fix(#429): prevent API keys from being committed via map-codebase

Defense-in-depth approach:

Layer 1 - Prevention:
- Add <forbidden_files> section to gsd-codebase-mapper agent
- Explicitly prohibit reading .env, credentials, keys, secrets
- Agent can note file existence but never quote contents

Layer 2 - Detection:
- Add scan_for_secrets step before commit in map-codebase workflow
- Regex patterns catch: sk-*, ghp_*, AKIA*, xox*-*, JWTs, private keys
- Halts with alert if secrets detected, requires user confirmation

Layer 3 - Documentation:
- Add Security section to README
- Document Claude Code deny rules for sensitive files
- Recommend defense-in-depth approach

Closes #429

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Lex Christopherson
2026-02-05 12:15:56 -06:00
parent 12a06aba7a
commit f53011c9e2
3 changed files with 92 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@@ -545,6 +545,37 @@ At milestone completion, GSD offers squash merge (recommended) or merge with his
---
## Security
### Protecting Sensitive Files
GSD's codebase mapping and analysis commands read files to understand your project. **Protect files containing secrets** by adding them to Claude Code's deny list:
1. Open Claude Code settings (`.claude/settings.json` or global)
2. Add sensitive file patterns to the deny list:
```json
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"Read(.env)",
"Read(.env.*)",
"Read(**/secrets/*)",
"Read(**/*credential*)",
"Read(**/*.pem)",
"Read(**/*.key)"
]
}
}
```
This prevents Claude from reading these files entirely, regardless of what commands you run.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> GSD includes built-in protections against committing secrets, but defense-in-depth is best practice. Deny read access to sensitive files as a first line of defense.
---
## Troubleshooting
**Commands not found after install?**

View File

@@ -85,8 +85,9 @@ Explore the codebase thoroughly for your focus area.
ls package.json requirements.txt Cargo.toml go.mod pyproject.toml 2>/dev/null
cat package.json 2>/dev/null | head -100
# Config files
ls -la *.config.* .env* tsconfig.json .nvmrc .python-version 2>/dev/null
# Config files (list only - DO NOT read .env contents)
ls -la *.config.* tsconfig.json .nvmrc .python-version 2>/dev/null
ls .env* 2>/dev/null # Note existence only, never read contents
# Find SDK/API imports
grep -r "import.*stripe\|import.*supabase\|import.*aws\|import.*@" src/ --include="*.ts" --include="*.tsx" 2>/dev/null | head -50
@@ -712,6 +713,28 @@ Ready for orchestrator summary.
</templates>
<forbidden_files>
**NEVER read or quote contents from these files (even if they exist):**
- `.env`, `.env.*`, `*.env` - Environment variables with secrets
- `credentials.*`, `secrets.*`, `*secret*`, `*credential*` - Credential files
- `*.pem`, `*.key`, `*.p12`, `*.pfx`, `*.jks` - Certificates and private keys
- `id_rsa*`, `id_ed25519*`, `id_dsa*` - SSH private keys
- `.npmrc`, `.pypirc`, `.netrc` - Package manager auth tokens
- `config/secrets/*`, `.secrets/*`, `secrets/` - Secret directories
- `*.keystore`, `*.truststore` - Java keystores
- `serviceAccountKey.json`, `*-credentials.json` - Cloud service credentials
- `docker-compose*.yml` sections with passwords - May contain inline secrets
- Any file in `.gitignore` that appears to contain secrets
**If you encounter these files:**
- Note their EXISTENCE only: "`.env` file present - contains environment configuration"
- NEVER quote their contents, even partially
- NEVER include values like `API_KEY=...` or `sk-...` in any output
**Why this matters:** Your output gets committed to git. Leaked secrets = security incident.
</forbidden_files>
<critical_rules>
**WRITE DOCUMENTS DIRECTLY.** Do not return findings to orchestrator. The whole point is reducing context transfer.
@@ -720,7 +743,7 @@ Ready for orchestrator summary.
**USE THE TEMPLATES.** Fill in the template structure. Don't invent your own format.
**BE THOROUGH.** Explore deeply. Read actual files. Don't guess.
**BE THOROUGH.** Explore deeply. Read actual files. Don't guess. **But respect <forbidden_files>.**
**RETURN ONLY CONFIRMATION.** Your response should be ~10 lines max. Just confirm what was written.

View File

@@ -227,6 +227,41 @@ wc -l .planning/codebase/*.md
If any documents missing or empty, note which agents may have failed.
Continue to scan_for_secrets.
</step>
<step name="scan_for_secrets">
**CRITICAL SECURITY CHECK:** Scan output files for accidentally leaked secrets before committing.
Run secret pattern detection:
```bash
# Check for common API key patterns in generated docs
grep -E '(sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}|sk_live_[a-zA-Z0-9]+|sk_test_[a-zA-Z0-9]+|ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}|gho_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}|glpat-[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+|AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}|xox[baprs]-[a-zA-Z0-9-]+|-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY|eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.)' .planning/codebase/*.md 2>/dev/null && SECRETS_FOUND=true || SECRETS_FOUND=false
```
**If SECRETS_FOUND=true:**
```
⚠️ SECURITY ALERT: Potential secrets detected in codebase documents!
Found patterns that look like API keys or tokens in:
[show grep output]
This would expose credentials if committed.
**Action required:**
1. Review the flagged content above
2. If these are real secrets, they must be removed before committing
3. Consider adding sensitive files to Claude Code "Deny" permissions
Pausing before commit. Reply "safe to proceed" if the flagged content is not actually sensitive, or edit the files first.
```
Wait for user confirmation before continuing to commit_codebase_map.
**If SECRETS_FOUND=false:**
Continue to commit_codebase_map.
</step>