feat(#1433): capability trust gate + upgrade/compat (ADR-1244 Phase 4) (#1449)

ADR-1244 Phase 4 (D5 trust + D6 upgrade/compat). capability-trust.cjs (disclosure/consent, strict_known_registries, engines+compatVersions, reserved namespace) + capability-lifecycle.cjs (install/upgrade/remove/reconcile; ledger-as-commit-point _pending intent; atomic stage-then-swap; surgical marker-isolated shared-edit strip; owner-token lock) + capability-source promote/skipEnginesGate seams + loader pending-skip + config keys. No sandbox re-derived (consent+integrity+reversibility). 6 Codex adversarial rounds + /security-review (no HIGH) + /code-review; gsd-test green both platforms; CI green. Phase 5 (#1434) wires the CLI dispatch.

Closes #1433.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tom Boucher
2026-06-18 21:40:37 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 1abb0d3427
commit 9219af3360
22 changed files with 2843 additions and 14 deletions

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@@ -550,6 +550,27 @@ Setting the parent object (`agent_skills_security`) directly is not supported; u
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## Capability Trust (`capabilities.*`)
Policy for installing and updating third-party capabilities (ADR-1244). These keys govern the trust gate; they have no effect if you only ever use the native first-party capabilities shipped with GSD. They are **policy inputs** read by the `gsd capability` command flow, which passes the resulting decision into the capability lifecycle — `strict_known_registries` gates whether a source may be installed at all; `auto_update` is consulted by the `update`/`outdated` flow (which always re-prompts when a new version's executable surface set changes). The full rationale — including why there is no sandbox — is in [The capability trust model](explanation/the-capability-trust-model.md).
| Setting | Type | Default | Description |
|---------|------|---------|-------------|
| `capabilities.strict_known_registries` | array \| null | `null` | Allowlist gating **which sources** third-party capabilities may be installed from. `null` (default) is permissive: external installs (git / npm / tarball) are allowed and each still passes the consent + integrity gate. `[]` (explicit empty array) is lockdown: **all external installs are blocked** — only local-filesystem installs are permitted (managed/enterprise mode). A non-empty list is a **host-based allowlist**: only sources whose host matches an entry (exact host or a subdomain of it — `github.com` matches `api.github.com` but never `evilgithub.com`) are permitted; add the literal token `npm` to permit the npm source kind. Local installs are never "external" and are always allowed. |
| `capabilities.auto_update` | boolean | `false` | Whether installed third-party capabilities may auto-update. **Off by default.** Even when enabled, GSD re-prompts for explicit consent whenever a new version's executable surface set (hooks / command modules / MCP servers) differs from the installed one — the consent you gave was for a specific surface, not a blank cheque. |
```bash
# Lock the machine down to local-only capability installs:
gsd config-set capabilities.strict_known_registries '[]'
# Allow only your org's GitHub + npm:
gsd config-set capabilities.strict_known_registries '["github.com", "npm"]'
```
> **Security note:** `strict_known_registries` matching is **host-based, not substring** — a lookalike host like `evilgithub.com` is rejected even when `github.com` is allowed. `integrity` (sha512) pins only the top-level fetched artifact, not an npm package's transitive dependency tree; see the trust-model explanation for that boundary.
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## Feature Flags
Toggle optional capabilities via the `features.*` config namespace. Feature flags default to `false` (disabled) — enabling a flag opts into new behavior without affecting existing workflows.