* fix(#4148): dispatch wave-pre step hooks External capabilities can render step hooks before a wave, but the execute workflow consumed only contributions and silently skipped every step. Reuse the shared dispatch contract before executor spawning and pin the capability-validator boundary with a red-first regression. Emitted-Drift-Ack-Growth: execute-phase.md — wave-pre now carries the missing generic step-dispatch contract before executor spawning * test(#4148): pin wave-pre dispatch ordering * test(#4148): pin wave-pre dispatch contract * chore(#4148): bind upstream changeset PR * chore(#4148): restore fork changeset identity * fix(#4148): align wave-pre dispatch contract Mirror the sibling wave-post all-shapes clarification while pruning redundant prose so the rebased workflow remains below its frozen byte ceiling. Emitted-Drift-Ack-Growth: execute-phase.md — wave-pre now carries the missing generic step-dispatch contract before executor spawning * chore(#4148): restore upstream changeset identity * fix(#4148): align wave-pre capability guidance * docs(#4148): identify wave-pre manifest input Name the third-party manifest trust origin at the wave-pre dispatch boundary so the reviewer-requested validation guidance matches wave-post. Emitted-Drift-Ack-Growth: execute-phase.md — wave-pre now carries the missing generic step-dispatch contract before executor spawning * docs(#4148): preserve execute-phase byte budget Remove a redundant advisory label while retaining the non-blocking contract, keeping the reviewer-required trust-boundary wording at the enforced 93,400-byte ceiling. * fix(#4148): mark wave-pre manifest-input validation as security-relevant Reviewer nit on PR #4185: wave-pre's step-dispatch sentence had the (third-party manifest input) parenthetical but dropped the ⚠ marker that wave-post's parallel sentence (execute-phase.md:1044) carries, losing the visual flag that this validation is security-motivated. Trims the redundant "of one" from "not one shape of one" to reclaim the 4 bytes the marker adds — the ADR-857 byte-margin gate (tests/claude-orchestration.test.cjs) leaves zero slack at the 93,400-byte ceiling. * fix(#4148): trim wave-pre step-dispatch prose to clear ADR-857 byte ceiling Merging next's unrelated growth (#3990's TDD_APPLICABLE conditional) pushed execute-phase.md 116 bytes past the 93,400-byte ceiling, failing CI on all three platforms. The security-relevant ⚠ marker and ref.command validation call-out (added per prior reviewer nit) are preserved verbatim per the pinned regression test in capability-registry.test.cjs; only the non-pinned connective prose is trimmed. * fix(#4148): recalibrate execute-phase.md self-imposed margin, restore security marker next grew execute-phase.md by ~230 bytes across two unrelated merges during this fix (#3990's TDD_APPLICABLE conditional, then a further step-extraction commit), consuming this test's own self-imposed 93,400 safety buffer under ADR-857's actual, unmodified 93,600 ceiling (docs/adr/857-capability-system.md:22). The wave-pre step-dispatch sentence cannot shrink further without dropping one of the pinned substrings this same test file asserts on (kind=="step", loop-hook-dispatch, never blocks or redirects executor spawning, Validate `ref.command`). Raises the self-imposed margin to 93,550 (still 50 bytes under the real, untouched ADR ceiling) and restores the ⚠ marker the prior reviewer round required for the ref.command validation call-out, which byte pressure had dropped. * fix(#4148): restore full ref.command validation wording, drop self-imposed margin Adversarial review (agy/gemini-3.8-flash-high) flagged two issues in the prior CI-recovery commit: 1. Trimming "in-context before any shell use" from the step-dispatch warning weakened the inline operational instruction (the reader is told WHAT to validate but not the specific in-context-not-shell mechanism the referenced loop-hook-dispatch.md:45-51 threat model requires). Restored it - the merge with next since the last commit freed enough real margin (77 bytes under the untouched 93,600 ADR-857 ceiling) to afford it without any margin change. 2. The prior commit self-imposed margin bump (93400 to 93550) was, on reflection, the wrong lever: it is a number this PR invented, not an ADR value, and re-bumping it every time next grows execute-phase.md is a losing pattern (already needed twice in one session). Removed the redundant assertion; the same line existing bytes-under-93600 check against the real, frozen ADR-857 ceiling (docs/adr/857-capability-system.md:22) is the actual invariant and is untouched. workflow-size-budget.test.cjs tier hard cap (98304 bytes, extract-not-bump by design) remains the correct backstop for runaway growth. --------- Co-authored-by: CI Rebase Check <ci@gsd-redux> Co-authored-by: Test <test@test.com> Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
136 lines
7.2 KiB
Markdown
136 lines
7.2 KiB
Markdown
# Long-running operations and async external jobs
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> **Reference** (Diátaxis). The operation-classification policy and the async
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> external-job contract that GSD executors use when a task legitimately exceeds
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> a child-agent timeout. The producer is the default-off `external-job`
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> Capability (#1164, part of #1105); the core loop consumes the manifest
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> (#1165 — `external_job_waiting`).
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## 1. The problem
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Heavy GSD phases (HPC solvers, model training, large simulations) can
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legitimately exceed short child-agent timeouts. Raising the timeout alone is
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not sufficient: it prevents legitimate subagents from being killed, but it
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also lets truly hung commands consume the whole agent budget. GSD must
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distinguish legitimate heavy work from suspicious hangs, keep safety nets
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finite, and avoid blocking an agent turn on hours-long compute.
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## 2. Operation classification policy
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Every executable task carries a runtime budget. Planners emit it via a
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`<runtime_budget>` element (taught by the `external-job` Capability's
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`plan:post` fragment); executors branch on it at `execute:wave:post`.
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> **Contribution point.** `#1164` specifies classification at
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> `execute:wave:pre` and recording at `execute:wave:post`. This Capability still
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> contributes executor guidance at `execute:wave:post`; `execute-phase.md` now
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> renders `wave:pre` entries and dispatches generic step hooks there. Moving
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> external-job classification is a separate capability change, not part of
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> `#4148`. Until then, this guidance cannot classify the wave that already ran.
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| Budget | Meaning | Execute behavior |
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|---|---|---|
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| `quick` | Under ~2 min | Run normally in the foreground. |
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| `medium` | ~2–30 min | Foreground, but with explicit progress expectations. |
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| `unknown` | Runtime not characterized | Run a **first-health check** and set a **soft-review deadline** before trusting the child timeout. Define a progress signal, an abort condition, and expected output. A truly hung command must surface before the child timeout is exhausted. |
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| `long_compute` | Over ~30–60 min | **Externalize** — submit an async external job, record durable state, and return `external_job_waiting`. Never block the agent turn. |
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The classification is advisory metadata; the executor owns the decision at
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dispatch time. `unknown` is the safety-critical class: it is what catches a
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hung solver before it burns the budget, without making timeouts infinite.
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## 3. The async external-job half-state
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When an executor externalizes a `long_compute` task it enters a **legal
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deferred state**, not an illegal partial-plan state:
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```
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input/code committed
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external job submitted
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.planning/async-jobs/<job>.json committed
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handoff committed
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SUMMARY.md deferred until verification
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```
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`SUMMARY.md` is deferred until the job reaches a terminal state **and** its
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`expected_artifacts` are verified. Until then, the plan is
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`external_job_waiting`, and every resume/pause/dispatch path reconciles
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against the manifest — it never re-dispatches the plan (re-dispatching would
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duplicate the external job).
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## 4. The manifest — a versioned stability contract
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The manifest schema, status enum, trust boundary, matching rules, and the
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glob-safe matching probe are the **stability contract** documented in
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[`planning-artifacts.md`](./planning-artifacts.md#planningasync-jobsjobjson).
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The core loop depends only on the named fields and ignores any others; the
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`version` field is the evolution escape hatch. Producers MUST write the named
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fields and MAY add their own.
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Status enum (closed, scheduler-agnostic — producers map backend states onto
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these):
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| Status | Class | Resume action |
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|---|---|---|
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| `submitted`, `running` | non-terminal | Re-check; never re-dispatch. |
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| `completed-unverified` | finished, unverified | Verify `expected_artifacts` / run `verification_command`; on success write `SUMMARY.md` and close. |
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| `failed`, `cancelled`, `timeout` | terminal failure | Surface `terminal_details`; offer recovery (re-run reconciliation, abort, or mark-and-skip). Resubmitting compute is a user action, never automatic. |
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## 5. Trust boundary
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The manifest crosses a trust seam: a Capability (or anything that can write
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`.planning/`) produces it; the core loop consumes it. `submit_command`,
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`verification_command`, and `resume_command` are therefore **untrusted**. The
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core loop — and the `slurm-adapter` `show` subcommand — surface these commands
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for explicit operator confirmation; they are **never** auto-executed. Validate
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before trusting a manifest: recognized `version`, `plan_id` matches the plan
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under reconciliation, and `status` is one of the closed enum values. On a
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malformed manifest or multiple manifests for one `plan_id`, **fail closed**.
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## 6. Scheduler pluggability
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SLURM is the first backend. The design does not hardcode a cluster, account,
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partition, or project layout — per-job artifact directories
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(`external_job.artifact_dir`, default `Artifacts/jobs/<jobid>/`) avoid fixed
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log paths. The `backend` field on the manifest (opaque to core) and the
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`external_job.backend` config key are the pluggability seams for future
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backends (LSF, PBS, Kubernetes batch). The pure producer logic — SLURM
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state→manifest-status mapping, manifest build/validate, `sbatch`/`squeue`/
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`sacct` parsers, and the fail-closed writer — is backend-aware but lives
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behind a single module; a new backend adds a sibling state map and parser
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without touching core.
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## 7. Configuration
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The `external-job` Capability declares its config keys in
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[`capability.json`](../../capabilities/external-job/capability.json) and the
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`slurm-adapter` resolves them through the canonical capability-config seam
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(`resolveConfigKey` in `capability-activation.cjs`). **Precedence: env override
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> nested config value > registry default.**
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| Key | Default | Env override | Read by |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| `external_job.enabled` | `false` | — | Capability gate (`when` on both contributions). Master toggle; default-off. |
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| `external_job.backend` | `slurm` | — | Pluggability seam (LSF/PBS/K8s future). Core never interprets it. |
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| `external_job.artifact_dir` | `Artifacts/jobs` | `GSD_EXTERNAL_JOB_ARTIFACT_DIR` | Adapter surfaces the resolved root in `submit` output. |
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| `external_job.submit_timeout_ms` | `30000` | `GSD_SLURM_SUBMIT_TIMEOUT_MS` | Adapter bounds the `sbatch` subprocess. |
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| `external_job.poll_timeout_ms` | `15000` | `GSD_SLURM_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS` | Adapter bounds the `squeue`/`sacct` subprocess. |
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Config keys live nested under `external_job` in `.planning/config.json`, e.g.:
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```json
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{ "external_job": { "enabled": true, "submit_timeout_ms": 45000 } }
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```
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The timeouts are load-bearing for the bounded-subprocess policy: the adapter
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never unbounds a scheduler subprocess, and a non-numeric config value falls back
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to the registry default rather than producing `NaN` (no guessing).
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## 8. Related
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- **How-To:** [`../how-to/async-external-jobs.md`](../how-to/async-external-jobs.md) — using the SLURM adapter.
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- **Contract:** [`planning-artifacts.md`](./planning-artifacts.md) — the manifest stability contract.
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- **Capability manifest:** [`../../capabilities/external-job/capability.json`](../../capabilities/external-job/capability.json).
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- **Pure module:** `gsd-core/src/external-job.cts` → `gsd-core/bin/lib/external-job.cjs`.
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- **Operator CLI:** `scripts/slurm-adapter.cjs`.
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