* feat(#3970): per-task external-tracker content-resolution seam Implements ADR-3646 (Phase 1, #3970): a `<task tracker-id="...">` attribute plus a new optional `taskContentResolver` capability-manifest field let a capability resolve a task's action/verify/acceptance-criteria/read_first/done content from an external issue tracker instead of PLAN.md's inline body. - src/plan-document.cts: parses the `tracker-id` attribute into `PlanTask.trackerId` - src/task-content-resolution.cts: new leaf module — split/find/build/resolve, with a hard-halt (throw) contract on ambiguous/failed/timeout/malformed resolution, never a silent fallback to possibly-stale inline text - src/task-command-router.cts: new `task resolve-content --plan --task-id --raw` CLI verb wiring the module into a real process exit code - gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-validator.cjs: validates the new `taskContentResolver` manifest field (feature-role only, cross-capability trackerPrefix uniqueness) - gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md, gsd-core/references/loop-hook-dispatch.md, docs/reference/capability-manifest.md: wire the seam into the per-task loop and document it as a new `execute:task` point outside the existing contribution/step/gate vocabulary (unconditional in autonomous mode) Closes #3970 * fix(#3970): gate checkpoint tasks out of content resolution, close trackerPrefix grammar parity gap, cover path-traversal guard Standards/Spec code-review pass on the task-content-resolution seam (ADR-3646 Phase 1) found three defects: 1. execute-plan.md's task-content-resolution bullet fired on any tracker-id-bearing task with no check that it wasn't type="checkpoint:*", contradicting ADR-3646 Decision 1 (a checkpoint task must never enter resolve-content). plan-document.cts already parses trackerId: null unconditionally for checkpoint tasks; only the workflow prose needed the fix, so the bullet now explicitly excludes checkpoint tasks. 2. task-content-resolution.cts's parseResolverDeclaration accepted any non-empty trackerPrefix with no grammar check, while capability- validator.cjs's KEBAB_RE enforces kebab-case at install time — a Generative Fix Divergence gap. Added the same grammar (as a literal regex, documented as intentionally not shared across the .cts/.cjs build boundary) plus a parity test asserting the two surfaces agree across a valid/invalid trackerPrefix table. 3. task-command-router.cts's routeResolveContent path-traversal guard on --plan had zero test coverage. Added a test exercising a ../../../etc/passwit-shaped path and asserting the USAGE rejection names the offending path. * fix(#3970): sanitize resolver diagnostics and cap resolver timeoutMs Two findings caught by an isolated security-review pass on the task content resolution seam: - ResolverFailedError/ResolverMalformedOutputError embedded raw, unsanitized subprocess stderr/stdout (attacker/model-influenced via the tracker-id argv token) into .message. A hostile or buggy resolver could smuggle a newline plus a forged "Error: " line, or terminal escape sequences, into a diagnostic io.cjs's error() writes verbatim to stderr. Fixed at the constructor (task-content-resolution.cts) via io.cjs's existing formatDiagnosticToken(), so every caller of resolveTaskContent gets a safe .message by construction. - capability-validator.cjs's validateTaskContentResolverFields had no upper bound on taskContentResolver.invoke.timeoutMs, letting a manifest declare an effectively unbounded value and defeat the "bounded subprocess" design intent. Added a 120000ms ceiling specific to this field, without touching the shared isPositiveIntegerMs() helper (still used unbounded by the reviewer lane's timeoutFloorMs and probe timeoutMs). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#3970): fix gsd-test failures — stale prose allowlist line and stderr-vs-message assertion gsd-test (remote dockerized matrix) came back red with 5 failures on this PR; all five are real defects, fixed here. - tests/no-bare-gsd-tools-command-position.test.cjs: PROSE_ALLOWLIST's execute-plan.md entry pointed at line 415, which ffc190df4's checkpoint-exclusion caveat (added near line 221) shifted down by one line. The actual "validated downstream by gsd-tools uat classify-coverage" descriptive mention now sits at line 416. Updated the allowlist entry's line number to match. - tests/task-command-router-resolve-content.test.cjs: the path-traversal test asserted the outside-project-scope diagnostic against the thrown ExitError's own .message. io.cts's error() (ADR-3889) writes its human-readable message to fd 2 via writeAllSync and then throws a bare `new ExitError(1)` with no message argument — by design, so the exception carries no duplicate text and the thrown ExitError's message defaults to "process exit 1" (cli-exit.cts's ExitError constructor). Root cause was the test, not the source: task-command-router.cjs's outside-project-scope rejection already calls error() correctly and the diagnostic text is genuinely emitted, just on fd 2, not on the exception. Fixed the test to capture fd-2 writes (mirroring tests/estimate-calibrate.test.cjs's runCalibrateExpectError and this same file's own captureStdout for fd 1) and assert against the captured stderr text instead of err.message. This was masked locally because a manual `node -e` sanity check that only inspects the caught exception's .message cannot see what the real node:test run actually failed on. Emitted-Drift-Ack-Growth: execute-plan.md — adds the ADR-3646 task-content-resolution bullet and checkpoint-exclusion caveat to the per-task execute loop; a real behavioral prose addition, not incidental bloat. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(#3970): backfill changeset PR number (pr:0 -> pr:4000) --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
121 lines
6.2 KiB
Markdown
121 lines
6.2 KiB
Markdown
# Loop Hook Dispatch Contract
|
|
|
|
Generic reference for consuming the `--raw` JSON output of `gsd_run loop render-hooks <point>`
|
|
in any host-loop workflow. This document is point-agnostic — it applies to every loop
|
|
extension point (discuss:pre, discuss:post, plan:pre, plan:post, execute:pre, execute:wave:pre,
|
|
execute:wave:post, execute:post, verify:pre, verify:post, ship:pre, ship:post).
|
|
|
|
## Envelope shape
|
|
|
|
```json
|
|
{
|
|
"point": "discuss:pre",
|
|
"activeHooks": [
|
|
{ "kind": "contribution", "into": "orchestrator", "fragment": { "inline": "..." } },
|
|
{ "kind": "step", "ref": { "skill": "my-skill" } },
|
|
{ "kind": "gate", "check": { "query": "..." }, "blocking": true, "onError": "skip" }
|
|
],
|
|
"rendered": "..."
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
`activeHooks` is an array of enabled hook entries for the named point. It is empty (or absent)
|
|
when no capability has registered an active hook at this point — treat that as a no-op.
|
|
|
|
## Dispatch rules by `kind`
|
|
|
|
### `contribution`
|
|
|
|
Inject `fragment.inline` verbatim into the context for the role named in `into`
|
|
(e.g. `orchestrator`, `planner`). Do not paraphrase — the text is the product.
|
|
|
|
### `step`
|
|
|
|
Dispatch the referenced unit. Exactly one of `ref.skill`, `ref.agent`, or `ref.command` is set.
|
|
|
|
- `ref.skill` present → dispatch via the Skill tool with skill id `gsd-<ref.skill>`.
|
|
- `ref.agent` present → dispatch via the Agent tool with `subagent_type` = `ref.agent`.
|
|
Before dispatching an agent, print the canonical liveness banner so users know silence
|
|
is expected and do not kill a healthy agent:
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
◆ Spawning <agent>... (runs in a subagent — no output until it returns; expected, not a freeze)
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
- `ref.command` present → **validate it IN-CONTEXT first, before any shell use.** It comes
|
|
from a capability manifest, which may be third-party. Check the value you read from
|
|
`activeHooks` against `^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*( [a-z][a-z0-9-]*)*$` yourself — **never** by pasting
|
|
it into a shell command to be tested there, because a value carrying a quote, `;`,
|
|
`` ` ``, `$(`, or a newline would terminate the assignment and run as its own statement
|
|
before any shell-side check could execute. A value that fails is a malformed manifest:
|
|
record a warning, skip that hook, continue to the next entry. Only a value that has passed
|
|
is run, with the phase number appended:
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
gsd_run ${ref.command} --phase "${PHASE_NUMBER}" --raw
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Wait for the result before continuing to the next hook or the next step.
|
|
|
|
A `step` is **advisory by construction**: it never blocks or redirects the host workflow —
|
|
that is what a `gate` is for. Each dispatch is best-effort; on error record a warning and
|
|
continue, honoring `onError`.
|
|
|
|
**A point whose workflow hand-rolls one `kind` does not implement this contract.** Several
|
|
host workflows historically matched a single hook (e.g. `execute:post` matched only
|
|
`ref.skill == "code-review"`), so any other step registered there was declared and silently
|
|
never run. When a workflow defers to this file, it dispatches **every** active `step` entry,
|
|
not one shape of one.
|
|
|
|
### `gate`
|
|
|
|
**Validate `check` before any shell use.** `check.query` and `check.predicate` come from a
|
|
capability manifest, which may be third-party — and `gates[].check` is **not** one of the
|
|
executable surfaces the install consent prompt discloses (`hooks`, command modules,
|
|
`mcpServers`, reviewer lanes), so a capability can be consented to as declarative-only and
|
|
still reach a shell through a gate. Check the query value you read from `activeHooks` against
|
|
`^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*( [a-z][a-z0-9-]*)*$` yourself, IN-CONTEXT — **never** by pasting it into a
|
|
shell command to be tested there, because a value carrying a quote, `;`, a `` ` ``, `$(`, or a
|
|
newline would terminate the assignment and run as its own statement before any shell-side
|
|
check could execute. A value that fails is a malformed manifest: record a warning, route it
|
|
per the gate's `onError`, and do not run it. Pass `check.predicate` as a **single argv
|
|
element** for the same reason — never re-quote it into a shell string, where an apostrophe
|
|
would close the literal. This is the identical requirement `step` → `ref.command` carries
|
|
above; it was stated there and omitted here, which is the gap #3559 closed.
|
|
|
|
Evaluate `check` (one of `query`, `predicate`, or `agentVerdict`). Then honor `blocking`:
|
|
|
|
- `blocking: true` → if the check returns `block: true`, surface `check.message` to the user
|
|
and stop the current step. Do not continue.
|
|
- `blocking: false` → advisory only; surface the message but continue regardless of outcome.
|
|
|
|
Honor `onError` if the check itself errors: `skip` means treat as non-blocking and continue;
|
|
`halt` means surface the error and stop.
|
|
|
|
## Empty / absent `activeHooks`
|
|
|
|
If `activeHooks` is absent, null, or an empty array, skip silently and continue to the next
|
|
step in the workflow. No output to the user is needed.
|
|
|
|
## The `execute:task` point (a different shape)
|
|
|
|
`execute:task` exists below wave granularity — it is evaluated once per task, inside the
|
|
`execute:wave:pre` / `execute:wave:post` bracket, immediately before that task's `read_first`
|
|
gate. It is **not** one of the 12 points documented above, does not appear in `steps` /
|
|
`contributions` / `gates`, and is never dispatched through `gsd_run loop render-hooks <point>` or
|
|
this file's `activeHooks` envelope.
|
|
|
|
Instead, a capability declares task-content resolution directly in its manifest body via
|
|
`taskContentResolver` (`trackerPrefix` + a bounded `invoke`) — see
|
|
[Capability manifest reference](../../docs/reference/capability-manifest.md). `execute-plan.md`'s
|
|
per-task loop calls `gsd_run task resolve-content --plan <path> --task-id <tracker-id> --raw`
|
|
directly, an unconditional, required subprocess invocation with a real, binding exit code —
|
|
never a prose-dispatched `step`/`gate` entry chosen from an `activeHooks` array.
|
|
|
|
This point always runs — there is no `when` config gate and no autonomous-mode elision. That is
|
|
deliberate, not an oversight: the twelve points above are best-effort prose dispatch, which
|
|
`execute:task`'s hard-halt safety property cannot be built on top of (a missed dispatch is
|
|
indistinguishable from a legitimate resolver-empty fallback). See
|
|
[ADR-3646](../../docs/adr/3646-per-task-content-resolution-seam.md) for the full rationale,
|
|
including why a `kind: "gate"` shape was rejected outright.
|