test(#3090): let the destructive call ask the safety question the function already answers

cleanup() computed `isTmpPath` — the exact predicate for "is this path safe to
delete" — and consulted it only inside the catch block, to classify a transient
Windows error. The rmSync above it ran unconditionally against whatever path it
was handed, with `recursive: true, force: true`. The guard existed and the
destructive call never asked it.

The chdir at the top of the function makes the failure mode worse rather than
better: a wrong target first moves the process out of the tree, then deletes it.

So the predicate moves above both, and an out-of-tmpdir path is refused before
either can run. The refusal throws and names the path; returning quietly would
reproduce the fail-open shape this wave exists to remove.

The catch keeps its `&& isTmpPath` term. It is now always true, but it states
the condition the swallow depends on rather than inheriting it from a check
twenty lines up, and it stays correct if the guard is ever relaxed.

All 300+ call sites resolve under os.tmpdir() today, including the two files
that override TMPDIR — both create their override root through the real
os.tmpdir() first — so nothing legitimate is refused.

The regression test targets tests/ itself: a real directory that must never be
deleted, so nothing is created and nothing needs tearing down. It asserts the
throw names the path, that cwd is unchanged (the chdir hazard), and that a known
file inside still exists — proving the directory was not emptied rather than
merely still present.

Whether tests/ is outside os.tmpdir() is environment-dependent: os.tmpdir() is
/tmp on Linux, so a checkout under /tmp would put it inside, and there a correct
guard would delete this directory rather than refuse it. The test asserts that
precondition before calling cleanup, so that environment fails loudly instead of
destructively.

Refs #3057

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
sim
2026-08-05 18:39:51 -04:00
parent 6128f73003
commit fba501836b
2 changed files with 70 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const { cleanup, createTempDir } = require('./helpers.cjs');
// ─── Test 1: Real-FS happy path ──────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -98,3 +100,62 @@ test('cleanup does not throw when cwd is inside the target dir, and removes the
assert.strictEqual(fs.existsSync(dir), false, 'temp dir should not exist after cleanup');
});
// ─── Test 4: out-of-tmpdir refusal ───────────────────────────────────────────
test('cleanup throws and does not chdir or delete when target is outside os.tmpdir()', () => {
// __dirname (this repo's tests/ directory) must never be deleted. Whether
// it is actually outside os.tmpdir() is environment-dependent: on Linux
// os.tmpdir() is /tmp, and a CI container that checks the repo out under
// /tmp would put __dirname INSIDE tmpdir, in which case a correctly-working
// cleanup() would not refuse it -- it would delete this directory. The
// precondition assertion below verifies the "outside tmpdir" assumption
// before cleanup() is ever called, so that situation fails loudly and
// safely instead of destructively. No scratch directory is created, so
// there is nothing to tear down.
const outsideDir = __dirname;
const knownFile = path.join(outsideDir, 'helpers-cleanup.test.cjs');
// Mirror cleanup()'s own out-of-tmpdir predicate (tests/helpers.cjs) so
// this test cannot run on a target it does not actually control.
const tmpRoot = path.resolve(os.tmpdir());
const resolvedOutsideDir = path.resolve(outsideDir);
const isInsideTmpdir =
resolvedOutsideDir === tmpRoot || resolvedOutsideDir.startsWith(`${tmpRoot}${path.sep}`);
assert.strictEqual(
isInsideTmpdir,
false,
`this test cannot run safely when the repo lives under os.tmpdir(): ` +
`outsideDir (${resolvedOutsideDir}) is inside os.tmpdir() (${tmpRoot})`
);
const cwdBefore = process.cwd();
assert.throws(
() => cleanup(outsideDir),
(err) => err instanceof Error && err.message.includes(outsideDir),
'cleanup must throw an Error whose message names the offending path'
);
assert.strictEqual(
process.cwd(),
cwdBefore,
'cleanup must refuse before chdir, so cwd is unchanged'
);
assert.strictEqual(fs.existsSync(outsideDir), true, 'target directory must still exist after refusal');
assert.strictEqual(
fs.existsSync(knownFile),
true,
'a known file inside the target must still exist, proving the dir was not emptied'
);
});
// ─── Test 5: control — a real os.tmpdir()-rooted path still cleans up ───────
test('cleanup still removes a real os.tmpdir()-rooted directory (control)', () => {
const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cleanup-control-'));
cleanup(dir);
assert.strictEqual(fs.existsSync(dir), false, 'os.tmpdir()-rooted directory should be removed');
});

View File

@@ -211,6 +211,15 @@ function cleanup(tmpDir) {
const target = path.resolve(tmpDir);
const cwd = path.resolve(process.cwd());
const tmpRoot = path.resolve(os.tmpdir());
// isTmpPath was previously computed only inside the catch block below, so it
// classified a transient Windows error but was never consulted by the
// destructive rmSync call itself — a wrong `target` would still chdir out of
// its own tree and get force-deleted. Hoisted above both the chdir and the
// rmSync so an out-of-tmpdir path is refused before either can run.
const isTmpPath = target === tmpRoot || target.startsWith(`${tmpRoot}${path.sep}`);
if (!isTmpPath) {
throw new Error(`cleanup() refused to remove a path outside os.tmpdir(): ${target}`);
}
if (cwd === target || cwd.startsWith(`${target}${path.sep}`)) {
// Windows cannot remove a directory that is the current working directory.
process.chdir(path.dirname(target));
@@ -225,7 +234,6 @@ function cleanup(tmpDir) {
} catch (error) {
// After retries, Windows can still briefly hold temp dirs open after a timed-out
// child exits. Ignore that teardown-only flake for temp roots, but rethrow everything else.
const isTmpPath = target === tmpRoot || target.startsWith(`${tmpRoot}${path.sep}`);
const isTransientWinErr = process.platform === 'win32'
&& isTmpPath
&& ['EBUSY', 'ENOTEMPTY', 'EPERM'].includes(error && error.code);