* fix(#1634): honor capability hook matcher and node-prefix command
Capability hook install (applyCapabilitySharedEdits) wrote each settings.json
hook entry with no `matcher`, so a tool-scoped hook fired on every tool (a
fail-closed guard could then block the whole session), and emitted a bare
single-quoted script path so a .js-family hook from a git/tarball source
without +x failed with Permission denied on every matching call.
- Pass through an optional declared `matcher` (entry-level sibling of `hooks`);
absent => omitted (match-all), so existing shipped capabilities are unchanged.
- Validate `matcher` in the declaration (non-empty string, no control chars).
- Emit `node <quoted-path>` for .js/.cjs/.mjs hooks (mirrors first-party);
.sh and others keep the bare quoted path (unchanged).
Root cause: the manifest hook schema (validator rule C4) was {event, script}
only with no matcher, and applyCapabilitySharedEdits never read or wrote one;
the command used shellSingleQuote(absScript) with no node prefix.
Regression tests fail-first on both defects (matcher dropped; bare path) and
pass after the fix; #1460 command assertions updated for the node prefix.
* chore(#1634): backfill changeset pr:1638
* fix(#1634): resolve lint and windows CI failures
- validator: replace the control-character range regex with a char-code loop.
The literal /[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/ tripped ESLint's no-control-regex rule; char
codes are equally precise and lint-clean. Behavior unchanged (still rejects
matchers containing ASCII control characters incl. DEL).
- test: gate the executable-bit precondition on POSIX. Windows fs does not
honor POSIX write modes (a 0o644 write reads back as 0o666), so the
precondition is meaningless there and failed the windows-latest lane. The
node-prefix assertion — the actual fix — is platform-independent and still
runs everywhere.
* docs(#1634): amend ADR-894 for optional lifecycle hook matcher
The `role: "feature"` `hooks[]` entry now carries an optional `matcher`
(settings.json tool-scoping pattern: exact/pipe/wildcard/regex). Document
the field in the §2 schema table and record a Grilling-amendments entry:
the install path projects a declared matcher onto the emitted settings.json
hook entry (absent = match-all, so shipped capabilities are unchanged), and
per-runtime matcher projection (ADR-857 D8) stays a separate concern. This
amendment ships with the fix that introduced the field rather than as a
follow-up.
* docs(#1634): record WINDOWS-POSIX-MODE-BIT-ASSERT defect in CONTEXT.md
Capture the CI failure pattern from #1634/PR #1638 so it is not repeated: a
test that writes a file with a POSIX mode and then asserts statSync().mode
& 0o777 === <octal> passes on macOS/Linux but fails on windows-latest
(Windows fs does not honor POSIX write modes — reads back 0o666). Added as a
machine-greppable DEFECT predicate (symptom/examples/detect/fix-forward/
prevention) next to DEFECT.WINDOWS-TEST-PORTABILITY, with the fix-forward:
gate the mode-bit precondition on process.platform !== 'win32' and keep the
platform-independent behavioral assertion running everywhere.
* feat(#1435): capability matrix (generated + drift-guarded) + trust-model doc consolidation
ADR-1244 Phase 6. Adds the capability matrix reference, generated FROM the committed registry so it
can never drift from the actual capability set:
- scripts/gen-capability-matrix.cjs (--write / --check); --check is a CI drift guard.
- tests/capability-matrix-sync.test.cjs (4 tests): drift guard, buildMatrix==committed, every cap
present, no placeholders.
- docs/reference/capability-matrix.md regenerated from the registry (release-stable: shows engines.gsd,
omits the lockstep per-cap version that would churn the file every release).
- Consolidated the duplicate trust-model doc: deleted docs/explanation/the-capability-trust-model.md,
merged its content into capability-trust-model.md, redirected ~10 references; no stale links remain.
- Diataxis verification (now that gsd capability is a real command): corrected the matrix's third-party
section — the matrix is the first-party catalogue; the overlay-aware view of installed third-party
capabilities is 'gsd capability list', not this generated file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(#1435): Added changeset for the capability matrix reference
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(#1435): address code-review — non-vacuous matrix test + generator polish
- capability-matrix-sync.test.cjs: assert the 'security registers a ship:pre gate' precondition
unconditionally so the extension-point check can never degrade to a vacuous pass on registry drift.
- gen-capability-matrix.cjs: warn (stderr) on an unknown loop point at generation time; rename
enginesOf -> fmtEngines for consistency with the other fmt* helpers (output unchanged).
- capability-trust-model.md: point the two how-to links at the real files
(import-a-capability-from-a-url.md, version-a-capability.md) instead of the bare directory.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(#1435): backfill changeset PR number → #1458
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(#1451): wire gsd capability install/update/remove/list/disable/enable CLI
ADR-1244 D5/D6: the management command was built as a library (capability-lifecycle.cjs
install/upgrade/remove + capability-ledger.cjs) across Phases 3-5 but never wired to a
user-facing command — gsd-tools.cjs 'capability' only handled state/set. This adds the
six subcommands, dispatching to the existing lifecycle/ledger:
- install <spec> [--integrity] [--scope global|project] [--yes] [--shared-file <rel>]…
- update [<id>|--all] [--scope] [--yes] [--shared-file] (re-resolves recorded source)
- remove <id> [--purge-data] [--scope] (first-party rejected)
- list [--json] (first-party + overlay, both scopes, JSON array)
- disable|enable <id> (activation-state alias of capability set --off/--on)
Scope→runtimeDir mapping matches capability-loader exactly (global=$GSD_HOME||home,
project=project root; caps at <root>/.gsd/capabilities/<id>, ledger at <root>/.gsd-capabilities.json).
Consent is non-interactive: --yes grants; without it an executable install aborts after
printing the disclosure and writes nothing. Best-effort reconcile before each mutation.
Tests: tests/capability-cli.test.cjs (20 behavioral, real resolver via local specs,
GSD_HOME-sandboxed) — install consent/block/usage matrix, list, update round-trip,
remove round-trip + first-party guard, disable/enable, unknown subcommand.
Docs: docs/reference/gsd-capability-command.md reconciled to the real surface
(ledger paths, --shared-file, consent model, disable mechanism, outdated marked planned);
docs/COMMANDS.md gains the gsd capability entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(#1451): resolve adversarial-review findings + root-cause the --raw silent-output bug
Adversarial-review (Codex) fixes:
- capReadStrict passes a malformed strict_known_registries value THROUGH so the trust gate
fail-closes on it (was silently downgrading to permissive)
- installCapability/upgradeCapability gain an expectedId guard + first-party-id rejection
(capability-lifecycle.cts): an overlay can't shadow a first-party id, and 'update <id>' can't
act on a different id if the recorded source was retargeted
- capability update: prints the consent disclosure, exits non-zero on --all partial failure,
no longer masks the resolved id
- capability remove: ledger-first ordering so an overlay is removable even if it shadows a
first-party name; first-party guard only fires for ids not in the ledger
- gsd-capability-command.md: disable/enable doc corrected (registry-known ids; overlay toggle
not yet wired through this path)
Silent-output bug (root cause, not waved off as pre-existing):
- captureStdoutSyncWrites buffered fd-1 output and DISCARDED it on the throw path — any --raw
command that emitted a result/error envelope then threw (to set a non-zero exit) lost ALL of
stdout. Now it flushes the captured buffer before re-throwing (exit code preserved).
- cmdCapabilitySet threw via process.exit() (bypassing the capture wrapper entirely); now throws
ExitError so the wrapper flushes — matches the repo's no-process-exit architecture.
- Regression test: capability disable <unknown> --raw must emit the JSON error envelope on stdout.
Verified: capability suite 165/165, @file/json-errors/phase 183/183, lint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(#1451): address adversarial-review R2 — shared-file confinement, MCP no-clobber, config fail-closed
- confinedSharedFile(): realpath-confine every shared-config write/strip to the scope root (mirrors
safeRmUnder), so a --shared-file whose parent is a symlink escaping the scope can't write outside it.
- mcpServers shared edits: never overwrite an UNOWNED entry — a name collision with the user's (or
another capability's) server is skipped, so install/remove can't silently clobber user MCP config
(hooks already append; the map-keyed mcpServers path was the gap).
- capReadStrict: a PRESENT-but-unparseable .planning/config.json now fails CLOSED (lockdown) instead
of silently downgrading the strict_known_registries policy to permissive.
- Tests: symlink-escape shared-file writes nothing outside scope; colliding user mcpServers entry
preserved; unparseable config blocks an external install. capability suite 83/83, lint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(#1451): address code-review — aborted-status robustness + coverage + project-scoped strict doc
- install/update: handle an 'aborted' result independently of the requiresConsent flag so it can never
fall through to the generic 'blocked: unknown reason' arm (aborted always means consent-needed per
the lifecycle contract; latent today, hardened for future status additions).
- Clarify capResolveScope comment (project scope === already-resolved cwd) and document that
strict_known_registries is a PROJECT-scoped policy (read regardless of --scope; no machine-wide
allowlist) in gsd-capability-command.md.
- Tests: update --all over an empty ledger returns an empty result set (exit 0); a flag value that
looks like another flag (--integrity --scope) is rejected, not swallowed. CLI suite 33/33, lint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(#1451): FEATURES.md entry #147 + Added/Fixed changesets for the capability CLI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(#1451): backfill changeset PR number → #1457
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
