* feat(#3411): one canonical Windows binary resolver in the platform seam CONTEXT.md declares src/shell-command-projection.cts the single OS-facing seam, but Windows binary resolution had grown four divergent implementations outside it. #3445 folded two of them together — inside gsd-core/bin/gsd-tools.cjs, not the seam — so the declaration stayed untrue and execTool still had no handling at all. Lift the resolver into the seam as resolveExecutableBinary, and export the half that actually executes as projectSpawnInvocation: CreateProcess cannot run a .cmd/.bat, so the cmd.exe mediation is inseparable from the lookup and splitting them is how the copies accumulated. cmd.exe is invoked with an explicit argv array, never shell:true — CVE-2024-27980's vector and Node 26's DEP0190. execTool now resolves on win32. POSIX is a strict no-op by construction, which matters: execTool rates CRITICAL blast radius (167 symbols, 53 files). gsd-tools.cjs deletes its private scan and its private mediation and delegates. Two semantics grown beyond #3445's resolver, both additive: a name already carrying a PATHEXT-listed extension is tried as-is before the append loop, and a suffix outside PATHEXT is not treated as an extension. Refs #3411 * fix(#3411): keep mediating a declared .cmd that PATH resolution misses Standards review caught a narrowing against the code this replaces. gsd-tools.cjs computed `target = resolveSpawnBinary(binary) || binary` and keyed the shim test on `target`, so a declared .cmd mediated whether or not PATH resolution found it. That is load-bearing: resolveExecutableBinary scans PATH only, while `cmd.exe /c` also finds a batch file in the current directory. Mediation now keys on the target — resolved path, else declared name. The ENOENT contract still holds for BARE unresolved names, which is the case it was written for. P9/P10 pin both halves. Spec review found E1/E2/E3/E5 promised by 50-test-matrix.md but never written; added. E3 is the integration proof that the CVE-relevant mediation fires through execTool, not only through projectSpawnInvocation in isolation. Also adds the CONTEXT.md glossary entry for the seam's new resolution ownership (a PR gate) and the changeset fragment. Refs #3411 * fix(#3617): pass mediated cmd.exe arguments verbatim so metacharacters cannot inject The isolated security pass found the mediation shape carried an argument-injection surface. libuv's quote_cmd_arg force-quotes an argv element only when it contains a space, tab, or quote — never for a cmd metacharacter — and cmd.exe re-parses everything after /c. So an arg of a&calc arrived unquoted and cmd ran calc. Node's own CVE-2024-27980 escaping cannot help: it fires only when the spawned FILE is the .bat/.cmd, and here the file is cmd.exe. Caret-escaping is not a fix. It is correct only when libuv does not quote, and libuv quotes whenever the arg also contains a space — no per-arg transform is right in both cases. So build the command line and pass it through verbatim, the shape Rust's std adopted for the sibling CVE-2024-24576: one outer quote pair that cmd /c strips, every token inside force-quoted, embedded quotes doubled. An argument containing CR or LF is refused rather than mediated — a newline cannot be represented in a Windows command line, so mediating would silently truncate. Failing visibly is correct. Known limit, documented at the seam: %VAR% still expands inside a /c string and has no escape outside a batch file. That is information disclosure, not arbitrary execution, and is the same limit Rust's std documents. This was byte-for-byte the shape #3445 shipped, so the fix closes it for the reviewer-lane spawn path too, not only for execTool's newly reachable route. Refs #3411 * docs(#3617): document the subprocess-execution security posture Adds Layer 4 to the security model: why GSD never uses shell:true for binary invocation (CVE-2024-27980, Node 26 DEP0190), why resolution is explicit and never tries the bare name on Windows (the npm extensionless-shim trap behind #3275), and why .cmd/.bat mediation builds a verbatim force-quoted command line rather than relying on default escaping — Node's own CVE protection cannot fire once the started program is cmd.exe. The residual %VAR% expansion limit is stated plainly under Trade-offs rather than left implicit: it is information disclosure, not arbitrary execution, and callers passing untrusted text to a Windows .cmd should not assume the value arrives byte-identical. Docs-only; no code change. Refs #3411 * chore(#3617): backfill changeset pr number 3621 * fix(#3617): read PATH, PATHEXT and ComSpec case-insensitively The Windows CI lane on #3621 failed E5, and the root cause was a defect in the implementation, not the assertion. Windows names the variable Path, not PATH. process.env is a case-insensitive proxy, so process.env.PATH works — but execTool builds { ...process.env, ...opts.env } whenever a caller supplies opts.env, and spreading discards the proxy while keeping the OS's actual casing. The exact-case env['PATH'] lookup then returned undefined, the PATH scan saw zero segments, resolution returned null, and the change degraded to precisely the spawn ENOENT it exists to fix. ComSpec and PATHEXT had the same exposure. #3445's tests never caught it because they pass uppercase keys explicitly, and neither did the Linux remote runner — this is a defect only the Windows lane could see. _envGet resolves a variable by exact match first (so a canonical caller pays no scan) and falls back to a case-insensitive sweep. R23 and P16 pin it and were proven RED by execution: with the fix stashed and build:lib re-run, R23 returned null and P16 returned the cmd.exe default. R24 was rewritten because the first version was vacuous — it staged foo.CMD, so the default PATHEXT already contained .CMD and it passed against the broken code for the wrong reason. It now stages foo.XYZ, an extension absent from the default, and carries a negative control asserting that dropping the Pathext key yields null. Re-proven RED the same way. E5's assertion was corrected alongside the fix: 'PATH' in options.env expressed the wrong contract. It now checks case-insensitively for the key. Refs #3411 * fix(#3617): execTool spawns the declared name unless mediation is required The Windows full-test lane on #3621 failed tests/graphify.test.cjs — the python3 identity check asserted 'python3' and got the absolute resolved path C:\hostedtoolcache\windows\Python\3.12.10\x64\python3.EXE instead. Those tests are correct and the change was wrong. They pin a long-standing contract — execTool spawns the program name it was given — by spying on spawnSync's first argument, and routing every win32 call through the projected invocation broke it. Resolving a .exe buys nothing. libuv's CreateProcess path already performs PATH + PATHEXT search, which is why spawning a bare 'node' has always worked on Windows. The only case the OS genuinely cannot spawn is a .cmd/.bat. So execTool now adopts the projection only when mediation actually happened — windowsVerbatimArguments is exactly that flag — and otherwise passes the declared program and args through untouched. 40-design.md already rejected gratuitous change for this reason: symmetry is not worth a behavior change to 53 files that fixes nothing. That reasoning was applied to POSIX and missed the win32 non-batch case. Rows 5 and 20 now record it, and the CONTEXT.md glossary states the caller-choice rule. deps.spawn deliberately still adopts the resolved path: its hasBinary probe answers from the same resolver, so probe and spawn must agree on the exact file (#3445). The asymmetry is now documented at both call sites rather than latent. E7 pins the restored contract and was verified by executing execTool against a monkeypatched spawnSync: python3 in, python3 spawned. Refs #3411 --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
GSD Core
Git. Ship. Done.
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A light-weight meta-prompting, context engineering, and spec-driven development system for Claude Code, OpenCode, Antigravity CLI, Kimi CLI, Kilo, Codex, Copilot, Cursor, Windsurf, and more.
What is GSD Core
GSD Core is a context-engineering and spec-driven development framework that drives AI coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, Antigravity CLI, Kimi CLI, Copilot, Cursor, and more) through a disciplined phase loop. It solves context rot — the quality degradation that accumulates as an AI fills its context window — by running all heavy research, planning, and execution work in fresh-context subagents while keeping your main session lean.
How it works
Each milestone repeats the same five-step loop, one phase at a time:
- Discuss — capture implementation decisions before anything is planned
- Plan — research, decompose, and verify the plan fits a fresh context window
- Execute — run plans in parallel waves; each executor starts with a clean 200k-token context
- Verify — walk through what was built; diagnose and fix before declaring done
- Ship — create the PR, archive the phase, repeat for the next one
Quickstart
npx @opengsd/gsd-core@latest
The installer prompts for your runtime (Claude Code, OpenCode, Antigravity CLI, Kimi CLI, Kilo, Codex, Copilot, Cursor, Windsurf, and more) and whether to install globally or locally. The installer is required for cross-runtime compatibility — do not copy files from agents/ or commands/ directly.
On another runtime or without Node.js? See Install on your runtime.
Once installed, start a new project or onboard an existing repo:
/gsd-new-project # greenfield project
/gsd-onboard # existing codebase
New here? Follow Your first project for a guided walkthrough from install to first shipped phase, or Onboarding an existing codebase for brownfield setup.
Documentation
What's new in 1.7.0 → docs/whats-new-1.7.0.md
Tutorials — learning by doing:
How-to guides — task-focused recipes:
Reference — authoritative facts:
Explanation — concepts and design decisions:
Full index: docs/README.md. Other languages: 日本語 · 한국어 · Português · 简体中文.
Why it works
Most AI-coding setups fail at scale because context bloat silently degrades output quality, there is no shared memory between sessions, and nothing verifies that code actually works. GSD Core solves all three: heavy work runs in fresh subagents, structured artifacts like STATE.md and CONTEXT.md survive session boundaries, and the verify step walks through what was built and generates fix plans before a phase is declared done. See docs/explanation/context-engineering.md for the full reasoning.
Troubleshooting? See docs/how-to/recover-and-troubleshoot.md.
Community
| Project | Platform |
|---|---|
| gsd-opencode | Original OpenCode port |
| Discord | Community support |
Star History
License
MIT License. See LICENSE for details.
Claude Code is powerful. GSD Core makes it reliable.