12e4d93b19
* fix(#2393): add GSD_ALLOW_SYMLINKED_DEST opt-in for intentional user-owned symlink layouts Bug: v1.7.0's destSubpath write-confinement (ADR-1239 Phase B) refused install/update whenever CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR (or an artifact-kind child like skills/, hooks/) was a pre-existing symlink, with no opt-out. Three legitimate user-owned layouts were blocked: - (lars-hh) CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=~/.claude-personal with skills/hooks symlinked to a user-owned external dir - (Mamiki) ~/.claude/skills is a Windows Junction to a shared skills dir - (Azd325) ~/.claude itself is a symlink to a dotfiles repo (the early root-is-symlink return refused before the component loop ran) Fix: add GSD_ALLOW_SYMLINKED_DEST env var (accepts '1' or 'true'). When set, hasExistingSymlinkBetween follows symlinks instead of refusing them. Cross-platform: fs.lstatSync().isSymbolicLink() returns true for both POSIX symlinks and NTFS junctions (Node ≥ 16), so Mamiki's Junction case is handled by the same code path. Threat model preserved (these still refuse EVEN WITH opt-in): (a) path-traversal in the destSubpath string itself ('../../etc'-style) — ADR-1239 Phase B threat (a), untrusted destSubpath protection (b) a symlink whose resolved real path equals the install root itself — would let _removeGsdEntries wipe the root; #1704 threat (b) (c) broken symlinks (realpathSync throws) — fail-closed What opt-in RELAXES specifically: the 'pre-existing symlink pointing outside configHome' refusal — #1704 threat (c). The user has explicitly asserted they own and trust the symlink target. Error messages at all 4 call sites (installRuntimeArtifacts, _copyStaged, migrateLegacyDevPreferencesToSkill, installOpencodeFamilySkills) updated to (1) name the env var opt-in, (2) be accurate when the root itself is a symlink (Azd325's complaint that the old message accused destDir of 'containing' a symlink when the root was the actual symlink). Docs: docs/CONFIGURATION.md Environment Variables table updated. Regression tests in tests/install-write-confinement.test.cjs cover: - child-symlink layout (lars-hh / Mamiki): default refuses, opt-in allows - root-is-symlink layout (Azd325): default refuses, opt-in follows - path-traversal '../../etc' refused EVEN WITH opt-in (threat a preserved) - resolved-target-equals-install-root refused EVEN WITH opt-in (threat b) - broken symlink refused EVEN WITH opt-in (fail-closed) * test(#2393): import beforeEach/afterEach in install-write-confinement suite The original file imported only { describe, test } from node:test. The new #2393 opt-in describe block uses beforeEach/afterEach to manage the GSD_ALLOW_SYMLINKED_DEST env var lifecycle — add them to the import. * test(#2393): correct broken-symlink test — existsSync follows link → loop terminates early Initial test expected broken symlinks to be refused even with opt-in. That was wrong: fs.existsSync follows symlinks, so a broken symlink returns false from existsSync and the component loop terminates before the symlink check fires. Both default and opt-in paths share this behavior; the fix preserves it. Updates the test to pin the actual current behavior so a future refactor (e.g. switching to lstatSync for existence) is a deliberate behavior change. * fix(#2393): realpath the install root — guard against macOS /var ↔ /private/var Code review (security subagent) flagged a HIGH-severity hole in the threat-(b) preservation: realTarget (from fs.realpathSync) is fully symlink-resolved, resolvedRoot (from path.resolve) is lexical-only. On macOS /var is a symlink to /private/var, so resolvedRoot='/var/foo/.claude' but realConfigHome is '/private/var/foo/.claude'. A symlink whose realtarget matches the install root by real path would compare unequal to the lexical resolvedRoot — defeating the wipe-protection guard exactly in the reporter's case (Azd325, nix-darwin: ~/.claude is itself a symlink). Fix: compute realRoot once via fs.realpathSync(resolvedRoot) at function entry (with fail-closed fallback to lexical form on realpath failure — broken/missing root, permission denied, exotic FS). Threat (a) path-traversal check above still confines regardless. Compare against BOTH lexical and real forms in both the root-symlink and component-symlink branches. Also adds the reviewer's transitivity-trust clarification comment: once a symlink is followed under opt-in, the walk continues from the resolved real path WITHOUT re-checking further segments stay inside a confining boundary. This is documented opt-in semantics — one opt-in trusts the whole reachable tree — and the comment makes the design choice explicit so a future maintainer doesn't add a 'follow one symlink only' expectation. Regression test added for the macOS /var normalization case (spelled configHome via os.tmpdir() lexically while pointing the test symlink through its realpath). Test skips on non-darwin platforms and when os.tmpdir() has no symlink component. * fix(#2393): root-symlink branch — do not apply threat-(b) check to root itself Initial fix applied the wipe-threat-(b) check to the root-symlink branch unconditionally. That was wrong: when root itself is a symlink (Azd325's nix-darwin case), its realpath IS realRoot by construction — so the check always fires, defeating the opt-in for exactly the case it was meant to enable. The wipe threat (b) does NOT apply to root being a symlink: destDir is a CHILD of root, and resolving root just gives root's target. There is no circular back-reference to root from a path that descends from a resolved root. So the root-symlink branch should just follow the symlink under opt-in and continue the walk, no threat-(b) check. Threat (b) only fires in the COMPONENT loop, where a child symlink can resolve back to the install root. That branch keeps the (b) check using BOTH lexical and real forms of root (the macOS /var ↔ /private/var fix from the prior commit). * fix(#2393): apply opt-in at the 5 bin/install.js call sites + add env-var/transitive tests Code review (correctness subagent) flagged a Critical coverage gap: the initial fix updated only the 4 src/install-engine.cts call sites. Five more call sites in bin/install.js still used the 2-arg signature, so the opt-in env var was silently ignored on: - installCodexConfig (config.toml + agents/ dir + per-agent .toml paths) — Codex only - copyWithPathReplacement (the generic emit path: workflows, commands, staging) — ALL runtimes - resolveInstallRelativePath (path resolver used in various places) Result: a user setting GSD_ALLOW_SYMLINKED_DEST=1 would see SOME refusals disappear (engine path) and OTHERS remain (bin/install.js paths) — a partially-applied install and a confusing UX, directly contradicting the PR's headline claim. Fix: - Export isSymlinkedDestOptIn from src/install-engine.cts alongside hasExistingSymlinkBetween - Import it in bin/install.js - Update all 5 bin/install.js call sites to pass { allowOptInFollow } - Update all 3 bin/install.js error messages to name the env var, matching the engine's phrasing Also addresses reviewer's Medium test-adequacy findings: - isSymlinkedDestOptIn env-var parsing now tested directly (accepts only documented '1' / 'true'; rejects 'TRUE', 'yes', 'on', '0', 'false', empty, unset) - transitive symlink chain (configHome/outer → outside1 → outside2) test pins the documented 'transitive and unbounded' opt-in semantics so a future contributor can't accidentally narrow it * chore(changeset): backfill pr:2445 in .changeset/eager-wasps-swim.md
GSD Core
Git. Ship. Done.
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A light-weight meta-prompting, context engineering, and spec-driven development system for Claude Code, OpenCode, Antigravity CLI, Kimi CLI, Kilo, Codex, Copilot, Cursor, Windsurf, and more.
What is GSD Core
GSD Core is a context-engineering and spec-driven development framework that drives AI coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, Antigravity CLI, Kimi CLI, Copilot, Cursor, and more) through a disciplined phase loop. It solves context rot — the quality degradation that accumulates as an AI fills its context window — by running all heavy research, planning, and execution work in fresh-context subagents while keeping your main session lean.
How it works
Each milestone repeats the same five-step loop, one phase at a time:
- Discuss — capture implementation decisions before anything is planned
- Plan — research, decompose, and verify the plan fits a fresh context window
- Execute — run plans in parallel waves; each executor starts with a clean 200k-token context
- Verify — walk through what was built; diagnose and fix before declaring done
- Ship — create the PR, archive the phase, repeat for the next one
Quickstart
npx @opengsd/gsd-core@latest
The installer prompts for your runtime (Claude Code, OpenCode, Antigravity CLI, Kimi CLI, Kilo, Codex, Copilot, Cursor, Windsurf, and more) and whether to install globally or locally. The installer is required for cross-runtime compatibility — do not copy files from agents/ or commands/ directly.
On another runtime or without Node.js? See Install on your runtime.
Once installed, start a new project or onboard an existing repo:
/gsd-new-project # greenfield project
/gsd-onboard # existing codebase
New here? Follow Your first project for a guided walkthrough from install to first shipped phase, or Onboarding an existing codebase for brownfield setup.
Documentation
What's new in 1.7.0 → docs/whats-new-1.7.0.md
Tutorials — learning by doing:
How-to guides — task-focused recipes:
Reference — authoritative facts:
Explanation — concepts and design decisions:
Full index: docs/README.md. Other languages: 日本語 · 한국어 · Português · 简体中文.
Why it works
Most AI-coding setups fail at scale because context bloat silently degrades output quality, there is no shared memory between sessions, and nothing verifies that code actually works. GSD Core solves all three: heavy work runs in fresh subagents, structured artifacts like STATE.md and CONTEXT.md survive session boundaries, and the verify step walks through what was built and generates fix plans before a phase is declared done. See docs/explanation/context-engineering.md for the full reasoning.
Troubleshooting? See docs/how-to/recover-and-troubleshoot.md.
Community
| Project | Platform |
|---|---|
| gsd-opencode | Original OpenCode port |
| Discord | Community support |
Star History
License
MIT License. See LICENSE for details.
Claude Code is powerful. GSD Core makes it reliable.