
||||
let i = 0;
|
||||
// A streaming Dir that yields the real manifest first, then synthetic tiny files lazily.
|
||||
return {
|
||||
readSync() {
|
||||
readSyncCalls++;
|
||||
if (i === 0) { i++; return makeDirent('capability.json', { file: true }); }
|
||||
if (i <= TOTAL_SYNTH) { const n = i++; return makeDirent(`synth-${n}.txt`, { file: true }); }
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
},
|
||||
closeSync() {},
|
||||
[Symbol.iterator]() { return this; },
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
return realOpendir.call(this, p, ...rest);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await assert.rejects(
|
||||
() => resolveCapabilitySource(src, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
||||
/entry count exceeds|maximum of 100000|too many entries/i,
|
||||
'a source with more than the entry cap must be refused during the streaming copy',
|
||||
);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
fs.opendirSync = realOpendir;
|
||||
fs.readdirSync = realReaddir;
|
||||
fs.lstatSync = realLstat;
|
||||
fs.copyFileSync = realCopyFile;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// (2a) The copy enumerated the source via the streaming opendir/readSync path.
|
||||
assert.ok(opendirOnSrc >= 1, 'copyDirRecursive must opendirSync the source (streaming)');
|
||||
assert.ok(readSyncCalls >= 1, 'copyDirRecursive must readSync the source (streaming)');
|
||||
// (2b) The copy did NOT use the whole-array readdirSync materialization on the source.
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readdirOnSrc, 0, 'copyDirRecursive must NOT readdirSync the source (no full materialization)');
|
||||
// (2c) It aborted at ~the cap, NOT after enumerating all TOTAL_SYNTH entries.
|
||||
assert.ok(
|
||||
readSyncCalls <= MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES + 5,
|
||||
`streaming copy must abort at ~the cap (readSync called ${readSyncCalls}, cap ${MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES})`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(src);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Atomicity: nothing promoted; .staging cleaned up.
|
||||
const capRoot = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities');
|
||||
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(capRoot) ||
|
||||
fs.readdirSync(capRoot).filter((e) => e !== '.staging').length === 0,
|
||||
'no capability is promoted after an over-entry-budget bundle is refused');
|
||||
const stagingRoot = path.join(capRoot, '.staging');
|
||||
if (fs.existsSync(stagingRoot)) {
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(fs.readdirSync(stagingRoot).length, 0, '.staging must be empty after an over-entry refusal');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a source whose copied bytes exceed the budget is refused DURING the copy (cumulative byte counter)', async () => {
|
||||
// The streaming copy threads a cumulative BYTE counter too: an oversized regular file trips the byte
|
||||
// cap during the copy, before the rest of the tree is read/copied.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: the old copyDirRecursive copied everything unconditionally and relied solely on the
|
||||
// post-copy walk; if that post-copy walk were ALSO removed (and copy not budgeted), the oversized
|
||||
// artifact would land in staging. With the in-copy byte budget the copy itself fails closed.
|
||||
const src = createTempDir('gsd-cap-copybudget-bytes-');
|
||||
try {
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(src, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(featureCap('copybudget-bytes-cap')), 'utf8');
|
||||
const big = path.join(src, 'artifact.bin');
|
||||
const fd = fs.openSync(big, 'w');
|
||||
try { fs.ftruncateSync(fd, MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES + 1); } finally { fs.closeSync(fd); }
|
||||
|
||||
await assert.rejects(
|
||||
() => resolveCapabilitySource(src, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
||||
/exceeds|budget|maximum|too large|staged bundle/i,
|
||||
'an over-byte-budget source must be refused during the streaming copy',
|
||||
);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(src);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const capRoot = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities');
|
||||
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(capRoot) ||
|
||||
fs.readdirSync(capRoot).filter((e) => e !== '.staging').length === 0,
|
||||
'no capability is promoted after an over-byte-budget bundle is refused');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CONTROL: a normal small source still stages through the streaming copy', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = createTempDir('gsd-cap-copybudget-control-');
|
||||
try {
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(featureCap('copybudget-control-cap')), 'utf8');
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(dir, 'nested'), { recursive: true });
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'nested', 'extra.txt'), 'hello', 'utf8');
|
||||
|
||||
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(result.id, 'copybudget-control-cap', 'a within-budget bundle resolves');
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(result.stagedDir, 'capability.json')), 'staged manifest present');
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(result.stagedDir, 'nested', 'extra.txt')), 'nested file copied through the streaming copy');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(fs.readFileSync(path.join(result.stagedDir, 'nested', 'extra.txt'), 'utf8'), 'hello', 'nested file bytes preserved');
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(dir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// #1461 finding 2 (MED) — the spoofable parseTarMemberSize header-size parse was
|
||||
// REMOVED. The staged-dir aggregate budget (finding 1) is now the real bound on
|
||||
// the extracted RESULT, so the fragile/spoofable BSD-vs-GNU date-token size scan
|
||||
// is gone. The tar NAME/TYPE guards (traversal, symlink, hardlink) remain and a
|
||||
// within-name/type tarball still resolves through extraction.
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
describe('#1461 finding 2 — tar header-size parse removed; NAME/TYPE guards remain', () => {
|
||||
let gsdHome = '';
|
||||
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-cap-tarsize-removed-'); });
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(null);
|
||||
cleanup(gsdHome);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('the spoofable per-member size cap export (MAX_TAR_MEMBER_BYTES) is REMOVED', () => {
|
||||
// REVERT-FAILS: if parseTarMemberSize / its export are re-introduced, this asserts the constant
|
||||
// is gone (the spoofable BSD-owner="Jan" mis-anchor fail-open is no longer relied upon).
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(capSource.MAX_TAR_MEMBER_BYTES, undefined, 'the spoofable per-member tar size cap is removed');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a tar with a HUGE declared member size (formerly rejected by the size parse) now extracts — and the staged budget is the real bound', async () => {
|
||||
// This listing once tripped the per-member size cap. With that removed, the NAME/TYPE guards pass
|
||||
// and extraction proceeds; a WITHIN-budget extracted result resolves normally. (An over-budget
|
||||
// result would be caught by finding 1's staged-dir budget, exercised in the finding-1 suite.)
|
||||
const cap = featureCap('tarsize-removed-cap');
|
||||
const tgzBuf = _fakeTarball(cap);
|
||||
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(() => Promise.resolve({ statusCode: 200, body: tgzBuf }));
|
||||
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource('https://example.com/huge-decl.tgz', {
|
||||
gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
||||
execOverrides: {
|
||||
tar: (_prog, args) => {
|
||||
if (args[0] === '-tzf') {
|
||||
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: 'capability.json\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (args[0] === '-tvzf') {
|
||||
// A wildly large DECLARED size in the column — formerly rejected, now ignored.
|
||||
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '-rw-r--r-- 0 user group 999999999999 Jan 1 2020 capability.json\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
||||
}
|
||||
const extractDir = args[args.indexOf('-C') + 1];
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(extractDir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(cap), 'utf8');
|
||||
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(result.id, 'tarsize-removed-cap', 'a huge-declared-size tar with safe names/types now extracts');
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(result.stagedDir), 'staged dir exists after extraction');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user