Refinements A-D to the external-job capability (PR #1998 follow-up): A. Document why the contribution registers at execute:wave:post: #1164 asks for wave:pre, but execute-phase.md only dispatches wave:post today (wave:pre is declared in the loop host contract but not rendered). Wiring wave:pre is a core-loop change #1164 puts out of scope; the executor honors the runtime_budget classification guidance before running any tagged task. B. external_job.artifact_dir is now consumed (was declared but unused): the adapter resolves it via the canonical capability-config seam and surfaces the resolved root in submit output. C. external_job.submit_timeout_ms / poll_timeout_ms are now read from config (were shadowed by env-only reads). Precedence: env > config > registry default; non-numeric config values fall back (no guessing, no NaN). D. CLI surface gains unit coverage: parseFlags, findPlanningDir, resolveExternalJobSettings, formatShowReport. Regenerates capability-registry.cjs from the updated capability.json.
139 lines
7.3 KiB
Markdown
139 lines
7.3 KiB
Markdown
# Long-running operations and async external jobs
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> **Reference** (Diátaxis). The operation-classification policy and the async
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> external-job contract that GSD executors use when a task legitimately exceeds
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> a child-agent timeout. The producer is the default-off `external-job`
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> Capability (#1164, part of #1105); the core loop consumes the manifest
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> (#1165 — `external_job_waiting`).
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## 1. The problem
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Heavy GSD phases (HPC solvers, model training, large simulations) can
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legitimately exceed short child-agent timeouts. Raising the timeout alone is
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not sufficient: it prevents legitimate subagents from being killed, but it
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also lets truly hung commands consume the whole agent budget. GSD must
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distinguish legitimate heavy work from suspicious hangs, keep safety nets
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finite, and avoid blocking an agent turn on hours-long compute.
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## 2. Operation classification policy
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Every executable task carries a runtime budget. Planners emit it via a
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`<runtime_budget>` element (taught by the `external-job` Capability's
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`plan:post` fragment); executors branch on it at `execute:wave:post`.
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> **Contribution point.** `#1164` specifies classification at
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> `execute:wave:pre`, but `execute-phase.md` only dispatches
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> `execute:wave:post` today — `wave:pre` is declared in the loop host contract
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> but not rendered. Wiring `wave:pre` dispatch is a core-loop change `#1164`
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> explicitly puts out of scope ("without touching core loop semantics"), so the
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> Capability registers at `execute:wave:post` and the executor honors the
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> classification guidance **before** running any task tagged
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> `<runtime_budget>long_compute</runtime_budget>`, whether in the current or a
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> subsequent wave.
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| Budget | Meaning | Execute behavior |
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|---|---|---|
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| `quick` | Under ~2 min | Run normally in the foreground. |
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| `medium` | ~2–30 min | Foreground, but with explicit progress expectations. |
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| `unknown` | Runtime not characterized | Run a **first-health check** and set a **soft-review deadline** before trusting the child timeout. Define a progress signal, an abort condition, and expected output. A truly hung command must surface before the child timeout is exhausted. |
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| `long_compute` | Over ~30–60 min | **Externalize** — submit an async external job, record durable state, and return `external_job_waiting`. Never block the agent turn. |
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The classification is advisory metadata; the executor owns the decision at
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dispatch time. `unknown` is the safety-critical class: it is what catches a
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hung solver before it burns the budget, without making timeouts infinite.
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## 3. The async external-job half-state
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When an executor externalizes a `long_compute` task it enters a **legal
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deferred state**, not an illegal partial-plan state:
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```
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input/code committed
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external job submitted
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.planning/async-jobs/<job>.json committed
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handoff committed
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SUMMARY.md deferred until verification
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```
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`SUMMARY.md` is deferred until the job reaches a terminal state **and** its
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`expected_artifacts` are verified. Until then, the plan is
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`external_job_waiting`, and every resume/pause/dispatch path reconciles
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against the manifest — it never re-dispatches the plan (re-dispatching would
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duplicate the external job).
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## 4. The manifest — a versioned stability contract
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The manifest schema, status enum, trust boundary, matching rules, and the
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glob-safe matching probe are the **stability contract** documented in
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[`planning-artifacts.md`](./planning-artifacts.md#planningasync-jobsjobjson).
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The core loop depends only on the named fields and ignores any others; the
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`version` field is the evolution escape hatch. Producers MUST write the named
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fields and MAY add their own.
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Status enum (closed, scheduler-agnostic — producers map backend states onto
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these):
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| Status | Class | Resume action |
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|---|---|---|
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| `submitted`, `running` | non-terminal | Re-check; never re-dispatch. |
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| `completed-unverified` | finished, unverified | Verify `expected_artifacts` / run `verification_command`; on success write `SUMMARY.md` and close. |
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| `failed`, `cancelled`, `timeout` | terminal failure | Surface `terminal_details`; offer recovery (re-run reconciliation, abort, or mark-and-skip). Resubmitting compute is a user action, never automatic. |
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## 5. Trust boundary
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The manifest crosses a trust seam: a Capability (or anything that can write
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`.planning/`) produces it; the core loop consumes it. `submit_command`,
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`verification_command`, and `resume_command` are therefore **untrusted**. The
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core loop — and the `slurm-adapter` `show` subcommand — surface these commands
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for explicit operator confirmation; they are **never** auto-executed. Validate
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before trusting a manifest: recognized `version`, `plan_id` matches the plan
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under reconciliation, and `status` is one of the closed enum values. On a
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malformed manifest or multiple manifests for one `plan_id`, **fail closed**.
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## 6. Scheduler pluggability
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SLURM is the first backend. The design does not hardcode a cluster, account,
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partition, or project layout — per-job artifact directories
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(`external_job.artifact_dir`, default `Artifacts/jobs/<jobid>/`) avoid fixed
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log paths. The `backend` field on the manifest (opaque to core) and the
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`external_job.backend` config key are the pluggability seams for future
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backends (LSF, PBS, Kubernetes batch). The pure producer logic — SLURM
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state→manifest-status mapping, manifest build/validate, `sbatch`/`squeue`/
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`sacct` parsers, and the fail-closed writer — is backend-aware but lives
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behind a single module; a new backend adds a sibling state map and parser
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without touching core.
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## 7. Configuration
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The `external-job` Capability declares its config keys in
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[`capability.json`](../../capabilities/external-job/capability.json) and the
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`slurm-adapter` resolves them through the canonical capability-config seam
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(`resolveConfigKey` in `capability-activation.cjs`). **Precedence: env override
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> nested config value > registry default.**
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| Key | Default | Env override | Read by |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| `external_job.enabled` | `false` | — | Capability gate (`when` on both contributions). Master toggle; default-off. |
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| `external_job.backend` | `slurm` | — | Pluggability seam (LSF/PBS/K8s future). Core never interprets it. |
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| `external_job.artifact_dir` | `Artifacts/jobs` | `GSD_EXTERNAL_JOB_ARTIFACT_DIR` | Adapter surfaces the resolved root in `submit` output. |
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| `external_job.submit_timeout_ms` | `30000` | `GSD_SLURM_SUBMIT_TIMEOUT_MS` | Adapter bounds the `sbatch` subprocess. |
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| `external_job.poll_timeout_ms` | `15000` | `GSD_SLURM_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS` | Adapter bounds the `squeue`/`sacct` subprocess. |
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Config keys live nested under `external_job` in `.planning/config.json`, e.g.:
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```json
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{ "external_job": { "enabled": true, "submit_timeout_ms": 45000 } }
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```
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The timeouts are load-bearing for the bounded-subprocess policy: the adapter
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never unbounds a scheduler subprocess, and a non-numeric config value falls back
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to the registry default rather than producing `NaN` (no guessing).
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## 8. Related
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- **How-To:** [`../how-to/async-external-jobs.md`](../how-to/async-external-jobs.md) — using the SLURM adapter.
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- **Contract:** [`planning-artifacts.md`](./planning-artifacts.md) — the manifest stability contract.
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- **Capability manifest:** [`../../capabilities/external-job/capability.json`](../../capabilities/external-job/capability.json).
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- **Pure module:** `gsd-core/src/external-job.cts` → `gsd-core/bin/lib/external-job.cjs`.
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- **Operator CLI:** `scripts/slurm-adapter.cjs`.
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