Commit Graph

37 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tom Boucher
06845717fe feat(#4740): make the Loop Host Contract role partition normative and enforced (#4742)
* test(#4740): pin the per-step role-family partition

Failing-first coverage for the Loop Host Contract role partition. At this
commit crossCheckRoleFamilies does not exist, so the rows throw
"crossCheckRoleFamilies is not a function" -- the RED proof they bind to
behavior rather than restating it.

ADR-894 section 3 assigns roles per step but parenthesises the assignment as
"(illustrative roles)", and nothing enforced it. The only thing standing in the
way was a single deepEqual in this same file, which is editable prose.

Rows cover: each step's own family accepted; a strict subset accepted; a
foreign role rejected at every step; an unknown role rejected; an unknown step
failing CLOSED; capitalization not silently matched; every offending role
reported rather than only the first; and purity, because buildContract puts the
same array into the generated contract.

Two rows exist because an earlier cut of this suite was vacuous. The purity
fixture is deliberately UNSORTED -- an alphabetically-sorted fixture cannot
fail an in-place sort(), and the mutant was being killed by three unrelated
rows instead. A parity row asserts ROLE_FAMILY and ROLE_TO_AGENT cover the
exact same role-name domain, both directions: they are parallel constants over
one domain, so divergence is the generative-fix class CLAUDE.md names.

Every negative row asserts the offending ROLE NAME and the STEP NAME appear in
the message. A count-only assertion survives a mutant that reports the wrong
role, which the 80% Stryker gate would surface only after a full CI round-trip.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(#4740): reject a cross-family agent-role declaration

Orchestration and execution are distinct functions of the loop and must not
drift into one another. That partition was real but unenforced: ADR-894
section 3 calls its own role assignment "illustrative", and the generator
accepted anything. Adding orchestrator to execute-phase.md's agent-roles line
compiled, --check passed once regenerated, and capability-validator.cjs then
began accepting into:"orchestrator" at every execute point.

ROLE_FAMILY maps every role to one of orchestration, planning or execution.
EXPECTED_FAMILY_BY_STEP gives each of the five steps exactly one family.
crossCheckRoleFamilies rejects a cross-family role, a role outside the
vocabulary, and an unknown step. It reports every offender, not the first.

It fails CLOSED on an unknown step, deliberately diverging from
assertPointsCoverage's "unknown step -- caught elsewhere". For points that is
true: the canonical-set and duplicate checks catch it. For roles there is no
second net, so failing open would leave an unknown step as the one input that
bypasses the gate.

crossCheckRoles' orchestrator exemption is untouched. ROLE_TO_AGENT maps roles
to agent FILES and the orchestrator is the host, owning none -- admissibility
and agent-file presence are separate concerns with separate checks.

Additive to section 3's existing rule that contribution.into must be a member
of the step's agentRoles, which is unchanged. That governs what a CAPABILITY
may target; this governs what a WORKFLOW may declare. No capability is
affected, and all five workflows already declare single-family sets, so the
gate is green on the commit that introduces it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(#4740): make the ADR-894 role assignment normative

Section 3 parenthesises its per-step role assignment as "(illustrative roles)".
That word was accurate about the list's PURPOSE -- it illustrated the shape of
a generated contract entry -- and wrong about its STATUS, because the
assignment was load-bearing from the moment the generator consumed it. Read
literally it makes the partition an example rather than a rule.

Appended as a dated in-place section per docs/contributor-standards.md, which
records that an accepted ADR is never rewritten and names this the default
pattern. Section 3's original body is untouched.

The amendment states the three disjoint families, the one family each step
admits, that a step may declare a strict subset but never outside it, and why
this is a clarification rather than a new decision: the contract is generated
from the workflow markers "so it cannot drift into a lie", and all five
workflows have always declared single-family sets. What was absent was any
statement that it is required, and any check that it holds.

It also pins the distinction that is easy to re-merge: contribution.into being
a member of agentRoles governs what a CAPABILITY may target and is unchanged;
the family rule governs what a WORKFLOW may declare. The CONTEXT.md glossary
entry for the Loop Host Contract records the same, beside the agent-reference
drift guard it already documented.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(#4740): add changeset fragment

pr:0 placeholder is backfilled with the real number once the PR exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(#4740): backfill changeset pr number

Replaces the pr:0 placeholder with 4742 now that the PR exists. Verified with
GITHUB_BASE_REF=next, the way CI runs them: changeset lint and lint:docs both
go from invalid_pr(0) to ok. Without that env both report success without
evaluating the branch at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#4740): stop injecting the orchestrator procedure into executors

claude-orchestration declared a contribution at execute:wave:pre with
into:"executor". loop-hook-dispatch.md defines a contribution as "inject
fragment.inline verbatim into the context for the role named in into", so its
267 lines were injected into EXECUTOR prompts whenever the capability was
enabled. Those lines are orchestration end to end -- construct a wave manifest,
resolve the dispatch backend, invoke the Workflow tool to spawn executors,
bridge per-agent results into the merge chain. An executor can act on none of
it.

Retargeting to into:"orchestrator" would not have been a fix. ROLE_TO_AGENT
carries no orchestrator entry by design: the orchestrator IS the host, and the
host's procedure lives in execute-phase.md. A step's agentRoles enumerates
agents a capability may inject context INTO, so adding orchestrator there would
model the host as an injectable agent -- the same category error pointed the
other way, and it would need an exception carved into the partition the same
issue just made normative.

So the defect is the mechanism, not the label. A contribution injects into an
agent's context; "replace step 3's inline dispatch loop" is a change to what
the HOST does. The contribution channel was serving as a host-behaviour
directive because it was the only channel available at an execute point.

The entry is removed. plan:post into:"planner" is correct and untouched. The
procedure is preserved verbatim at docs/workflow-backend-dispatch.md inside the
capability -- it is the only copy in the repo -- and is no longer injected
anywhere.

Consequence, not softened: the Workflow backend now has no loop wiring.
Detection, emission and config remain and the design is intact, but nothing
dispatches it. Under the separation ADR-1143 itself asserts it never had a
legitimate channel; ADR-1143's own audit already records the end-to-end path
has never been exercised. Wiring it properly needs a host-level mechanism that
does not exist today.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#4740): invert the stale execute:wave:pre registry assertions

Removing the contribution left four surfaces asserting or describing the old
state. Caught by an isolated review before a verification run was spent, which
is the point of reviewing first: the first of these was a guaranteed CI red.

execute-wave-post-gate-pipeline-e2e asserted against the REAL generated
registry that byLoopPoint['execute:wave:pre'] held exactly one contribution
with capId claude-orchestration. It now holds zero. Inverted to assert exactly
0 -- not a vague >= 0 -- and the #2285 comment above it now explains the
current state rather than the one it was written for.

CONTEXT.md's Claude Orchestration entry claimed two contributions at wired
points. It is now one, and the entry's execute:wave:post label was already
wrong before this change: the manifest said execute:wave:pre. Rewritten to one
plan:post contribution, why the execute-point one was removed, and where the
procedure now lives.

One assertion in claude-orchestration.test.cjs could not fail. It tested for
the prose "(into the executor)" while the doc says "(`into: executor`)", so no
plausible wording matched it and the paired plan:post assertion was carrying
the row. Replaced with a check on the structural claim, and proved RED by
restoring the two-contribution wording before reverting.

The moved procedure keeps section headings that speak as a live contribution --
"When this contribution is active", "Why execute:wave:pre". Preserving the body
verbatim was deliberate, so the headings stay and an editor's note under the
header explains why they read that way.

A sweep of all 17 files referencing byLoopPoint found no further siblings: the
remaining hits are a synthetic capability fixture and an empty-points test that
already expected no active hooks, both correct before and after.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 18:30:47 -04:00
Tom Boucher
bbdf7e8e84 chore(#4654): add local/no-unconfined-path-join and drain it to zero — Phase 4 of #4636 (#4674)
* chore(#4654): add local/no-unconfined-path-join and drain it to zero

Phase 4 of epic #4636 — the ratchet, and the phase that makes the epic hold.

THE MEASUREMENT THAT RESHAPED THE PHASE. An AST census (the repo's own parser,
not grep) found what the epic never enumerated: ADR-4650 named seven containment
implementations; `src/` alone held roughly 24 more hand-rolled gates across ~13
files, several guarding a write or an `fs.rmSync`. Two verified by reading rather
than pattern-matching — `research-store.cts` comments its own as "ensure the
resolved file path stays inside the store dir" immediately before a write, and
`capability-lifecycle.cts` gates `fs.rmSync` with one.

So the epic's Done-when "one containment predicate, used at every site" was FALSE
when Phase 3 reported it satisfied. It is true now: the rule is clean across
src/, scripts/, gsd-core/bin/ and hooks/ with an EMPTY allowlist.

WHY NOT THE RULE THE ISSUE PROPOSED. #4654 proposed flagging `path.join` whose
first argument is a managed root and whose later arguments derive from argv. That
is a taint analysis over 2046 call sites, in ESLint, without type information;
"derives from argv" is not locally decidable. Any approximation either floods or
is trivially evaded, and a rule that fires on hundreds of correct sites earns an
allowlist of hundreds — the opposite of a ratchet. What is actually duplicated is
the COMPARISON, not the join, and that has one recognizable shape.

  Arm 1  X.startsWith(Y + sep)            the hand-rolled containment idiom
  Arm 2  a containment predicate called as a bare statement, answer discarded

Arm 2 is the issue's "asserts the result was narrowed, not merely that a helper
was called". Its example `validatePath(x, root).resolved` is already
structurally impossible — Phase 3 un-exported `validatePath` — so the remaining
expressible failure is ignoring the answer, which is the defect that recurred
five times in this epic. The census found exactly one live instance
(`milestone.cts:1643`); it now returns the proven `ContainedPath` so consumers
stop re-deriving the path the comment above it was extracted to stop them
re-deriving.

The rule deliberately does NOT try to catch validate-one-path-use-another where
the answer is used but a different variable flows onward. That needs flow
analysis; the branded `ContainedPath` from Phase 3 is the defense there, and the
two are complementary.

PER-SITE FAMILY CHOICE, NOT A DEFAULT. Phase 3's lesson binds: collapsing a
lexical site onto the realpath family broke four tests and was caught only by the
matrix. Every migrated site was triaged individually. The six
installer-migrations tree-walks and the six capability-lifecycle gates take the
LEXICAL family because their operands are already realpath-resolved and they
deliberately treat the final component as a link; boundary sites take realpath.

TWO SITES WITH AN INVERTED CONTRACT, which a mechanical swap would have broken.
`installer-migrations.cts:127` and `runtime-artifact-install-plan.cts:144` REJECT
`target === root` by contract, while the canonical comparison ACCEPTS it. Swapped
naively, a migration could `rmdir` the user's config root and a third-party
descriptor could write at configHome itself. Both keep `=== root` as an explicit
additional arm alongside the predicate call — the predicate decides containment,
the call site keeps its own extra condition (ADR-4650 decision 6).

ONE DUPLICATE DELETED OUTRIGHT: `planning-inspect.cts`'s `isWithinRoot` was
byte-identical to `isContainedIn` and said so in its own docstring.
`isContainedIn` is now exported for callers that have already resolved both
operands and need only the comparison, with a doc note that a caller which has
NOT resolved them must use a full predicate instead.

THE MARKER, AND WHY IT IS NOT THE ALLOWLIST. Nine sites are justified holdouts and
carry `// allow-handrolled-containment: <reason>` with a mandatory, reviewable
reason. Two justifications: (a) not a containment decision — an ancestor-walk loop
condition, sub-repo grouping, worktree identity matching, declared-path coverage;
(b) it IS containment but the canonical predicate is unreachable —
`capability-validator.cjs` is a committed pre-build `.cjs` and the compiled
`security.cjs` is untracked build output, so requiring it would break a fresh
clone. `scripts/lib/drift-scan.cjs` runs under `lint:ci` with the same exposure.
The marker was renamed from `allow-lexical-prefix-match` mid-phase because that
name asserted only (a) and would have stated something false at the (b) sites.

A marker suppresses BEFORE the violation counter increments, so a file whose
every occurrence is marked still reports `staleAllowlistEntry` — otherwise a
drained entry lingers and silently re-permits the site later.

DEMONSTRATED RED, per #4654: a hand-rolled copy reintroduced into a real `src/`
file made `npm run lint` fail with the rule's full guidance message; removing it
returned the tree to clean. Both halves recorded — red alone proves nothing,
since a rule red for an unrelated reason looks identical.

DISCLOSED: `defaultRequireFromInstallRoot` (gsd-tools.cjs) previously carried two
distinct rejection messages and two manual realpath calls; routing it through
`tryWithinRoot` collapses them to one message, and a missing module now surfaces
as MODULE_NOT_FOUND rather than ENOENT. No test asserts either message. The
security property is preserved and slightly strengthened — the candidate is
realpathed and containment re-checked, and the dangling-symlink oracle closure
comes along with it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(#4654): record the containment ratchet in CONTEXT.md and the security model

Both entries previously described the seam without the thing that keeps it a
seam. They now state what the rule bans, and — more usefully for whoever reads
this next — what it deliberately does NOT attempt: deciding per path.join call
whether an argument came from user input. That question is not locally
decidable, and an approximation across ~2000 join sites would earn an exemption
list of hundreds, which is the opposite of a ratchet.

Also records the marker's two legitimate justifications and that its reason is
mandatory, so the escape stays reviewable rather than becoming a mute button.

Glossary gate 270 refs exit 0; install-tree goldens and CONTEXT-INDEX.json
regenerated and confirmed byte-identical rather than assumed — which also
confirms eslint-rules/ is not a shipped path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#4654): close review findings and the two matrix failures

MATRIX FAILURE 1 — a collapsed message broke a negative-proof test, and my
evidence for collapsing it was wrong. I searched tests/ for the literal string
"resolves outside its install root", found nothing, and reported that no test
asserted it. The test matches a REGEX SUBSTRING, /outside its install root/, so
the literal search missed it. What broke was "NEGATIVE PROOF: a symlinked module
pointing OUTSIDE the install root is not loaded" — the test guarding the exact
property I claimed was preserved. defaultRequireFromInstallRoot now does both
checks again with both messages byte-identical, each routed through the
canonical predicate, which is better than the original since that hand-rolled
both comparisons.

MATRIX FAILURE 2 — shipped migrations are checksum-locked, and a marker cannot
serve there. migrationChecksum hashes plan.toString(), which INCLUDES comments,
so a suppression marker inside a plan body drifts the baseline exactly as an
edit does. Measured: with markers in place, two of the four still differed from
their committed checksums. The four shipped bodies are now byte-identical to
next, and the rule's config excludes those four paths BY NAME rather than by a
directory wildcard, so a NEW migration is still covered. Six containment
comparisons stay un-ratcheted there; that gap is recorded in the rule's Known
gaps, in CONTEXT.md and in the security model rather than left implicit.
Justification (c) is removed from the marker's documented reasons, because a
marker was proven unable to express it.

ADVERSARIAL REVIEW — the sharpest finding was that the rule banned the CORRECT
shape while permitting the incorrect one: startsWith(root) with no separator is
the genuinely unsafe form, since it accepts a sibling such as root-evil, and my
own test blessed it as valid. Flagging every bare startsWith would swamp the
rule, so that stays a STATED gap rather than a silent one. Closed for real: the
template-literal spelling, which the census never saw because it only inspected
plus-concatenation — that surfaced TWELVE more sites, now triaged and migrated.
A separator reached through a const alias is now resolved via scope analysis.
And isContainedIn, exported in Phase 3, was missing from the discarded-result
set, so a bare no-op call went unflagged on the one function the epic funnels
through.

SECURITY REVIEW — the marker could over-suppress two ways: a block comment
worked identically to a line comment, and one marker silently covered every
violation sharing its line. It now requires a Line comment positioned after the
flagged node ends, so it anchors to the node it trails. Four sites had dropped
an unreachable-but-deliberate equality rejection against the root; each is
restored as the call site's own arm. eslint.config.mjs still documented the OLD
marker token, which my rename missed — it would have sent the next author in
circles.

A FALSE GREEN, recorded because it nearly stuck: lint:ci reported exit 0 from a
stale eslint cache while twelve real violations existed. Every lint check here
now clears the cache first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#4654): anchor a suppression marker to the violation it actually trails

The matrix caught this; my own test caught it, on its first execution. The case
"two violations on one line: trailing marker suppresses only the one it trails"
expected 1 error and got 0 — both were suppressed.

ROOT CAUSE: the anchoring accepted any Line comment on the node's line whose
range started at or after the node's end. A trailing marker at the END of a line
sits after EVERY node on that line, so that condition held for all of them.
"After the node" does not identify WHICH node the marker trails. The fix reads
as correct and is not.

FIX: deferred reporting. Violations accumulate during traversal instead of being
reported immediately; at Program:exit each marker claims exactly ONE pending
violation — the one on its line whose end is nearest before the marker begins —
and every unclaimed violation is then counted and reported. One marker, one
suppression. An earlier violation sharing the line is still reported, which is
the property the security review asked for and the previous attempt only
appeared to deliver.

The counter now increments at flush time rather than during traversal, so a
suppressed occurrence still does not keep an allowlist entry alive.

AND A TOOL THAT SHOULD HAVE EXISTED BEFORE THE FIRST MATRIX RUN. `node --test`
is hard-blocked here, so this rule's test file could only ever be executed on
the remote matrix — which is why a broken anchoring shipped into a run. ESLint's
programmatic Linter API is not a test runner, and exercising the rule through it
verifies every case locally in seconds. All 24 now pass locally, including the
two-on-one-line case that failed remotely. That loop should have been built
before the rule was first sent to the matrix rather than after it failed twice.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(#4654): backfill PR 4674 into the changeset and complete 70-docs.json

The phase gate requires enablementSequence and the Diataxis quadrants; 70-docs
now carries both, with the how-to quadrant skipped for a stated reason rather
than an empty field. The audience for this deliverable is a contributor who
trips the rule, and the task-oriented guidance reaches them in the ESLint
message itself — which names the correct predicate, says how to choose between
the realpath and lexical families, cites the Phase 3 regression caused by
choosing wrong, and gives the marker syntax. A docs/how-to page would be a
second, driftable copy read by nobody at the moment of failure.

enablementSequence is recorded as what it actually is: a VERIFICATION sequence,
not an enablement one. The rule is never off, so there is no off-to-on
transition to describe.

scripts/lint-docs-required.cjs now passes (ok_docs_updated) — it could not
evaluate against the mandated pr:0 placeholder.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 22:17:46 -04:00
sim
bbc3f131be refactor(#4653): make containment ONE decision, resolved two ways
Satisfies #4653 DW1 and DW9, which were the phase's outstanding acceptance
criteria: every other implementation must be deleted or route its containment
DECISION through the canonical predicate, and no surviving wrapper may decide
WHETHER a path is contained.

Three implementations were being retained with their own comparisons, on the
argument that each needs LEXICAL resolution — a realpath-based predicate is the
wrong tool wherever a symlink must be preserved rather than resolved. That
argument is correct about RESOLUTION and was being used to justify owning the
DECISION too. Those are separable, and separating them is what closes the
criteria honestly rather than by reinterpretation.

  isContainedIn(resolvedTarget, resolvedRoot, pathImpl?)   module-internal

is now the single place this repo decides containment. It is separator-aware, so
a sibling merely sharing a prefix (`<root>-evil` against `<root>`) is still
rejected. Two exported families sit on it and differ ONLY in how a candidate is
resolved before the decision:

  assertWithinRoot / tryWithinRoot                realpath-resolving
  assertWithinRootLexical / tryWithinRootLexical  path.resolve only, no I/O

The lexical pair carries `opts.pathImpl`, so win32 separator semantics stay
testable off Windows — that seam already existed in isPathConfined and would
have been lost by a naive collapse.

The three call sites now take their decision from the predicate and keep only
what is genuinely theirs:

  external-descriptor-trust isPathConfined   delegates outright; pathImpl forwarded
  installer-migrations ensureInsideConfig    delegates; keeps its own message and
                                             its LEXICAL fullPath, which callers
                                             consume for existsSync and journal rows
  gsd-tools.cjs isInsideDir                  delegates; keeps its own `target !==
                                             root` condition, and the separate
                                             symlink refusal above it stands

DW5 is not weakened by this. That criterion binds the symlink oracle and the
ancestor canonicalization; both are untouched. The only change inside
validatePath is three comparison lines becoming one call, and the rejection
string `Path escapes allowed directory: <resolved> is outside <base>` stays
byte-identical because it is an observable CLI contract.

What this does NOT do, stated plainly: the lexical family still cannot see a
symlink. That is a property of lexical resolution, not a gap in the seam, and
the three callers that need it are the three that must pair it with their own
symlink refusal — which is exactly what the fix earlier in this phase added at
the install sites. The doc comment says so at the definition, and CONTEXT.md and
docs/explanation/security-model.md are corrected: they previously described
these three as deliberately NOT routed through the predicate, which is no longer
true.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 18:33:01 -04:00
sim
6f0e5ccf85 fix(#4636,#4653): close the symlink hole, revert a wrong collapse, fix six review findings
The RED checkpoint and two orthogonal reviews found eight defects. All fixed here.

THE COLLAPSE THAT WAS WRONG — installer-migrations. Routing ensureInsideConfig's
containment decision through the realpath-based canonical predicate broke four
tests, and the failure message says it plainly: "migration path escapes
configDir: extensions/gsd.cjs". That module's entire contract is that a
symlinked managed path is snapshotted, restored and backed up AS A LINK and
never dereferenced. The canonical predicate dereferences, then rejects the
result for escaping configDir — so it destroys exactly the thing the module
exists to preserve. Reverted to lexical, with the ruling recorded above the
function so it is not collapsed a third time. normalizeRelPath is the real
pre-gate there; it throws on absolute paths and '..' before this check runs.

That makes THREE deliberately-retained implementations, not two, and they share
one shape worth naming: a realpath-based predicate is the wrong tool wherever a
symlink must be PRESERVED rather than resolved. CONTEXT.md and
docs/explanation/security-model.md are corrected — both previously described
ensureInsideConfig as collapsed.

THE MISSED CONSUMER. tests/security-prompt-injection.security.test.cjs
destructures validatePath from the compiled lib; un-exporting it turned five
tests into TypeError. It appeared in my own earlier search output and I did not
follow it up. Translated under the same rule as the rest: assertions on the
rejection REASON go through assertWithinRoot, boolean-only through
tryWithinRoot.

VALIDATE-ONE-PATH-USE-ANOTHER, FOUND TWICE MORE. This is the fourth and fifth
occurrence in this epic of the exact defect it exists to prevent.
  - scripts/check-glossary-refs.cjs decided containment on `token` and then
    stat'd a separately re-joined path.join(ROOT, token). The ContainedPath is
    now carried through to the probe, so the validated value is the probed one.
  - src/init.cts computed skillPathContained and DISCARDED it, re-joining from
    the raw input for the existsSync and read. The branded type exists to make
    that a type error and here it was inert.

AND THE OVER-CORRECTION OF THAT FIX, caught before it shipped. The first attempt
also substituted the validated value into the EMITTED `ref` for a global skill.
That value is a display token, not a path anything reads through — the only fs
access in that branch runs on the lexical path beforehand — so substituting it
changed emitted output two ways: it is realpath-resolved, so a symlinked global
skills directory would have emitted its resolved target instead of the user's
own path, and it came from path.join, so Windows would have emitted a backslash
where the template has a literal '/'. Restored, with the distinction recorded:
the containment check there is a GATE, not a path producer.

A TEST THAT COULD NOT FAIL. The first symlink regression planted its symlink
from inside a hooked fs.readdirSync and never asserted the planting happened —
if the hook did not fire, the "nothing was written outside" assertion passed
trivially, green against vulnerable code. It now asserts the plant, matching its
sibling. The other two were re-checked: one already asserted its equivalent, the
other plants synchronously and cannot silently no-op.

THE SYMLINK FIX ITSELF, now that the tests are proven red on the matrix.
isPathConfined is lexical by design and structurally cannot see a symlink; three
callers relied on it with no defense of their own. install-engine.cts:1608 and
install-profiles.cts:880 refuse to mkdir/write through a link — mkdirSync with
recursive:true does NOT throw on an existing symlink-to-directory, so a planted
link redirected the SKILL.md write outside the install root.
install-profiles.cts:755 refuses to read through one — statSync FOLLOWS links,
so an outside file's contents were returned and installed as a skill body. Each
mirrors the guard retired-artifact-cleanup.cts:77 already uses.

Severity stated accurately rather than dramatically: only the read at :755 needs
no race. _removeGsdEntries sweeps a pre-planted link at :1608 before the write
loop, and :880's stageDir is a fresh mkdtemp, so both of those require winning a
window. They are fixed as defense-in-depth, not as live exploits.

ALSO: the Changed changeset claimed "every command's observable behavior [is]
unchanged". Three rejection messages are reworded. It now says so, and says that
none of them reveals a host path it previously hid. A stale comment in
verify.cts still named validatePath; an init.cts warning hardcoded "resolves
outside the project directory" for a check that also rejects absolute paths, NUL
bytes and empty strings; and the rationale deleted with check-glossary-refs'
retired helper is restored, noting honestly that a rejected token is now
realpath-resolved before rejection rather than rejected by string comparison.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 13:59:52 -04:00
sim
9953d02184 docs(#4653): describe the consolidated path-containment seam in the security model
The security model's input-validation section still described path traversal as
a per-call check with a macOS symlink footnote. It now describes what actually
exists: one predicate, a module-internal engine, three exported shapes none of
which can hand back a usable path when the answer is unsafe, the branded return
type, and the named acceptance policy — including the point the old wording
invited a reader to get wrong, that allowing an absolute candidate does not
relax containment.

Also records the two checks deliberately NOT routed through the predicate and
why each is narrower or stricter rather than a second opinion, so a later
cleanup pass does not read them as stragglers.

Required by the Changed changeset: scripts/lint-docs-required.cjs makes
Added/Changed/Deprecated/Removed fragments demand a file under docs/, and
CONTEXT.md is at the repo root, so the glossary entry alone would not have
satisfied it. The lint currently reports invalid_pr against the mandated pr:0
placeholder and becomes meaningful after backfill.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 13:41:40 -04:00
Tom Boucher
dacae92730 docs(#2845): record the inventory-provenance limits where readers meet them (#3746)
The limits shipped with #2845 were disclosed only in the PR body, which is
read once at merge and then buried. They are properties of what the feature
does, so they belong in the documentation.

Three surfaces, each at the point a reader forms an expectation:
docs/how-to/design-a-ui-phase.md gains a 'What this check is and is not'
subsection under the provenance how-to; docs/explanation/security-model.md
gains a residual-risk pair matching the section's existing shape; and
docs/AGENTS.md notes them where gsd-ui-checker's behavior is described.

The substance: a provenance line makes an inventory's origin falsifiable
rather than verified, since nothing re-runs the command or compares the
count; the rule is agent-applied like the other six dimensions, not a schema
check; and 'the checker never runs the recorded command' is an instruction
rather than a capability boundary, because the checker holds a Bash grant it
genuinely needs for the agent-skills bootstrap and tool grants here are not
command-scoped.

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-21 13:22:50 -04:00
Tom Boucher
14679b866b enhance(#2856): add default-off live-DOM UAT capability (#3716)
* test(#2856): add failing-first suite for the live-dom-uat capability

Binds the approved triage shape before any of it exists:

- containment — the execute:wave:post hook must not render unless
  workflow.live_dom_uat is true AND the capability resolves active
  (fail-closed on a missing state entry, and on a non-boolean value)
- criterion 4 — agents/gsd-executor.md carries no browser MCP family;
  asserted as an absence, which is the only way it is observable
- Hyrum guard — the pre-existing mcp__playwright__* branch must stay
  outside the key-gated block, or upgrading silently removes working
  automated UI verification for every current Playwright-MCP user
- parity — the browser glob list now lives in two surfaces (agent
  frontmatter + workflow detection block); the assertion fails if
  either gains or loses a family without the other

Red by construction: the capability, agent and workflow block do not
exist yet. Verified on the remote runner.

Refs #2856

* enhance(#2856): add default-off live-DOM UAT capability

A phase whose acceptance criteria needed a live DOM could not be
finished by the agent that executed it: gsd-executor carries no browser
tools, so it correctly returned checkpoint:human-action even though the
work was not human-only, just tool-less. Every such phase degraded to
"executed, then finished by hand in the orchestrator", and autonomous:
false could not distinguish "a human must judge this" from "the executor
lacks the tool".

Implements the shape approved at triage, not the one reported. The
executor's tools: line is NOT widened, in any configuration: for a
first-party agent the static list is the only control that exists
(ADR-1244 D2, ADR-857 D4, no per-dispatch override). Instead one
default-off capability owns the key, the agent, and the step:

- capabilities/live-dom-uat/ — activationKey workflow.live_dom_uat
  (boolean, default false), one additive step at execute:wave:post
  (onError: skip, gates: []), so it can never halt a wave
- agents/gsd-dom-verifier.md — the only GSD agent carrying browser MCP
  globs, in its own tools: line, with no Bash
- verify-work automated_ui_verification — a gsd:live-dom-families block
  naming both new families AND the key; presence alone never activates

Two independent fail-closed gates: isCapabilityActive renders a hook
only on state.active === true, plus the step's own `when`.

The pre-existing mcp__playwright__* branch keeps the gating it already
had and stays outside the new block. Pulling it behind a default-off key
would have silently removed working automated UI verification from every
current Playwright-MCP user on upgrade.

Also closes a host gap this surfaced: execute:wave:post dispatched only
contribution + gate, so ANY registered step was declared and silently
never run — exactly the single-kind hand-roll loop-hook-dispatch.md
names. Step 5.75 now dispatches every kind == "step".

The browser-profile lock is tolerated, not coordinated: --isolated is a
flag on the operator's own MCP-server registration that GSD neither
launches nor parameterizes, so the verifier reports could_not_look /
profile_locked, names the flag, and stops. DOM-VERIFY.md keeps
could_not_look and nothing_to_report distinct behind a closed reason
enum — collapsing them is the ambiguous-run-notes defect reported.

Verified on the remote runner.

Closes #2856

* fix(#2856): apply review findings from the orthogonal passes

Correctness pass (blocker):
- delete detectionBlockIsCrlfSafe. It was pass-always: it read the file,
  replaced LF with CRLF, then indexOf'd marker strings that contain no
  newline, so the replacement could not change the result and the
  assertion could never fail for the reason it stated. There is no real
  CRLF risk on this surface either — the gsd:live-dom-families block has
  no parser, only human and agent readers. Deleted rather than replaced,
  per the repo's pass-always-test rule.

Isolated security pass (two minors, both real):
- execute-phase.md step 5.75: this change is what first activates
  kind == "step" dispatch at execute:wave:post, which newly opens the
  ref.command shell path at that loop point. Our own step uses ref.agent
  and never touches it, but the door is now open, so the step-dispatch
  line carries the same in-context validate-before-shell warning the
  sibling gate-dispatch line directly below it already carries.
- gsd-dom-verifier: quoted page text in DOM-VERIFY.md is attacker
  influenced. Require it wrapped in inline code or a fence, kept short,
  and never left reading as a directive to the next reader.

Verified on the remote runner.

Refs #2856

* fix(#2856): settle the new-agent roster ripple

Checkpoint 2 returned 28 failures, none in the new suite — all of them
the guards that exist to make adding an agent a deliberate act. Each is
a real boundary that had to move:

- docs/AGENTS.md: Tools row must copy the frontmatter verbatim (#2526),
  so the browser globs lose their backticks; primary-agent counts 21->22,
  roster 33/34->34/35, Verifiers category 1->2
- docs/INVENTORY.md: roster completeness requires every agents/gsd-*.md
  to be classified exactly once
- gsd-dom-verifier: add the anti-heredoc instruction and the commented
  hooks: frontmatter pattern both agent gates require
- gsd-core/bin/shared/model-catalog.json: every shipped agent needs a
  profile entry (#3229)
- copilot-install / kilo-upgrades / qwen-upgrades: expected agent list
  and the 34->35 roster boundary
- execute-wave-post-gate-pipeline-e2e: execute:wave:post legitimately
  carries one step now. Asserted as an exact shape — one step, capId
  live-dom-uat, ref.agent gsd-dom-verifier, onError skip — so it stays a
  real guard against accidental change rather than being relaxed

Two findings worth naming:

mcp-tool-inheritance (#2526) rejected the agent for documenting
mcp__playwright__* while its tools: line withholds it — a dead
instruction that invites the agent to claim a path it cannot take. The
prose now names the Playwright MCP family without the dispatchable
token, in both the agent and the capability fragment.

runtime-launcher-parity rejected the new gsd_run call: each fenced block
is its own shell, so a workflow step file invoking gsd_run needs its own
canonical preamble. Propagated with scripts/sync-runtime-launcher.cjs.
That script also normalizes explore.md, which is unrelated pre-existing
drift the parity check tolerates, so it is reverted to keep this diff
scoped.

The emitted-drift ack supersedes the spent #3370 entry for
execute-phase.md — it is merged into next, so its ripple is absorbed at
the base and it can no longer clear anything. That is the same supersede
the #3370 entry itself performed on the spent #3324 fragment. Its
unrelated execute-plan.md entry is untouched.

Verified on the remote runner.

Refs #2856

* fix(#2856): drop the stale emitted-drift ack entry

The automated-ui-verification.md entry was written speculatively rather
than from a reported growth, and the check names that precisely: an ack
"written or reworded in THIS diff, but nothing here needed it, so it
explains nothing".

The growth tier keys on the bare filename as it appears under
gsd-core/workflows/ or agents/. automated-ui-verification.md is nested
under verify-work/steps/, so it was never in the tracked set — only
execute-phase.md was ever reported, both before and after the launcher
preamble landed.

Only ack what the check actually reports.

Verified on the remote runner.

Refs #2856

* chore(#2856): backfill changeset pr number

pr:0 -> 3716. The placeholder fails both changeset-lint
(fail_invalid_fragment) and docs-lint (fail_malformed_fragment) by
design and can only be resolved once the PR number exists. Both now
report ok against GITHUB_BASE_REF=next.

Refs #2856

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-20 15:07:21 -04:00
Tom Boucher
bf87dd4156 enhance(#3617): one canonical Windows binary resolver in the platform seam (epic #3411 Phase 1) (#3621)
* feat(#3411): one canonical Windows binary resolver in the platform seam

CONTEXT.md declares src/shell-command-projection.cts the single OS-facing seam,
but Windows binary resolution had grown four divergent implementations outside
it. #3445 folded two of them together — inside gsd-core/bin/gsd-tools.cjs, not
the seam — so the declaration stayed untrue and execTool still had no handling
at all.

Lift the resolver into the seam as resolveExecutableBinary, and export the half
that actually executes as projectSpawnInvocation: CreateProcess cannot run a
.cmd/.bat, so the cmd.exe mediation is inseparable from the lookup and splitting
them is how the copies accumulated. cmd.exe is invoked with an explicit argv
array, never shell:true — CVE-2024-27980's vector and Node 26's DEP0190.

execTool now resolves on win32. POSIX is a strict no-op by construction, which
matters: execTool rates CRITICAL blast radius (167 symbols, 53 files).
gsd-tools.cjs deletes its private scan and its private mediation and delegates.

Two semantics grown beyond #3445's resolver, both additive: a name already
carrying a PATHEXT-listed extension is tried as-is before the append loop, and a
suffix outside PATHEXT is not treated as an extension.

Refs #3411

* fix(#3411): keep mediating a declared .cmd that PATH resolution misses

Standards review caught a narrowing against the code this replaces. gsd-tools.cjs
computed `target = resolveSpawnBinary(binary) || binary` and keyed the shim test
on `target`, so a declared .cmd mediated whether or not PATH resolution found it.
That is load-bearing: resolveExecutableBinary scans PATH only, while `cmd.exe /c`
also finds a batch file in the current directory.

Mediation now keys on the target — resolved path, else declared name. The ENOENT
contract still holds for BARE unresolved names, which is the case it was written
for. P9/P10 pin both halves.

Spec review found E1/E2/E3/E5 promised by 50-test-matrix.md but never written;
added. E3 is the integration proof that the CVE-relevant mediation fires through
execTool, not only through projectSpawnInvocation in isolation.

Also adds the CONTEXT.md glossary entry for the seam's new resolution ownership
(a PR gate) and the changeset fragment.

Refs #3411

* fix(#3617): pass mediated cmd.exe arguments verbatim so metacharacters cannot inject

The isolated security pass found the mediation shape carried an argument-injection
surface. libuv's quote_cmd_arg force-quotes an argv element only when it contains
a space, tab, or quote — never for a cmd metacharacter — and cmd.exe re-parses
everything after /c. So an arg of a&calc arrived unquoted and cmd ran calc.
Node's own CVE-2024-27980 escaping cannot help: it fires only when the spawned
FILE is the .bat/.cmd, and here the file is cmd.exe.

Caret-escaping is not a fix. It is correct only when libuv does not quote, and
libuv quotes whenever the arg also contains a space — no per-arg transform is
right in both cases. So build the command line and pass it through verbatim, the
shape Rust's std adopted for the sibling CVE-2024-24576: one outer quote pair
that cmd /c strips, every token inside force-quoted, embedded quotes doubled.

An argument containing CR or LF is refused rather than mediated — a newline
cannot be represented in a Windows command line, so mediating would silently
truncate. Failing visibly is correct.

Known limit, documented at the seam: %VAR% still expands inside a /c string and
has no escape outside a batch file. That is information disclosure, not arbitrary
execution, and is the same limit Rust's std documents.

This was byte-for-byte the shape #3445 shipped, so the fix closes it for the
reviewer-lane spawn path too, not only for execTool's newly reachable route.

Refs #3411

* docs(#3617): document the subprocess-execution security posture

Adds Layer 4 to the security model: why GSD never uses shell:true for binary
invocation (CVE-2024-27980, Node 26 DEP0190), why resolution is explicit and
never tries the bare name on Windows (the npm extensionless-shim trap behind
#3275), and why .cmd/.bat mediation builds a verbatim force-quoted command line
rather than relying on default escaping — Node's own CVE protection cannot fire
once the started program is cmd.exe.

The residual %VAR% expansion limit is stated plainly under Trade-offs rather
than left implicit: it is information disclosure, not arbitrary execution, and
callers passing untrusted text to a Windows .cmd should not assume the value
arrives byte-identical.

Docs-only; no code change.

Refs #3411

* chore(#3617): backfill changeset pr number 3621

* fix(#3617): read PATH, PATHEXT and ComSpec case-insensitively

The Windows CI lane on #3621 failed E5, and the root cause was a defect in the
implementation, not the assertion.

Windows names the variable Path, not PATH. process.env is a case-insensitive
proxy, so process.env.PATH works — but execTool builds
{ ...process.env, ...opts.env } whenever a caller supplies opts.env, and
spreading discards the proxy while keeping the OS's actual casing. The exact-case
env['PATH'] lookup then returned undefined, the PATH scan saw zero segments,
resolution returned null, and the change degraded to precisely the spawn ENOENT
it exists to fix. ComSpec and PATHEXT had the same exposure.

#3445's tests never caught it because they pass uppercase keys explicitly, and
neither did the Linux remote runner — this is a defect only the Windows lane
could see.

_envGet resolves a variable by exact match first (so a canonical caller pays no
scan) and falls back to a case-insensitive sweep.

R23 and P16 pin it and were proven RED by execution: with the fix stashed and
build:lib re-run, R23 returned null and P16 returned the cmd.exe default.

R24 was rewritten because the first version was vacuous — it staged foo.CMD, so
the default PATHEXT already contained .CMD and it passed against the broken code
for the wrong reason. It now stages foo.XYZ, an extension absent from the
default, and carries a negative control asserting that dropping the Pathext key
yields null. Re-proven RED the same way.

E5's assertion was corrected alongside the fix: 'PATH' in options.env expressed
the wrong contract. It now checks case-insensitively for the key.

Refs #3411

* fix(#3617): execTool spawns the declared name unless mediation is required

The Windows full-test lane on #3621 failed tests/graphify.test.cjs — the python3
identity check asserted 'python3' and got the absolute resolved path
C:\hostedtoolcache\windows\Python\3.12.10\x64\python3.EXE instead.

Those tests are correct and the change was wrong. They pin a long-standing
contract — execTool spawns the program name it was given — by spying on
spawnSync's first argument, and routing every win32 call through the projected
invocation broke it.

Resolving a .exe buys nothing. libuv's CreateProcess path already performs
PATH + PATHEXT search, which is why spawning a bare 'node' has always worked on
Windows. The only case the OS genuinely cannot spawn is a .cmd/.bat. So execTool
now adopts the projection only when mediation actually happened —
windowsVerbatimArguments is exactly that flag — and otherwise passes the declared
program and args through untouched.

40-design.md already rejected gratuitous change for this reason: symmetry is not
worth a behavior change to 53 files that fixes nothing. That reasoning was
applied to POSIX and missed the win32 non-batch case. Rows 5 and 20 now record
it, and the CONTEXT.md glossary states the caller-choice rule.

deps.spawn deliberately still adopts the resolved path: its hasBinary probe
answers from the same resolver, so probe and spawn must agree on the exact file
(#3445). The asymmetry is now documented at both call sites rather than latent.

E7 pins the restored contract and was verified by executing execTool against a
monkeypatched spawnSync: python3 in, python3 spawned.

Refs #3411

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-18 14:12:44 -04:00
Tom Boucher
6badb839a0 fix(#3514): deny internal fetch hosts; disclose unverified integrity (#3516)
* test(#3514): add failing-first denylist and integrity suites

* fix(#3514): deny internal fetch hosts; disclose unverified integrity

* docs(#3514): trust-model, glossary, and changeset entries

* fix(#3514): scope v6 checks to literals; exact pin kinds in prompt

* chore(#3514): backfill changeset pr number

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-14 21:34:29 -04:00
Tom Boucher
268ca7e32d fix(#3504): harden hook injection patterns and force-add guard (#3510)
* test(#3504): add failing-first parity, fail-closed, and bypass suites

* fix(#3504): harden hook injection patterns and force-add guard

* test(#3504): stage the scanner lib dependency in shared-hooks fixture

* chore(#3504): backfill changeset pr number

* test(#3504): build parity samples from fragments for the ci scan

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-14 21:19:35 -04:00
Tom Boucher
e57918a648 fix(#3515): disclose the intentional mcp unconfined posture (#3517)
* test(#3515): add failing-first unconfined-mcp notice suite

* fix(#3515): disclose the intentional mcp unconfined posture

* chore(#3515): backfill changeset pr number

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-14 21:19:04 -04:00
Tom Boucher
f96cb44f85 enhance(#3248): disclose capability skills as an instruction surface (#3253)
* test(#3248): failing-first suite for instruction-surface disclosure

28 matrix rows from 50-test-matrix.md. Rows requiring the new
Disclosure.instructionSurfaces field fail today; rows 18-20/23-25 (the
ADR-2363 D4 signature invariants) pass today by construction because the
current code never reads skills/agents at all, and stand as regression
guards for the implementation commit.

Refs #3248

* feat(#3248): disclose capability skills and agents as an instruction surface

ADR-2363 D5. A capability whose only contribution was skills disclosed
nothing at install: summarizeDisclosure early-returned "ships no executable
surfaces (declarative only)" because hasExecutable was false, while each
SKILL.md body landed verbatim in the agent's instruction context.

discloseExecutableSurfaces gains a fifth, NON-executable class,
instructionSurfaces, collecting declared skills/agents stems through the same
safeCollect wrapper as the four existing collectors, so a hostile value
degrades only this class and the function stays total for any manifest shape.
Nothing existing is edited: the collectors, hasExecutable, disclosureSignature
and missingArtifacts are untouched. get_impact rates the symbol CRITICAL at
196 affected, which is why the design is strictly additive.

D4 is implemented by omission and pinned rather than left incidental: adding,
changing or removing skills/agents leaves disclosureSignature byte-identical,
so no stored consent record is perturbed and no spurious re-consent fires.
ADR-2782's conditional-append trick is deliberately NOT reused - it worked
because no manifest could declare a reviewer body before that class existed,
whereas skills predate this one, so a conditional append would re-sign every
already-consented skill-bearing capability.

The renderer is extracted as summarizeInstructionSurfaces and called from BOTH
branches of summarizeDisclosure. Appending only at the end would never render
for skill-only capabilities - the ones that need it - since those take the
early return. That branch's "declarative only" claim is now conditional on
there being no instruction surface either. The renderer iterates rather than
spreading into push, so an unbounded stem count cannot throw RangeError, and
tolerates the bare {} the CLI edge passes via `res.disclosure || {}`.

Scope note: #3248's prose says "skill stems"; ADR-2363 D3 classifies
instruction surfaces as "skills, agents". Shipping skills alone would leave an
ADR deliverable owned by no phase, and the epic has no Phase 2. Agents are the
same shape at no extra cost. Narrowing back is a two-line change.

Ratifies ADR-2363 (Proposed -> Accepted) and adds the owed ADR-1244 back-link.

Closes #3248

* fix(#3248): escape consent-prompt values and narrow disclosure to skills

Two review findings, both of which made the previous commit wrong.

BLOCKER (isolated adversarial review). Every manifest-supplied value
interpolated into a consent-prompt line was rendered unescaped. Those lines
are joined with \n and written RAW to stderr on the needs-consent path
(capability-command-router -> cli-exit runMain), so a stem carrying a newline
forged additional lines indistinguishable from genuine GSD disclosure text,
and an ANSI escape could clear or rewrite lines already printed. That defeats
the informed-consent guarantee this change exists to provide, and is a
prompt-injection vector against any agent that reads the stderr text to decide
whether to retry with --yes.

The hole was not unique to the new class - hook event/script, command
family/module/router, every MCP field, and every reviewer-lane field were
equally unescaped. Fixing only the new one would have created the
generative-fix divergence this repo tracks, so renderValueForPrompt is applied
to all five classes through one helper, guarded by a parity test that fails if
a future class skips it. Escaping is identity for ordinary names, so no
well-formed manifest's output changes. The disclosure OBJECT stays verbatim -
only the rendered LINE is escaped - because the signature and every consumer
reasoning about identity depend on the declared value.

NARROWED to skills only. The previous commit also collected agents, arguing
ADR-2363 D3 classifies instruction surfaces as "skills, agents". Verified
against staging: stageSkillsForRuntimeAsSkills takes a registry and unions
third-party skills in via readInstalledCapabilitySkill, while
stageAgentsForRuntimeWithConverter takes only a source directory and has no
registry-aware path. Third-party agents are never staged into the instruction
context, so disclosing them would have put a false claim in a security prompt -
worse than the scope creep two reviewers flagged it as. D3's classification
stands; D5 now records that Phase 1 implements the skills half and that
whether agents should be staged at all is an open maintainer question.

Also reverts the premature ADR-2363 ratification. The previous commit flipped
it to Accepted and asserted "#3248 merged" while this branch IS #3248 and is
unmerged. Status returns to Proposed, and the ADR-1244 back-link - owed only on
ratification - is withdrawn.

Adds the fast-check property suite CLAUDE.md requires and the direct precedent
(reviewer-trust-disclosure) already had: totality, D4 signature invariance, D3
hasExecutable invariance, and renderer totality over adversarial manifests.

Refs #3248

* chore(#3248): correct changeset scope claim and backfill pr number

The fragment was written against the pre-narrowing commit and still
advertised 'skills and agents'. 4d26887e narrowed disclosure to skills
only - third-party agents are never staged into the instruction context -
but did not touch the fragment, so the release notes would have carried a
claim the code does not implement.

Also backfills pr:0 -> 3253 and names the prompt-escaping fix, which is
user-visible and was absent from the original body.

Changeset-only; no code or test changed, so the gsd-test pass recorded for
4d26887e still describes this tree's behavior.

Refs #3248

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-09 13:52:29 -04:00
Tom Boucher
bc5619dd27 docs(#3247): record the capability instruction-surface trust model (#3249)
* docs(#3247): record the capability instruction-surface trust model

ADR-2363 records the trust posture for third-party capability SKILL.md
bodies, which #2322/#2340 made agent-invocable without any content-level
control. The path-level protections that fix shipped are all present; no
content scanner exists, and external-descriptor-trust.cts never had one.
Nothing was bypassed - the control did not exist and the boundary was
never written down.

D1 records the posture: skill bodies are trusted, unscanned agent
instructions. D2 rejects content scanning on Kerckhoffs (a shipped rule
set is readable by the adversary who installs it), on threat-model
non-transfer from ADR-1577 (there, instructions are anomalous inside
data; here they are the payload's legitimate form), and on Goodhart (a
scanned-OK line displaces the judgment the consent prompt exists to
provoke). D3 replaces the executable/non-executable binary with three
classes, adding instruction surface.

D4 keeps instruction surfaces out of the v1 disclosureSignature. The
signature is NOT the activation binding - hasProjectConsent compares
contentHash only, and a global install carries no consent record at all.
What re-encoding would do is perturb the signature of every skill-bearing
capability and fire a spurious re-consent prompt on its next upgrade,
which is what ADR-2782 D4 rule 5 already forbids. If instruction surfaces
ever need to be signature-bound, that lands as a versioned v2 signature
with a migration, never an in-place re-encoding.

Corrects capability-trust-model.md, which claimed skills get lighter
consent because they do not execute code - true, and not the relevant
property, since the agent is the interpreter. Adds the author-side
boundary to develop-a-capability.md and links it from
publish-a-capability.md. Both state that per-skill disclosure at the
consent prompt lands with #3248 and does not happen today.

Docs-only. No behavior change; no consent record perturbed. D5's
mechanism is Phase 1 (#3248), which is why the ADR is Proposed.

Refs #2363

* chore(#3247): backfill changeset pr number to 3249

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-09 11:47:54 -04:00
Tom Boucher
ffd5370464 fix(#2903): use the command form that actually works in reader-facing docs (#3047)
* fix(#2903): use the command form that actually works in reader-facing docs

Docs told readers to type the colon form, which no runtime registers -- 18 of
19 runtimes use slash-hyphen and the 19th uses shell-var -- so anyone copying an
example got an unrecognized command. Swept 178 occurrences across 53 files,
locale mirrors included so they do not re-diverge from English.

The colon form is a source-authoring token, not a user-facing one: install-time
converters key on it to produce the hyphen form runtimes actually register. So
the sweep is scoped, and three things are deliberately left alone:

- ADRs, which are a historical record; editing their prose falsifies what was
  written at the time.
- The legacy release-notes archive, pending a maintainer decision on whether it
  follows the same historical carve-out. Excluding it keeps a later reversal
  additive rather than a revert.
- Source artifacts under commands, workflows and agents, where the colon form is
  load-bearing. Rewriting those would break the installed-skill guarantee across
  every runtime -- the single largest hazard here.

The plugin namespace form is a real, separate token and survives untouched.

Adds a lint enforcing exactly that boundary, since the correct form genuinely
differs by directory and nothing previously caught the drift.

Also fixes a hardcoded colon form in the capability-matrix generator. The sweep
alone would have left the generated matrix disagreeing with the template that
produces it, so the fix is at the source and the output regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#2903): stop the sweep misquoting source frontmatter

Adversarial review caught three lines where the sweep rewrote a citation of the
literal YAML name: key from a source command file. That key genuinely is the
colon form -- this change's own carve-out logic says source-authoring tokens keep
it -- so the docs ended up misquoting the real files. One of the three is an
acceptance-checklist assertion, which the sweep turned into a false statement.

Restored the three citations to match their sources verbatim, surgically: where a
line carried both a name: citation and a real reader-facing slash command, only
the citation reverted and the command stayed corrected.

The guard needed the same distinction, or it would have flagged the restoration
and reddened the build: a gsd:<cmd> token preceded by name: is a citation of a
source token and is now permitted. The exemption is deliberately narrow -- a bare
gsd:<cmd> anywhere else still fails -- with a test pinning that narrowness.

Also makes the detection case-insensitive. Review found /GSD:next slipped through
silently; no such casing exists in the tree today, so this closes a latent gap
rather than fixing a live one.

Swept the whole tree for further corrupted citations: none beyond the three.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#2903): retire the stale-next invariant and sweep next like every other command

Maintainer decision on a genuine conflict between two contracts.

Invariant #3054 banned the literal /gsd-next from user-facing docs because it
named a retired workflow-advance command. But commands/gsd/next.md is a live
command -- the state-aware smart-entry launcher -- and this issue requires docs
to use the hyphen form every runtime actually registers. Both could not hold for
this one command, so docs had been sidestepping the ban by keeping the colon
form, which is exactly the defect this issue exists to remove.

FEATURES.md already recorded the reassignment: the hyphen form "is not the
retired workflow-advance command; it is reserved for the state-aware smart-entry
launcher. Workflow advancement remains under /gsd-progress --next." With that
reassignment the invariant's premise is obsolete and the guard now contradicts
the documented command form, so it is retired with a comment recording why
rather than deleted silently.

next is now swept like every other command, and the earlier exemption added to
the new guard is removed so nothing is special-cased.

Four citations of the literal name: frontmatter key stay in colon form, because
the source file really does carry name: gsd:next and a doc quoting it must
reproduce it verbatim. Two of those lines were reworded to say which side is the
frontmatter key and which is the slash command, since they previously conflated
the two.

Verified the retired scan would now genuinely fail against this tree -- the
conflict was real and resolved, not dodged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(#2903): backfill changeset pr number

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 13:23:44 -04:00
Tom Boucher
de78f2eef2 docs(#2775): align package-legitimacy docs to the ADR-0656 registry-API gate (#3010)
* docs(#2775): align package-legitimacy docs to the ADR-0656 registry-API gate

security-model.md, USER-GUIDE.md, ARCHITECTURE.md, COMMANDS.md,
FEATURES.md, and gsd-planner.md's STRIDE template (+ ja-JP mirrors)
described the pre-ADR-0656 design: slopcheck as the install-or-degrade
gate, with unavailability degrading every package to [ASSUMED].
ADR-0656 inverted this months ago — registry-API verdicts (npm/PyPI/
crates.io) are the gate; slopcheck is an optional escalate-only adapter
that no shipped configuration wires. Verified every replacement claim
against src/package-legitimacy.cts (checkPackages, classifyPackage,
lookupNpm/lookupPypi/lookupCrates) via Memtrace before writing it, so
the corrected prose matches the live implementation rather than
restating the ADR from memory.

Restored docs/explanation/security-model.md:79-84 (and its ja-JP
mirror) to original wording after an orthogonal spec review caught
that an earlier draft had edited the "Why WebSearch packages are
always [ASSUMED]" paragraph — inside the range issue #2775 explicitly
named as correct and to leave alone.

The ja-JP mirror was missing the closing clause present in the
corrected English original ("its absence leaves registry-API verdicts
intact rather than downgrading everything to [ASSUMED]") — added for
parity. This completes the ja-JP mirror the issue's acceptance
criteria named explicitly.

zh-CN/ko-KR/pt-BR (not named by #2775, but carrying the same stale
design) get the mechanical portion of the same fix: command-string
swaps, table headers, ARCHITECTURE.md diagram labels, and technical-
term swaps that reuse a word already attested elsewhere in the same
file (合法性/적법성/legitimidade for "legitimacy") — surrounding prose
untouched. The remainder in those three locales — full-paragraph
rewrites of the corrected degrade-path mechanism, deleted "External
dependency" bullets, and "manually install slopcheck" code blocks —
needs prose composed by a fluent speaker of each language and is filed
as open-gsd/gsd-core#3002 with an exact file:line inventory.

* test(#2775): acknowledge gsd-planner.md byte growth from the STRIDE-row fix

agents/gsd-planner.md grew 14 bytes (49309 -> 49323) from the STRIDE
supply-chain row correction (slopcheck -> package-legitimacy gate).
Emitted agent/workflow files are byte-tracked; this fragment
acknowledges the growth per tests/emitted-attribution.test.cjs's
"differential attribution over the real tree" check.

* docs(#2775): close ja-JP FEATURES.md gap; fix a ko-KR transliterated heading

docs/ja-JP/FEATURES.md:2808 still read the katakana transliteration
"スロップチェック verdict" in REQ-PKG-GATE-01 — invisible to a literal
"slopcheck" grep, so it was missed when ja-JP parity was checked and
declared complete. Corrected to "正当性判定" (legitimacy verdict),
matching the term already established in ja-JP/explanation/
security-model.md and ja-JP/USER-GUIDE.md. This was the only
remaining ja-JP gap; a full sweep for the transliterated form across
docs/ja-JP/ now returns zero hits, and the ja-JP mirror is genuinely
at parity.

docs/ko-KR/USER-GUIDE.md:398's heading "슬롭체크 판정:" had the same
transliteration problem. Fixed inline to "적법성 판정:", reusing the
적법성/legitimacy word already attested two lines below in the same
table. A parallel sweep of zh-CN and pt-BR found no transliterated
forms of "slopcheck" in either locale. The remaining transliterated
occurrence in ko-KR (USER-GUIDE.md:406, the lead-in to the
pip-install code block) needs prose composition like the rest of that
block and is added to open-gsd/gsd-core#3002's inventory.

* chore(#2775): backfill changeset PR number to 3010

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-02 20:24:42 -04:00
Tom Boucher
69dbf28ca7 feat(#2796): reviewer lane as a fourth trust-disclosure class (#2826)
* feat(#2796): reviewer lane as a fourth trust-disclosure class

Phase 3 of epic #2782, delivering ADR-2782 D5. A reviewer lane is piped the plan
text, requirements, research findings and CONTEXT.md decisions, and its output is
read back into REVIEWS.md -- an egress channel for the most sensitive artifacts
GSD produces. Making lanes pluggable WITHOUT a disclosure class would open a
data-exfiltration path behind a manifest field, which is why this gates the
feature rather than following it.

- discloseExecutableSurfaces was cyclomatic 51 / cognitive 99 / 110 lines with
  risk_level critical. Rather than grow it, it is now a short orchestrator over
  four extracted collectors (hooks, commands, mcp -- behaviour-preserving -- plus
  the new lane collector), each independently testable. That is also what makes
  the 80% mutation threshold survivable: 51 branches in one function cannot be
  mutation-covered by whole-function tests.

- A spawn lane discloses its binary AND its full declared args, in rendered and
  raw form. Binary-only disclosure would be insufficient and not hypothetically:
  a lane declaring python3 with innocuous args could later change them to
  ['-c', '<program>'] without the binary changing. That is the bug class #1459
  already fixed for MCP servers.

- An openai-http lane has no binary, so it discloses the destination host and the
  config key naming it. A localhost destination is disclosed and distinguished
  from a remote one. Both forms name the egress payload classes.

THE CONSTRAINT THAT SHAPED THE DESIGN: the lane element is appended to the
disclosure signature ONLY when at least one lane is declared. signatureForManifest
is the consent key both the loader and the lifecycle compare, so appending
unconditionally would have changed every installed capability's signature and
re-prompted every user for every capability on their next upgrade -- for a feature
they do not use. Two pre-change goldens are asserted byte-for-byte as the tripwire.

The resolved host is deliberately NOT in the signature. The loader has no config
resolver, so including it would make the loader and the lifecycle compute
different signatures for the same manifest and produce a permanent false-mismatch
loop. It is disclosed and recorded instead; Phase 5b re-resolves and compares at
invocation, which is D5 rule 4's own placement.

reviewsSection and timeoutFloorMs are also excluded from the signature: a cosmetic
change must not force re-consent, because a prompt carrying no security
information is how users learn to click through.

A lane's binary is NOT existence-checked against the staged bundle. It is a PATH
tool, never a bundle artifact; treating it like a hook script would add every lane
to missingArtifacts and block every lane install.

Two defects fixed beyond the fourth class:
- isLocalHostValue mis-parsed a scheme-less host: new URL('localhost:1234') does
  NOT throw, it reads 'localhost' as the URL scheme and yields an empty hostname,
  so a bare host:port would have been reported as non-local. Now falls back on an
  empty hostname rather than only on a caught throw.
- The orchestrator's safeCollect closes a PRE-EXISTING totality gap in the other
  three classes: a null manifest, or one with a throwing getter or Proxy trap,
  previously threw out of disclosure -- which runs on an UNVALIDATED manifest at
  install time. No well-formed input changes; all 51 existing trust tests pass.

Closes #2796

* fix(#2796): close four disclosure gaps found by the isolated security review

All four were REPRODUCED by execution against the shipped module, and all four
passed the existing 41-test suite while live -- each exists because the matrix
did not think to ask.

B (MEDIUM, reachable via plain JSON). Non-string argv members were folded into
the consent SIGNATURE but dropped from the human-facing text, because the summary
rendered the string-filtered args rather than the raw declared array. A manifest
declaring args ['--json', 7, {mode:'exfiltrate-everything'}, true] printed as
'--json' alone -- the host still receives the rest, so the user consented to a
surface never shown. That directly contradicts this design's own Kerckhoffs claim
that nothing about a lane is hidden. The summary now renders the raw array, with
non-strings shown in a visible form, and never throws on a circular or BigInt
member.

F (MEDIUM, reachable). The [local] flag is design-load-bearing, and it was
dropped for every loopback form except the dotted quad and the bare hostname.
Bracketed IPv6 was mangled by splitting on the address's own colons ([::1]:8080
became '['), and legacy IPv4 encodings were not recognised at all. A browser,
curl and the OS resolver all treat 127.1, 2130706433, 0x7f000001 and 0177.0.0.1
as loopback. isLocalHostValue now handles bracketed and bare IPv6, IPv4-mapped
loopback, and inet_aton shorthand/decimal/hex/octal. The dangerous direction was
already clean and is now pinned by tests: localhost.evil.com,
http://user@localhost@evil.com and friends stay REMOTE.

C (LOW). An empty reviewer body flipped hasExecutable true and perturbed the
disclosure signature, producing a re-consent prompt whose only content was
'(no binary declared)'. A prompt carrying no security information is the
click-through-training harm this design explicitly refuses for reviewsSection and
timeoutFloorMs; refusing it there and permitting it here was inconsistent. A body
declaring nothing recognised is no longer a lane. The test is deliberately broad
-- any ONE recognised field suffices -- because requiring specifically a binary,
or specifically a slug, would let a lane declaring only the other slip through
unconsented, which is the far worse failure. Pinned in both directions.

D (LOW-MEDIUM). Disclosure runs BEFORE validation, so a mis-cased or unrecognised
transport reaches this code. Keying on an exact string sent a lane that plainly
declares a hostConfigKey down the spawn branch, printing '(no binary declared)'
for a lane egressing to a live remote host, and left its resolvedHost blank --
which reads as 'no destination', the precise thing the design forbids. Both the
collector and the summary now branch on the declared SHAPE, so such a lane
discloses its key and either a resolved host or the explicit unresolved marker.

Two further findings were reproduced but confirmed NOT reachable through the real
pipeline and are recorded as known limits rather than fixed: a selective-throw
Proxy blanking a whole lane, and NaN/Infinity/undefined colliding to 'null' in a
signature. Every production manifest reaches disclosure through
readManifestBounded's strict JSON.parse, which cannot produce a Proxy, a getter,
a BigInt, a circular reference, NaN or Infinity. The 0/-0 sub-case IS reachable
via valid JSON but is inert -- String(0) === String(-0), so a spawned process
receives identical argv.

9 regression tests added (50 total in this file, up from 41).

* chore(#2796): backfill changeset pr number to 2826
2026-07-29 11:21:49 -04:00
Tom Boucher
0d08c32048 fix(#2590): emit Workflow scripts the Workflow tool accepts; make the backend reachable (#2681)
* fix(#2590): emit Workflow scripts the Workflow tool accepts; make the backend reachable

Every emitted script was rejected. Four invalid constructs, the first fatal on
its own, so the Workflow backend could never dispatch a wave:

  1. no `export const meta = {…}` first statement -> whole script rejected
  2. resumeFromRunId("<id>")  -> "resumeFromRunId is not defined". It is a
     Workflow TOOL INPUT parameter, not a script function. The run id still
     reaches the caller via summary.resumeRunId, to pass as that input.
  3. budget(<n>)              -> "budget is not a function". `budget` is a
     read-only object { total, spent(), remaining() } fed by the caller's token
     directive; a script cannot set it. Recorded as intent in a comment.
  4. parallel(agent(…), agent(…)) -> "parallel() expects an array of functions".
     Now parallel([() => agent(…), …]) — passing agent() results directly also
     started every agent eagerly, before parallel() could bound concurrency.

The single-plan stage had its own branch with the same parallel() defect; both
branches are now one array-emitting path. Waves also emit phase() calls whose
titles match meta.phases exactly, so progress groups correctly.

Two secondary defects kept the script from ever being REACHED — which is why
this shipped undetected:

  5. NOTHING resolved the Agent SDK version. The fragment claimed there was "no
     scriptable way" to introspect it and told callers to omit the flag, so
     gate 5 returned agent_sdk_version_unknown on every automated run while
     `capability state` still reported active:true. True for bash, false for
     Node: the router now reads the installed @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk
     version, walking node_modules up the tree and reading package.json
     directly — require.resolve throws ERR_PACKAGE_PATH_NOT_EXPORTED because the
     SDK's exports map does not expose ./package.json. Precedence: explicit flag
     > GSD_AGENT_SDK_VERSION > installed. Fail-closed is preserved; an
     unresolvable version still declines to inline. A too-old SDK now reports
     the truthful agent_sdk_version_below_floor instead of unknown.
  6. The runtime fallback was `--runtime > GSD_RUNTIME > 'unknown'`, diverging
     from the canonical `GSD_RUNTIME > config.runtime > 'claude'`, so any
     invocation without --runtime reported runtime_not_claude on an ordinary
     Claude project. Now delegates to runtime-slash.resolveRuntime.

The fragment's `${AGENT_SDK_VERSION:+--agent-sdk-version "$AGENT_SDK_VERSION"}`
snippet is removed rather than repaired: it was also shell-dependent — zsh does
not word-split unquoted parameter expansions, so it collapsed to a single argv
element, argValue() never matched, and the run failed into the same
agent_sdk_version_unknown, indistinguishable from genuinely unknown. Auto-
resolution removes the need for the construct entirely.

Verified with the issue's own repro: no flags now reaches the version gate; an
SDK above the floor yields backend:"workflow" with a script that parses as a
real ES module.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015TCwhbMuY37DzRMCfzTABJ

* fix(#2590): sync generated registry, repair sibling tests, reject duplicate wave ids

Findings from the isolated review, all fixed.

HIGH — gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-registry.cjs was stale, and `lint:ci` was
already RED because of it. The registry embeds the fragment text INLINE, so the
shipped/installed copy still taught the exact broken contract this PR fixes:
the old `${AGENT_SDK_VERSION:+…}` bash line and the "OMIT the flag when unknown"
guidance. Regenerated. (I had read `lint:ci` by grepping its output instead of
checking its exit code, so I recorded a red chain as green — checking $? now.)

HIGH — three existing tests asserted the OLD broken shape and would have failed
CI; none was touched by the first commit:
  tests/fix-2285-claude-orchestration-wiring.test.cjs — matched resumeFromRunId("…")
  tests/claude-orchestration.test.cjs                 — .includes('budget(')
  tests/claude-orchestration-command-router.test.cjs  — .includes('budget(')
Each now asserts the corrected contract: the id/pool reaches the caller via
summary, and neither construct is ever CALLED. Two sibling assertions had also
gone vacuous — `.includes('resumeFromRunId')` still passed, but only because the
new explanatory COMMENT contains that substring, not because anything is wired.
Rewritten to assert the real property.

MEDIUM — duplicate wave ids were never rejected. Plan-id uniqueness was checked
within a wave, but nothing checked wave ids across waves. That was harmless
before; it is not now, because each wave emits a `phase("Wave <id>")` call plus a
matching meta.phases entry and the tool matches titles by exact string — two
waves sharing an id would collapse into one progress group and misattribute the
second wave's agents to the first. Rejected at validation, with tests either
side of the boundary.

MEDIUM — the fragment contradicted itself (its "Manifest construction" header
still listed $AGENT_SDK_VERSION as orchestrator-built) and, more seriously, never
told the orchestrator to pass summary.resumeRunId as the Workflow tool's
resumeFromRunId INPUT. Since this PR moves resume from a broken in-script call to
a tool-invocation input, an implementer following only the fragment would have
silently regressed phase-resume to a no-op. Both fixed.

MEDIUM — docs/how-to/enable-claude-orchestration-workflow-backend.md and
docs/explanation/claude-orchestration-capability.md documented
`resumeFromRunId("<id>")` and `budget(<tokens>)` as current correct output —
teaching the bug as the feature. Updated to the real contract, including the
required meta block and the thunk-array parallel() form. (The changeset is
`Fixed`, so the docs gate exempts this; it is corrected because it is wrong,
not because a gate demanded it.)

LOW — the router's top-of-file comment still described the divergent
`--runtime > GSD_RUNTIME > 'unknown'` chain as current, ninety lines above the
fix; and inserting resolveInstalledAgentSdkVersion had orphaned
resolveDetectionArgs' JSDoc above the wrong function. Both repaired.

lint:ci now exits 0 (verified by exit code, not by reading output).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015TCwhbMuY37DzRMCfzTABJ

* chore(#2590): backfill changeset pr number (#2681)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 20:49:38 -04:00
Tom Boucher
ff9cb6069f fix(#2285): wire claude-orchestration Workflow backend into execute-phase (#2314)
The claude-orchestration capability (#1143) shipped registered 'active'
but fully inert: detectWorkflowBackend/emitWorkflowScript had no caller
outside their own CLI router, and execute-phase.md declared an
execute:wave:pre hook point that the workflow body never rendered — so
claude_orchestration.enabled:true had zero effect on real runs.

Approach B (maintainer-chosen):
- execute-phase.md now renders the execute:wave:pre hook
  (gsd_run loop render-hooks execute:wave:pre) at a new step 2.75,
  immediately before each wave's Agent() dispatch — fixing the latent
  dead-hook gap for any pre-wave capability.
- Move the claude-orchestration contribution execute:wave:post ->
  execute:wave:pre (a pre-wave backend selector belongs before dispatch,
  not after); rename fragments/execute-wave-post.md -> execute-wave-pre.md
  with prose instructing the orchestrator to call resolve-wave-dispatch
  before step 3. Unrelated wave:post contributions (ui.safety-gate, drift,
  external-job, mempalace) untouched.
- New .cts seam resolveWaveDispatch(input) composes detectWorkflowBackend
  + emitWorkflowScript into one {backend:'inline'|'workflow', ...} result;
  exposed as gsd-tools claude-orchestration resolve-wave-dispatch. This is
  a real non-CLI-router, non-test caller of both functions.

Fail-closed: any gate miss (disabled, non-Claude runtime, Workflow tool
absent, SDK below floor, execution_backend:inline, malformed input) or an
emit failure resolves to inline with a byte-identical result shape — no
regression to the default-off execute-phase path.

Regression tests (tests/fix-2285-*) cover happy-path activation + SDK-floor
BVA, the fail-closed gate-miss table with detectWorkflowBackend parity, a
fast-check composition property, capability.json contribution assertions,
and a source-contract guard that execute:wave:pre is now actually rendered.
Dependent registry-shape assertions updated in-scope.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-15 19:18:28 -04:00
Tom Boucher
c4237df8e6 docs(#2276): 1.7.0 release documentation — what's-new, EoS explanation, feature index (#2282)
Add a curated 1.7.0 release-highlights page (docs/whats-new-1.7.0.md) and a
conceptual Embeddable Orchestration System (EoS) explanation
(docs/explanation/embeddable-orchestration-system.md), extend docs/FEATURES.md
with a v1.7.0 feature section, and wire both new docs into the docs index
(docs/README.md) and the root README.

Covers the release's marquee changes: the ADR-1239 Host-Integration Interface /
EoS (Embeddable Orchestration System) runtime expansion, the Capability + EoS
discoverability registries, the gsd-mcp-server companion, model-catalog advances
(GPT-5.6, (1M) badge), statusline enhancements, the compact GSD-state format,
plus a themed summary of the 100 fixes and 4 security hardenings.

Also corrects a stale CONTEXT.md glossary entry: the Capability Registry Overlay
now documents the #2009 fail-open behavior for a load-failed gate-declaring
capability (previously described as fail-closed).

American house style; no parity-gated reference docs hand-edited.

Refs #2276, #1678

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 22:49:44 -04:00
Tom Boucher
46f8d3814c fix(#2009): load-failed capability gates fail open with a loud warning
Previously a capability that failed to LOAD (e.g. incompatible engines.gsd) but
declared a gate-kind loop hook caused the loop resolver to inject a BLOCKING
synthetic gate (blocking:true, onError:halt) at every declared point, halting
every ship:pre / verify:post project-wide over an unrelated load error, with no
remediation surfaced.

Per maintainer decision (#2009) it now fails OPEN: no gate is injected (the loop
proceeds; --active-cap correctly reports the failed cap inactive) and a loud
warning is emitted — to stderr (the channel host workflows/agents actually see)
and in the envelope 'warnings' array — naming the load reason and the exact
'gsd capability remove <id>' remediation. The loader still records blockedGates;
only the consequence changes from block to warn.

Security (review): capId and reason originate from a third-party manifest /
directory name. capId is validated against the canonical kebab-case id shape
before it is placed in the runnable remediation command (withheld otherwise);
reason is stripped of control chars and backticks. This closes an argument/
prompt-injection vector in the surfaced message.

Docs updated to the fail-open-warning posture (ARCHITECTURE, INVENTORY,
CONFIGURATION, README, capability-overlay-model). Also removes a dead 'before'
import surfaced by lint in the issue-2045 test.
2026-07-07 19:38:01 -04:00
Tom Boucher
e3262d94d3 feat(capabilities): add claude-orchestration capability (Workflow backend) (#1143)
Default-off, BETA, claude-only capability adopting Claude Code's Workflow tool
(/effort ultracode, Agent SDK >= v0.3.149) as an optional parallel-execution
backend for the GSD loop. Restores the wave parallelism + plan-checker + verifier
that #853 forces inline on Claude Code, and folds gsd-ultraplan-phase under one
runtime gate.

- Pure fail-closed core (src/claude-orchestration.cts): detectWorkflowBackend
  (gate ladder: enabled -> Claude -> backend != inline -> nested+background host
  -> valid Agent SDK -> SDK >= floor; every miss degrades to inline) and
  emitWorkflowScript (waves -> parallel() barriers, plans -> gsd-executor +
  worktree, files_modified overlap -> separate stages, resumeFromRunId, budget).
  All interpolated identifiers validated script-safe; briefs JSON-quoted.
- claude-orchestration command family (gsd-tools claude-orchestration
  detect-backend|emit-workflow) for orchestrator invocation.
- Two gated loop contributions at wired points (execute:wave:post, plan:post);
  federated config keys (enabled/execution_backend/min_agent_sdk_version).
- ADR-1143 implementation amendment; CONTEXT.md glossary entry; explanation doc.

On any runtime lacking the Workflow tool, behaviour is byte-identical to today.

closes #1143
2026-07-06 15:18:23 -04:00
Tom Boucher
8f2ebbe9bf feat(#1928): remove sunset Gemini CLI runtime, redirect to Antigravity (#1996)
* feat(#1928): remove sunset gemini cli runtime, redirect to antigravity

Google sunset Gemini CLI on 2026-06-18; Antigravity CLI is its official successor (already a first-class GSD runtime). Remove the gemini runtime from the enum (16->15), aliases, labels, config-home fragment, install path, converters (convertClaudeToGemini{Markdown,Toml,Agent}, convertSlashCommandsToGeminiMentions), capability descriptor, gemini-extension.json, RULESET.GEMINI.*, and the interactive menu (renumbered, no gap).

--gemini now prints an explicit deprecation notice citing the 2026-06-18 sunset and redirects to --antigravity (no silent alias, per the issue's Hyrum's-Law rejection). Antigravity is preserved throughout: its GEMINI.md contextFileName, .gemini/antigravity config home, the shared convertGeminiToolName/claudeToGeminiTools tool vocabulary, and the 'gemini' hookEvents dialect it declares. GEMINI.md retargeted as Antigravity's context file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(#1928): backfill changeset PR number (#1996)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(#1928): drop Gemini CLI from issue templates (review nit)

Removes the sunset Gemini CLI runtime from the two GitHub issue-template
runtime lists that the removal PR missed, per @davesienkowski's review nit:
- feature_request.yml: 'Applicable runtimes' checkbox (a user could otherwise
  request a feature for a runtime GSD no longer supports)
- bug_report.yml: 'Runtime' dropdown + the stale ~/.gemini/settings.json
  retrieval-help line

Leaves the post-removal templates fully consistent with the Antigravity redirect.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 13:32:51 -04:00
Tom Boucher
69fef7c00e docs(#1683): Diátaxis host-integration docs + versioning policy + ADR-1239 Accepted — Slice 3 (#1940)
- how-to: author a host-plugin (external-author guide against the SDK surface)
- tutorial: embed GSD in a new host (end-to-end programmatic-cli example)
- reference: the Host-Integration Interface (axes, adapters, handshake, profiles)
- explanation: interface versioning + deprecation policy (additive vs breaking,
  PROTOCOL_VERSION bumps, deprecation window)
- ADR-1239 Status: Proposed → Accepted (Phases B–E shipped)
2026-07-02 18:38:11 -04:00
Alex V.
a63684c222 enhance(#1577): WebFetch/WebSearch injection isolation + opt-in blocking (#1585)
* fix(#1577): isolate WebFetch/WebSearch ingress + opt-in injection blocking

Split A of #1573 (security-critical). Scans WebFetch/WebSearch output (the
largest untrusted channel) in gsd-read-injection-scanner; shared
untrusted-input-boundary reference @-included by the 8 ingest agents
(randomized per-wrap delimiters, in-prompt self-scan guard, task-anchoring);
opt-in security.injection_blocking (default advisory — non-breaking).

arXiv: 2506.05739 (PPA), 2507.15219 (PromptArmor), 2504.20472 (Referencing), 2503.00061 (defense-in-depth).

* fix(#1577): address review — honest blocking docs, config key, ADR, property test, revert localized

- A1: rewrote the opt-in-blocking doc + Security changeset honestly — the PostToolUse hook is a
  circuit-breaker (halts the agent's next step), NOT a redactor; it does not scrub content already
  in the transcript. The prompt-level data/instruction boundary is the primary control.
- A2: registered security.injection_blocking in the config schema + defaults manifests (default
  false) + an e2e config-roundtrip test; the dotted setter writes the nested shape the hook reads.
- A3: reverted the 4 hand-edited localized security-model.md (canonical EN only, per convention).
- A5: ADR-1577 (untrusted-input boundary + opt-in blocking; redaction-vs-circuit-breaker rationale).
- A6: property test — scanner never crashes / only emits valid JSON on unicode/large/malformed input.
- Also: inventory (untrusted-input-boundary.md) + agent-size baseline (8 ingest agents) +
  drift-guard matcher update (Read -> Read|WebFetch|WebSearch). A7 (content<20 early-exit) left as
  the noted pre-existing follow-up.

* fix(#1577): allowlist untrusted-input-boundary.md in injection-scan CI gate

The new reference quotes injection phrases ('ignore previous instructions',
'you are now…') as examples agents must NOT comply with, tripping the repo's
own prompt-injection-scan.sh diff gate (the standalone 'security' CI job, red
on HEAD). Allowlist it alongside the other security docs (security-model.md,
TEST-EXAMPLES.md) that legitimately demonstrate injection patterns. The JS
scanner test doesn't scan references/, so only the shell gate needed it.

Verified: scan --diff origin/next -> 0 findings; scanner JS test 15/15.

* fix(#1577): cover AC #2's gsd-ui-researcher + gsd-assumptions-analyzer

trek-e Major 1: the @-included set dropped two AC #2 agents. Restore them so
no named web-ingress agent is uncovered, keeping the two justified additions
(gsd-ai-researcher, gsd-domain-researcher). Final set = AC's 8 + 2 = 10.
 - gsd-ui-researcher carries the full WebSearch/WebFetch + MCP-fetch toolset.
 - gsd-assumptions-analyzer reads 5-15 codebase source files (external/source-
   document ingress per the boundary), though it has no web tools.
INGEST_AGENTS in the isolation test now asserts all 10; size baselines
regenerated (+60 bytes each, both well under the DEFAULT cap); changeset
reworded 8 -> 10.

Verified: untrusted-input-isolation 14/14; agent-size-budget 39/39.

* docs(#1577): document security.injection_blocking + boundary seam

trek-e Major 2 + Minor:
 - docs/CONFIGURATION.md: add the top-level security.injection_blocking key to
   the Full Schema and a Security Settings subsection, distinguishing it from
   the workflow.security_* namespace; honest circuit-breaker-not-redactor
   framing matching ADR-1577 / security-model.
 - CONTEXT.md: add the 'Untrusted-input boundary' seam glossary entry.

Verified: lint:docs ok; config-field-docs + contributor-standards green.

* test(#1577): make read-injection property test git-text, not binary

trek-e nit (and more): the file embedded a raw U+FFFF AND a raw NUL byte as
degenerate-edge inputs. The NUL is what actually made git classify it binary
(git binary = NUL in first 8K). Replace both with text-safe escapes that keep
the identical runtime values: '\\x00' and String.fromCodePoint(0xFFFF). File
now diffs/blames line-by-line.

Verified: property test 2/2; no NUL/raw-noncharacter bytes remain.

* docs(#1577): align untrusted boundary docs

Name all 10 ingress agents in INVENTORY/security-model and allowlist the intentional read-injection property corpus for the prompt-injection scanner.

* docs(#1577): align ADR ingest agent count

Update ADR-1577 from 8 to 10 ingest agents so it matches the actual boundary include set and the rest of the docs.

---------

Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
2026-06-24 17:07:23 -04:00
Tom Boucher
02c6491e61 docs(#1464): fix ADR-1244 capability doc set — followable tutorials, overlay-model + install tutorial, set/fragment/runtimeCompat reference, accuracy fixes 2026-06-20 13:02:24 -04:00
Tom Boucher
e7855bc217 fix(#1459): user-owned consent store gates third-party capability activation; env/cwd in disclosure; loader validator parity (#1473) 2026-06-20 01:59:03 -04:00
Tom Boucher
0d56f544d2 feat(#1435): capability matrix (generated + drift-guarded) + trust-model doc consolidation (#1458)
* feat(#1435): capability matrix (generated + drift-guarded) + trust-model doc consolidation

ADR-1244 Phase 6. Adds the capability matrix reference, generated FROM the committed registry so it
can never drift from the actual capability set:
- scripts/gen-capability-matrix.cjs (--write / --check); --check is a CI drift guard.
- tests/capability-matrix-sync.test.cjs (4 tests): drift guard, buildMatrix==committed, every cap
  present, no placeholders.
- docs/reference/capability-matrix.md regenerated from the registry (release-stable: shows engines.gsd,
  omits the lockstep per-cap version that would churn the file every release).
- Consolidated the duplicate trust-model doc: deleted docs/explanation/the-capability-trust-model.md,
  merged its content into capability-trust-model.md, redirected ~10 references; no stale links remain.
- Diataxis verification (now that gsd capability is a real command): corrected the matrix's third-party
  section — the matrix is the first-party catalogue; the overlay-aware view of installed third-party
  capabilities is 'gsd capability list', not this generated file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(#1435): Added changeset for the capability matrix reference

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#1435): address code-review — non-vacuous matrix test + generator polish

- capability-matrix-sync.test.cjs: assert the 'security registers a ship:pre gate' precondition
  unconditionally so the extension-point check can never degrade to a vacuous pass on registry drift.
- gen-capability-matrix.cjs: warn (stderr) on an unknown loop point at generation time; rename
  enginesOf -> fmtEngines for consistency with the other fmt* helpers (output unchanged).
- capability-trust-model.md: point the two how-to links at the real files
  (import-a-capability-from-a-url.md, version-a-capability.md) instead of the bare directory.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(#1435): backfill changeset PR number → #1458

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-19 12:45:26 -04:00
Tom Boucher
1abebbf4fd feat(#1434): registry-driven dispatch for third-party capabilities (ADR-1244 Phase 5) (#1450)
ADR-1244 Phase 5 (D7). dispatchOverlayCapabilityCommand in gsd-tools.cjs dispatches an installed third-party capability command family via loadRegistry({includeInstalled}), gated on a committed ledger entry (consent) and confined to the capability's install root (defaultRequireFromInstallRoot: bare-.cjs basename + realpath containment, rejects ../ traversal + symlink escape); same own-property/function/sync/ExitError guards as the first-party path. capability-loader records _overlay.commandRoots only for accepted overlay caps with a committed, structurally-valid ledger entry (fail closed). First-party graphify/intel/audit unchanged (already on the registry seam). 3 Codex rounds converged + /security-review (no HIGH) + /code-review (Approve); gsd-test green both platforms; CI green.

Closes #1434.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 23:37:43 -04:00
Tom Boucher
9219af3360 feat(#1433): capability trust gate + upgrade/compat (ADR-1244 Phase 4) (#1449)
ADR-1244 Phase 4 (D5 trust + D6 upgrade/compat). capability-trust.cjs (disclosure/consent, strict_known_registries, engines+compatVersions, reserved namespace) + capability-lifecycle.cjs (install/upgrade/remove/reconcile; ledger-as-commit-point _pending intent; atomic stage-then-swap; surgical marker-isolated shared-edit strip; owner-token lock) + capability-source promote/skipEnginesGate seams + loader pending-skip + config keys. No sandbox re-derived (consent+integrity+reversibility). 6 Codex adversarial rounds + /security-review (no HIGH) + /code-review; gsd-test green both platforms; CI green. Phase 5 (#1434) wires the CLI dispatch.

Closes #1433.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 21:40:37 -04:00
Tom Boucher
a0dbf8bbdf fix(#1319): use portable Claude skill effort (#1352) 2026-06-16 15:30:17 -04:00
Tom Boucher
f52a7a5f77 feat(#1245): add capability ecosystem ADR, PRD, and developer documentation (#1248)
Phase 0 of the Capability Ecosystem epic (#1244): the design record and the
third-party-author documentation set, with no runtime or code changes.

- docs/adr/1244-capability-ecosystem.md — architecture decision record
  (amends/extends ADR-857 Decisions 7 & 8)
- docs/prd/1244-capability-ecosystem.md — product requirements
- Diataxis docs: tutorial, how-to (publish/import/version/remove),
  reference (manifest schema, /gsd:capability command, capability matrix),
  explanation (trust model); cross-links added to develop-a-capability.md

Refs #1244

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 17:51:43 -04:00
Tom Boucher
ae8bb707bc refactor(#1170): remove hand-maintained INVENTORY count scalars (#1179)
* refactor(#1170): remove hand-maintained INVENTORY count scalars

The `(N shipped)` heading counts in docs/INVENTORY.md were absolute
scalars that collided silently on merge: two branches each bumping the
same integer to N+1 produced a clean git merge whose value the merged
filesystem (N+2) contradicted, hard-failing inventory-counts.test.cjs on
the CI merge commit across all platforms (DEFECT.INVENTORY-MERGE-UNDERCOUNT).

- Strip the six `(N shipped)` heading counts + the two prose footnote
  counts; repoint the intro to INVENTORY-MANIFEST.json as the registry.
- Drop the decorative `generated` date from the manifest + its
  strip-before-compare branch in gen-inventory-manifest.cjs (it conflicted
  on cross-day merges and is read by nothing).
- Delete inventory-counts.test.cjs (scalar-vs-disk gate, the collision
  source); its drift protection is subsumed by the merge-safe set-membership
  test inventory-manifest-sync.test.cjs, which stays as the sole gate.
- Add inventory-headings-countfree.test.cjs guard (fails if a count is
  re-added to a heading).
- Fix already-broken count-bearing cross-doc anchors to stable count-free
  slugs in ARCHITECTURE.md + multi-agent-orchestration.md.
- Retire the now-impossible DEFECT.INVENTORY-MERGE-UNDERCOUNT + obsolete
  RULESET.DOC-CONSISTENCY in CONTEXT.md; de-count DEFECT.INVENTORY-DRIFT;
  correct stale MANIFEST-CANONICAL-KEY (all six families canonical).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(#1170): backfill changeset PR number (#1179)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 21:30:03 -04:00
Colin
cd5db1f8db test(suites): seed security/slow/integration suites via measured retags
Renames (git mv) with all references updated (ci-test-scope RULES,
windows-parity allowlist, test-file-count allowlist, docs in 6 locales):

- 5 scanner tests -> *.security.test.cjs — the 'Run security tests' CI step
  ran zero files since the suite taxonomy landed; it is now honest.
- graphify-auto-update -> *.slow.test.cjs (36s, slowest file in the suite;
  e2e gsd-tools spawns) — runs on full-matrix lanes and push to next.
- installer-migration-install-integration -> *.integration.test.cjs
  (13s; an integration test by its own name).

Coverage gate measured after retags: 88.55% lines (gate 70%).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-09 23:50:41 -04:00
Tom Boucher
b866b95296 fix(#921,#922): orchestrators must not fork; plan-phase Agent gate is attempt-based (#926)
`context: fork` strips the `Agent` tool from a subagent's environment.
Spawning orchestrators (`/gsd-autonomous`, `/gsd-execute-phase`,
`/gsd-plan-phase`) depend on `Agent` to dispatch sub-agents; running
them forked silently disables the core capability they exist to provide
(#921). Remove `context: fork` from all three command frontmatter files.
`effort: xhigh` (introduced by #769) is preserved.

The `<runtime_compatibility>` Agent-availability guard added by #913 was
checking whether `Agent` was present *before* attempting the call. On
runtimes where the tool list is dynamically resolved this produced
false-negative aborts in sessions that have the tool (#922). Replace
the introspection-based pattern with an attempt-based gate: always
attempt the `Agent()` call; stop only if a real tool-unavailable error
is returned. This preserves #853's backgrounded-session close-off and
#913's intent of preventing inline role-collapse, while eliminating
false negatives.

Tests updated: enh-769-context-fork-effort.install.test.cjs asserts the
three orchestrators lack `context: fork` and that the converter still
passes the field through for non-orchestrator commands; plan-phase-drift-
guard.test.cjs adds four assertions for the attempt-based gate language;
workflow-size-budget unchanged (budgets not exceeded).

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-09 08:42:25 -04:00
Tom Boucher
29c0a2f5a1 docs(#849): capture 1.4.0 release features across the docs base (#850)
Diataxis review of the 1.4.0 content (52 changesets, multi-runtime maturation
plus native packaging and new flags) against the existing docs base found most
per-feature docs already landed with their PRs. Fill the four remaining gaps,
each in its Diataxis quadrant:

- Reference: FEATURES.md Feature #36 (Multi-Runtime Support) updated in place
  with 1.4.0 additions — native skills emission (Cline/Kilo/OpenCode), new
  slash-command surfaces (CodeBuddy/Augment/Cursor), cross-runtime lifecycle
  hooks for context-headroom tracking, and the Gemini CLI extension package.
- Reference: CONFIGURATION.md gains a dedicated worktree.baseRef entry (values,
  .claude/settings.local.json location, auto-set-on-install behaviour).
- How-to: plan-a-phase.md gains an 'override planning granularity for one phase'
  section for the --granularity flag.
- Explanation: context-engineering.md gains a 'Lifecycle hooks and context
  headroom' section (the why of lifecycle hooks + forked context), cross-linked
  from multi-agent-orchestration.md.

Docs-only; documents already-shipped features, so no changeset required
(docs/ is not in the changeset-lint user-facing prefixes).

Closes #849

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-07 23:22:15 -04:00
Tom Boucher
463cffd894 chore(#604): rename get-shit-done/ runtime directory to gsd-core/ (#615)
* chore(#604): rename get-shit-done/ runtime directory to gsd-core/

Renames the installed runtime directory `get-shit-done/` to `gsd-core/` so the
on-disk name matches the package (`@opengsd/gsd-core`), repo, and binary
(`gsd-tools`). The npm package name and binary are unchanged; npx/npm consumers
are unaffected.

Mechanical (bulk, ~90% of the diff):
- `git mv get-shit-done gsd-core`
- Swept path/identifier references across the repo via
  `perl -pe 's/get-shit-done(?!-\w)/gsd-core/g'`. The negative lookahead
  preserves the five legitimate slug variants that are NOT the directory:
  get-shit-done-{OLD,cc,classic,cli,redux} (old package/repo names).
- Build/manifest wiring: package.json (bin, files, coverage globs),
  tsconfig.build.json (outDir), ~86 .gitignore build-output entries,
  stryker.config.mjs, scan-ignore files, install.js path strings.
- Frozen (not rewritten): CHANGELOG.md history; translated docs
  (README.<locale>.md and docs/{ja-JP,ko-KR,pt-BR,zh-CN}/).

New logic (review here):
- src/installer-migrations/003-rename-get-shit-done-to-gsd-core.cts: a proper
  ADR-0008 installer migration. On upgrade it walks the legacy
  `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` tree, classifies each file via the prior install
  manifest, and emits remove-managed / backup-and-remove for managed files
  while PRESERVING unknown user-added files. Symlink-safe (skips a symlinked
  root and symlinked entries; bounds-checks every path under configDir). The
  framework rolls back on install failure. Emptied dirs may remain (framework
  has no recursive dir-removal primitive) — documented.
- scripts/lint-legacy-dir-name.cjs: CI regression guard forbidding the bare
  `get-shit-done` directory token (split token to avoid self-match; case-
  insensitive; `(?!-\w)` lookahead allows the slug variants; allowlists
  CHANGELOG, translated docs, and `gsd-allow-legacy-name` marker lines).
  Wired into the lint-tests CI job.
- Restored scripts/lint-package-identity-drift.cjs detection regexes (the
  mechanical sweep had wrongly rewritten the old-name patterns it exists to
  detect) and marked them as intentional legacy references.
- TDD tests for the migration and the guard; do.md slash-command guard regex
  tightened so a `/gsd-core/bin` path segment is not mistaken for a command;
  changeset + docs/installer-migrations.md row added.

Breaking: the installed runtime path moves `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` ->
`~/.claude/gsd-core/`. Migration 003 removes the stale legacy dir's managed
files (preserving user files) on upgrade. Users with custom hooks/configs
hardcoding the old path must update them.

Closes #604

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): unsweep pending changesets + allowlist injection-example docs

CI fixes for the rename PR:
- Do not sweep pending .changeset/*.md (ephemeral release-note fragments,
  like CHANGELOG); reverted those body edits so 5 pre-existing malformed
  fragments (missing type/pr) no longer enter the PR diff and trip docs-lint.
  Allowlisted .changeset/ in the legacy-name guard accordingly.
- Allowlisted TEST-EXAMPLES.md and docs/explanation/security-model.md in
  prompt-injection-scan.sh: they contain intentional injection examples /
  security-model prose; the path-reference rewrites are kept.

CodeQL alerts on this PR are pre-existing (alert lines unchanged by this PR;
none in the new migration/guard) and are out of scope for the rename.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): resolve CodeQL alerts surfaced on this PR

The rename diff touched files carrying pre-existing CodeQL findings; per the
no-pre-existing-dismissal rule, fixing every surfaced alert rather than waving
them off. All behavior-preserving:

- scripts/ci-test-scope.cjs: build the config-path match from string
  .includes() instead of a RegExp over an arg-derived value (js/regex-injection).
- src/profile-output.cts: escape backslashes before pipe-escaping desc/safeName
  so the table-cell escape is complete (js/incomplete-sanitization).
- tests/{bug-2643,bug-2808,docs-parity-live-registry}: two-pass HTML-comment
  strip so a bare/unclosed `<!--` cannot survive (js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization).
- tests/inline-plan-threshold: drop the no-op `\s`->`\s` identity replace,
  keep the meaningful POSIX-class conversion (js/identity-replacement).

Verified: build:lib green; the touched test files + ci-test-scope + profile-output
suites pass; lint:legacy-name clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): correctly resolve remaining CodeQL alerts (regex-injection + sanitization)

The prior commit's fixes for two alerts were ineffective:
- ci-test-scope.cjs js/regex-injection: the alert is the CLI-arg-derived `file`
  reaching static regex `.test(file)` calls (not the config rule). Removed ALL
  regex over file/t — startsWith/includes/=== string checks + an isWindowsHint
  helper — so there is no regex sink for the tainted value.
- js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization (3 test files): a single
  `.replace(/<!--...-->/g,'')` can let `<!--` re-form. Replaced with a fixpoint
  loop (replace until stable) plus a final bare-opener strip.

Verified: no regex over file/t remains; ci-test-scope + the 3 test suites pass;
lint:legacy-name clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): make ci-test-scope + comment-strippers regex-free to clear CodeQL

CodeQL flags the regex PATTERNS syntactically (regex-injection on the
--files arg split; incomplete-multi-character-sanitization on the <!--...-->
replace), so loop fixes do not satisfy it. Made these paths regex-free:
- ci-test-scope.cjs splitFiles: char-by-char separator tokenizer (no /[,\\s]+/).
- 3 test files: indexOf/slice HTML-comment stripper (no .replace(/<!--/)).
Behavior preserved; ci-test-scope + the 3 suites pass; guard clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): unblock security base64 scan on the large rename diff

The security job hit its 10m timeout: base64-scan.sh choked on the binary
test fixture tests/feat-3594-parser-property-style.test.cjs (embedded NUL/
non-UTF8 bytes -> thousands of bogus blobs + "ignored null byte" warnings),
and the ~800-file rename diff is slow to scan regardless.

- scripts/base64-scan.sh: skip binary-by-content files (grep -Iq .) — they
  can't carry base64-obfuscated *text* and feeding NUL bytes through the
  per-line scanner is pathologically slow. collect_files already filtered
  binary *extensions*; this catches binary *content* in text extensions.
- .github/workflows/security-scan.yml: raise the security job timeout 10m->30m
  to accommodate very large diffs (the scan itself is unchanged).

Verified locally: scan skips the fixture, 0 "ignored null byte" warnings,
0 findings, exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): sweep get-shit-done refs introduced by merging next

The branch was updated with next (#614/#384/#618 etc.), which reference the
get-shit-done/ dir (still named that on next). Swept the stale references in
the merged files to gsd-core so the rename stays consistent and lint:legacy-name
passes:
- commands/gsd/discuss-phase.md (runtime-launcher shim paths)
- src/core.cts (getAgentsDir layout comments)
- tests/bug-384-agents-runtime-aware.test.cjs (require path to runtime lib)

Verified: guard 0 violations; build green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): exclude gsd-core/ path segments from bug-3683 command cross-ref invariant

The #614 runtime-launcher shim added to discuss-phase.md references
`${_GSD_RUNTIME_ROOT}/gsd-core/bin/...`. bug-3683's REF_PATTERN excluded path-y
refs only via lookbehind, but `}` precedes `/gsd-core/` in the shim, so it
mis-read the directory path as a dangling `/gsd-core` command ref (same class as
the #604 bug-2954 fix). Added a trailing `(?![\w-]*\/)` so `/gsd-<x>/...` path
segments are not treated as slash-command references.

Verified locally on BOTH platforms before pushing:
- mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures
- gsd-test-runner (linux, node22 image) full suite: 0 failures
- bug-3683 + bug-2954 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): lazily resolve findProjectRoot in gsd-tools (harden flaky CI)

CI intermittently failed state.test's gsd-tools subprocess with
"findProjectRoot is not a function" (flip-flopping across legs; not reproducible
on mac full suite, gsd-test linux full suite, test:unit, or state.test x8).
findProjectRoot is a re-export from core.cjs (sourced from project-root.cjs);
binding it via destructure at module-load can be undefined under a load-ordering
edge. Resolve it lazily at call time via a small wrapper so the lookup happens
after core.cjs is fully initialized.

Verified green on BOTH platforms before pushing:
- mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures
- gsd-test-runner (linux, node22) full suite: 0 failures
- state.test.cjs: 106/106; gsd-tools loads cleanly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): allowlist verification-patterns.md placeholder examples in secret scan

The rename git-mv'd references/verification-patterns.md into gsd-core/, pulling
it into the secret-scan diff. It documents stub/placeholder RED-FLAG env-var
examples (illustrative Stripe test-key / database-URL / API-key placeholders) —
not real credentials. Added it to .secretscanignore with the strict annotation,
mirroring the existing gsd-core/workflows/plan-phase.md exception.

Verified locally: secret-scan-lint --strict OK; secret-scan --diff origin/next
exits 0 with 0 findings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 18:35:29 -04:00
Tom Boucher
3bb2f8f1c5 docs: rebrand to GSD Core and restructure docs with Diataxis (#605)
* chore: wire docs/agents config into AGENTS.md Agent skills section

Add the `## Agent skills` discovery block pointing the engineering
skills at the existing docs/agents/{issue-tracker,triage-labels,domain}.md
files (issue tracker, triage label mapping, single-context domain docs).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: rebrand to GSD Core and restructure docs with Diataxis

Reorganise the root README and docs/ around the Diataxis framework
(tutorials, how-to guides, reference, explanation), add new how-to
guides and schema references (STATE.md / CONTEXT.md / PLAN.md /
planning artifacts), and cross-link the whole set. Update the lone
legacy gsd-build reference to open-gsd; keep internal get-shit-done/
filesystem paths unchanged (directory rename tracked separately in
open-gsd/gsd-core#604). Regenerate the ja-JP, ko-KR, pt-BR and zh-CN
localised trees to mirror the new structure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: backfill changeset PR number (#605)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 08:13:09 -04:00