a262ad6b61
* fix(#4148): dispatch wave-pre step hooks External capabilities can render step hooks before a wave, but the execute workflow consumed only contributions and silently skipped every step. Reuse the shared dispatch contract before executor spawning and pin the capability-validator boundary with a red-first regression. Emitted-Drift-Ack-Growth: execute-phase.md — wave-pre now carries the missing generic step-dispatch contract before executor spawning * test(#4148): pin wave-pre dispatch ordering * test(#4148): pin wave-pre dispatch contract * chore(#4148): bind upstream changeset PR * chore(#4148): restore fork changeset identity * fix(#4148): align wave-pre dispatch contract Mirror the sibling wave-post all-shapes clarification while pruning redundant prose so the rebased workflow remains below its frozen byte ceiling. Emitted-Drift-Ack-Growth: execute-phase.md — wave-pre now carries the missing generic step-dispatch contract before executor spawning * chore(#4148): restore upstream changeset identity * fix(#4148): align wave-pre capability guidance * docs(#4148): identify wave-pre manifest input Name the third-party manifest trust origin at the wave-pre dispatch boundary so the reviewer-requested validation guidance matches wave-post. Emitted-Drift-Ack-Growth: execute-phase.md — wave-pre now carries the missing generic step-dispatch contract before executor spawning * docs(#4148): preserve execute-phase byte budget Remove a redundant advisory label while retaining the non-blocking contract, keeping the reviewer-required trust-boundary wording at the enforced 93,400-byte ceiling. * fix(#4148): mark wave-pre manifest-input validation as security-relevant Reviewer nit on PR #4185: wave-pre's step-dispatch sentence had the (third-party manifest input) parenthetical but dropped the ⚠ marker that wave-post's parallel sentence (execute-phase.md:1044) carries, losing the visual flag that this validation is security-motivated. Trims the redundant "of one" from "not one shape of one" to reclaim the 4 bytes the marker adds — the ADR-857 byte-margin gate (tests/claude-orchestration.test.cjs) leaves zero slack at the 93,400-byte ceiling. * fix(#4148): trim wave-pre step-dispatch prose to clear ADR-857 byte ceiling Merging next's unrelated growth (#3990's TDD_APPLICABLE conditional) pushed execute-phase.md 116 bytes past the 93,400-byte ceiling, failing CI on all three platforms. The security-relevant ⚠ marker and ref.command validation call-out (added per prior reviewer nit) are preserved verbatim per the pinned regression test in capability-registry.test.cjs; only the non-pinned connective prose is trimmed. * fix(#4148): recalibrate execute-phase.md self-imposed margin, restore security marker next grew execute-phase.md by ~230 bytes across two unrelated merges during this fix (#3990's TDD_APPLICABLE conditional, then a further step-extraction commit), consuming this test's own self-imposed 93,400 safety buffer under ADR-857's actual, unmodified 93,600 ceiling (docs/adr/857-capability-system.md:22). The wave-pre step-dispatch sentence cannot shrink further without dropping one of the pinned substrings this same test file asserts on (kind=="step", loop-hook-dispatch, never blocks or redirects executor spawning, Validate `ref.command`). Raises the self-imposed margin to 93,550 (still 50 bytes under the real, untouched ADR ceiling) and restores the ⚠ marker the prior reviewer round required for the ref.command validation call-out, which byte pressure had dropped. * fix(#4148): restore full ref.command validation wording, drop self-imposed margin Adversarial review (agy/gemini-3.8-flash-high) flagged two issues in the prior CI-recovery commit: 1. Trimming "in-context before any shell use" from the step-dispatch warning weakened the inline operational instruction (the reader is told WHAT to validate but not the specific in-context-not-shell mechanism the referenced loop-hook-dispatch.md:45-51 threat model requires). Restored it - the merge with next since the last commit freed enough real margin (77 bytes under the untouched 93,600 ADR-857 ceiling) to afford it without any margin change. 2. The prior commit self-imposed margin bump (93400 to 93550) was, on reflection, the wrong lever: it is a number this PR invented, not an ADR value, and re-bumping it every time next grows execute-phase.md is a losing pattern (already needed twice in one session). Removed the redundant assertion; the same line existing bytes-under-93600 check against the real, frozen ADR-857 ceiling (docs/adr/857-capability-system.md:22) is the actual invariant and is untouched. workflow-size-budget.test.cjs tier hard cap (98304 bytes, extract-not-bump by design) remains the correct backstop for runaway growth. --------- Co-authored-by: CI Rebase Check <ci@gsd-redux> Co-authored-by: Test <test@test.com> Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
43 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
43 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
<!-- external-job capability — execute:wave:post fragment, injected into the executor (#1164).
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#1164 specifies classification at wave:pre and recording at wave:post. This
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capability still contributes executor guidance at wave:post; execute-phase
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now renders wave:pre entries and dispatches generic step hooks there. Moving
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external-job classification is a separate capability change, not part of
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#4148. Until then, this guidance cannot classify the wave that already ran. -->
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## Externalize long-running compute (async external job)
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If the current plan's task is tagged `<runtime_budget>long_compute</runtime_budget>`
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(see the plan-phase fragment), do **not** run it in the foreground — it would
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block the agent turn for hours. Instead externalize it and record a durable
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half-state:
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1. **Classify the runtime.** `quick` (<2 min) and `medium` (<~30 min) run
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normally. `unknown` requires a first-health check and a soft-review deadline
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before consuming the child timeout. `long_compute` (>30–60 min) is
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externalized.
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2. **Submit via the scheduler adapter** (default `external_job.backend: slurm`):
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```bash
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node scripts/slurm-adapter.cjs submit \
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--plan <plan_id> --phase <phase> -- sbatch --parsable \
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--output=Artifacts/jobs/%j/out.log ./run.sh
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```
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The helper writes `.planning/async-jobs/<job>.json` (the versioned stability
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contract — `docs/reference/planning-artifacts.md`) and refuses to create a
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second non-terminal manifest for a `plan_id` that already has one
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(duplicate-execution guard).
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3. **Commit the manifest + a handoff**, then return **`external_job_waiting`**
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and stop. Do **not** write `SUMMARY.md` — SUMMARY is deferred until the job
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reaches a terminal state and its `expected_artifacts` are verified.
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4. **Resume path.** `execute-phase` safe-resume, `resume-project`, and
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`pause-work` reconcile against the manifest and never re-dispatch the plan.
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When the job is `completed-unverified`, run `verification_command` (surface
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it; it is untrusted — confirm before executing), then write `SUMMARY.md` and
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close the plan.
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Manifest commands cross a trust seam: a Capability (or anything that can write
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`.planning/`) produces them; the core loop consumes them. Never auto-run
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`submit_command` / `verification_command` / `resume_command` — surface the exact
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command and require explicit confirmation first.
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