Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tom Boucher
6badb839a0 fix(#3514): deny internal fetch hosts; disclose unverified integrity (#3516)
* test(#3514): add failing-first denylist and integrity suites

* fix(#3514): deny internal fetch hosts; disclose unverified integrity

* docs(#3514): trust-model, glossary, and changeset entries

* fix(#3514): scope v6 checks to literals; exact pin kinds in prompt

* chore(#3514): backfill changeset pr number

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Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-14 21:34:29 -04:00
Tom Boucher
d3d689a5e9 fix(#1920): resolve host version from gsd-core/VERSION + ship capability generators (#1938)
The flattened install layout broke the third-party capability ecosystem in two
ways. Both are fixed at the host-version / installer boundary.

Gap 1 — host version read as 0.0.0. The running GSD version was resolved via
require('../../../package.json') (loader/source) and require('../../package.json')
(the gsd-tools CLI), which in the installed layout is the versionless CommonJS
marker → the fail-closed fallback reported 0.0.0, so `capability install` rejected
any manifest with a real engines.gsd range as "incompatible with GSD 0.0.0". For
runtimes that get no marker, and for local installs, that walked-up package.json
could even be the USER's own project, reporting a wrong version. Fix:
readHostVersion() (capability-loader.cts, capability-source.cts) and capHostVersion()
(gsd-tools.cjs) now prefer the authoritative gsd-core/VERSION the installer already
writes for EVERY runtime (mirrors resolveVersionFrom(), #1383), falling back to the
runtime-root package.json for the dev/source tree, then fail-closing. This fixes
every runtime and the actual `capability install` CLI path without touching the
marker package.json, so uninstall is unchanged (no data-loss surface).

Gap 2 — scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs (+ its sibling
gen-loop-host-contract.cjs) were never copied by the installer, so the loader's
never-crash invariant discarded every overlay and fell back to the frozen
first-party registry (installed capabilities silently inert). Now copied,
uninstalled, and manifest-tracked exactly like fix-slash-commands.cjs (#1223).

Regenerates the 16 golden-install-parity fixtures to capture the two newly shipped
generator scripts and the gsd-tools.cjs change.

Regression tests (RED→GREEN): readHostVersion VERSION-first / fallback / fail-closed
resolution; an end-to-end `capability install` against a REAL installed layout
proving the engines gate sees the real host version, not 0.0.0; and a real-install
check that both generators are shipped and manifest-tracked.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 20:34:30 -04:00
Tom Boucher
871621c3c8 feat(#1740): require-fs-op-fallback production AST rule + Windows transient-lock retry (Phase 6) (#1742)
* feat(#1740): require-fs-op-fallback production AST rule + Windows transient-lock retry (Phase 6)

ADR-1703 Phase 6 of the cross-platform portability epic (#1702). Adds the
second production-code portability AST rule + the ADR-mandated glob expansion
to bin/install.js and scripts/build-hooks.js.

- eslint-rules/require-fs-op-fallback.cjs: flags an unguarded fs.rename /
  fs.renameSync (the atomic-publish primitive named first in
  DEFECT.WINDOWS-FS-OPS.symptom) that is NOT inside a try/catch whose handler
  references a transient errno ('EPERM'/'EBUSY'/'EACCES' or a *RETRY_ERRNOS
  set) AND NOT behind a Windows platform guard. A catch that silently swallows
  or cleans-up-and-rethrows without an errno check does NOT satisfy the
  defect's 'never silently swallow' clause. copyFile/unlink are deliberately
  not flagged (they are the fallback primitives per the defect's own
  fix-forward). Scope narrowed to rename per Phase 5's precision discipline;
  documented on #1740.

- src/shell-command-projection.cts: export retryRenameSync(from, to) — the
  drop-in bounded-retry helper over the existing atomicRenameWithRetry.

- 27 bare fs.renameSync sites across 11 modules routed through retryRenameSync
  (capability-lifecycle/lock/source, installer-migrations, milestone, phase,
  planning-workspace, roadmap-upgrade, runtime-hooks-surface, state,
  workstream). Idempotent on POSIX; resilient to AV/indexer transient locks
  on Windows.

- eslint.config.mjs: register rule at error on src/**/*.cts; new focused
  portability-rules block covering bin/install.js + scripts/build-hooks.js
  (ADR-1703 L124-126 glob expansion — both files are compliant: zero
  rename violations).

- tests: 15-case RuleTester suite; portability-rule-disable-ban extended
  (PROTECTED_RULES + scans bin/install.js/build-hooks.js with shebang
  handling); ci-test-scope portability-lint selection rule.

- CONTEXT.md DEFECT.WINDOWS-FS-OPS predicate rewritten to point at the rule;
  docs/contributing/cross-platform-portability-rules.md reference + how-to.

Closes #1740

* chore(#1740): backfill changeset pr:1742

* fix(#1740): tighten require-fs-op-fallback precision (codex review HIGH-1/HIGH-2)

Addresses two false-negative findings from the codex (gpt-5.5/high)
adversarial review of PR #1742:

HIGH-1 — a catch that REFERENCES a transient errno but only rethrows (no
retry/fallback) was marked compliant. The DEFECT.WINDOWS-FS-OPS fix-forward
requires retry, not just recognition. Fix: catchHandlerHasRetrySignal now
requires a loop `continue` backedge OR a `return <call>` delegation; a bare
rethrow is flagged. The misleading `/* retry logic */` valid test is replaced
with a real retry loop, and the rethrow-only shape is added as invalid.

HIGH-2 — the nested-try ancestor walk treated an OUTER errno-catch as
protecting the rename even when an INNER catch intercepted/swallowed the error
(the outer catch is unreachable). Fix: isInsideTransientErrnoTryCatch now stops
at the NEAREST enclosing TryStatement WITH A CATCH HANDLER whose block contains
the rename (try-finally is skipped — it doesn't catch); outer catches are no
longer consulted. The unsound nested-try valid test is converted to invalid,
and a try-finally-skipped valid case is added.

Verified: 17 RuleTester cases pass; zero new production violations (the 27
fixed sites use retryRenameSync; the real retry loops — atomicRenameWithRetry,
capability-ledger/consent, build-hooks — remain compliant via continue/errno);
lint:ci green; disable-ban + vocab-drift green.

---------

Co-authored-by: review-bot <review-bot@gsd>
2026-06-25 23:55:58 -04:00
Tom Boucher
7c93d9e222 feat(#1463): add capability outdated (per-source update check); drop phantom slash-command docs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-20 10:50:12 -04:00
Tom Boucher
08d1c57d6e fix(#1460): verify-or-reject capability --integrity per source; confine hook commands to the bundle
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-20 09:10:04 -04:00
Tom Boucher
f7c6ce7a1f fix(#1461): loader never crashes on a malformed overlay (skip-with-warning); bound the source fetch
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-20 03:24:47 -04:00
Tom Boucher
9219af3360 feat(#1433): capability trust gate + upgrade/compat (ADR-1244 Phase 4) (#1449)
ADR-1244 Phase 4 (D5 trust + D6 upgrade/compat). capability-trust.cjs (disclosure/consent, strict_known_registries, engines+compatVersions, reserved namespace) + capability-lifecycle.cjs (install/upgrade/remove/reconcile; ledger-as-commit-point _pending intent; atomic stage-then-swap; surgical marker-isolated shared-edit strip; owner-token lock) + capability-source promote/skipEnginesGate seams + loader pending-skip + config keys. No sandbox re-derived (consent+integrity+reversibility). 6 Codex adversarial rounds + /security-review (no HIGH) + /code-review; gsd-test green both platforms; CI green. Phase 5 (#1434) wires the CLI dispatch.

Closes #1433.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 21:40:37 -04:00
Tom Boucher
1abb0d3427 feat(#1432): capability source resolver + ledger (ADR-1244 Phase 3) (#1443)
* feat(#1432): capability source resolver + ledger (ADR-1244 Phase 3)

ADR-1244 D3 + D4 — additive, testable-in-isolation modules (the /gsd:capability
install command + consent gate are Phase 4). NEW modules only; not yet wired into
bin/install.js.

- src/capability-source.cts → resolveCapabilitySource(spec, opts): one seam, one
  adapter per source kind — local (fs copy), git (execGit clone+checkout, https/ssh/
  git transports only), npm (execNpm pack --ignore-scripts + tar, NEVER npm install),
  tarball (https download + sha512 integrity-before-extraction + tar), registry (stub).
  SECURITY: install never executes capability code (copy/extract only, --ignore-scripts);
  integrity verified before staging; symlink members rejected at interior, source-root,
  AND tar-member (verbose-listing) layers; tar-slip member paths rejected pre-extraction;
  npm specs with shell metacharacters (incl %) rejected (execNpm uses a Windows shell);
  git ext::/file:// transports + leading-dash/metachar refs rejected; atomic staging
  (.staging→rename, restore-on-failure); full Phase 1/2 validator suite + engines.gsd
  pre-check on the fetched manifest. Test seam _setCapabilitySourceHttpGet.
- src/capability-ledger.cts → per-runtime .gsd-capabilities.json install manifest:
  readLedger/writeLedger (atomic via platformWriteSync)/recordInstall (idempotent,
  prototype-pollution-guarded)/removeEntry/reconcile (orphan report, hardened against
  hostile/non-string/'..' files[] members — never throws, never oracles outside runtimeDir).
- 48 new tests (34 source incl. the full security matrix, 14 ledger). Two Codex
  adversarial rounds; all 12 findings fixed + regression-tested.
- .gitignore + eslint.config.mjs: built capability-source/ledger.cjs git+eslint-ignored
  (ADR-457 #551 migration coverage); CONTEXT glossary + INVENTORY rows + manifest regen.

Closes #1432

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(#1432): add changeset for capability source resolver + ledger

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 16:23:20 -04:00