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fix(#3493): confine key_links from:/to: to the project directory (#3506)

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`cmdVerifyKeyLinks` resolved `from:` and `to:` with `path.join(cwd, <value>)` where the value comes verbatim from plan YAML. `path.join` normalizes `../` rather than rejecting it, so a plan travelling with a repository could name any file the process can read, and the command reports whether the link's `pattern` matched it — an arbitrary-file-read oracle reachable from `verify-phase`.

Both reads now go through `validatePath` in src/security.cts, the existing realpath-based confinement seam already used at 11 call sites. Not a missing capability — a bypassed one.

Two defects in that seam, found by adversarial review and fixed here because they affect all 11 callers:

1. A dangling in-project symlink escaped confinement. A link to an EXISTING outside path was refused (realpath lands outside) while a link to a MISSING outside path took the parent-resolution fallback and was accepted — an existence oracle for arbitrary absolute paths. lstat succeeds on a dangling link and throws ENOENT on a truly absent path; an unresolvable link is now refused. A symlink resolving inside the project is still accepted.

2. A canonicalized base was compared against an uncanonicalized path when a file and its parent were both missing, wrongly refusing legitimate in-project paths on any non-canonical cwd (every macOS temp dir). This was a live regression in this PR: the wave-pending classification (#1202) depends on the not-yet-created case. Resolution now walks up to the nearest existing ancestor.

Two adjacent aborts fixed: the from: read sat outside the per-link try, so a non-ENOENT errno killed the whole command; and an empty from: read the cwd directory, throwing EISDIR. Both now fail per-link.

The issue was filed as a fourth ADR-0174 consolidation loss. It is not one — validatePath/requireSafePath never went away, only the SDK's name for the concept did. This is an instance of epic #3473's F2 family. The ADR-0174 loss count is three.

Closes #3493

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tom Boucher
2026-08-14 17:29:58 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent e57e3b5d6e
commit 7a02f98574
7 changed files with 475 additions and 8 deletions
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5
.changeset/patient-lynx-march.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
---
type: Security
pr: 3506
---
**Path validation no longer accepts a symbolic link whose target is missing** — `validatePath` canonicalizes a path with `realpath`, and for a path that does not exist yet it fell back to canonicalizing the parent directory instead. A symlink inside the project pointing at a **non-existent** location outside it took that fallback and was accepted, while a symlink pointing at an **existing** outside location was correctly refused — a difference an attacker could use to test whether arbitrary absolute paths exist. Such a link is now refused outright. The same fallback also compared an uncanonicalized path against a canonicalized base when several leading directories were missing, wrongly refusing legitimate not-yet-created paths on any non-canonical working directory (every macOS temp directory, for one); it now canonicalizes from the nearest existing ancestor. (#3493)

5
.changeset/serene-eagles-roar.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
---
type: Security
pr: 3506
---
**`verify key-links` no longer reads files outside the project** — `from:` and `to:` were taken verbatim from plan frontmatter and resolved with `path.join(cwd, …)`, which normalizes `../` rather than rejecting it, so a plan carried in an untrusted repository could name any file the process could read and learn from the reported result whether a supplied pattern matched its contents. Both paths now resolve through the project's realpath-based confinement seam; a path that escapes is refused without being read, reported as `path_rejected`, and never counts as verified. (#3493)

2
docs/CLI-TOOLS.md
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@@ -547,6 +547,8 @@ node gsd-tools.cjs verify artifacts <plan-file>
node gsd-tools.cjs verify key-links <plan-file>
```
`verify key-links` confines each link's `from:`/`to:` to the project directory (#3493): a path that resolves outside the project (via `../` traversal, an absolute path, or a symlink) is never read. That link's `links[]` entry reports `path_rejected: "from"` or `path_rejected: "to"` (whichever field was rejected) alongside `verified: false`, without echoing the underlying path-confinement error (which would embed an absolute host path). A rejected link fails independently — it does not abort evaluation of the other links in the same plan, and does not set `path_rejected` on links whose paths resolve inside the project.
---
## Validation Commands

46
src/security.cts
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@@ -56,12 +56,50 @@ export function validatePath(filePath: unknown, baseDir: unknown, opts: { allowA
try {
resolvedPath = fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath);
} catch {
const parentDir = path.dirname(resolvedPath);
// realpathSync failed — either resolvedPath doesn't exist at all, or it's
// a dangling symlink (the link itself exists but its target doesn't).
// lstat (unlike stat/realpath) stats the link itself and does NOT follow
// it, so it succeeds for a dangling symlink and throws ENOENT for a
// genuinely absent path. That's the discriminator: without it, a dangling
// symlink to a non-existent OUTSIDE path would fall through to the
// parent-resolution fallback below and be re-accepted as an in-project
// path, while a symlink to an EXISTING outside path is correctly
// rejected via the realpathSync success branch above — a state
// difference an attacker can use as an existence oracle for arbitrary
// absolute paths.
try {
const realParent = fs.realpathSync(parentDir);
resolvedPath = path.join(realParent, path.basename(resolvedPath));
if (fs.lstatSync(resolvedPath).isSymbolicLink()) {
return { safe: false, resolved: '', error: 'Path is an unresolvable symbolic link' };
}
} catch {
// Parent doesn't exist either — keep the resolved path as-is
// lstat also threw — resolvedPath (and its would-be link) genuinely
// doesn't exist. Fall through to ancestor resolution below.
}
// Walk up to the nearest ancestor that exists and realpath THAT, then
// re-append the remaining (not-yet-created) segments. This canonicalizes
// resolvedPath the same way resolvedBase was canonicalized above,
// regardless of how many leading directories are missing — a single
// parent-only check would leave resolvedPath un-canonicalized whenever
// the parent is also missing, which breaks the startsWith comparison
// below on any non-canonical cwd (e.g. macOS /var/... vs
// /private/var/...).
let ancestor = path.dirname(resolvedPath);
const remainder: string[] = [path.basename(resolvedPath)];
for (;;) {
try {
const realAncestor = fs.realpathSync(ancestor);
resolvedPath = path.join(realAncestor, ...remainder);
break;
} catch {
const parent = path.dirname(ancestor);
if (parent === ancestor) {
// Reached filesystem root without finding an existing ancestor —
// keep resolvedPath as-is.
break;
}
remainder.unshift(path.basename(ancestor));
ancestor = parent;
}
}
}
const normalizedBase = resolvedBase + path.sep;

57
src/verify.cts
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@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ const { findOrphanSummaries, findUnsummarizedPlans } = coreUtilsMod;
import planningScopeMod = require('./planning-scope.cjs');
const { SCOPE } = planningScopeMod;
import { execGit, platformReadSync as safeReadFile } from './shell-command-projection.cjs';
import { validatePath } from './security.cjs';
import { formatGsdSlash, resolveRuntime } from './runtime-slash.cjs';
import { detectSchemaFiles, checkSchemaDrift } from './schema-detect.cjs';
import { extractTaggedBlocks } from './markdown-sectionizer.cjs';
@@ -1222,8 +1223,39 @@ function cmdVerifyKeyLinks(cwd: string, planFilePath: string, raw: boolean): voi
detail: '',
};
const fromPath = (link['from'] as string) || '';
const sourceContent = safeReadFile(path.join(cwd, fromPath));
const fromRaw = link['from'];
const fromPath = typeof fromRaw === 'string' ? fromRaw : '';
let sourceContent: string | null = null;
if (fromPath !== '') {
// An empty/missing `from:` is a malformed plan, not a path-confinement
// violation — validatePath's traversal check (and path_rejected) only
// applies to a non-empty path that actually resolves outside the
// project. Leave sourceContent as null so the existing not-found /
// pending classification below runs unchanged. Note this guard is
// narrower than it may look: `from: "."` is a non-empty string, so it
// still reaches validatePath and safeReadFile below, and DOES read the
// cwd directory (yielding "Source read failed: EISDIR") — this branch
// only short-circuits the true empty-string case.
const fromCheck = validatePath(fromPath, cwd);
if (!fromCheck.safe) {
// Do not echo result.error — it embeds absolute host paths.
check['path_rejected'] = 'from';
check['detail'] = 'Source path rejected — resolves outside the project directory';
results.push(check);
continue;
}
try {
sourceContent = safeReadFile(fromCheck.resolved);
} catch (err) {
// Report the errno only — never the message or path (untrusted `from:`
// can trigger EISDIR/EACCES, which platformReadSync re-throws for any
// non-ENOENT errno). A single bad link must not abort the whole command.
const code = (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException)?.code ?? 'unknown';
check['detail'] = `Source read failed: ${code}`;
results.push(check);
continue;
}
}
if (!sourceContent) {
// Check if the missing file is promised by a plan at the same or later wave.
const promised = getPromisedFiles();
@@ -1269,11 +1301,28 @@ function cmdVerifyKeyLinks(cwd: string, planFilePath: string, raw: boolean): voi
check['verified'] = true;
check['detail'] = 'Pattern found in source';
} else {
const targetContent = safeReadFile(path.join(cwd, (link['to'] as string) || ''));
const toRaw = link['to'];
const toPath = typeof toRaw === 'string' ? toRaw : '';
let targetContent: string | null = null;
if (toPath !== '') {
// An empty/missing `to:` is a malformed plan, not a
// path-confinement violation — only a non-empty path that
// actually resolves outside the project is path_rejected.
const toCheck = validatePath(toPath, cwd);
if (!toCheck.safe) {
// Do not read a rejected `to:` — treat as no target content
// and do not echo result.error, which embeds absolute host
// paths.
check['path_rejected'] = 'to';
check['detail'] = `Pattern "${link['pattern'] as string}" not found in source; target path rejected — resolves outside the project directory`;
} else {
targetContent = safeReadFile(toCheck.resolved);
}
}
if (targetContent && pat.test(targetContent)) {
check['verified'] = true;
check['detail'] = 'Pattern found in target';
} else {
} else if (!check['path_rejected']) {
check['detail'] = `Pattern "${link['pattern'] as string}" not found in source or target`;
}
}

151
tests/security.test.cjs
View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const fs = require('fs');
const { cleanup } = require('./helpers.cjs');
const {
validatePath,
@@ -92,6 +93,156 @@ describe('validatePath', () => {
const result = validatePath('src/../lib/file.js', base);
assert.ok(result.safe);
});
// ─── Dangling symlink + non-canonical base regression coverage ───────────
//
// Helpers scoped to this describe block. `withSymlinkGuard` matches the
// skip-on-unsupported-platform convention used elsewhere (see
// tests/commands.test.cjs "B12" for the same EPERM/EACCES/ENOTSUP pattern).
function withSymlinkGuard(t, fn) {
try {
fn();
} catch (error) {
if (error && ['EPERM', 'EACCES', 'ENOTSUP'].includes(error.code)) {
t.skip('symlink creation is not available on this platform');
return false;
}
throw error;
}
return true;
}
function makeScratchDir() {
return fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-sec-validatepath-'));
}
// Returns a `base` string that is guaranteed non-canonical relative to
// `canonicalDir` — either the real tmpdir (already non-canonical on macOS,
// where os.tmpdir() lives under /var and realpaths to /private/var), or a
// freshly created symlink alias when the platform's tmpdir happens to be
// canonical already (e.g. Linux), so the test is meaningful everywhere.
function makeNonCanonicalBase(canonicalDir, t) {
const realCanonicalDir = fs.realpathSync(canonicalDir);
if (realCanonicalDir !== canonicalDir) {
return { base: canonicalDir, canonical: realCanonicalDir, symlinked: false, aliasParent: null };
}
const aliasParent = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-sec-alias-'));
const alias = path.join(aliasParent, 'link');
let ok = withSymlinkGuard(t, () => fs.symlinkSync(canonicalDir, alias, 'dir'));
if (!ok) {
cleanup(aliasParent);
return null;
}
return { base: alias, canonical: canonicalDir, symlinked: true, aliasParent };
}
test('in-project symlink to an existing in-project target: still safe:true', (t) => {
const scratch = makeScratchDir();
try {
const targetPath = path.join(scratch, 'target.txt');
fs.writeFileSync(targetPath, 'in-project content');
const linkPath = path.join(scratch, 'link.txt');
const ok = withSymlinkGuard(t, () => fs.symlinkSync(targetPath, linkPath, 'file'));
if (ok) {
const result = validatePath('link.txt', scratch);
assert.ok(result.safe, `expected safe:true, got error: ${result.error}`);
assert.equal(result.resolved, fs.realpathSync(targetPath));
}
} finally {
cleanup(scratch);
}
});
test('in-project symlink to an existing OUTSIDE target: safe:false (unchanged)', (t) => {
const scratch = makeScratchDir();
const outside = makeScratchDir();
try {
const outsideTarget = path.join(outside, 'outside-target.txt');
fs.writeFileSync(outsideTarget, 'outside content');
const linkPath = path.join(scratch, 'evil-link.txt');
const ok = withSymlinkGuard(t, () => fs.symlinkSync(outsideTarget, linkPath, 'file'));
if (ok) {
const result = validatePath('evil-link.txt', scratch);
assert.ok(!result.safe);
}
} finally {
cleanup(scratch);
cleanup(outside);
}
});
test('in-project DANGLING symlink to a non-existent OUTSIDE target: safe:false (BLOCKER-1 regression)', (t) => {
const scratch = makeScratchDir();
try {
const nonExistentOutsideTarget = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `gsd-sec-nonexistent-${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`);
const linkPath = path.join(scratch, 'dangling-link.txt');
const ok = withSymlinkGuard(t, () => fs.symlinkSync(nonExistentOutsideTarget, linkPath, 'file'));
if (ok) {
const result = validatePath('dangling-link.txt', scratch);
assert.ok(!result.safe, 'a dangling symlink must not be accepted as an in-project path');
assert.ok(
result.error && result.error.includes('unresolvable symbolic link'),
`expected the unresolvable-symlink error, got: ${result.error}`,
);
}
} finally {
cleanup(scratch);
}
});
test('not-yet-created file in an EXISTING in-project dir, non-canonical base: safe:true', (t) => {
const scratch = makeScratchDir();
let nc = null;
try {
nc = makeNonCanonicalBase(scratch, t);
if (nc) {
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(nc.canonical, 'existingSub'));
const result = validatePath('existingSub/newfile.txt', nc.base);
assert.ok(result.safe, `expected safe:true, got error: ${result.error}`);
assert.equal(result.resolved, path.join(nc.canonical, 'existingSub', 'newfile.txt'));
}
} finally {
cleanup(scratch);
if (nc && nc.aliasParent) cleanup(nc.aliasParent);
}
});
test('not-yet-created file in a not-yet-created SUBDIR, non-canonical base, nested two levels deep: safe:true (BLOCKER-2 regression)', (t) => {
const scratch = makeScratchDir();
let nc = null;
try {
nc = makeNonCanonicalBase(scratch, t);
if (nc) {
// Neither 'sub1' nor 'sub1/sub2' exist — the immediate-parent-only
// fallback fails here, which is exactly the BLOCKER-2 scenario.
const result = validatePath('sub1/sub2/newfile.txt', nc.base);
assert.ok(result.safe, `expected safe:true, got error: ${result.error}`);
assert.equal(result.resolved, path.join(nc.canonical, 'sub1', 'sub2', 'newfile.txt'));
}
} finally {
cleanup(scratch);
if (nc && nc.aliasParent) cleanup(nc.aliasParent);
}
});
test('../ escape from a not-yet-created subdir, non-canonical base: still safe:false', (t) => {
const scratch = makeScratchDir();
let nc = null;
try {
nc = makeNonCanonicalBase(scratch, t);
if (nc) {
// sub1/sub2 don't exist, and the .. segments escape not just the
// not-yet-created subdirs but the base itself — the ancestor walk-up
// must not turn this into an accepted path.
const result = validatePath('sub1/sub2/../../../escape.txt', nc.base);
assert.ok(!result.safe, 'escaping via .. through not-yet-created dirs must still be rejected');
}
} finally {
cleanup(scratch);
if (nc && nc.aliasParent) cleanup(nc.aliasParent);
}
});
});
describe('requireSafePath', () => {

217
tests/verify.test.cjs
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@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ const { test, describe, beforeEach, afterEach } = require('node:test');
const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const { runGsdTools, createTempProject, createTempGitProject, cleanup } = require('./helpers.cjs');
const { gitOrThrow } = require('./helpers/git-fixture.cjs');
const { runHook } = require('./helpers/process-seam.cjs');
@@ -1844,6 +1845,222 @@ describe('verify key-links command', () => {
`Expected "No must_haves.key_links" in error: ${output.error}`
);
});
// ── #3493: path confinement — from:/to: are untrusted plan frontmatter and
// must never be readable outside the project directory. ────────────────────
test('from: traversal outside project is rejected — not read, per-link failure only (#3493)', () => {
const outsideDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-3493-outside-'));
try {
const outsideFile = path.join(outsideDir, 'secret.txt');
fs.writeFileSync(outsideFile, 'top-secret-oracle-bait\n');
const traversalFrom = path.relative(tmpDir, outsideFile);
writePlanWithKeyLinks(tmpDir, [
`- from: "${traversalFrom.split(path.sep).join('/')}"`,
' to: "src/b.js"',
]);
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'src', 'b.js'), 'module.exports = {};\n');
const result = runGsdTools('verify key-links .planning/phases/01-test/01-01-PLAN.md', tmpDir);
assert.ok(result.success, `Command failed: ${result.error}`);
const output = JSON.parse(result.output);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].verified, false);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].path_rejected, 'from');
assert.strictEqual(output.all_verified, false);
// Load-bearing: pins the confinement-specific detail text. This is NOT
// the same as asserting the secret content is absent from the JSON —
// that assertion is tautological here (no code path ever echoes file
// *content* into `detail`/output, confined or not — a no-pattern link
// only ever reports whether `to:` text appears in the source, never
// the source's own bytes), so it would pass even without the
// path-confinement fix. This assertion, by contrast, DOES fail
// pre-fix: without confinement the outside file is actually read, the
// no-pattern branch falls through to "Target not referenced in
// source", and `path_rejected` is never set at all.
assert.strictEqual(
output.links[0].detail,
'Source path rejected — resolves outside the project directory',
);
} finally {
cleanup(outsideDir);
}
});
test('to: traversal is rejected — outside file content never read even when pattern would match it (#3493)', () => {
const outsideDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-3493-outside-'));
try {
const outsideFile = path.join(outsideDir, 'secret.txt');
fs.writeFileSync(outsideFile, 'oracleMarkerXYZ\n');
const traversalTo = path.relative(tmpDir, outsideFile);
writePlanWithKeyLinks(tmpDir, [
'- from: "src/a.js"',
` to: "${traversalTo.split(path.sep).join('/')}"`,
' pattern: "oracleMarkerXYZ"',
]);
// Pattern deliberately absent from the (valid) source so the check must
// fall through to the target read — proving the oracle stays closed.
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'src', 'a.js'), 'const x = 1;\n');
const result = runGsdTools('verify key-links .planning/phases/01-test/01-01-PLAN.md', tmpDir);
assert.ok(result.success, `Command failed: ${result.error}`);
const output = JSON.parse(result.output);
assert.strictEqual(
output.links[0].verified,
false,
`Expected verified:false — a matching outside file must never flip this true: ${JSON.stringify(output.links[0])}`,
);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].path_rejected, 'to');
} finally {
cleanup(outsideDir);
}
});
test('absolute from: path is rejected (#3493)', () => {
const absoluteDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-3493-absolute-'));
try {
const absoluteFrom = path.join(absoluteDir, 'gsd-3493-absolute-probe.txt');
fs.writeFileSync(absoluteFrom, 'irrelevant\n');
writePlanWithKeyLinks(tmpDir, [
`- from: "${absoluteFrom.split(path.sep).join('/')}"`,
' to: "src/b.js"',
]);
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'src', 'b.js'), 'module.exports = {};\n');
const result = runGsdTools('verify key-links .planning/phases/01-test/01-01-PLAN.md', tmpDir);
assert.ok(result.success, `Command failed: ${result.error}`);
const output = JSON.parse(result.output);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].verified, false);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].path_rejected, 'from');
} finally {
cleanup(absoluteDir);
}
});
test('a symlink inside the project pointing outside it is rejected as from: (#3493)', (t) => {
const outsideDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-3493-outside-'));
try {
const outsideFile = path.join(outsideDir, 'secret.txt');
fs.writeFileSync(outsideFile, 'top-secret-oracle-bait\n');
const symlinkPath = path.join(tmpDir, 'src', 'linked.js');
try {
fs.symlinkSync(outsideFile, symlinkPath, 'file');
} catch (error) {
if (error && ['EPERM', 'EACCES', 'ENOTSUP'].includes(error.code)) {
t.skip('symlink creation is not available on this platform');
return;
}
throw error;
}
writePlanWithKeyLinks(tmpDir, [
'- from: "src/linked.js"',
' to: "src/b.js"',
]);
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'src', 'b.js'), 'module.exports = {};\n');
const result = runGsdTools('verify key-links .planning/phases/01-test/01-01-PLAN.md', tmpDir);
assert.ok(result.success, `Command failed: ${result.error}`);
const output = JSON.parse(result.output);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].verified, false);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].path_rejected, 'from');
} finally {
cleanup(outsideDir);
}
});
test('normal in-project from:/to: still verifies with no path_rejected field (#3493 no-regression)', () => {
writePlanWithKeyLinks(tmpDir, [
'- from: "src/a.js"',
' to: "src/b.js"',
' pattern: "import.*b"',
]);
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'src', 'a.js'), "import { x } from './b';\n");
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'src', 'b.js'), 'exports.x = 1;\n');
const result = runGsdTools('verify key-links .planning/phases/01-test/01-01-PLAN.md', tmpDir);
assert.ok(result.success, `Command failed: ${result.error}`);
const output = JSON.parse(result.output);
assert.strictEqual(output.all_verified, true);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].verified, true);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].path_rejected, undefined);
});
test('a rejected first link does not abort the second, valid link (#3493 per-link failure)', () => {
const outsideDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-3493-outside-'));
const outsideFile = path.join(outsideDir, 'secret.txt');
fs.writeFileSync(outsideFile, 'irrelevant\n');
const traversalFrom = path.relative(tmpDir, outsideFile);
writePlanWithKeyLinks(tmpDir, [
`- from: "${traversalFrom.split(path.sep).join('/')}"`,
' to: "src/b.js"',
'- from: "src/a.js"',
' to: "src/b.js"',
' pattern: "import.*b"',
]);
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'src', 'a.js'), "import { x } from './b';\n");
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'src', 'b.js'), 'exports.x = 1;\n');
const result = runGsdTools('verify key-links .planning/phases/01-test/01-01-PLAN.md', tmpDir);
assert.ok(result.success, `Command failed: ${result.error}`);
const output = JSON.parse(result.output);
assert.strictEqual(output.links.length, 2, `Expected both links reported: ${JSON.stringify(output.links)}`);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].path_rejected, 'from');
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].verified, false);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[1].path_rejected, undefined);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[1].verified, true, `Second link must still evaluate: ${JSON.stringify(output.links[1])}`);
assert.strictEqual(output.all_verified, false);
cleanup(outsideDir);
});
test('empty from: is a malformed link, not a path-confinement rejection (#3493)', () => {
writePlanWithKeyLinks(tmpDir, [
'- from: ""',
' to: "src/b.js"',
]);
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'src', 'b.js'), 'module.exports = {};\n');
const result = runGsdTools('verify key-links .planning/phases/01-test/01-01-PLAN.md', tmpDir);
assert.ok(result.success, `Command failed: ${result.error}`);
const output = JSON.parse(result.output);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].verified, false);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].path_rejected, undefined);
assert.strictEqual(
output.links[0].detail,
'Source file not found (from: must be a relative file path; describe components/endpoints in via:)',
);
});
test('empty to: with a non-matching pattern is a malformed link, not a path-confinement rejection (#3493)', () => {
writePlanWithKeyLinks(tmpDir, [
'- from: "src/a.js"',
' to: ""',
' pattern: "oracleMarkerXYZ"',
]);
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'src', 'a.js'), 'const x = 1;\n');
const result = runGsdTools('verify key-links .planning/phases/01-test/01-01-PLAN.md', tmpDir);
assert.ok(result.success, `Command failed: ${result.error}`);
const output = JSON.parse(result.output);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].verified, false);
assert.strictEqual(output.links[0].path_rejected, undefined);
assert.strictEqual(
output.links[0].detail,
'Pattern "oracleMarkerXYZ" not found in source or target',
);
});
});