4b69dc346b6bf1a88f860b35dba9f38c2b1b83b8
6 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Tom Boucher
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f96cb44f85 |
enhance(#3248): disclose capability skills as an instruction surface (#3253)
* test(#3248): failing-first suite for instruction-surface disclosure 28 matrix rows from 50-test-matrix.md. Rows requiring the new Disclosure.instructionSurfaces field fail today; rows 18-20/23-25 (the ADR-2363 D4 signature invariants) pass today by construction because the current code never reads skills/agents at all, and stand as regression guards for the implementation commit. Refs #3248 * feat(#3248): disclose capability skills and agents as an instruction surface ADR-2363 D5. A capability whose only contribution was skills disclosed nothing at install: summarizeDisclosure early-returned "ships no executable surfaces (declarative only)" because hasExecutable was false, while each SKILL.md body landed verbatim in the agent's instruction context. discloseExecutableSurfaces gains a fifth, NON-executable class, instructionSurfaces, collecting declared skills/agents stems through the same safeCollect wrapper as the four existing collectors, so a hostile value degrades only this class and the function stays total for any manifest shape. Nothing existing is edited: the collectors, hasExecutable, disclosureSignature and missingArtifacts are untouched. get_impact rates the symbol CRITICAL at 196 affected, which is why the design is strictly additive. D4 is implemented by omission and pinned rather than left incidental: adding, changing or removing skills/agents leaves disclosureSignature byte-identical, so no stored consent record is perturbed and no spurious re-consent fires. ADR-2782's conditional-append trick is deliberately NOT reused - it worked because no manifest could declare a reviewer body before that class existed, whereas skills predate this one, so a conditional append would re-sign every already-consented skill-bearing capability. The renderer is extracted as summarizeInstructionSurfaces and called from BOTH branches of summarizeDisclosure. Appending only at the end would never render for skill-only capabilities - the ones that need it - since those take the early return. That branch's "declarative only" claim is now conditional on there being no instruction surface either. The renderer iterates rather than spreading into push, so an unbounded stem count cannot throw RangeError, and tolerates the bare {} the CLI edge passes via `res.disclosure || {}`. Scope note: #3248's prose says "skill stems"; ADR-2363 D3 classifies instruction surfaces as "skills, agents". Shipping skills alone would leave an ADR deliverable owned by no phase, and the epic has no Phase 2. Agents are the same shape at no extra cost. Narrowing back is a two-line change. Ratifies ADR-2363 (Proposed -> Accepted) and adds the owed ADR-1244 back-link. Closes #3248 * fix(#3248): escape consent-prompt values and narrow disclosure to skills Two review findings, both of which made the previous commit wrong. BLOCKER (isolated adversarial review). Every manifest-supplied value interpolated into a consent-prompt line was rendered unescaped. Those lines are joined with \n and written RAW to stderr on the needs-consent path (capability-command-router -> cli-exit runMain), so a stem carrying a newline forged additional lines indistinguishable from genuine GSD disclosure text, and an ANSI escape could clear or rewrite lines already printed. That defeats the informed-consent guarantee this change exists to provide, and is a prompt-injection vector against any agent that reads the stderr text to decide whether to retry with --yes. The hole was not unique to the new class - hook event/script, command family/module/router, every MCP field, and every reviewer-lane field were equally unescaped. Fixing only the new one would have created the generative-fix divergence this repo tracks, so renderValueForPrompt is applied to all five classes through one helper, guarded by a parity test that fails if a future class skips it. Escaping is identity for ordinary names, so no well-formed manifest's output changes. The disclosure OBJECT stays verbatim - only the rendered LINE is escaped - because the signature and every consumer reasoning about identity depend on the declared value. NARROWED to skills only. The previous commit also collected agents, arguing ADR-2363 D3 classifies instruction surfaces as "skills, agents". Verified against staging: stageSkillsForRuntimeAsSkills takes a registry and unions third-party skills in via readInstalledCapabilitySkill, while stageAgentsForRuntimeWithConverter takes only a source directory and has no registry-aware path. Third-party agents are never staged into the instruction context, so disclosing them would have put a false claim in a security prompt - worse than the scope creep two reviewers flagged it as. D3's classification stands; D5 now records that Phase 1 implements the skills half and that whether agents should be staged at all is an open maintainer question. Also reverts the premature ADR-2363 ratification. The previous commit flipped it to Accepted and asserted "#3248 merged" while this branch IS #3248 and is unmerged. Status returns to Proposed, and the ADR-1244 back-link - owed only on ratification - is withdrawn. Adds the fast-check property suite CLAUDE.md requires and the direct precedent (reviewer-trust-disclosure) already had: totality, D4 signature invariance, D3 hasExecutable invariance, and renderer totality over adversarial manifests. Refs #3248 * chore(#3248): correct changeset scope claim and backfill pr number The fragment was written against the pre-narrowing commit and still advertised 'skills and agents'. 4d26887e narrowed disclosure to skills only - third-party agents are never staged into the instruction context - but did not touch the fragment, so the release notes would have carried a claim the code does not implement. Also backfills pr:0 -> 3253 and names the prompt-escaping fix, which is user-visible and was absent from the original body. Changeset-only; no code or test changed, so the gsd-test pass recorded for 4d26887e still describes this tree's behavior. Refs #3248 --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local> |
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Tom Boucher
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6a9babda69 |
chore(#2798): declare the eleven reviewer lanes as manifest data (#2837)
* chore(#2798): declare the eleven reviewer lanes as manifest data Phase 5a of epic #2782, delivering ADR-2782 D9 (roster half) and D3. - Five reviewers GSD never installs into become lane-only role:reviewer capabilities with no runtime body, no runtimeCompat and no install surface: gemini, coderabbit, ollama, lm-studio, llama-cpp. Before this they had no descriptor at all and lived as a hardcoded NON_RUNTIME_REVIEWER_SLUGS tail, which is now deleted outright. - The six hosts that are ALSO reviewers gain a reviewer body alongside their runtime body. Their runtime bodies are byte-identical to next -- verified per capability against the git blob, not asserted -- so no install behaviour moves. - KNOWN_REVIEWER_SLUGS derives from declared bodies via an exported deriveReviewerSlugs(registry). hostBehaviors.reviewerCli survives as a derived legacy alias for one release; where a capability carries both, the body wins and the slug appears once. Alias removal is Phase 7 (#2801). THE KEYSTONE: the roster is the SAME ELEVEN SLUGS as before -- antigravity, claude, coderabbit, codex, cursor, gemini, llama_cpp, lm_studio, ollama, opencode, qwen. This phase changes HOW the roster is derived, not WHO is in it, and the test asserts that literal list rather than a count. kimi-code is deliberately NOT declared here. It is net-new with no invoke_reviewers leg, so declaring it now would make it selectable but not invocable -- present in --all, selected, emitting an empty section for the whole 5a-to-5b window -- and would break Phase 1's parity assertion. It lands in 5b alongside the iteration that can run it. Legacy kimi (the Python CLI) is not a reviewer at all and gains nothing. The highest-value test is declaredManifestLanesMatchThePhase1Descriptor: it deep-compares all eleven declared bodies against REVIEWER_LANES field-by-field, including probe and invoke sub-fields. All eleven are byte-identical, key order included. The epic's premise is that the manifest and the core descriptor describe the same lane with NO translation layer, and Phase 2's review already caught one divergence that every other test missed. Two ADR corrections folded in, as Phases 1-3 each did: 1. PHASE ORDER. The ADR runs Phase 4 (federated config) before 5a and #2798 claims a dependency on 4. That is inverted and makes Phase 4 unsatisfiable: D9 assigns review.<host>_host to lane capabilities that do not exist until THIS phase creates them, and a federated config slice must live inside capabilities/<id>/capability.json. Real graph: Phase 2 -> 5a -> 4. 2. #2798's INVENTORY acceptance item is vacuous. The inventory catalogs bin/lib/*.cjs modules, not capability directories -- antigravity, opencode and qwen appear zero times in it -- and gen-inventory-manifest --check passes with the five new dirs and no edit. Also corrected a stale line in Phase 2's own ADR amendment: it recorded the slug pattern as /^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]*$/, but Phase 2's security review widened the shipped pattern to /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]*$/ to match Phase 1's exported LANE_SLUG_RE. The prose had not followed the code. Closes #2798 * fix(#2798): catalogue reviewer capabilities in the generated matrix The capability matrix rendered exactly two tables, feature and runtime, via renderTable(caps, role) filtering on c.role === role. ADR-2782 D3 added a THIRD role, so every role:"reviewer" capability was silently dropped from the first-party catalogue. The drift guard did not catch it, and could not: --check compares generated output against the committed file, and both omitted the five lanes identically, so it reported "up to date" while five shipped capabilities were invisible in the one document that is supposed to list what ships. A guard blind to an entire role is not guarding. This phase is what exposed it -- it ships the first role:"reviewer" capabilities -- so it is fixed here rather than deferred (CLAUDE.md: a defect found while working is fixed in the current change, which overrides one-concern-per-PR). Verified red-before-green: with a lane row deleted from the matrix, --check now exits 1; restored, it exits 0. Before this fix the lanes were absent entirely, so there was nothing for the guard to compare. Phase 6 (#2800) still owns enriching the matrix with lane-specific detail (slug/flag/transport columns) and the locale parity gate. This is the narrower fix: the capabilities APPEAR at all. * fix(#2798): close two hardening gaps and record three limits durably Isolated security review (5 targets, no blockers) reproduced two gaps in the new deriveReviewerSlugs. Both are unreachable through the checked-in registry -- it is generated, JSON-sourced and code-reviewed -- but the function is EXPORTED for reuse and carries no other validation, so it must not depend on its caller. - A whitespace-only slug passed the length>0 test verbatim and occupied a roster entry it could never match. Slugs are now trimmed before the emptiness test. A blank body correctly falls through to the legacy alias rather than DROPPING the lane, which would have been worse than the blank slug. - KNOWN_REVIEWER_SLUGS is computed at require() time, so an uncaught throw there breaks import for EVERY consumer rather than degrading selection. It is now guarded, yielding an empty roster on a malformed registry. That is a visible degradation, not a silent one: under D4 an explicitly requested reviewer that is unavailable is an ERROR, so /gsd:review --claude against an empty roster fails loudly. This also removes an asymmetry -- the sibling capability-trust module documents its collectors as TOTAL and wraps them for exactly this reason. Also records three findings that previously existed ONLY in squash-merged PR bodies, which is not a durable record: - ADR-2782 D5 gains an implementation note explaining why the resolved host is deliberately EXCLUDED from the disclosure signature. Rule 1 says consent binds the resolved host; the loader has no config resolver, so folding it in would make the loader and lifecycle compute different signatures for one manifest and re-prompt forever. The binding is split: signature covers the SHA-pinned manifest fields, the consent record stores the resolved host, and Phase 5b re-resolves at invocation -- which is where rule 4 already puts the check. A reader comparing rule 1 to the code would otherwise conclude it is unimplemented. - CONTEXT.md's capability-trust entry still described THREE executable surfaces. Phase 3 added the fourth and made that false; corrected here, since it is drift this epic introduced rather than Phase 6's new-glossary-term work. - stableJson documents the NaN/Infinity/undefined -> null signature collision and why it is unreachable (JSON grammar has no such literal, so JSON.parse throws first). Reachability rests entirely on the ingest path staying JSON.parse-only, so the note lives where someone would break it. * chore(#2798): backfill changeset pr number to 2837 |
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Tom Boucher
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69dbf28ca7 |
feat(#2796): reviewer lane as a fourth trust-disclosure class (#2826)
* feat(#2796): reviewer lane as a fourth trust-disclosure class Phase 3 of epic #2782, delivering ADR-2782 D5. A reviewer lane is piped the plan text, requirements, research findings and CONTEXT.md decisions, and its output is read back into REVIEWS.md -- an egress channel for the most sensitive artifacts GSD produces. Making lanes pluggable WITHOUT a disclosure class would open a data-exfiltration path behind a manifest field, which is why this gates the feature rather than following it. - discloseExecutableSurfaces was cyclomatic 51 / cognitive 99 / 110 lines with risk_level critical. Rather than grow it, it is now a short orchestrator over four extracted collectors (hooks, commands, mcp -- behaviour-preserving -- plus the new lane collector), each independently testable. That is also what makes the 80% mutation threshold survivable: 51 branches in one function cannot be mutation-covered by whole-function tests. - A spawn lane discloses its binary AND its full declared args, in rendered and raw form. Binary-only disclosure would be insufficient and not hypothetically: a lane declaring python3 with innocuous args could later change them to ['-c', '<program>'] without the binary changing. That is the bug class #1459 already fixed for MCP servers. - An openai-http lane has no binary, so it discloses the destination host and the config key naming it. A localhost destination is disclosed and distinguished from a remote one. Both forms name the egress payload classes. THE CONSTRAINT THAT SHAPED THE DESIGN: the lane element is appended to the disclosure signature ONLY when at least one lane is declared. signatureForManifest is the consent key both the loader and the lifecycle compare, so appending unconditionally would have changed every installed capability's signature and re-prompted every user for every capability on their next upgrade -- for a feature they do not use. Two pre-change goldens are asserted byte-for-byte as the tripwire. The resolved host is deliberately NOT in the signature. The loader has no config resolver, so including it would make the loader and the lifecycle compute different signatures for the same manifest and produce a permanent false-mismatch loop. It is disclosed and recorded instead; Phase 5b re-resolves and compares at invocation, which is D5 rule 4's own placement. reviewsSection and timeoutFloorMs are also excluded from the signature: a cosmetic change must not force re-consent, because a prompt carrying no security information is how users learn to click through. A lane's binary is NOT existence-checked against the staged bundle. It is a PATH tool, never a bundle artifact; treating it like a hook script would add every lane to missingArtifacts and block every lane install. Two defects fixed beyond the fourth class: - isLocalHostValue mis-parsed a scheme-less host: new URL('localhost:1234') does NOT throw, it reads 'localhost' as the URL scheme and yields an empty hostname, so a bare host:port would have been reported as non-local. Now falls back on an empty hostname rather than only on a caught throw. - The orchestrator's safeCollect closes a PRE-EXISTING totality gap in the other three classes: a null manifest, or one with a throwing getter or Proxy trap, previously threw out of disclosure -- which runs on an UNVALIDATED manifest at install time. No well-formed input changes; all 51 existing trust tests pass. Closes #2796 * fix(#2796): close four disclosure gaps found by the isolated security review All four were REPRODUCED by execution against the shipped module, and all four passed the existing 41-test suite while live -- each exists because the matrix did not think to ask. B (MEDIUM, reachable via plain JSON). Non-string argv members were folded into the consent SIGNATURE but dropped from the human-facing text, because the summary rendered the string-filtered args rather than the raw declared array. A manifest declaring args ['--json', 7, {mode:'exfiltrate-everything'}, true] printed as '--json' alone -- the host still receives the rest, so the user consented to a surface never shown. That directly contradicts this design's own Kerckhoffs claim that nothing about a lane is hidden. The summary now renders the raw array, with non-strings shown in a visible form, and never throws on a circular or BigInt member. F (MEDIUM, reachable). The [local] flag is design-load-bearing, and it was dropped for every loopback form except the dotted quad and the bare hostname. Bracketed IPv6 was mangled by splitting on the address's own colons ([::1]:8080 became '['), and legacy IPv4 encodings were not recognised at all. A browser, curl and the OS resolver all treat 127.1, 2130706433, 0x7f000001 and 0177.0.0.1 as loopback. isLocalHostValue now handles bracketed and bare IPv6, IPv4-mapped loopback, and inet_aton shorthand/decimal/hex/octal. The dangerous direction was already clean and is now pinned by tests: localhost.evil.com, http://user@localhost@evil.com and friends stay REMOTE. C (LOW). An empty reviewer body flipped hasExecutable true and perturbed the disclosure signature, producing a re-consent prompt whose only content was '(no binary declared)'. A prompt carrying no security information is the click-through-training harm this design explicitly refuses for reviewsSection and timeoutFloorMs; refusing it there and permitting it here was inconsistent. A body declaring nothing recognised is no longer a lane. The test is deliberately broad -- any ONE recognised field suffices -- because requiring specifically a binary, or specifically a slug, would let a lane declaring only the other slip through unconsented, which is the far worse failure. Pinned in both directions. D (LOW-MEDIUM). Disclosure runs BEFORE validation, so a mis-cased or unrecognised transport reaches this code. Keying on an exact string sent a lane that plainly declares a hostConfigKey down the spawn branch, printing '(no binary declared)' for a lane egressing to a live remote host, and left its resolvedHost blank -- which reads as 'no destination', the precise thing the design forbids. Both the collector and the summary now branch on the declared SHAPE, so such a lane discloses its key and either a resolved host or the explicit unresolved marker. Two further findings were reproduced but confirmed NOT reachable through the real pipeline and are recorded as known limits rather than fixed: a selective-throw Proxy blanking a whole lane, and NaN/Infinity/undefined colliding to 'null' in a signature. Every production manifest reaches disclosure through readManifestBounded's strict JSON.parse, which cannot produce a Proxy, a getter, a BigInt, a circular reference, NaN or Infinity. The 0/-0 sub-case IS reachable via valid JSON but is inert -- String(0) === String(-0), so a spawned process receives identical argv. 9 regression tests added (50 total in this file, up from 41). * chore(#2796): backfill changeset pr number to 2826 |
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Tom Boucher
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e7855bc217 | fix(#1459): user-owned consent store gates third-party capability activation; env/cwd in disclosure; loader validator parity (#1473) | ||
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Tom Boucher
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0d56f544d2 |
feat(#1435): capability matrix (generated + drift-guarded) + trust-model doc consolidation (#1458)
* feat(#1435): capability matrix (generated + drift-guarded) + trust-model doc consolidation ADR-1244 Phase 6. Adds the capability matrix reference, generated FROM the committed registry so it can never drift from the actual capability set: - scripts/gen-capability-matrix.cjs (--write / --check); --check is a CI drift guard. - tests/capability-matrix-sync.test.cjs (4 tests): drift guard, buildMatrix==committed, every cap present, no placeholders. - docs/reference/capability-matrix.md regenerated from the registry (release-stable: shows engines.gsd, omits the lockstep per-cap version that would churn the file every release). - Consolidated the duplicate trust-model doc: deleted docs/explanation/the-capability-trust-model.md, merged its content into capability-trust-model.md, redirected ~10 references; no stale links remain. - Diataxis verification (now that gsd capability is a real command): corrected the matrix's third-party section — the matrix is the first-party catalogue; the overlay-aware view of installed third-party capabilities is 'gsd capability list', not this generated file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(#1435): Added changeset for the capability matrix reference Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#1435): address code-review — non-vacuous matrix test + generator polish - capability-matrix-sync.test.cjs: assert the 'security registers a ship:pre gate' precondition unconditionally so the extension-point check can never degrade to a vacuous pass on registry drift. - gen-capability-matrix.cjs: warn (stderr) on an unknown loop point at generation time; rename enginesOf -> fmtEngines for consistency with the other fmt* helpers (output unchanged). - capability-trust-model.md: point the two how-to links at the real files (import-a-capability-from-a-url.md, version-a-capability.md) instead of the bare directory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(#1435): backfill changeset PR number → #1458 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Tom Boucher
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9219af3360 |
feat(#1433): capability trust gate + upgrade/compat (ADR-1244 Phase 4) (#1449)
ADR-1244 Phase 4 (D5 trust + D6 upgrade/compat). capability-trust.cjs (disclosure/consent, strict_known_registries, engines+compatVersions, reserved namespace) + capability-lifecycle.cjs (install/upgrade/remove/reconcile; ledger-as-commit-point _pending intent; atomic stage-then-swap; surgical marker-isolated shared-edit strip; owner-token lock) + capability-source promote/skipEnginesGate seams + loader pending-skip + config keys. No sandbox re-derived (consent+integrity+reversibility). 6 Codex adversarial rounds + /security-review (no HIGH) + /code-review; gsd-test green both platforms; CI green. Phase 5 (#1434) wires the CLI dispatch. Closes #1433. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |