Files
msd-core/docs/reference/capability-manifest.md
Tom Boucher f96cb44f85 enhance(#3248): disclose capability skills as an instruction surface (#3253)
* test(#3248): failing-first suite for instruction-surface disclosure

28 matrix rows from 50-test-matrix.md. Rows requiring the new
Disclosure.instructionSurfaces field fail today; rows 18-20/23-25 (the
ADR-2363 D4 signature invariants) pass today by construction because the
current code never reads skills/agents at all, and stand as regression
guards for the implementation commit.

Refs #3248

* feat(#3248): disclose capability skills and agents as an instruction surface

ADR-2363 D5. A capability whose only contribution was skills disclosed
nothing at install: summarizeDisclosure early-returned "ships no executable
surfaces (declarative only)" because hasExecutable was false, while each
SKILL.md body landed verbatim in the agent's instruction context.

discloseExecutableSurfaces gains a fifth, NON-executable class,
instructionSurfaces, collecting declared skills/agents stems through the same
safeCollect wrapper as the four existing collectors, so a hostile value
degrades only this class and the function stays total for any manifest shape.
Nothing existing is edited: the collectors, hasExecutable, disclosureSignature
and missingArtifacts are untouched. get_impact rates the symbol CRITICAL at
196 affected, which is why the design is strictly additive.

D4 is implemented by omission and pinned rather than left incidental: adding,
changing or removing skills/agents leaves disclosureSignature byte-identical,
so no stored consent record is perturbed and no spurious re-consent fires.
ADR-2782's conditional-append trick is deliberately NOT reused - it worked
because no manifest could declare a reviewer body before that class existed,
whereas skills predate this one, so a conditional append would re-sign every
already-consented skill-bearing capability.

The renderer is extracted as summarizeInstructionSurfaces and called from BOTH
branches of summarizeDisclosure. Appending only at the end would never render
for skill-only capabilities - the ones that need it - since those take the
early return. That branch's "declarative only" claim is now conditional on
there being no instruction surface either. The renderer iterates rather than
spreading into push, so an unbounded stem count cannot throw RangeError, and
tolerates the bare {} the CLI edge passes via `res.disclosure || {}`.

Scope note: #3248's prose says "skill stems"; ADR-2363 D3 classifies
instruction surfaces as "skills, agents". Shipping skills alone would leave an
ADR deliverable owned by no phase, and the epic has no Phase 2. Agents are the
same shape at no extra cost. Narrowing back is a two-line change.

Ratifies ADR-2363 (Proposed -> Accepted) and adds the owed ADR-1244 back-link.

Closes #3248

* fix(#3248): escape consent-prompt values and narrow disclosure to skills

Two review findings, both of which made the previous commit wrong.

BLOCKER (isolated adversarial review). Every manifest-supplied value
interpolated into a consent-prompt line was rendered unescaped. Those lines
are joined with \n and written RAW to stderr on the needs-consent path
(capability-command-router -> cli-exit runMain), so a stem carrying a newline
forged additional lines indistinguishable from genuine GSD disclosure text,
and an ANSI escape could clear or rewrite lines already printed. That defeats
the informed-consent guarantee this change exists to provide, and is a
prompt-injection vector against any agent that reads the stderr text to decide
whether to retry with --yes.

The hole was not unique to the new class - hook event/script, command
family/module/router, every MCP field, and every reviewer-lane field were
equally unescaped. Fixing only the new one would have created the
generative-fix divergence this repo tracks, so renderValueForPrompt is applied
to all five classes through one helper, guarded by a parity test that fails if
a future class skips it. Escaping is identity for ordinary names, so no
well-formed manifest's output changes. The disclosure OBJECT stays verbatim -
only the rendered LINE is escaped - because the signature and every consumer
reasoning about identity depend on the declared value.

NARROWED to skills only. The previous commit also collected agents, arguing
ADR-2363 D3 classifies instruction surfaces as "skills, agents". Verified
against staging: stageSkillsForRuntimeAsSkills takes a registry and unions
third-party skills in via readInstalledCapabilitySkill, while
stageAgentsForRuntimeWithConverter takes only a source directory and has no
registry-aware path. Third-party agents are never staged into the instruction
context, so disclosing them would have put a false claim in a security prompt -
worse than the scope creep two reviewers flagged it as. D3's classification
stands; D5 now records that Phase 1 implements the skills half and that
whether agents should be staged at all is an open maintainer question.

Also reverts the premature ADR-2363 ratification. The previous commit flipped
it to Accepted and asserted "#3248 merged" while this branch IS #3248 and is
unmerged. Status returns to Proposed, and the ADR-1244 back-link - owed only on
ratification - is withdrawn.

Adds the fast-check property suite CLAUDE.md requires and the direct precedent
(reviewer-trust-disclosure) already had: totality, D4 signature invariance, D3
hasExecutable invariance, and renderer totality over adversarial manifests.

Refs #3248

* chore(#3248): correct changeset scope claim and backfill pr number

The fragment was written against the pre-narrowing commit and still
advertised 'skills and agents'. 4d26887e narrowed disclosure to skills
only - third-party agents are never staged into the instruction context -
but did not touch the fragment, so the release notes would have carried a
claim the code does not implement.

Also backfills pr:0 -> 3253 and names the prompt-escaping fix, which is
user-visible and was absent from the original body.

Changeset-only; no code or test changed, so the gsd-test pass recorded for
4d26887e still describes this tree's behavior.

Refs #3248

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-09 13:52:29 -04:00

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# Capability Manifest Reference (`capability.json`)
> **Canonical ADRs:** [ADR-1244](../adr/1244-capability-ecosystem.md) · [ADR-894](../adr/894-capability-declaration-format.md) · [ADR-1016](../adr/1016-runtime-capability-descriptor.md)
> **See also:** [How to develop a capability](../how-to/develop-a-capability.md) · [Capability Command Reference](gsd-capability-command.md)
Each capability is a folder `capabilities/<id>/` (or an overlay root `~/.gsd/capabilities/<id>/` / `.gsd/capabilities/<id>/`) containing one `capability.json` declaration.
The file is schema-validated JSON with a common **envelope** plus a **role-typed body** (`role: "feature"`, `role: "runtime"`, or `role: "reviewer"`).
---
## Envelope fields
These fields are present for `role: "feature"`, `role: "runtime"`, and `role: "reviewer"` capabilities.
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| `id` | string (kebab-case) | Yes | Unique identifier; **must equal the folder name**. The prefix `gsd-`, `gsd-core-`, and `anthropic-` are reserved for first-party use. |
| `role` | `"feature"` \| `"runtime"` \| `"reviewer"` | Yes | Discriminator that selects the body schema. `"reviewer"` is for lane-only capabilities that ship a `reviewer` body and nothing else — see [Reviewer body](#reviewer-body-role-reviewer-or-on-any-role) below. |
| `version` | semver string | Yes (1.6.0+) | Semantic version of this capability. The registry rejects a manifest without one. |
| `title` | string | Yes | Short human-readable label. Must be a non-empty string. |
| `description` | string | Yes | Longer summary sentence. Must be a non-empty string. |
| `tier` | `"core"` \| `"standard"` \| `"full"` | Yes | **Source of truth** for install-profile membership and surface cluster assignment. `tier` propagates via the `requires`-closure; install profiles are generated from it. |
| `requires` | string[] | Yes | Capability `id` values this capability depends on. Must be present as an array (use `[]` when there are no dependencies). Each entry must exist in the registry, be acyclic, and be tier-monotone (a `core` capability may not require a `standard` or `full` capability; a `standard` capability may not require a `full` capability). |
| `engines` | object | No | Host-compatibility constraint. Sub-field: `gsd` — semver range string (e.g. `">=1.6.0 <3.0.0"`). Acts as a hard gate at install **and** at load; a mismatch blocks installation and causes the overlay to be skipped with a warning at load time. |
| `runtimeCompat` | object | Yes (`role: "feature"`) | Declares which host runtimes this capability can surface through. Validated for every `role: "feature"` capability (a feature manifest without it fails validation). Sub-fields: `supported` — a **non-empty** array of kebab-case runtime ids, or the single wildcard `["*"]` for a runtime-agnostic capability; `unsupported` — an array of kebab-case runtime ids (the wildcard is **not** permitted here); `notes` — optional object mapping a runtime id (or `"*"`) to a non-empty explanatory string. The wildcard `"*"` may not be mixed with concrete ids in the same array, and the reserved names `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` are rejected. |
| `compatVersions` | object | No | Graceful-downgrade table mapping `"<capVersion>"` to `"<min gsd version>"`. Only meaningful for sources that enumerate versions (git tags, registry, npm); a bare tarball URL carries one version and simply blocks on incompatibility. |
| `integrity` | string | No | `sha512-<base64>` hash of the capability bundle. Verified before extraction when present; mismatch aborts install. |
| `provenance` | object | No | `{ sourceRepo: string, commit: string }`. Emitted in CI for first-party and curated capabilities. |
| `author` | object | No | `{ name: string, email?: string, url?: string }`. |
| `homepage` | string | No | URL. |
| `repository` | string | No | URL. |
| `license` | string | No | SPDX licence identifier (e.g. `"MIT"`). |
| `keywords` | string[] | No | Arbitrary search tags. |
---
## Feature body (`role: "feature"`)
Feature capabilities declare owned artefacts, lifecycle hooks, a federated configuration slice, and loop extension registrations.
### `skills` and `agents`
| Sub-field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `skills` | string[] | Owned skill stems. Exactly one capability may own each stem across the entire merged registry (first-party ∪ overlay). |
| `agents` | string[] | Owned agent stems. Same uniqueness constraint as skills. |
The `skills` stems declared here are disclosed by name as **instruction surfaces** in the pre-install consent summary ([ADR-2363](../adr/2363-capability-instruction-surface-trust.md)). Bodies are installed verbatim and are not content-scanned — see [the capability trust model](../explanation/capability-trust-model.md).
`agents` are classified as an instruction surface too (ADR-2363 D3), but the stems declared here are **not** disclosed at the prompt: a third-party capability's `agents[]` are never staged into the agent's instruction context — the staging path that unions third-party skills into a runtime's skills directory has no equivalent for agents — so naming them would claim a surface that does not exist. This does not make agents safe or inert; it means the mechanism does not yet reach them.
### `hooks`
Non-loop lifecycle hooks.
| Sub-field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `event` | string | Hook event name (host-runtime specific). |
| `script` | string | Path to the hook script, **relative** to the capability root. The hook `command` written into the host settings is the realpath-confined **absolute** path to this script (so it always runs the bundle's own file regardless of the working directory) and is POSIX single-quoted (so an install prefix containing spaces cannot break it). For shell safety the path must contain only `[A-Za-z0-9._/-]` — no whitespace, no shell metacharacters (`; \| & $ ` `` ` `` `( ) < > * ? [ ] { } ! ~ # ' " \` newline), no leading `-`, no absolute path, and no `..` segment. A script outside this allowlist fails validation and the capability is rejected. |
### `config` — federated config-key schema slice
The `config` field is an object whose keys are federated configuration keys contributed by this capability. Each key must be absent from the central `config-schema` and absent from every other capability's `config` object (collision fails the build gate). Each entry has the following shape:
| Property | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `type` | `"boolean"` \| `"string"` \| `"number"` \| `"enum"` | Value type. |
| `default` | (type-consistent) | Default value; must be consistent with `type`. |
| `description` | string | Human-readable explanation of the key's effect. |
| `values` | string[] | **`enum` only.** Exhaustive list of permitted string values. |
### `steps`
Steps run at a loop extension point as independent units. Ordering within a point is derived from `produces`/`consumes` (topological sort; capability-id is the tiebreak).
| Sub-field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| `point` | string | Yes | One of the 12 valid loop extension point identifiers (see table below). |
| `ref` | object | Yes | The dispatch target. Exactly one of `{ "skill": "<stem>" }`, `{ "agent": "<stem>" }`, or `{ "command": "<name>" }` (the three are mutually exclusive). A `skill`/`agent` stem must be declared in this capability's `skills`/`agents` array. |
| `produces` | string[] | Yes | Artefact names this step produces. Must be present as an array (use `[]` when it produces none); an omitted `produces` fails validation. No two capability steps may produce the same artefact at the same point. |
| `consumes` | string[] | Yes | Artefact names this step consumes. Must be present as an array (use `[]` when it consumes none); an omitted `consumes` fails validation. |
| `onError` | `"skip"` \| `"halt"` | Yes | Behaviour on failure; must be present and one of `"skip"` or `"halt"` (an omitted `onError` fails validation). Steps are purely additive — they never halt or redirect the host workflow on their own; a blocking precondition is expressed as a `gate`. |
| `when` | string | No | Dotted config key; the step is active only when the key is truthy. Evaluated deterministically at render time; phase-context applicability is the skill's own responsibility. |
| `fragment` | object | No | Optional inline-or-file prompt fragment attached to the step, with the **same** `{ "path": "<relative path>" }` or `{ "inline": "<string>" }` semantics as a contribution's `fragment`. A `path` is materialised (read and inlined) at load time, resolved against the capability directory and confined to it (`..` traversal is rejected). |
### `contributions`
Contributions inject a fragment into a named agent role's prompt at a loop extension point. Multiple contributions into the same agent role render as ordered labelled blocks (`<contribution from="<id>">…</contribution>`).
| Sub-field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| `point` | string | Yes | One of the 12 valid loop extension point identifiers. |
| `into` | string | Yes | Agent role name. Must be a role published by that loop extension point in the host contract. |
| `produces` | string[] | Yes | Artefact names this contribution produces. Use `[]` when it produces none. |
| `consumes` | string[] | Yes | Artefact names this contribution reads. Use `[]` when it reads none. |
| `fragment` | object | Yes | Either `{ "path": "<relative path>" }` (file content) or `{ "inline": "<string>" }` (literal text). |
| `when` | string | No | Dotted config key; activates the contribution conditionally. |
| `onError` | `"skip"` \| `"halt"` | No | Behaviour on failure. |
### `gates`
Gates check a condition at a loop extension point and optionally block progression.
| Sub-field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| `point` | string | Yes | One of the 12 valid loop extension point identifiers. |
| `check` | object | Yes | One of three forms (see table below). Must be present as an object; an omitted `check` fails validation. |
| `blocking` | boolean | Yes | Must be present and a boolean; an omitted `blocking` fails validation. When `true`, a failed check halts the loop at this point. |
| `onError` | `"skip"` \| `"halt"` | Yes | Behaviour when the check itself errors; must be present and one of `"skip"` or `"halt"` (an omitted `onError` fails validation). |
| `when` | string | No | Dotted config key; activates the gate conditionally. |
**`check` forms:**
| Form | Shape | Blocking permitted | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Query | `{ "query": "<gsd_run query>" }` | Yes | Deterministic first-party code. |
| Predicate | `{ "predicate": { "kind": "artifact-exists" \| "config-equals" \| …, … } }` | Yes | Declarative; no code path. |
| Agent verdict | `{ "agentVerdict": { "ref": …, "prompt": … } }` | No (forced advisory) | LLM evaluation; non-deterministic checks may not halt the loop. |
---
## Valid `point` values
The 12 loop extension points are a **closed, additive-only vocabulary**. Every `steps`, `contributions`, and `gates` entry must use one of these identifiers exactly.
| Point | Phase | Position |
|---|---|---|
| `discuss:pre` | Discuss | Before the discuss step executes |
| `discuss:post` | Discuss | After the discuss step completes |
| `plan:pre` | Plan | Before the plan step executes |
| `plan:post` | Plan | After the plan step completes |
| `execute:pre` | Execute | Before the execute phase begins |
| `execute:wave:pre` | Execute | Before each execution wave |
| `execute:wave:post` | Execute | After each execution wave |
| `execute:post` | Execute | After the execute phase completes |
| `verify:pre` | Verify | Before the verify step executes |
| `verify:post` | Verify | After the verify step completes |
| `ship:pre` | Ship | Before the ship step executes |
| `ship:post` | Ship | After the ship step completes |
---
## Runtime body (`role: "runtime"`)
Runtime capabilities describe how GSD projects its artefacts onto one host CLI. The body is a closed 8-axis (plus 4 install-surface) vocabulary; no feature-only fields (`skills`, `agents`, `steps`, `contributions`, `gates`, `hooks`) are permitted. Full semantic specifications, the closed enum values for each axis, and the 16-runtime worked examples are in [ADR-1016](../adr/1016-runtime-capability-descriptor.md).
| Axis | Field | Type summary |
|---|---|---|
| Config home | `runtime.configHome` | Structured object with `kind` (`dot-home` \| `dot-home-nested` \| `xdg` \| `generic-agents-root`), `name`, optional `parent`, `env[]`, `probe[]`, `probeExists`, `skillsHome`. `probeExists` is an optional sub-path applied to probe candidates: for `generic-agents-root` it is a hard filter (a candidate qualifies only if `<candidate>/<probeExists>` exists); for `dot-home-nested` it is a preference that makes probing pick the candidate GSD owns (e.g. `gsd-core/VERSION`) over a bare-existing sibling before falling back — see ADR-1016 and #213/#217. |
| Local config dir | `runtime.localConfigDir` | Required dot-prefixed string. The runtime's **local** content-rewrite directory — the `./` target GSD stamps into rewritten artefact bodies (e.g. `./.claude/` → `./<localConfigDir>/`) and the local install dir basename. Backs `getDirName()` (registry-derived, #1679). Usually `.<runtime>` (the runtime's home dot-dir), but **three runtimes diverge** because they read GSD's content from a non-home directory: `copilot` → `.github` (GitHub Copilot reads custom instructions from `.github/copilot-instructions.md` / `.github/instructions/`; see `convertClaudeToCopilotContent` rewrites in `src/runtime-artifact-conversion.cts`), `antigravity` → `.agents` (local agent/workflow dir; see the antigravity rewrites in `src/runtime-artifact-conversion.cts`), `kimi` → `.kimi-code`. Distinct from `configHome.name` (the **global** install home, which for these three is `.copilot` / `antigravity` / `agents`). Byte-parity-proven against the prior hand-maintained mapping by the golden-install-parity harness. |
| Config format | `runtime.configFormat` | Closed enum: `settings-json` \| `toml` \| `markdown` \| `markdown-dir` \| `none`. |
| Artefact layout | `runtime.artifactLayout` | Object with `global` and `local` arrays of `ArtifactKind` (`kind`, `destSubpath`, `prefix`, `nesting`, `recursive`, `stage`). |
| Command style | `runtime.commandStyle` | Closed enum: `slash-hyphen` \| `shell-var`. |
| Hooks surface | `runtime.hooksSurface` | Closed enum: `settings-json` \| `codex-hooks-json` \| `cursor-hooks-json` \| `copilot-inline` \| `cline-rules` \| `kimi-hooks-toml` \| `none`. |
| Sandbox tier | `runtime.sandboxTier` | Closed enum: `none` \| `codex-agent-sandbox`. |
| Support tier | `runtime.supportTier` | Integer: `1` (fully tested first-party) \| `2` (shipped, lower coverage). |
| Install surface | `runtime.installSurface` | Closed enum: `settings-json` \| `codex-toml` \| `copilot-instructions` \| `cline-rules` \| `cursor-hooks-json` \| `profile-marker-only`. |
| Shared settings | `runtime.writesSharedSettings` | boolean. Whether the runtime writes a shared `settings.json`. |
| Permission writer | `runtime.permissionWriter` | `null` \| `"opencode"` \| `"kilo"` \| `"antigravity"`. The finish-time permissions-sidecar writer. |
| Extended hook events | `runtime.extendedHookEvents` | string[] over a closed vocabulary: `SubagentStop`, `Stop`, `PreCompact`, `FileChanged`, `BeforeAgent`, `AfterAgent`, `BeforeModel`, `SubagentStart`. |
### `hostBehaviors`
`runtime.hostBehaviors` is an **open, unvalidated bag** of per-host behavior switches consumed directly by installer and runtime-adaptation code. Unlike every axis in the table above, it is **not covered by any schema**: the key `hostBehaviors` appears zero times in `scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs` and zero times in `scripts/registry-schema.cjs`. An unknown key inside `hostBehaviors` is neither rejected nor warned about — it is simply ignored by any code path that does not look for it by name.
58 distinct keys are declared across the shipped runtime manifests; most are set by exactly one capability. This table is not exhaustive — it lists the keys with the widest reuse so a reader can pattern-match new ones against the same shape:
| Key | Capabilities declaring it |
|---|---|
| `reapplyCommand` | 9 |
| `skipSharedHooksInstall` | 8 |
| `reviewerCli` | 6 |
| `frontmatterDialect` | 5 |
| `hyphenNameAgentBody` | 3 |
| `legacyCommandsGsdInstallMigration` | 3 |
| `skipUpdateBannerCommand` | 3 |
| `verificationStyle` | 3 |
**`reviewerCli` is deprecated.** It is a boolean that historically marked a runtime capability as also being a reviewer lane. It is now a **derived legacy alias**, retained for one release so an out-of-tree runtime descriptor that still sets it keeps working. A declared `reviewer` body (see below) takes precedence over the alias, and a capability declaring both contributes **one** slug, not two. `reviewerCli` is superseded by the `reviewer` body; its removal is tracked by issue #2801. It is currently set by 6 capabilities: `antigravity`, `claude`, `codex`, `cursor`, `opencode`, `qwen`.
See [ADR-1016](../adr/1016-runtime-capability-descriptor.md) (the runtime body is a closed 8-axis plus 4 install-surface vocabulary; `hostBehaviors` is the deliberate open seam beside it) and [ADR-2782](../adr/2782-reviewer-lane-capability-surface.md) (introduces the `reviewer` body and the `reviewerCli` alias's deprecation).
For a minimal `role: "runtime"` example, see [ADR-1016 §Decision 8](../adr/1016-runtime-capability-descriptor.md).
---
## Reviewer body (`role: "reviewer"`, or on any role)
[ADR-2782](../adr/2782-reviewer-lane-capability-surface.md) introduces the *reviewer lane*: one external CLI or model endpoint that `/gsd-review` hands a plan to for independent review.
To declare one, follow [Ship a reviewer lane in your capability](../how-to/ship-a-reviewer-lane.md). This section is the field reference behind that guide.
The `reviewer` body is **optional and absent-safe at every layer**. A capability with no `reviewer` body is simply not a lane — that is never a validation error. This is a normative forward/backward-compatibility invariant, not a nicety: a plugin, a runtime, or a future GSD version may omit `reviewer` entirely with no consequence.
The shape is **hybrid**:
- A `reviewer` body is admissible on `role: "runtime"`, so an existing runtime capability — `codex`, `antigravity` — keeps **one** manifest that is both an installable runtime and a reviewer lane.
- A third role, `role: "reviewer"`, exists for lane-only CLIs that GSD never installs into. There are currently 5: `coderabbit`, `gemini`, `llama-cpp`, `lm-studio`, `ollama`.
Current role counts across `capabilities/`: `feature` 20, `runtime` 19, `reviewer` 5.
All 12 shipped lane declarations carry all 13 fields below.
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `slug` | string | Lane identity; grammar `^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]*$`. May use `_` (`lm_studio`, `llama_cpp`) even where the capability *folder id* is kebab-case (`lm-studio`). |
| `flags` | string[] | User-facing CLI flags that select this lane. A lane may declare more than one — `antigravity` declares `--antigravity` and `--agy`. 12 lanes declare 13 flags in total. |
| `transport` | closed enum | `spawn` \| `openai-http`. |
| `probe` | object | Availability check. `probe.kind` is a closed enum: `command-exists` \| `command-capability` \| `http-reachable`. `command-capability` additionally takes `binary`, `needle`, and a **required** `timeoutMs` — it exists because a bare binary name can be ambiguous (`kimi` is claimed by both the Kimi Code CLI and the legacy Python `kimi-cli`), and the timeout bound is mandatory because an unbounded `--help \| grep` probe is this repo's named Unbounded Subprocesses defect. |
| `invoke` | object | Shape is selected by `transport`. For `spawn`: `binary`, `args[]`, `promptChannel` (`stdin` \| `argv` \| `argv-file-ref` \| `none`), `outputChannel` (`stdout` \| `file-arg`), `outputArg` (required when `outputChannel` is `file-arg`), `modelArg` (string or `null`), `effortChannel` (`none` \| `argv` \| `env`). For `openai-http`: `hostConfigKey`, `defaultHost`, `path`, `modelDiscovery` (`none` \| `first-from-models-endpoint`), `fallbackModel`, `effortChannel`. `args` supports the `{{model}}`, `{{prompt}}`, `{{effort}}`, and `{{output}}` placeholders. |
| `timeoutFloorMs` | number | Measured per-lane floor. Lane divergence here is real and correct — the descriptor's job is to declare divergence in one place, not to promise uniformity. |
| `emptyOutput` | closed enum | `stub-with-stderr` \| `handler-owned`. |
| `reviewsSection` | string | The `REVIEWS.md` heading this lane renders under. Must be unique across the merged roster. |
| `evidenceClass` | closed enum | `source-grounded` \| `diff-only` (diff-only findings are down-weighted in consensus). |
| `requiresBinaries` | string[] | Extra binaries the lane needs beyond `invoke.binary`. |
| `promptBudgetKey` | string or `null` | Federated config key bounding prompt size. |
| `modelConfigKey` | string or `null` | Federated config key naming the model, e.g. `review.models.kimi-code`. |
| `handler` | closed enum or `null` | `antigravity` \| `openai-compatible` \| `opencode` \| `null`. |
**`handler` is a closed enum of first-party handler names, not an open escape hatch.** [ADR-1016](../adr/1016-runtime-capability-descriptor.md) explicitly rejected "arbitrary code in the descriptor"; hard shapes are absorbed by adding a named primitive that is reviewed first-party. The consequence, stated plainly: **a third-party reviewer lane is strictly data-only.** A plugin can ship a lane, but not a quirky lane that needs imperative code — a lane requiring behavior beyond the closed `handler` set is not expressible and must be proposed and merged first-party.
Uniqueness is enforced across the merged first-party ∪ overlay set: duplicate `slug`, duplicate `flags` entry, and duplicate `reviewsSection` are each build-time violations. Two lanes sharing a `reviewsSection` heading would silently merge their output in `REVIEWS.md`, producing apparent consensus that does not exist.
An unknown field inside a `reviewer` body is a **non-fatal warning on stderr, never a build failure** ([ADR-2782](../adr/2782-reviewer-lane-capability-surface.md) D4), so a manifest built against a newer GSD degrades visibly rather than crashing.
### Example — lane-only `role: "reviewer"` capability
```json
{
"id": "coderabbit",
"role": "reviewer",
"version": "1.8.0",
"title": "CodeRabbit",
"description": "CodeRabbit CLI — cross-AI /gsd-review reviewer lane only; not a GSD install target (no runtime body, no artifacts).",
"tier": "full",
"requires": [],
"engines": { "gsd": ">=1.8.0" },
"reviewer": {
"slug": "coderabbit",
"flags": ["--coderabbit"],
"transport": "spawn",
"probe": { "kind": "command-exists", "binary": "coderabbit" },
"invoke": {
"binary": "coderabbit",
"args": ["review", "--prompt-only"],
"promptChannel": "none",
"outputChannel": "stdout",
"modelArg": null,
"effortChannel": "none"
},
"timeoutFloorMs": 360000,
"emptyOutput": "stub-with-stderr",
"reviewsSection": "CodeRabbit",
"evidenceClass": "diff-only",
"requiresBinaries": [],
"promptBudgetKey": null,
"modelConfigKey": null,
"handler": null
}
}
```
---
## Conformance invariants
The following invariants are enforced at **build time** by `scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs` and at **install time** by the runtime-callable `validateCapability()` / `validateCrossCapability()` over the merged first-party ∪ overlay set.
- **`version` is required.** The registry rejects any manifest without a semver `version` field.
- **`id` uniqueness.** No two capabilities may share an `id`. An overlay whose `id` collides with a first-party `id` is rejected; first-party always wins.
- **Skill and agent stem uniqueness.** Exactly one capability may own each skill or agent stem across the entire merged registry.
- **`requires` exist and are acyclic.** Every `id` listed in `requires` must exist in the registry; the dependency graph must be acyclic.
- **`requires` is tier-monotone.** A `core` capability may not require a `standard` or `full` capability. A `standard` capability may not require a `full` capability.
- **`point` values are from the closed set.** Every `point` in `steps`, `contributions`, and `gates` must be one of the 12 identifiers above.
- **`contribution.into` is a published agent role.** The `into` value must be an agent role declared by the host contract for that loop extension point.
- **Config key exclusivity.** A federated config key must be owned by exactly one capability and absent from the central `config-schema`. Presence in both is a collision; a half-migrated key fails the build gate.
- **Artefact production uniqueness per point.** No two capability steps may `produces` the same artefact name at the same loop extension point.
- **`engines.gsd` is a hard gate.** A capability whose `engines.gsd` range does not satisfy the installed GSD version is blocked at install and skipped (with a warning) at load time.
- **Path confinement.** Declared module paths may not use parent-directory traversal (`../`); modules are `require()`'d only from the capability's own install root.
- **Reserved namespace.** Capability `id` values beginning with `gsd-`, `gsd-core-`, or `anthropic-` are reserved; third-party capabilities using these prefixes are rejected.
---
## Example — complete `role: "feature"` capability
The following is the canonical UI design-contract capability from ADR-894. It illustrates all major body sections.
```json
{
"id": "ui",
"role": "feature",
"version": "1.0.0",
"title": "UI design contracts",
"description": "UI-SPEC design contract and retrospective UI audit for frontend phases.",
"tier": "standard",
"requires": [],
"engines": { "gsd": ">=1.6.0" },
"runtimeCompat": { "supported": ["*"], "unsupported": [] },
"skills": ["ui-phase", "ui-review"],
"agents": ["gsd-ui-checker", "gsd-ui-auditor"],
"hooks": [],
"config": {
"workflow.ui_phase": {
"type": "boolean",
"default": true,
"description": "Enable the UI design-contract gate during planning."
},
"workflow.ui_review": {
"type": "boolean",
"default": true,
"description": "Enable the retrospective UI audit."
},
"workflow.ui_safety_gate": {
"type": "boolean",
"default": true,
"description": "Block execution on unmet UI-SPEC contracts."
}
},
"steps": [
{
"point": "plan:pre",
"ref": { "skill": "ui-phase" },
"produces": ["UI-SPEC.md"],
"consumes": ["CONTEXT.md"],
"when": "workflow.ui_phase",
"onError": "skip"
},
{
"point": "verify:post",
"ref": { "skill": "ui-review" },
"produces": ["UI-REVIEW.md"],
"consumes": ["UI-SPEC.md"],
"when": "workflow.ui_review",
"onError": "skip"
}
],
"contributions": [],
"gates": [
{
"point": "execute:wave:post",
"check": { "query": "ui.safety-gate" },
"when": "workflow.ui_safety_gate",
"blocking": true,
"onError": "halt"
}
]
}
```
Notes on this example:
- `when` on each hook references its own config key; whether the phase is actually a frontend phase is decided inside `ui-phase` (self-gate).
- The `plan:pre` step self-skips on non-frontend phases, producing no `UI-SPEC.md`; the `execute:wave:post` gate's `ui.safety-gate` query passes gracefully when no `UI-SPEC.md` exists.
- A `contribution` follows this shape: `{ "point": "plan:pre", "into": "planner", "produces": [], "consumes": [], "fragment": { "path": "loop/threat-model.md" }, "when": "workflow.security_enforcement" }` (`produces` and `consumes` are required arrays — use `[]` when empty).