enhance(verify-phase): deterministic auto-locate of the prohibition check descriptor (#1278) (#1301)
* test(1278): RED-first descriptor parity + fail-closed guards + CHK-07 byte-stability (wave 1) - CHK-03 (RED): extend PROB-14 parity in prohibition-probe.schema.test.cjs to carry the flat check_kind/check_target/check_rule scalars through project->write->parseMustHavesBlock; the non-droppable check_kind-presence assertion is the load-bearing RED trigger (fails because projectProhibitions strips check_* on the current build). - CHK-07 (GREEN forward-guard): probe-core.test.cjs pins descriptor-less byte-stability + dispositionForProhibition fail-closed policy, with a t.todo marker forward-locking plan 01-02. - CHK-06 (RED): prohibition-enforcement.test.cjs asserts descriptorFromProjection export + fail-closed on absent/partial/unknown descriptors via the projection adapter (RED until 01-03). - No src/*.cts or .cjs edits; no new test files; lint-test-file-count clean. * feat(1278): add optional flat-scalar check descriptor fields to Prohibition interface (wave 2) - check_kind?/check_target?/check_rule? mirror CheckDescriptor.kind/target/rule (minus caller-attested failFirst, #1279) - optional so existing Prohibition consumers compile unchanged * feat(1278): project check descriptor as flat scalars in projectProhibitions (wave 2) - emit check_kind/check_target (+ check_rule only for lint-rule with a rule) when descriptor well-formed - under-specified/descriptor-less items project byte-identically (CHK-07); flat scalars ride existing parseMustHavesBlock continuation-KV path (no parser rewrite) - add CHK-02 probe-core unit cases pinning the projection - turns CHK-03 parity test GREEN; dispositionForProhibition untouched * feat(1278): descriptorFromProjection read-back adapter feeds fail-closed locate (wave 3) - Add descriptorFromProjection(projected) -> CheckDescriptor | null to src/prohibition-enforcement.cts: renames the projected flat scalars check_kind/check_target/check_rule -> {kind,target,rule?}, or null when the descriptor is absent/non-object (no check_kind key). - failFirst is NEVER sourced from the projection (stays caller-attested; #1279). - rule is set only when check_rule is a non-empty string; the adapter does NOT re-validate kind/target/rule — an under-specified descriptor reconstructs to one the EXISTING runProhibitionEnforcement LOCATE guard rejects (located:false, never green). The merged #1259 guard stays the single source of fail-closed truth. - Turns the RED CHK-06 fail-closed tests (plan 01-01) GREEN end-to-end; CHK-03 / CHK-07 stay green. CheckDescriptor type, locate guard, dispositionForProhibition, and parseMustHavesBlock are unchanged (additive +36/-0). * feat(1278): verify-phase locates prohibition check from projected descriptor (wave 3) - request.check kind/target/rule sourced from projected check_kind/check_target/check_rule via descriptorFromProjection, not verifier invention (CHK-05) - replaces the #1278 author-supplied / tracked-follow-up note with the delivered deterministic-locate behavior - preserves fail-closed routing: absent/partial descriptor -> never green, hard-gate in both modes - failFirst stays a verify-time caller attestation; #1279 bounds the remaining fail-first proof * feat(1278): spec-phase captures wired-check descriptor on test-tier resolution (wave 3) - Step 5.6 'Keep it' / verification: test path captures check_kind/check_target/check_rule, projected onto must_haves.prohibitions for verify-phase deterministic locate (CHK-04) - SOFT capture: a test-tier prohibition without a descriptor is still allowed (no hard authoring block); stays fail-closed/flagged downstream - --auto captures only an unambiguous descriptor, never fabricates a check path - failFirst NOT captured at spec-phase (verify-time attestation; #1279) - PROB-06 soft-gate + text-mode (PROB-09) behavior unchanged * chore(1278): re-baseline workflow size for grown verify-phase + spec-phase prose (wave 3) - spec-phase.md 28438 -> 30343 (+1905), verify-phase.md 35362 -> 36498 (+1136) - regenerated via npm run size:baseline (no hand-picked numbers); growth is the #1278 deterministic-locate + descriptor-capture prose - workflow-size-budget guard green (122/122) * docs(1278): ratify optional check descriptor in dated ADR-550 addendum + type:Changed changeset - Append dated 2026-06-15 ADR-550 addendum ratifying the D3 prohibition-item shape extension (optional flat-scalar check_kind/check_target/check_rule) - Document flat-scalar rationale, deterministic projection/read-back, fail-closed on partial/invalid/absent, #1279/policy out-of-scope - Add .changeset/1278-prohibition-check-descriptor.md (type: Changed) * docs(1278): document optional check descriptor in prohibition-probe reference + FEATURES - Add 'Optional wired-check descriptor (deterministic locate, #1278)' section to the prohibition-probe reference (flat-scalar keys, projection/read-back, fail-closed + backward-compat, failFirst stays attested) - Add deterministic prohibition-check descriptor source entry to FEATURES.md - No CONTEXT.md glossary change: descriptor reuses existing wired-check / verification:test vocabulary, no new glossary term introduced * fix(1278): pass packaging gates — changeset pr field + retired slash-form fix - Add required pr: 1278 to changeset (lint:changeset MISSING_PR hard requirement; plan's 'omit if unknown' was inaccurate — issue number per #1259 convention, updated to real PR number when opened) [Rule 3 - blocking] - Fix retired /gsd-spec-phase -> /gsd:spec-phase at verify-phase.md:83 (wave-3 prose; caught by slash-namespace invariant #3443/bug-2543, blocked CHK-09 full-suite-green) [Rule 1 - bug] - size:baseline + INVENTORY manifest verified in-sync post-build (no diff) * docs(1278): add check descriptor + descriptorFromProjection to CONTEXT.md prohibition glossary * fix(1278): harden descriptorFromProjection round-trip (numeric-coercion + stray-rule) per review - MD-01/LW-01: narrow projected scalars to primitives + String()-coerce, so a numeric-looking check_target (parseMustHavesBlock coerces ^\d+$ to number) reconstructs as a string and locates instead of silently un-locating; no as-string type-lie, satisfies no-base-to-string. - LW-02: attach rule only for the lint-rule kind (drop a stray node-test rule). - LW-03: document the optional check_* keys in the reference Output schema. RED->GREEN tests added in prohibition-enforcement.test.cjs. * chore(1278): set changeset pr to 1301 * test(1278): add fast-check property for the check-descriptor round-trip + fail-closed (trek-e review) RULESET.TESTS.property-based-testing: the projectProhibitions -> render -> parseMustHavesBlock -> descriptorFromProjection chain is a bijective/transformation contract. Adds 2 fc properties to tests/probe-core.property.test.cjs (no new file; ratchet stays at 2 for probe-core): - well-formed descriptors survive the round-trip across the full string domain incl. the numeric-coercion case (target/rule reconstruct as strings); - under-specified/invalid descriptors (absent / target-less / rule-less / unknown-kind) are always fail-closed (never green, flagged, unlocated). Stability is asserted at the descriptorFromProjection layer (the raw parse step is intentionally lossy for numeric scalars; the shared parser is unchanged). --------- Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
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---
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type: Changed
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pr: 1301
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---
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**The test-tier prohibition gate now has a deterministic SOURCE for its wired check** — a resolved `test`-tier `must_haves.prohibitions` item MAY carry an optional `check` descriptor authored at spec-phase: the flat-scalar keys `check_kind` (`node-test` | `lint-rule`), `check_target`, and `check_rule` (lint-rule only). `projectProhibitions` projects these scalars deterministically and verify-phase reads them back (via `descriptorFromProjection`) to locate the check handed to `check prohibition-enforcement` — so a wired, passing test closes the gap with **zero manual descriptor authoring** (previously the verify-phase LLM had to invent `{kind, target, rule}` each run, #1259). This extends the ADR-550 Decision 3 prohibition-item shape (ratified in a dated 2026-06-15 ADR-550 addendum). The descriptor is **optional and fully backward-compatible** — a prohibition with no descriptor parses and disposes byte-identically to today — and **fail-closed**: a partial, invalid, or absent descriptor falls through to the producer's existing fail-closed locate, never a silent green. The descriptor is represented as flat scalars (not a nested `check:{}` object) to keep the shared `parseMustHavesBlock` round-trip regression-free. Out of scope: machine-proven fail-first (#1279) and the `dispositionForProhibition` policy stay unchanged. (#1278)
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@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ The orthogonal `verification` dimension a resolved probe item carries alongside
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The ownership seam between the prohibition probe and security/compliance tooling (ADR-550 D6). The probe owns **bespoke** product/values prohibitions — the unwritten must-NOTs specific to this feature's intent (e.g. "the streak reminder must not manipulate the user into returning"). When precision classifies an item as a **canon** security/compliance concern (OWASP / GDPR / fairness / prototype-pollution / path-traversal — the codified, cross-project rule sets), the probe does **not** mint a SPEC prohibition: it emits a one-line breadcrumb (*"possible canon-security concern X — owned by `/gsd:secure-phase` / eslint"*) and stops. Canon checks are **referred, not duplicated** — keeping the surfaced list short (#644's ~2–3-item precision goal) and the secure-phase boundary explicit. See Prohibition Probe Module.
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### Prohibition Probe Module
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Second adapter of the Probe Core Module (ADR-550 Decision 7): the spec-phase prohibition-completeness probe wired into spec-phase Step 5.6, surfacing the unwritten *must-NOT* constraints (values/safety/ethics) the spec never forbids. Unlike the Edge Probe, recall is **prose-orchestrated, not a compiled engine** (ADR-550 D7b) — a two-stage pass per requirement: Stage 1 an adversarial recall question, Stage 2 a one-pass precision classifier (drop routine engineering, keep genuine prohibitions). The code surface is schema/projection only: `projectProhibitions()` (deterministic SPEC↔`must_haves.prohibitions` projection backing the `DEFECT.GENERATIVE-FIX` parity assertion), the `{test, judgment}` `PROHIBITION_VALIDATORS`, `validateProhibitionResolution`, and `dispositionForProhibition()` (the fail-closed default — an unwired `test`-tier item resolves to `unverified`/flagged, never green). No `proposeProhibitions()` — recall is LLM prose. `plan-phase` lifts every resolved prohibition from the SPEC `## Prohibitions (must-NOT)` section into the `must_haves.prohibitions` sibling block (never `truths`). Exports (locked surface): `projectProhibitions`, `PROHIBITION_VALIDATORS` (the `{test, judgment}` validators bundle injected into `probe-core`'s generic engine), `validateProhibitionResolution`, and `dispositionForProhibition` (the fail-closed disposition) — the prohibition adapter surface, shipped from `probe-core` alongside the generic engine. Source of truth: `gsd-core/bin/lib/probe-core.cjs` (the prohibition exports live in `src/probe-core.cts`, gitignored per ADR-457) + `gsd-core/references/prohibition-probe.md`. Tests: `tests/prohibition-probe.*.test.cjs`. See ADR-550, Probe Core Module, Edge Probe Module, Verification Tier, Bespoke vs Canon Prohibition.
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Second adapter of the Probe Core Module (ADR-550 Decision 7): the spec-phase prohibition-completeness probe wired into spec-phase Step 5.6, surfacing the unwritten *must-NOT* constraints (values/safety/ethics) the spec never forbids. Unlike the Edge Probe, recall is **prose-orchestrated, not a compiled engine** (ADR-550 D7b) — a two-stage pass per requirement: Stage 1 an adversarial recall question, Stage 2 a one-pass precision classifier (drop routine engineering, keep genuine prohibitions). The code surface is schema/projection only: `projectProhibitions()` (deterministic SPEC↔`must_haves.prohibitions` projection backing the `DEFECT.GENERATIVE-FIX` parity assertion), the `{test, judgment}` `PROHIBITION_VALIDATORS`, `validateProhibitionResolution`, and `dispositionForProhibition()` (the fail-closed default — an unwired `test`-tier item resolves to `unverified`/flagged, never green). **Deterministic test-tier locate (#1278, ADR-550 D3 addendum):** a resolved `test`-tier prohibition MAY carry an optional flat-scalar `check` descriptor — `check_kind` (`node-test` | `lint-rule`), `check_target`, and `check_rule` (lint-rule only) — that `projectProhibitions` emits into `must_haves.prohibitions` when well-formed, and `descriptorFromProjection()` (the read-back seam in the #1259 enforcement producer, `src/prohibition-enforcement.cts`) reconstructs into a `{kind, target, rule?}` `CheckDescriptor`, so verify-phase locates the wired check with zero LLM/author authoring. **Flat scalars, never a nested `check:{}` object** — so the round-trip rides the *unchanged* shared `parseMustHavesBlock` (the #644 no-parser-rewrite precedent); an absent/partial descriptor falls through to the producer's existing fail-closed locate, and `failFirst` stays caller-attested (machine-proof is #1279). No `proposeProhibitions()` — recall is LLM prose. `plan-phase` lifts every resolved prohibition from the SPEC `## Prohibitions (must-NOT)` section into the `must_haves.prohibitions` sibling block (never `truths`). Exports (locked surface): `projectProhibitions`, `PROHIBITION_VALIDATORS` (the `{test, judgment}` validators bundle injected into `probe-core`'s generic engine), `validateProhibitionResolution`, and `dispositionForProhibition` (the fail-closed disposition) — the prohibition adapter surface, shipped from `probe-core` alongside the generic engine. Source of truth: `gsd-core/bin/lib/probe-core.cjs` (the prohibition exports live in `src/probe-core.cts`, gitignored per ADR-457) + `gsd-core/references/prohibition-probe.md`. Tests: `tests/prohibition-probe.*.test.cjs`. See ADR-550, Probe Core Module, Edge Probe Module, Verification Tier, Bespoke vs Canon Prohibition.
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### MVP Mode
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Phase-level planning mode that frames work as a vertical slice (UI → API → DB) of one user-visible capability instead of horizontal layers. Resolved at workflow init via the precedence chain: `--mvp` CLI flag → ROADMAP.md `**Mode:** mvp` field → `workflow.mvp_mode` config → false. All-or-nothing per phase (PRD #2826 Q1). Surfaced as `MVP_MODE=true|false` to the planner, executor, verifier, and discovery surfaces (progress, stats, graphify). Canonical parser: `roadmap.cjs` `**Mode:**` field; canonical resolution chain documented in `workflows/plan-phase.md`. Concept index: `references/mvp-concepts.md`.
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@@ -3173,6 +3173,8 @@ Each resolved prohibition carries a `verification` tier — `test` (a negative t
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The load-bearing wire is the `plan-phase` lift into `must_haves.prohibitions`, so the section is not merely documentation.
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**Deterministic prohibition-check descriptor source (#1278).** A resolved `test`-tier prohibition MAY carry an optional **`check` descriptor** — the flat-scalar keys `check_kind` (`node-test` | `lint-rule`), `check_target`, and `check_rule` (lint-rule only) — authored at spec-phase. `projectProhibitions` projects these scalars deterministically and verify-phase reads them back to locate the check handed to `check prohibition-enforcement`, so a wired, passing test closes the gap with **zero manual descriptor authoring** (previously the verify-phase LLM had to invent `{kind, target, rule}` each run, #1259). The descriptor is **optional and backward-compatible** — a descriptor-less prohibition parses and disposes byte-identically to today — and **fail-closed**: a partial, invalid, or absent descriptor falls through to the producer's existing fail-closed locate, never a silent green. `failFirst` stays a verify-time caller attestation (machine-proven fail-first is tracked in #1279).
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**Requirements:**
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- REQ-PROHIB-01: The prohibition pass MUST run after the edge probe and emit a `## Prohibitions (must-NOT)` SPEC section.
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- REQ-PROHIB-02: Stage 1 MUST ask the adversarial recall question; Stage 2 MUST drop routine-engineering items and keep values/safety/ethics prohibitions.
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@@ -96,3 +96,19 @@ Decision 4 describes the `test`-tier as a "**Hard gate in both interactive and a
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Net effect on D4: the *guarantee* ("a `test`-tier prohibition is never a silent pass") was preserved through the fail-closed-now half and is now joined by the genuine-execution half — a test-tier prohibition with a passing, non-vacuous wired check can reach `green`/`passed`, and a missing/failing one hard-gates. The previously-unreachable green branch in `dispositionForProhibition()` is reachable from the live pipeline, and the fail-closed default backs every miss/fail. The one remaining gap to D4's literal intent — *machine-proven* fail-first — is documented above as a tracked follow-up. The decision also lives in `src/probe-core.cts` comments, `src/prohibition-enforcement.cts`, `verify-phase.md`, and the #644 / #1259 changesets.
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This enforcement seam is the concrete instance of **ADR-857 open-question §147** — the deferred "deterministic CI conformance test for the verifier↔predicate contract." Per D6 it lands on the **core verify rail** (non-toggleable substrate), never in `capabilities/`: the verifier consuming a contract-shaped, deterministic predicate is core, not an opt-in capability.
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## Addendum (2026-06-15): optional `check` descriptor on the prohibition item — D3 shape extension (#1278)
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This ratifies the **deterministic SOURCE** for the test-tier `CheckDescriptor` that #1259 (PR #1273) left caller/verifier-supplied. #1259 shipped the PRODUCER (`check prohibition-enforcement`) that *runs* a wired check given a `{kind, target, rule?}` descriptor, but the descriptor itself was invented by the verify-phase LLM each run (the "locate" half). #1278 makes that locate half **deterministic**: an optional `check` descriptor is authored at spec-phase on the resolved `test`-tier prohibition, projected by `projectProhibitions`, and read back by verify-phase — so a wired, passing test closes the gap with **zero manual authoring**. This extends the **Decision 3 prohibition-item shape** (it adds optional keys to that item), so it is ratified here rather than rewriting D3 in place.
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1. **The D3 item shape gains OPTIONAL flat-scalar keys.** Alongside `statement`, `status`+`verification`, and the dismissed-only `reason`, a resolved `test`-tier prohibition MAY carry `check_kind` (`node-test` | `lint-rule`), `check_target`, and `check_rule` (lint-rule only). All three are **optional**; a descriptor-less prohibition parses and disposes byte-identically to today (backward compatibility, CHK-07).
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2. **Flat scalars — NOT a nested `check:{}` object (load-bearing).** The representation is three flat scalar keys, never a nested object. The shared `parseMustHavesBlock` (`src/frontmatter.cts:252`) is a **flat parser**: continuation lines under a list item are handled only as nested ARRAYS or scalar `key: value` pairs, and the `reconstructFrontmatter` serializer is deliberately lossy for nested object-lists. A nested `check:{}` would flatten its keys into the parent item and mangle the round-trip. We follow the #644 precedent — **no parser rewrite, no `parseMustHavesBlock` change** — so the `truths`/`artifacts`/`key_links` shared-parser readers stay regression-free (the untouched frontmatter suite is the proof).
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3. **Deterministic projection + read-back.** `projectProhibitions` (`src/probe-core.cts`) emits the scalar keys ONLY for a well-formed descriptor (valid `check_kind` + non-empty `check_target`; `check_rule` only on the lint-rule path). `descriptorFromProjection` (`src/prohibition-enforcement.cts`) reads them back into a `{ kind: check_kind, target: check_target, rule?: check_rule }` `CheckDescriptor` to build the producer request. The `CheckDescriptor` type itself is unchanged; `failFirst` is **NOT** sourced from the projection — it stays a verify-time caller attestation. verify-phase locates from the projection, so a wired passing test needs no hand-authored descriptor.
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4. **Fail-closed on partial / invalid / absent descriptor.** A `lint-rule` descriptor missing `rule`, an unknown `kind`, or an absent descriptor on a test-tier prohibition MUST fall through to the producer's existing fail-closed locate ("no well-formed check descriptor is locatable → fail-closed") — never a silent green. The producer's locate semantics from #1259 are unchanged.
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5. **Out of scope (unchanged boundaries).** Machine-proven fail-first (a violation-fixture / RuleTester-invalid proof replacing the `failFirst` caller attestation) stays tracked as **#1279**. The `dispositionForProhibition` green/fail-closed **policy** is untouched. No new check kinds are added.
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Net effect on D3: the prohibition-item shape is extended with three optional, backward-compatible flat-scalar keys that give the test-tier locate a deterministic spec-phase source; the contract's CI-testable surface (D5) gains the projection round-trip parity (CHK-03), the fail-closed guard (CHK-06), and the byte-stable backward-compat fixture (CHK-07). The decision also lives in `src/probe-core.cts` / `src/prohibition-enforcement.cts` comments, the `verify-phase.md` / `spec-phase.md` prose, and the #1278 changeset.
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@@ -128,16 +128,51 @@ Splitting these axes keeps the lifecycle enum free of a verification fact and le
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prohibition adapter declare `test | judgment` without forking the shared lifecycle enum that
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the edge-probe's `explicit | backstop` also uses.
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## Optional wired-check descriptor (deterministic locate, #1278)
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A `resolved`/`test`-tier prohibition MAY carry an **optional `check` descriptor** that names
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the wired mechanical check, so verify-phase locates it deterministically instead of inventing
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`{kind, target, rule}` each run. The descriptor is captured at spec-phase (soft / optional —
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the author wires it when the negative test or lint rule already exists) and is represented as
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**three flat scalar keys** on the `must_haves.prohibitions` item — never a nested `check: {}`
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object:
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- `check_kind` — `node-test` | `lint-rule` (which producer mechanism runs the check).
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- `check_target` — the test file (`node-test`) or the file the rule runs against (`lint-rule`).
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- `check_rule` — the `ruleId` to filter on, **lint-rule only** (absent for `node-test`).
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The flat-scalar shape is load-bearing: the shared `parseMustHavesBlock` is a flat parser and a
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nested object would flatten/mangle the round-trip (ADR-550 2026-06-15 addendum; #644 "no parser
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rewrite" precedent). `projectProhibitions` emits these keys **only for a well-formed descriptor**
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(valid `check_kind` + non-empty `check_target`; `check_rule` only on the lint-rule path), and
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verify-phase reads them back via `descriptorFromProjection` into the `CheckDescriptor` handed to
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`check prohibition-enforcement`. A wired, passing test then closes the gap with **zero manual
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descriptor authoring**.
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**Fail-closed + backward-compat.** A partial descriptor (`lint-rule` missing `check_rule`), an
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unknown `check_kind`, or an **absent** descriptor on a test-tier prohibition falls through to the
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producer's existing fail-closed locate — never a silent green. A prohibition with no descriptor
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parses and disposes byte-identically to today. `failFirst` is **not** sourced from the
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descriptor — it stays a verify-time caller attestation (machine-proven fail-first is tracked in
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#1279; the `dispositionForProhibition` policy is unchanged).
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## Output schema
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The probe emits, per kept prohibition, an item of the form:
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```
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{ requirement_id, category, status, verification, resolution, reason, statement }
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{ requirement_id, category, status, verification, resolution, reason, statement,
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check_kind?, check_target?, check_rule? }
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```
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where `statement` is the must-NOT sentence and `category` is the values/safety/ethics class
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(`values`, `fairness`, `privacy`, `transparency`, `safety`, …), plus a coverage summary:
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(`values`, `fairness`, `privacy`, `transparency`, `safety`, …). The optional **flat-scalar
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`check_*` descriptor** (#1278) is present only on a resolved `test`-tier prohibition carrying a
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wired check: `check_kind` (`node-test` | `lint-rule`), `check_target`, and `check_rule` (lint-rule
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only). `projectProhibitions` emits these into `must_haves.prohibitions` and `descriptorFromProjection`
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reads them back into a `{ kind, target, rule? }` `CheckDescriptor`; they are flat scalars (never a
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nested `check:{}` object) so they round-trip through the unchanged `parseMustHavesBlock`. Plus a
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coverage summary:
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```
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coverage: { applicable, resolved, unresolved, byVerification: { test, judgment } }
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@@ -356,6 +356,21 @@ For each Requirement gathered so far, run the two-stage recall→precision pass:
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Criteria AND mark the prohibition `resolved` with a verification tier: `test` (a
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mechanical negative test/lint/assertion exists) or `judgment` (real but not mechanically
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checkable — routes to judgment review).
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- **Capture the wired-check descriptor on `test`-tier (#1278, SOFT).** When a prohibition is
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resolved `verification: test`, ALSO capture the descriptor of the wired check so
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`verify-phase` can LOCATE it deterministically (no verifier invention at verify time).
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Capture the flat scalars — persisted into SPEC and projected onto the
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`must_haves.prohibitions` item by `projectProhibitions`:
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- `check_kind` — `node-test` | `lint-rule`.
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- `check_target` — the negative-test file path (for `node-test`), or the path to lint
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(for `lint-rule`).
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- `check_rule` — the eslint rule id (e.g. `local/no-source-grep`); `lint-rule` only.
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This is a **SOFT capture (CHK-04): a `test`-tier prohibition WITHOUT a descriptor is still
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allowed** — if the author cannot yet name the wired check, leave the descriptor empty and
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proceed. It is NOT a hard authoring block; the item simply stays fail-closed/flagged
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downstream (an absent/partial descriptor → `descriptorFromProjection` null/under-specified
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→ producer fail-closed locate, never green). Do NOT capture `failFirst` here — it is a
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verify-time caller attestation, not a spec-authored field (#1279).
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- **Dismiss (reason)** → mark `dismissed` with a REQUIRED non-empty reason (PROB-05). The
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reason string is the audit trail; silence is not a valid dismissal.
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- **Defer** → leave `unresolved`.
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@@ -374,7 +389,11 @@ For each Requirement gathered so far, run the two-stage recall→precision pass:
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**`--auto` mode:** auto-`resolved` where a defensible negative acceptance criterion can be
|
||||
written (test or judgment tier); otherwise leave `unresolved`. **`--auto` NEVER auto-dismisses
|
||||
a prohibition** — a wrong dismissal is the exact silent failure this probe eliminates (PROB-06,
|
||||
the load-bearing safety property). Log: `[auto] prohibitions: R resolved, U unresolved`.
|
||||
the load-bearing safety property). On a `test`-tier auto-resolution, capture the `check_kind` /
|
||||
`check_target` / `check_rule` descriptor **only when a wired check is unambiguous**; otherwise
|
||||
leave it empty — `--auto` NEVER fabricates a check path (a wrong locate is re-validated and
|
||||
fails closed at the producer, but a fabricated path is still noise to avoid). Log:
|
||||
`[auto] prohibitions: R resolved, U unresolved`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Text mode (PROB-09):** per Step 5's text-mode rule, replace the AskUserQuestion menus above
|
||||
with plain-text numbered lists — there is NO hard AskUserQuestion dependency, so the probe
|
||||
@@ -382,7 +401,11 @@ runs identically for non-Claude / text-mode hosts.
|
||||
|
||||
Populate the `## Prohibitions` section of SPEC.md from the resolved prohibitions (each
|
||||
`resolved`/`test` row is a checkable negative acceptance criterion; `resolved`/`judgment`
|
||||
rows route to judgment review; `⚠ UNRESOLVED` rows are flagged as assumptions).
|
||||
rows route to judgment review; `⚠ UNRESOLVED` rows are flagged as assumptions). A
|
||||
`resolved`/`test` row ALSO carries its captured `check_kind` / `check_target` / `check_rule`
|
||||
descriptor when present (so the projection feeds `verify-phase`'s deterministic locate, #1278);
|
||||
a `test` row with no captured descriptor is still valid — it stays fail-closed/flagged
|
||||
downstream rather than blocking authoring.
|
||||
|
||||
## Step 6: Generate SPEC.md
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -70,17 +70,17 @@ Aggregate all must_haves across plans for phase-level verification.
|
||||
**Prohibitions (`must_haves.prohibitions`, ADR-550 D3 — the must-NOT sibling block):** When a plan carries `must_haves.prohibitions`, extract each `{ statement, status, verification }` item and route it by `verification` tier in verdict assembly (ADR-550 D4, "B-with-guard", 2026-06-12 maintainer decision). These are NEGATIVE checks (the must-NOT must NOT have happened), distinct from positive `truths`:
|
||||
|
||||
- **judgment-tier → mode-dependent soft-gate.** Interactive verify defers each item to the end-of-phase human checkpoint (`human_verify_mode: end-of-phase`). Autonomous verify records a NON-AUTHORITATIVE LLM-judge verdict + a prominent `unverified-prohibition — human review recommended` flag (autonomous completion reads "complete with N flagged prohibitions"). NEVER a silent pass; NEVER a hard halt of an AFK run.
|
||||
- **test-tier → ENFORCED via `check prohibition-enforcement` (green on pass, hard-gate on miss/fail).** Accept the `verification: test` value (the SPEC↔must_haves.prohibitions projection contract holds — no forced schema change later). For each test-tier item, the verifier invokes the deterministic producer:
|
||||
- **test-tier → ENFORCED via `check prohibition-enforcement` (green on pass, hard-gate on miss/fail).** Accept the `verification: test` value (the SPEC↔must_haves.prohibitions projection contract holds — no forced schema change later). For each test-tier item, the verifier builds `request.check` **DETERMINISTICALLY from the projected descriptor** — it does NOT invent `{ kind, target, rule }`. Read the flat scalar keys `check_kind` / `check_target` / `check_rule` off the `must_haves.prohibitions` item and reconstruct the `CheckDescriptor` via the `descriptorFromProjection` adapter in `prohibition-enforcement` (`descriptorFromProjection(projectedItem)` → `{ kind: check_kind, target: check_target, rule?: check_rule }`). Then attest `failFirst: true` in the request — `failFirst` is the ONE field NOT sourced from the projection; it stays a verify-time caller attestation (#1279 machine-proves it against a violation fixture). Invoke the producer (CLI surface unchanged):
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
gsd_run check prohibition-enforcement <request.json>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
where `<request.json>` carries `{ prohibition, check, mode }` — `check` being the wired mechanical-check descriptor `{ kind: 'node-test' | 'lint-rule', target, rule?, failFirst: true }`. For `node-test`, `target` is the negative-test file path; for `lint-rule`, `target` is the PATH to lint and `rule` is the eslint rule id (e.g. `local/no-source-grep`) — both required (a lint-rule without `rule` is not a valid wired check). The producer LOCATES the wired check, requires the caller-attested `failFirst` marker, RUNS it for a genuine non-vacuous pass, builds `enforcementEvidence`, and emits the `dispositionForProhibition()` verdict (#1259, ADR-550 D5d). (`failFirst` is caller-attested, not yet machine-proven against a violation fixture — a tracked follow-up.) Route the result by its typed fields:
|
||||
where `<request.json>` carries `{ prohibition, check, mode }` — `check` being the wired mechanical-check descriptor `{ kind: 'node-test' | 'lint-rule', target, rule?, failFirst: true }`, with `kind`/`target`/`rule` now sourced from the projected `check_*` scalars (not author/verifier invention) and `failFirst` caller-attested. For `node-test`, `target` (from `check_target`) is the negative-test file path; for `lint-rule`, `target` is the PATH to lint and `rule` (from `check_rule`) is the eslint rule id (e.g. `local/no-source-grep`) — both required (a lint-rule without `rule` is not a valid wired check). The producer LOCATES the wired check, requires the caller-attested `failFirst` marker, RUNS it for a genuine non-vacuous pass, builds `enforcementEvidence`, and emits the `dispositionForProhibition()` verdict (#1259, ADR-550 D5d). Route the result by its typed fields:
|
||||
- **`status: 'green'`, `flagged: false`** (a genuinely-passing wired negative test / lint rule, `located: true`, non-empty `evidence`) → the item is satisfiable → it can reach **passed**.
|
||||
- **missing, non-attested, or genuinely-non-passing check** (`located: false` OR `status: 'unverified'`, `flagged: true`) → **hard-gate**: disposes flagged-unverified, NEVER green, routing to `gaps_found` in BOTH interactive and autonomous modes (a failing mechanical check blocks even AFK; ADR-550 D4 / D3). The deterministic fail-closed default backing every miss/fail is `dispositionForProhibition()` in probe-core (`status: 'unverified'`, `flagged: true` on empty `enforcementEvidence`).
|
||||
|
||||
> **Descriptor authoring — current scope (#1259).** The `check` descriptor is **supplied by the phase author / verifier**; there is no projection field yet that deterministically derives `{ kind, target, rule, failFirst }` from a prohibition in `must_haves.prohibitions` (which carries only `{ statement, status, verification }`). So #1259 lands the **deterministic run+verdict half** (locate→run→evidence→disposition, all CI-testable) while the **locate→descriptor half is author-provided** for now. Deterministic auto-locate — so a wired passing test closes the gap with zero manual descriptor authoring — is a **tracked follow-up: #1278**. Until then, the green path requires the author to wire the descriptor explicitly.
|
||||
> **Descriptor source — deterministic locate (#1278, DELIVERED).** The `check` descriptor's `{ kind, target, rule }` is now sourced **deterministically from the projected `check_kind` / `check_target` / `check_rule` scalars** on the `must_haves.prohibitions` item (authored at `/gsd:spec-phase`, projected by `projectProhibitions`, read back via the `descriptorFromProjection` adapter). So a wired passing test closes the gap with **zero manual descriptor authoring** — the verifier no longer invents the locate (removing the spoofable invent-at-verify-time surface; ADR-857 §147 exogenous grading). **Fail-closed is preserved:** an item with NO projected descriptor — or a PARTIAL one (e.g. a `lint-rule` missing `check_rule`) — makes `descriptorFromProjection` return `null` / an under-specified descriptor, which falls through to the producer's existing fail-closed LOCATE (`located: false`) → flagged-unverified, NEVER green, in BOTH modes. The only field still attested at verify time (not projected) is `failFirst`; machine-proving it against a violation fixture is the remaining **tracked follow-up: #1279**.
|
||||
|
||||
**Option B: Use Success Criteria from ROADMAP.md**
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -290,6 +290,15 @@ export interface Prohibition {
|
||||
resolution: string | null;
|
||||
reason: string | null;
|
||||
statement: string;
|
||||
// Optional flat-scalar wired-check descriptor (#1278). A resolved test-tier prohibition may carry
|
||||
// these before projection; `projectProhibitions` emits them as the LOCKED flat scalar keys
|
||||
// `check_kind`/`check_target`/`check_rule` that round-trip the EXISTING flat `parseMustHavesBlock`
|
||||
// (a nested `check:{}` object is rejected per IMPL-SCOPING §3 — it flattens through the shared
|
||||
// parser). These mirror `CheckDescriptor.kind/target/rule` (prohibition-enforcement.cts:62) MINUS
|
||||
// the caller-attested `failFirst`, which is deliberately NOT a Prohibition field (#1279).
|
||||
check_kind?: 'node-test' | 'lint-rule';
|
||||
check_target?: string;
|
||||
check_rule?: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -329,6 +338,15 @@ export function validateProhibitionResolution(resolution: Resolution<Prohibition
|
||||
* and are intentionally NOT projected into the plan block (which is keyed on the must-NOT
|
||||
* statement, not the source requirement). A non-array input projects to `[]` (fail-soft on the
|
||||
* empty/zero-prohibition case), never a throw.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* An OPTIONAL wired-check descriptor (#1278) projects as the LOCKED flat scalar keys
|
||||
* `check_kind`/`check_target`/`check_rule` (NEVER a nested `check:{}` object; `failFirst` is never
|
||||
* projected). These ride the EXISTING continuation-KV path of `parseMustHavesBlock`
|
||||
* (src/frontmatter.cts:344) with NO shared-parser rewrite (IMPL-SCOPING §3 Option 1). The keys are
|
||||
* emitted ONLY for a well-formed descriptor (valid `check_kind` + non-empty `check_target`; plus
|
||||
* `check_rule` only for a lint-rule that carries one); a descriptor-less or under-specified item is
|
||||
* byte-identical to today (CHK-07), so an under-specified descriptor projects absent and fails closed
|
||||
* at the producer downstream (CHK-06), never as a partial-but-locatable green.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function projectProhibitions(
|
||||
items: unknown,
|
||||
@@ -345,6 +363,20 @@ export function projectProhibitions(
|
||||
};
|
||||
if (p.verification != null) entry.verification = String(p.verification);
|
||||
if (p.reason != null && String(p.reason).trim()) entry.reason = String(p.reason);
|
||||
// Optional wired-check descriptor (#1278): emit flat scalars ONLY when well-formed. A valid kind
|
||||
// plus a non-empty target is the minimum; under that bar nothing is emitted (CHK-07 byte-identity,
|
||||
// and the producer fails closed on the absent descriptor — CHK-06).
|
||||
const kind = p.check_kind;
|
||||
const targetOk = typeof p.check_target === 'string' && p.check_target.trim() !== '';
|
||||
if ((kind === 'node-test' || kind === 'lint-rule') && targetOk) {
|
||||
entry.check_kind = kind;
|
||||
entry.check_target = String(p.check_target);
|
||||
// `check_rule` rides only the lint-rule path (node-test never carries one); a lint-rule missing
|
||||
// its rule leaves check_rule absent so the producer's fail-closed locate rejects it (CHK-06).
|
||||
if (kind === 'lint-rule' && typeof p.check_rule === 'string' && p.check_rule.trim() !== '') {
|
||||
entry.check_rule = String(p.check_rule);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
out.push(entry);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -66,6 +66,52 @@ export interface CheckDescriptor {
|
||||
failFirst?: boolean;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* READ-BACK ADAPTER (#1278, plan 01-03): reconstruct a `CheckDescriptor` from the flat scalar keys
|
||||
* `projectProhibitions` emits onto a prohibition item (`check_kind` / `check_target` / `check_rule`,
|
||||
* src/probe-core.cts). This is the deterministic bridge from the projected descriptor back into the
|
||||
* merged #1259 producer request — the verify-phase caller reads the projected scalars, this rebuilds
|
||||
* the `{ kind, target, rule? }` request, and `runProhibitionEnforcement`'s EXISTING fail-closed LOCATE
|
||||
* guard (validKind/validTarget/validRule, below) is the single source of fail-closed truth.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Contract:
|
||||
* - `null`/`undefined`/non-object input -> `null`.
|
||||
* - `check_kind` ABSENT -> `null` (no descriptor -> producer locates nothing -> fail-closed).
|
||||
* - `check_kind` present -> `{ kind: check_kind, target: check_target }`, adding `rule: check_rule`
|
||||
* ONLY when `check_rule` is a non-empty string.
|
||||
* - `failFirst` is NEVER sourced from the projection — it stays a verify-time caller attestation
|
||||
* (#1279 machine-proves it; out of scope here). The returned descriptor carries no `failFirst`.
|
||||
* - The adapter does NOT strictly validate kind/target/rule: it faithfully reconstructs whatever
|
||||
* scalars are present (e.g. `{check_kind:'lint-rule', check_target:'src/'}` with no `check_rule`
|
||||
* reconstructs to `{kind:'lint-rule', target:'src/'}`), letting the existing LOCATE guard reject
|
||||
* an under-specified descriptor (located:false, never green). It does NOT re-implement that guard.
|
||||
* - Pure, deterministic, no-throw.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function descriptorFromProjection(
|
||||
projected: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined,
|
||||
): CheckDescriptor | null {
|
||||
if (!projected || typeof projected !== 'object') return null;
|
||||
if (!('check_kind' in projected)) return null;
|
||||
// The shared `parseMustHavesBlock` (src/frontmatter.cts) coerces /^\d+$/ scalar values to NUMBERS on
|
||||
// round-trip, so a numeric-looking check_kind/check_target/check_rule arrives here as a number. Normalize
|
||||
// ONLY string|number scalars back to string — a non-scalar (object/array/bool) or absent value yields ''
|
||||
// (never an `[object Object]` stringification, no `as string` lie over a number). This keeps the
|
||||
// descriptor honestly typed and the round-trip lossless across the full string domain; an under-specified
|
||||
// '' target/kind is rejected by the producer's locate guard (fail-closed; never green).
|
||||
const scalar = (v: unknown): string =>
|
||||
typeof v === 'string' ? v : typeof v === 'number' ? String(v) : '';
|
||||
const kind = scalar(projected.check_kind) as CheckKind;
|
||||
const target = scalar(projected.check_target);
|
||||
const descriptor: CheckDescriptor = { kind, target };
|
||||
// `rule` belongs only to the lint-rule kind; a stray check_rule on a node-test descriptor is dropped
|
||||
// (the projector never emits one there — defense in depth). failFirst is NOT sourced here (#1279).
|
||||
if (kind === 'lint-rule') {
|
||||
const rule = scalar(projected.check_rule);
|
||||
if (rule.trim().length > 0) descriptor.rule = rule;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return descriptor;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The result a check-runner returns: whether the check genuinely, non-vacuously PASSED. The runner
|
||||
* reports only what it can OBSERVE (a real pass) — it does NOT determine fail-first. Whether the
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ const fc = require('./helpers/fast-check-setup.cjs');
|
||||
|
||||
const BUILT_SCRIPT = path.join(__dirname, '..', 'gsd-core', 'bin', 'lib', 'probe-core.cjs');
|
||||
const pc = require(BUILT_SCRIPT);
|
||||
// #1278: the check-descriptor deterministic-locate round-trip crosses three modules — probe-core's
|
||||
// projector, the shared flat parser, and the enforcement read-back adapter. Require all three here so
|
||||
// the property exercises the real end-to-end chain (not a stubbed seam).
|
||||
const fm = require(path.join(__dirname, '..', 'gsd-core', 'bin', 'lib', 'frontmatter.cjs'));
|
||||
const enforce = require(path.join(__dirname, '..', 'gsd-core', 'bin', 'lib', 'prohibition-enforcement.cjs'));
|
||||
|
||||
// The same representative validators bundle the edge adapter injects (see
|
||||
// tests/probe-core.test.cjs) — exercises the generic engine independent of any one probe.
|
||||
@@ -165,3 +170,102 @@ describe('probe-core property: orphan rejection is stable', () => {
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── #1278: the check-descriptor deterministic-locate round-trip (property-based) ────────────────
|
||||
// trek-e re-review (RULESET.TESTS.property-based-testing): the projectProhibitions -> render ->
|
||||
// parseMustHavesBlock -> descriptorFromProjection chain is a bijective/transformation contract. The
|
||||
// example suite (tests/prohibition-probe.schema.test.cjs CHK-03 A/B/C) pins three hand-picked rows;
|
||||
// these properties pin the invariant across the FULL input domain — including the parseMustHavesBlock
|
||||
// numeric-coercion case (a /^\d+$/ scalar parses back as a number; descriptorFromProjection
|
||||
// String()-normalizes it) and the under-specified fail-closed cases. The "stable" contract is
|
||||
// expressed at the descriptorFromProjection reconstruction layer, because the raw parse step is
|
||||
// intentionally lossy for numeric scalars (the shared parser coerces; #1278 does not change it).
|
||||
|
||||
// Mirror of the schema test's renderProhibitionsDoc: flat scalar continuation KVs, emitted only when
|
||||
// present (src/frontmatter.cts:344 reads them back as scalar `key: value` lines).
|
||||
function renderProhibitionsDoc(entries) {
|
||||
const lines = ['---', 'phase: 01-x', 'plan: 01', 'must_haves:', ' prohibitions:'];
|
||||
for (const e of entries) {
|
||||
lines.push(` - statement: "${e.statement}"`);
|
||||
lines.push(` status: ${e.status}`);
|
||||
if (e.verification !== undefined) lines.push(` verification: ${e.verification}`);
|
||||
if (e.reason !== undefined) lines.push(` reason: "${e.reason}"`);
|
||||
if (e.check_kind !== undefined) lines.push(` check_kind: ${e.check_kind}`);
|
||||
if (e.check_target !== undefined) lines.push(` check_target: ${e.check_target}`);
|
||||
if (e.check_rule !== undefined) lines.push(` check_rule: ${e.check_rule}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
lines.push('---', '', 'Body.', '');
|
||||
return lines.join('\n');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const BASE_TIER = Object.freeze({
|
||||
requirement_id: 'R1', category: 'safety', status: 'resolved', verification: 'test',
|
||||
resolution: null, reason: null, statement: 'MUST NOT do the forbidden thing',
|
||||
});
|
||||
const KIND_ARB = fc.constantFrom('node-test', 'lint-rule');
|
||||
// Path-like scalar that is NEVER pure-digit (so the flat parser does not numeric-coerce it) — models
|
||||
// realistic targets / rule-ids. The renderer is unquoted, so the charset excludes whitespace, quotes
|
||||
// and colons that the flat continuation-KV regex would not round-trip.
|
||||
const PATH_CHARS = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789/._-'.split('');
|
||||
const pathScalarArb = fc.array(fc.constantFrom(...PATH_CHARS), { minLength: 1, maxLength: 24 })
|
||||
.map((chars) => chars.join(''))
|
||||
.filter((s) => /\D/.test(s)); // ≥1 non-digit → stays a string through parseMustHavesBlock
|
||||
// Canonical integer string — exercises the numeric-coercion path (render `key: 12345` -> parse coerces
|
||||
// to NUMBER -> descriptorFromProjection String()-normalizes back). Capped well under MAX_SAFE_INTEGER,
|
||||
// no leading zeros, so the integer round-trips exactly.
|
||||
const numericScalarArb = fc.nat({ max: 9999999 }).map(String);
|
||||
const targetArb = fc.oneof(pathScalarArb, numericScalarArb);
|
||||
|
||||
// A fully well-formed descriptor item (resolved test-tier); node-test carries no rule.
|
||||
const wellFormedArb = KIND_ARB.chain((kind) =>
|
||||
fc.record({ target: targetArb, rule: pathScalarArb }).map(({ target, rule }) => {
|
||||
const item = { ...BASE_TIER, check_kind: kind, check_target: target };
|
||||
if (kind === 'lint-rule') item.check_rule = rule;
|
||||
return { item, kind, target, rule: kind === 'lint-rule' ? rule : undefined };
|
||||
}),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
describe('probe-core property: #1278 check-descriptor round-trip is deterministic across the full string domain', () => {
|
||||
test('a well-formed descriptor survives project -> render -> parse -> descriptorFromProjection (incl. numeric coercion); target/rule reconstruct as strings', () => {
|
||||
fc.assert(
|
||||
fc.property(wellFormedArb, ({ item, kind, target, rule }) => {
|
||||
const projected = pc.projectProhibitions([item]);
|
||||
if (projected[0].check_kind !== kind) return false; // projector emits the descriptor
|
||||
const reparsed = fm.parseMustHavesBlock(renderProhibitionsDoc(projected), 'prohibitions');
|
||||
const d = enforce.descriptorFromProjection(reparsed[0]);
|
||||
if (!d || d.kind !== kind) return false;
|
||||
// target is string-normalized even when parseMustHavesBlock numerically coerced it.
|
||||
if (typeof d.target !== 'string' || d.target !== target) return false;
|
||||
if (kind === 'lint-rule') {
|
||||
return typeof d.rule === 'string' && d.rule === rule;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return !('rule' in d); // a node-test descriptor never carries a rule
|
||||
}),
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Under-specified / invalid projected descriptors: the deterministic-locate contract is fail-CLOSED —
|
||||
// the adapter + the producer's existing locate guard must NEVER green and ALWAYS flag, even when the
|
||||
// (injected) runner would report a pass.
|
||||
const malformedArb = fc.oneof(
|
||||
fc.constant({ ...BASE_TIER }), // absent descriptor (no check_*)
|
||||
KIND_ARB.map((kind) => ({ ...BASE_TIER, check_kind: kind })), // valid kind, NO target
|
||||
pathScalarArb.map((t) => ({ ...BASE_TIER, check_kind: 'lint-rule', check_target: t })), // lint-rule, NO rule
|
||||
fc.record({ k: fc.constantFrom('shell-script', 'bash', 'python', 'exec', ''), t: targetArb })
|
||||
.map(({ k, t }) => ({ ...BASE_TIER, check_kind: k, check_target: t })), // unknown kind
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
describe('probe-core property: #1278 under-specified descriptor is always fail-closed (never green)', () => {
|
||||
test('an absent / target-less / rule-less / unknown-kind descriptor never disposes green and is always flagged + unlocated', () => {
|
||||
fc.assert(
|
||||
fc.property(malformedArb, (projectedItem) => {
|
||||
const d = enforce.descriptorFromProjection(projectedItem);
|
||||
const result = enforce.runProhibitionEnforcement(projectedItem, d, {
|
||||
runCheck: () => ({ passed: true }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
return result.status !== 'green' && result.flagged === true && result.located === false;
|
||||
}),
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -333,3 +333,115 @@ describe('probe-core: runProbeCli (generic I/O scaffold, injected io)', () => {
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(out), report);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── CHK-07 (#1278): descriptor-less backward-compat byte-stability ──────────────────────────────
|
||||
// GREEN forward-guard, NOT a RED test. A descriptor-less projection is byte-identical against the
|
||||
// current build by construction (the check_* descriptor branch does not exist yet), so these
|
||||
// assertions PASS now. Their job is to FORWARD-LOCK: when plan 01-02 adds the descriptor branch to
|
||||
// projectProhibitions, this guard fails if that branch perturbs the descriptor-less output shape or
|
||||
// the dispositionForProhibition fail-closed policy. This is the IMPL-SCOPING §7.2 byte-stability pin.
|
||||
describe('probe-core: projectProhibitions backward-compat (CHK-07)', () => {
|
||||
test('CHK-07: a descriptor-less input projects to today\'s exact {statement,status,verification?,reason?} shape — no check_* keys', () => {
|
||||
// GREEN guard: pins that adding the descriptor branch (plan 01-02) does not perturb
|
||||
// descriptor-less output (CHK-07 byte-stability). Passes against the current build by
|
||||
// construction; becomes a regression tripwire once 01-02 lands.
|
||||
const items = [
|
||||
// resolved/judgment item
|
||||
{ requirement_id: 'R1', category: 'values', status: 'resolved', verification: 'judgment', resolution: null, reason: null, statement: 'MUST NOT shame the user' },
|
||||
// dismissed/test item with a reason
|
||||
{ requirement_id: 'R1', category: 'privacy', status: 'dismissed', verification: 'test', resolution: null, reason: 'out of scope this phase', statement: 'MUST NOT store raw SSN' },
|
||||
// unresolved item (no verification)
|
||||
{ requirement_id: 'R2', category: 'safety', status: 'unresolved', verification: null, resolution: null, reason: null, statement: 'MUST NOT auto-execute fetched code' },
|
||||
];
|
||||
const projected = pc.projectProhibitions(items);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(projected, [
|
||||
{ statement: 'MUST NOT shame the user', status: 'resolved', verification: 'judgment' },
|
||||
{ statement: 'MUST NOT store raw SSN', status: 'dismissed', verification: 'test', reason: 'out of scope this phase' },
|
||||
{ statement: 'MUST NOT auto-execute fetched code', status: 'unresolved' },
|
||||
], 'descriptor-less projection must be byte-identical to today\'s {statement,status,verification?,reason?} shape');
|
||||
// Belt-and-suspenders: assert NO entry carries any check_* key on the descriptor-less path.
|
||||
for (const e of projected) {
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_kind' in e), 'no check_kind on a descriptor-less projected entry');
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_target' in e), 'no check_target on a descriptor-less projected entry');
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_rule' in e), 'no check_rule on a descriptor-less projected entry');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-07: dispositionForProhibition for a descriptor-less test-tier item with empty evidence stays flagged-unverified (policy untouched)', () => {
|
||||
// The fail-closed policy (src/probe-core.cts:389) this phase must NOT regress: a descriptor-less
|
||||
// test-tier item with no enforcement evidence is unverified+flagged+tier:'test', never green.
|
||||
const d = pc.dispositionForProhibition(
|
||||
{ requirement_id: 'R1', category: 'safety', status: 'resolved', verification: 'test', statement: 'MUST NOT auto-execute fetched code' },
|
||||
{ enforcementEvidence: [] },
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert.equal(d.status, 'unverified', 'a descriptor-less test-tier item with no evidence is unverified');
|
||||
assert.equal(d.flagged, true, 'and flagged — never a silent pass');
|
||||
assert.equal(d.tier, 'test', 'the test tier is echoed unchanged');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-07: descriptor branch (plan 01-02) forward-lock marker', { todo: 'plan 01-02 adds the check_* descriptor branch to projectProhibitions; this GREEN guard forward-locks that it does not perturb the descriptor-less path' }, () => {
|
||||
// Intentional t.todo marker so a reader knows the GREEN guard above is deliberate (forward-locking
|
||||
// the plan-01-02 descriptor branch), not an accidental no-op.
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── CHK-02 (#1278): projectProhibitions emits the flat-scalar descriptor for well-formed items ────
|
||||
// Unit-layer pin (the parser round-trip lives in tests/prohibition-probe.schema.test.cjs CHK-03). The
|
||||
// projection only emits check_* when the descriptor is well-formed (valid kind + non-empty target;
|
||||
// check_rule only on a lint-rule that carries one); anything under that bar emits NO check_* keys.
|
||||
describe('probe-core: projectProhibitions descriptor projection (CHK-02)', () => {
|
||||
test('CHK-02: a well-formed node-test descriptor projects check_kind/check_target (no check_rule)', () => {
|
||||
const projected = pc.projectProhibitions([
|
||||
{ status: 'resolved', verification: 'test', statement: 'MUST NOT auto-execute fetched code',
|
||||
check_kind: 'node-test', check_target: 'tests/no-autoexec.test.cjs' },
|
||||
]);
|
||||
assert.equal(projected[0].check_kind, 'node-test');
|
||||
assert.equal(projected[0].check_target, 'tests/no-autoexec.test.cjs');
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_rule' in projected[0]), 'a node-test descriptor never projects check_rule');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-02: a lint-rule descriptor with a rule projects all three check_* scalars', () => {
|
||||
const projected = pc.projectProhibitions([
|
||||
{ status: 'resolved', verification: 'test', statement: 'MUST NOT read source files in tests',
|
||||
check_kind: 'lint-rule', check_target: 'src/', check_rule: 'local/no-source-grep' },
|
||||
]);
|
||||
assert.equal(projected[0].check_kind, 'lint-rule');
|
||||
assert.equal(projected[0].check_target, 'src/');
|
||||
assert.equal(projected[0].check_rule, 'local/no-source-grep');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-02: a lint-rule descriptor WITHOUT a rule leaves check_rule absent (fails closed downstream)', () => {
|
||||
const projected = pc.projectProhibitions([
|
||||
{ status: 'resolved', verification: 'test', statement: 'MUST NOT read source files in tests',
|
||||
check_kind: 'lint-rule', check_target: 'src/' },
|
||||
]);
|
||||
assert.equal(projected[0].check_kind, 'lint-rule');
|
||||
assert.equal(projected[0].check_target, 'src/');
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_rule' in projected[0]), 'a lint-rule with no rule projects check_rule absent');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-02: an under-specified descriptor (kind but empty/missing target) emits NO check_* keys', () => {
|
||||
const projected = pc.projectProhibitions([
|
||||
// valid kind but empty target -> below the well-formedness bar -> descriptor projects absent
|
||||
{ status: 'resolved', verification: 'test', statement: 'MUST NOT do the thing',
|
||||
check_kind: 'node-test', check_target: ' ' },
|
||||
// unknown kind -> descriptor projects absent
|
||||
{ status: 'resolved', verification: 'test', statement: 'MUST NOT do the other thing',
|
||||
check_kind: 'grep-rule', check_target: 'src/' },
|
||||
]);
|
||||
for (const e of projected) {
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_kind' in e), 'an under-specified descriptor projects no check_kind');
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_target' in e), 'an under-specified descriptor projects no check_target');
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_rule' in e), 'an under-specified descriptor projects no check_rule');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-02: a descriptor-less item projects with no check_* keys', () => {
|
||||
const projected = pc.projectProhibitions([
|
||||
{ status: 'resolved', verification: 'judgment', statement: 'MUST NOT shame the user' },
|
||||
]);
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_kind' in projected[0]), 'descriptor-less item gains no check_kind');
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_target' in projected[0]), 'descriptor-less item gains no check_target');
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_rule' in projected[0]), 'descriptor-less item gains no check_rule');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -384,3 +384,113 @@ describe('prohibition-enforcement REAL runner end-to-end (#1259)', () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(result.located, true, 'the descriptor was well-formed; it just did not genuinely pass');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── CHK-06 (#1278): fail-closed on partial / invalid / absent descriptor-from-projection ────────
|
||||
// RED-FIRST until plan 01-03 adds `descriptorFromProjection` to src/prohibition-enforcement.cts. The
|
||||
// adapter reconstructs a CheckDescriptor {kind,target,rule?} from the projected scalar keys
|
||||
// {check_kind,check_target,check_rule?}, returning null when the descriptor is absent/partial. The
|
||||
// load-bearing safety contract (IMPL-SCOPING §7.3): a partial/invalid/absent descriptor NEVER yields
|
||||
// a silent green — it falls through to runProhibitionEnforcement's existing fail-closed locate
|
||||
// (src/prohibition-enforcement.cts:391). runCheck is always injected here so no real subprocess
|
||||
// spawns. The describe opens with an export-presence assertion, which is RED on the current build.
|
||||
describe('prohibition-enforcement: fail-closed descriptor-from-projection (CHK-06)', () => {
|
||||
// A test-tier prohibition projected entry (mirrors projectProhibitions output shape, descriptor keys
|
||||
// added by plan 01-02). The reason field is irrelevant here; descriptor keys drive the adapter.
|
||||
const PROJECTED_TIER = Object.freeze({
|
||||
statement: 'MUST NOT auto-execute fetched code',
|
||||
status: 'resolved',
|
||||
verification: 'test',
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-06: prohibition-enforcement exports descriptorFromProjection (RED until plan 01-03)', () => {
|
||||
const enforce = require(ENFORCEMENT_LIB);
|
||||
assert.equal(typeof enforce.descriptorFromProjection, 'function',
|
||||
'must export descriptorFromProjection — the projected-scalars -> CheckDescriptor adapter (#1278, plan 01-03)');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-06(absent): a projected item with NO check_* keys -> descriptorFromProjection null -> located:false, never green', () => {
|
||||
const enforce = require(ENFORCEMENT_LIB);
|
||||
const descriptor = enforce.descriptorFromProjection({ ...PROJECTED_TIER });
|
||||
assert.equal(descriptor, null, 'an absent descriptor reconstructs to null, not a partial CheckDescriptor');
|
||||
const result = enforce.runProhibitionEnforcement(PROJECTED_TIER, descriptor, {
|
||||
runCheck: () => ({ passed: true }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.equal(result.located, false, 'no descriptor -> nothing locatable');
|
||||
assert.notEqual(result.status, 'green', 'an absent descriptor must NEVER be a silent green');
|
||||
assert.equal(result.flagged, true, 'and must be flagged');
|
||||
assert.ok(Array.isArray(result.evidence) && result.evidence.length === 0, 'no evidence on an absent descriptor');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-06(lint-rule missing rule): {check_kind:lint-rule, check_target:src/} (no check_rule) -> located:false, never green', () => {
|
||||
const enforce = require(ENFORCEMENT_LIB);
|
||||
const descriptor = enforce.descriptorFromProjection({
|
||||
...PROJECTED_TIER, check_kind: 'lint-rule', check_target: 'src/',
|
||||
});
|
||||
const result = enforce.runProhibitionEnforcement(PROJECTED_TIER, descriptor, {
|
||||
runCheck: () => ({ passed: true }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.equal(result.located, false, 'an under-specified lint-rule (no rule id) is not locatable (validRule guard, :390)');
|
||||
assert.notEqual(result.status, 'green', 'a lint-rule missing its rule id must NEVER green');
|
||||
assert.equal(result.flagged, true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-06(unknown kind): {check_kind:shell-script} -> validKind false -> located:false, never green', () => {
|
||||
const enforce = require(ENFORCEMENT_LIB);
|
||||
const descriptor = enforce.descriptorFromProjection({
|
||||
...PROJECTED_TIER, check_kind: 'shell-script', check_target: 'x',
|
||||
});
|
||||
const result = enforce.runProhibitionEnforcement(PROJECTED_TIER, descriptor, {
|
||||
runCheck: () => ({ passed: true }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.equal(result.located, false, 'an unknown kind is not a valid wired check (validKind guard, :388)');
|
||||
assert.notEqual(result.status, 'green', 'an unknown check kind must NEVER green');
|
||||
assert.equal(result.flagged, true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-06(well-formed but runCheck reports non-pass): located:true, never green (no false green)', () => {
|
||||
const enforce = require(ENFORCEMENT_LIB);
|
||||
const descriptor = enforce.descriptorFromProjection({
|
||||
...PROJECTED_TIER, check_kind: 'node-test', check_target: 'tests/no-autoexec.test.cjs',
|
||||
});
|
||||
// A complete node-test descriptor; failFirst is caller-attested at verify time (#1279), not sourced
|
||||
// from the projection, so attest it here. The injected runCheck reports a non-pass.
|
||||
const result = enforce.runProhibitionEnforcement(
|
||||
PROJECTED_TIER,
|
||||
descriptor ? { ...descriptor, failFirst: true } : descriptor,
|
||||
{ runCheck: () => ({ passed: false }) },
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert.equal(result.located, true, 'a well-formed descriptor IS located even though the run did not pass');
|
||||
assert.notEqual(result.status, 'green', 'a located check that does not genuinely pass must NEVER green');
|
||||
assert.equal(result.flagged, true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-06(MD-01 numeric coercion): a numeric-looking check_target reconstructs as a STRING (parseMustHavesBlock coerces ^\\d+$ to number) -> located, no type-lie / silent un-locate', () => {
|
||||
const enforce = require(ENFORCEMENT_LIB);
|
||||
// The shared parseMustHavesBlock (src/frontmatter.cts) coerces a /^\d+$/ scalar value to a NUMBER on
|
||||
// round-trip, so a numeric-looking check_target arrives at the adapter as a number. The adapter must
|
||||
// String()-coerce it (not cast `as string` over a number), so the descriptor is honestly typed AND a
|
||||
// numeric-looking target still locates instead of silently un-locating (the round-trip is lossless
|
||||
// across the full string domain — closes review finding MD-01/LW-01).
|
||||
const descriptor = enforce.descriptorFromProjection({
|
||||
...PROJECTED_TIER, check_kind: 'node-test', check_target: 12345,
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.equal(typeof descriptor.target, 'string',
|
||||
'a numeric-coerced check_target must reconstruct as a string, never a number behind an `as string` cast');
|
||||
assert.equal(descriptor.target, '12345');
|
||||
const result = enforce.runProhibitionEnforcement(
|
||||
PROJECTED_TIER,
|
||||
{ ...descriptor, failFirst: true },
|
||||
{ runCheck: () => ({ passed: true }) },
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert.equal(result.located, true,
|
||||
'a numeric-looking but valid target locates after String() coercion — no silent un-locate');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-06(LW-02 stray rule): a check_rule on a node-test descriptor is dropped (rule belongs to lint-rule only)', () => {
|
||||
const enforce = require(ENFORCEMENT_LIB);
|
||||
const descriptor = enforce.descriptorFromProjection({
|
||||
...PROJECTED_TIER, check_kind: 'node-test', check_target: 'tests/x.test.cjs', check_rule: 'local/no-source-grep',
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.equal(descriptor.rule, undefined, 'a node-test descriptor carries no rule even if a stray check_rule is present');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -150,6 +150,12 @@ describe('prohibition-probe schema: deterministic projectProhibitions round-trip
|
||||
lines.push(` status: ${e.status}`);
|
||||
if (e.verification !== undefined) lines.push(` verification: ${e.verification}`);
|
||||
if (e.reason !== undefined) lines.push(` reason: "${e.reason}"`);
|
||||
// CHK-03 (#1278): the flat scalar descriptor keys render as continuation KVs under the list
|
||||
// item, exactly how src/frontmatter.cts:344 reads them back. Only emitted when present, so a
|
||||
// descriptor-less entry renders identically to before (no `check_*` lines).
|
||||
if (e.check_kind !== undefined) lines.push(` check_kind: ${e.check_kind}`);
|
||||
if (e.check_target !== undefined) lines.push(` check_target: ${e.check_target}`);
|
||||
if (e.check_rule !== undefined) lines.push(` check_rule: ${e.check_rule}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
lines.push('---', '', 'Body.', '');
|
||||
return lines.join('\n');
|
||||
@@ -178,4 +184,87 @@ describe('prohibition-probe schema: deterministic projectProhibitions round-trip
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(pc.projectProhibitions(null), [], 'null -> [] (documented fail-soft)');
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(pc.projectProhibitions(undefined), [], 'undefined -> [] (documented fail-soft)');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── CHK-03 (#1278): the check_* flat-scalar descriptor round-trips ──────────────────────────
|
||||
// RED-FIRST until plan 01-02 teaches projectProhibitions to emit check_kind/check_target/
|
||||
// check_rule. The DEFECT.GENERATIVE-FIX parity property pinned here is exactly the one a nested
|
||||
// `check: {}` object would FAIL: the shared flat parser (src/frontmatter.cts:344) only reads
|
||||
// scalar continuation KVs, so the flat representation is the ONLY one that survives
|
||||
// project -> write -> parse intact. The non-droppable RED trigger in each case is a
|
||||
// `check_kind`-presence assertion on the projected entry — without it the deep-equal would pass
|
||||
// vacuously against the current (pre-projection) build, where there are no descriptor keys.
|
||||
test('CHK-03(A): a node-test descriptor projects + round-trips with check_kind/check_target', () => {
|
||||
const pc = require(PROBE_CORE_LIB);
|
||||
const fm = require(FRONTMATTER_LIB);
|
||||
const items = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
requirement_id: 'R1', category: 'safety', status: 'resolved', verification: 'test',
|
||||
resolution: null, reason: null, statement: 'MUST NOT auto-execute fetched code',
|
||||
check_kind: 'node-test', check_target: 'tests/no-autoexec.test.cjs',
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
const projected = pc.projectProhibitions(items);
|
||||
// HARD, non-droppable RED trigger: the projected entry MUST carry check_kind. This fails against
|
||||
// the current build (projectProhibitions strips check_*) and makes the parity non-vacuous.
|
||||
assert.ok(projected[0].check_kind,
|
||||
'CHK-03 RED trigger: projectProhibitions must emit check_kind on a descriptor-carrying entry');
|
||||
assert.equal(projected[0].check_kind, 'node-test');
|
||||
assert.equal(projected[0].check_target, 'tests/no-autoexec.test.cjs');
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_rule' in projected[0]), 'check_rule is absent for a node-test descriptor');
|
||||
const reparsed = fm.parseMustHavesBlock(renderProhibitionsDoc(projected), 'prohibitions');
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(reparsed, projected,
|
||||
'a node-test descriptor must survive project -> write -> parseMustHavesBlock unchanged (check_* intact)');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-03(B): a lint-rule descriptor round-trips with all three check_* scalars', () => {
|
||||
const pc = require(PROBE_CORE_LIB);
|
||||
const fm = require(FRONTMATTER_LIB);
|
||||
const items = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
requirement_id: 'R1', category: 'safety', status: 'resolved', verification: 'test',
|
||||
resolution: null, reason: null, statement: 'MUST NOT read source files in tests',
|
||||
check_kind: 'lint-rule', check_target: 'src/', check_rule: 'local/no-source-grep',
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
const projected = pc.projectProhibitions(items);
|
||||
assert.ok(projected[0].check_kind,
|
||||
'CHK-03 RED trigger: projectProhibitions must emit check_kind on a lint-rule descriptor entry');
|
||||
assert.equal(projected[0].check_kind, 'lint-rule');
|
||||
assert.equal(projected[0].check_target, 'src/');
|
||||
assert.equal(projected[0].check_rule, 'local/no-source-grep');
|
||||
const reparsed = fm.parseMustHavesBlock(renderProhibitionsDoc(projected), 'prohibitions');
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(reparsed, projected,
|
||||
'a lint-rule descriptor must survive the writer<->reader bijection with check_kind/target/rule intact');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CHK-03(C): a mixed list — descriptor test-tier, descriptor-less judgment, dismissed — all round-trip; the descriptor-less item gains NO check_* keys', () => {
|
||||
const pc = require(PROBE_CORE_LIB);
|
||||
const fm = require(FRONTMATTER_LIB);
|
||||
const items = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
requirement_id: 'R1', category: 'safety', status: 'resolved', verification: 'test',
|
||||
resolution: null, reason: null, statement: 'MUST NOT auto-execute fetched code',
|
||||
check_kind: 'node-test', check_target: 'tests/no-autoexec.test.cjs',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
requirement_id: 'R1', category: 'values', status: 'resolved', verification: 'judgment',
|
||||
resolution: null, reason: null, statement: 'MUST NOT shame the user',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
requirement_id: 'R2', category: 'privacy', status: 'dismissed', verification: 'test',
|
||||
resolution: null, reason: 'out of scope this phase', statement: 'MUST NOT store raw SSN',
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
const projected = pc.projectProhibitions(items);
|
||||
// Non-droppable RED trigger: the descriptor-carrying entry exposes check_kind.
|
||||
assert.ok(projected[0].check_kind,
|
||||
'CHK-03 RED trigger: the test-tier descriptor entry must carry check_kind');
|
||||
// The descriptor-less judgment item must NOT gain any check_* key.
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_kind' in projected[1]), 'a descriptor-less item gains no check_kind');
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_target' in projected[1]), 'a descriptor-less item gains no check_target');
|
||||
assert.ok(!('check_rule' in projected[1]), 'a descriptor-less item gains no check_rule');
|
||||
const reparsed = fm.parseMustHavesBlock(renderProhibitionsDoc(projected), 'prohibitions');
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(reparsed, projected,
|
||||
'a mixed list survives the writer<->reader bijection; descriptor presence/absence is preserved per item');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
|
||||
"ship.md": 24388,
|
||||
"sketch-wrap-up.md": 14223,
|
||||
"sketch.md": 19960,
|
||||
"spec-phase.md": 28438,
|
||||
"spec-phase.md": 30343,
|
||||
"spike-wrap-up.md": 15092,
|
||||
"spike.md": 24517,
|
||||
"stats.md": 6718,
|
||||
@@ -85,6 +85,6 @@
|
||||
"undo.md": 10431,
|
||||
"update.md": 21053,
|
||||
"validate-phase.md": 10745,
|
||||
"verify-phase.md": 35362,
|
||||
"verify-phase.md": 36498,
|
||||
"verify-work.md": 31157
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user