msd-core/hooks/lib/cli-exit.js

// GENERATED FILE — DO NOT EDIT BY HAND.
// Source of truth: src/cli-exit.cts. Regenerate with:
//   node scripts/gen-hooks-cli-exit.cjs --write
// Byte-compared by `npm run lint:generated-sync` (#3911, ADR-3889 Phase 7).
//
// Why this copy exists: hooks/ runs straight from a raw, unbuilt clone — a
// shipped hook must be able to `require('./lib/cli-exit.js')` relative to
// its own __dirname and terminate through `terminateNow` without depending
// on any build artifact. msd-core/bin/lib/cli-exit.cjs is gitignored tsc
// output and doubles as the build sentinel, so it cannot be required from
// here. `.js`, not `.cjs`, to match the hooks/lib/*.js convention. Hence one
// source, three emitted locations (msd-core/bin/lib, scripts/lib, hooks/lib).

"use strict";
var __importDefault = (this && this.__importDefault) || function (mod) {
    return (mod && mod.__esModule) ? mod : { "default": mod };
};
/**
 * Process-exit primitives (ExitError, runMain, terminateNow) plus the
 * json-error-mode and contract-version cells.
 *
 * Must import nothing but `node:fs` and `./exit-code-registry.cjs` — this
 * source is emitted to TWO locations, msd-core/bin/lib/cli-exit.cjs (tsc
 * build output) and scripts/lib/cli-exit.cjs (a generated, committed
 * artifact regenerated by scripts/gen-scripts-cli-exit.cjs), and the latter
 * must load on an unbuilt clone before anything under ./lib exists. The
 * registry require is safe here for the same reason: scripts/gen-exit-code-
 * registry.cjs (ADR-3889 Phase 1/2, #3905/#3906) dual-emits its OWN sibling
 * artifact, exit-code-registry.cjs, into both of these exact locations, so
 * a relative `./exit-code-registry.cjs` resolves next to whichever copy of
 * this module loaded it.
 */
const node_fs_1 = __importDefault(require("node:fs"));
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
const exitCodeRegistryModule = require("./exit-code-registry.js");
// Called only as exitCodeRegistryModule.exitCodeFor(...), never destructured:
// @typescript-eslint/unbound-method flags a bare function-typed property
// pulled off an object at the point of destructuring, since a detached
// reference COULD be called with the wrong `this` — keeping the member
// access qualified sidesteps that regardless of whether the callee ever
// actually touches `this` (it does not; exitCodeFor is pure).
const exitCodeFor = (name) => exitCodeRegistryModule.exitCodeFor(name);
/**
 * The wire value `runMain` stamps into its structured envelope. Declared HERE,
 * not in io.cts, because this module must not import anything (see the module
 * header): io.cts builds ERROR_REASON.SDK_FAIL_FAST from this constant, so the
 * two surfaces share ONE definition rather than two literals kept in step by a
 * parity test.
 */
const EXIT_ENVELOPE_REASON = 'sdk_fail_fast';
/**
 * Process-level flag: when true, error paths emit structured JSON to stderr
 * instead of plain text. Set by msd-tools.cjs when the CLI is invoked with
 * `--json-errors`; re-exported by io.cts, which is where most callers reach it.
 *
 * Held in a Symbol-keyed cell on globalThis rather than in module scope, and
 * that is load-bearing: this module is emitted to TWO locations
 * (msd-core/bin/lib/cli-exit.cjs and the generated scripts/lib/cli-exit.cjs),
 * so a process that loads both would get two independent module instances. A
 * module-level `let` would give them two independent flags — one copy could
 * think json mode is on while the other thought it was off, which is exactly
 * the divergence class ADR-3889 exists to remove. One cell, keyed by a
 * registry Symbol, makes that unrepresentable.
 */
const JSON_ERROR_MODE_KEY = Symbol.for('msd.exit.jsonErrorMode');
function setJsonErrorMode(v) {
    globalThis[JSON_ERROR_MODE_KEY] = !!v;
}
function getJsonErrorMode() {
    return globalThis[JSON_ERROR_MODE_KEY] === true;
}
/** The single registered name code 2 may ever be produced for (ADR-3889 §1). */
const HOOK_DENY_NAME = 'HOOK_DENY';
const HOOK_DENY_CODE = exitCodeFor(HOOK_DENY_NAME);
/**
 * Currently-resolved exit-contract version (ADR-3889 §4). Held in a
 * Symbol-keyed globalThis cell rather than a module-level `let`, for the
 * exact reason JSON_ERROR_MODE_KEY is (see its comment above): this module
 * is emitted to two locations and thus loaded as two independent module
 * instances in any process that requires both, so a module-level variable
 * would let those two instances disagree about which contract is active.
 * `resolveContractVersion` is the only writer; `terminateNow`/`runMain`
 * read it internally when projecting a declared outcome.
 */
const CONTRACT_VERSION_KEY = Symbol.for('msd.exit.contractVersion');
function setContractVersion(v) {
    globalThis[CONTRACT_VERSION_KEY] = v;
}
/**
 * Resolve the active exit-contract version, wiring the ambient process to the
 * two terminators (ADR-3889 §4/§3). Mirrors how JSON_ERROR_MODE_KEY already
 * works: a process-global cell means no entrypoint needs per-call wiring, so
 * a `scripts/` tool or a hook gets the same behaviour as `msd-tools` without
 * this module touching either (P8 owns `msd-tools`; P7 owns hooks).
 *
 * Precedence: if the cell already holds an explicit version, that wins —
 * this is what lets `setContractVersion` override the ambient process (a
 * later `MSD_EXIT_CONTRACT=v2` in the same process must NOT unseat an
 * explicit `setContractVersion('v1')` call). Otherwise resolve from argv/env
 * via `resolveContractVersion`, which itself persists the result into the
 * cell — so this is a one-time resolution per process; every later read is
 * just the cached cell value. An invalid ambient value (e.g. `v3`) is NOT
 * softened to a silent v1 here: `resolveContractVersion` throws, and that
 * throw propagates — swallowing it would reintroduce the "nothing fails with
 * success" defect ADR-3889 exists to close, on the very selector meant to
 * demonstrate the fix. Absent both flag and env, resolution still yields
 * 'v1' (the documented default) and that too gets memoized.
 */
function getContractVersion() {
    const cached = globalThis[CONTRACT_VERSION_KEY];
    if (cached === 'v1' || cached === 'v2')
        return cached;
    return resolveContractVersion({ argv: process.argv, env: process.env });
}
/**
 * Project a declared outcome onto an integer exit code for a given contract
 * version. Pure and total over its own input space: throws for anything not
 * an exact-case registered name (mirrors exitCodeFor's contract) or an
 * unrecognized version — it never returns undefined/NaN.
 *
 * PASS/FAIL and every registered name project IDENTICALLY under v1 and v2
 * (registered names are version-invariant) — the sole exception is DEGRADED:
 *
 *   v1: DEGRADED -> 0.  Deliberate, NOT a bug: ADR-2980 ratified 60
 *       `output({error})` call sites that already exit 0 on a payload-carried
 *       error, and ADR-2980's own "Revisit if" clause is what ADR-3889 §4
 *       answers — normalizing this to a non-zero code was explicitly
 *       DECLINED there on measured blast radius. A future reader must not
 *       "fix" this to look more consistent with v2; the inconsistency IS the
 *       compatibility boundary.
 *   v2: DEGRADED -> exitCodeFor('DEGRADED') (80). Looked up through the
 *       registry, never hardcoded, so a re-allocation of DEGRADED's code
 *       cannot silently desync this projection from the shipped table.
 */
function projectOutcome(outcome, version) {
    if (typeof outcome !== 'string' || outcome.length === 0) {
        throw new Error(`projectOutcome: outcome must be a non-empty string, received ${JSON.stringify(outcome)}`);
    }
    if (version !== 'v1' && version !== 'v2') {
        throw new Error(`projectOutcome: version must be 'v1' or 'v2', received ${JSON.stringify(version)}`);
    }
    if (outcome === 'PASS')
        return 0;
    if (outcome === 'FAIL')
        return 1;
    if (outcome === 'DEGRADED')
        return version === 'v1' ? 0 : exitCodeFor('DEGRADED');
    // Any other registered name: version-invariant, resolved through the
    // registry (throws for anything unregistered/empty/non-string/wrong-case —
    // exitCodeFor's own contract, which this function inherits verbatim).
    return exitCodeFor(outcome);
}
/**
 * Pending declared outcome (ADR-3889 §4, #3912): the outcome `output()`
 * records when it detects a payload-carried error (`{ error }`, any key
 * order) on a call that otherwise just returns — there is no thrown
 * ExitError and no explicit `main()` return for `runMain` to project, so
 * without this cell the declaration has nowhere to land. `runMain` reads it
 * ONLY when `main()` itself returns no explicit code (void/undefined); an
 * explicit number/string return always wins over whatever this cell holds.
 *
 * Held in a Symbol-keyed globalThis cell for the exact reason
 * JSON_ERROR_MODE_KEY / CONTRACT_VERSION_KEY are (see their comments above):
 * this module is emitted to three locations and thus loaded as independent
 * module instances in any process that requires more than one, so a
 * module-level variable would let those instances disagree about whether a
 * degraded result was ever declared.
 *
 * LIFETIME (#3912 review fix): LAST DECLARATION WINS, CLEARED ON CONSUMPTION.
 * This cell is NOT "was DEGRADED ever declared this process" — it is "is a
 * degraded outcome pending RIGHT NOW". `output()` sets it to 'DEGRADED' on a
 * payload-carried error and CLEARS it (`undefined`) on a clean payload, so a
 * later clean `output()` call undoes an earlier degraded one in the same
 * invocation. `runMain` clears it immediately after consuming it (in a
 * `finally`, on both the pending-cell branch and the case where nothing was
 * pending), so a second `runMain` in the same process starts clean. Without
 * both halves the cell is monotonic for the life of the process: any later
 * `main()` returning void would inherit a stale DEGRADED from an unrelated,
 * earlier call — this is the leak #3912 review found and fixed.
 */
const PENDING_OUTCOME_KEY = Symbol.for('msd.exit.pendingOutcome');
function setPendingOutcome(v) {
    globalThis[PENDING_OUTCOME_KEY] = v;
}
function getPendingOutcome() {
    return globalThis[PENDING_OUTCOME_KEY];
}
const EXIT_CONTRACT_FLAG_PREFIX = '--exit-contract=';
/** Scan argv for the FIRST `--exit-contract=<value>` token; undefined if absent. */
function findExitContractFlag(argv) {
    for (const arg of argv) {
        if (typeof arg === 'string' && arg.startsWith(EXIT_CONTRACT_FLAG_PREFIX)) {
            return arg.slice(EXIT_CONTRACT_FLAG_PREFIX.length);
        }
    }
    return undefined;
}
/**
 * Resolve which exit-contract version is active from argv/env, per ADR-3889
 * §4, and persist it to the shared contract-version cell so a later
 * `terminateNow`/`runMain` call (through EITHER module copy) projects
 * against it without re-parsing argv/env itself.
 *
 * Precedence: an explicit `--exit-contract=<v>` flag BEATS
 * `MSD_EXIT_CONTRACT`, in both directions (flag=v1 + env=v2 -> v1; flag=v2 +
 * env=v1 -> v2). Neither present -> 'v1' (the documented default). An empty
 * env var reads as UNSET, not as an explicit empty selection — a shell that
 * exports `MSD_EXIT_CONTRACT=` with nothing after the `=` must not silently
 * select a version.
 *
 * Casing is decided, not accidental: only the exact lowercase tokens `v1`/
 * `v2` are accepted (matching every example in ADR-3889 and this module's own
 * usage docs, both of which write `v2` never `V2`). Anything else recognized
 * as PRESENT but not a valid version — `v3`, `garbage`, or an explicitly
 * empty flag value (`--exit-contract=`) — THROWS rather than silently
 * defaulting to v1. A selector for a contract whose whole thesis is "nothing
 * fails with success" must not itself fail open.
 */
function resolveContractVersion(opts = {}) {
    const argv = opts.argv ?? process.argv;
    const env = opts.env ?? process.env;
    const flagValue = findExitContractFlag(argv);
    const rawEnvValue = env.MSD_EXIT_CONTRACT;
    const envValue = rawEnvValue === undefined || rawEnvValue === '' ? undefined : rawEnvValue;
    const selected = flagValue !== undefined ? flagValue : envValue;
    let resolved;
    if (selected === undefined) {
        resolved = 'v1';
    }
    else if (selected === 'v1' || selected === 'v2') {
        resolved = selected;
    }
    else {
        throw new Error(`resolveContractVersion: unrecognized exit-contract version ${JSON.stringify(selected)} `
            + `(expected 'v1' or 'v2')`);
    }
    setContractVersion(resolved);
    return resolved;
}
/**
 * Error carrying a process exit code. CLI logic throws this instead of calling
 * process.exit() (banned by n/no-process-exit); runMain() translates it into
 * process.exitCode at the entrypoint.
 */
class ExitError extends Error {
    code;
    hasUserMessage;
    constructor(code = 1, message) {
        super(message === undefined ? `process exit ${code}` : message);
        this.name = 'ExitError';
        this.code = code;
        this.hasUserMessage = message !== undefined;
    }
}
/**
 * Run a CLI main and translate its outcome into process.exitCode (never
 * process.exit, so n/no-process-exit stays satisfied; output flushes and
 * process.on('exit') cleanup still fires — this is precisely why runMain and
 * terminateNow are two different functions: drain-then-exit vs write-then-
 * terminate). main may be sync or async. Every arm below except the new
 * string one and the void/pending-cell one is UNCHANGED from before
 * ADR-3889 Phase 2:
 *   number return   -> process.exitCode = it (unchanged)
 *   string return   -> NEW: process.exitCode = projectOutcome(result, getContractVersion()),
 *                      UNLESS that projection is the HOOK_DENY exit code (see
 *                      the refusal below — 2 may only be produced by terminateNow).
 *   void/undefined return -> NEW (#3912, ADR-3889 §4): an explicit return
 *                      already handled above always wins, so this arm only
 *                      runs when main() declared no outcome of its own. If
 *                      the pending-outcome cell holds a value (currently only
 *                      ever 'DEGRADED', set by io.cts's output() on a
 *                      payload-carried error), project THAT through the
 *                      current contract version — BUT ONLY when
 *                      process.exitCode is not already a non-zero value.
 *                      FULL PRECEDENCE ORDER for the code a void-returning
 *                      main() ends up with:
 *                        1. An explicit number/string return from main()
 *                           (handled in the arms above) — always wins.
 *                        2. A non-zero process.exitCode already set by main()
 *                           itself before it returned (e.g. `state validate
 *                           --strict`'s `emit()` setting 1 directly) — wins
 *                           over the pending cell.
 *                        3. The pending-outcome cell's projection — used only
 *                           when process.exitCode is still unset/0.
 *                        4. Otherwise process.exitCode stays 0 (default).
 *                      This is a regression fix: unconditionally projecting
 *                      the pending cell here used to CLOBBER an
 *                      already-non-zero process.exitCode down to DEGRADED's
 *                      v1 projection (0) — turning a real declared failure
 *                      (e.g. `state validate --strict` against a missing
 *                      STATE.md, which sets process.exitCode = 1 directly)
 *                      into a false success. `runMain` must never LOWER an
 *                      exit code that main() itself already raised. DEGRADED
 *                      still projects to 0 under v1 when nothing else set a
 *                      code — the same value this arm produced before this
 *                      phase by doing nothing — so v1 behavior is
 *                      byte-identical for every caller that never sets its
 *                      own exit code.
 *   thrown ExitError -> process.exitCode = err.code (+ stderr err.message if hasUserMessage && code!=0) (unchanged)
 *   other throw -> when json-error mode is active, emits structured { ok:false, reason, message }
 *                  to stderr; otherwise writes raw stack trace. exit code = 1 in either case. (unchanged)
 */
function runMain(main) {
    Promise.resolve()
        .then(() => main())
        .then((result) => {
        // Cleared on EVERY branch below, not only the pending-cell-consuming
        // void arm: an explicit number/string return means main() declared
        // its own outcome and the cell (if anything set it earlier in this
        // same invocation) is now stale — leaving it set would leak into the
        // NEXT runMain call in this process, reintroducing the #3912 leak one
        // level up. "Cleared on consumption" therefore means "consumption of
        // this runMain call", not just "consumption of the pending value".
        try {
            if (typeof result === 'number') {
                process.exitCode = result;
                return;
            }
            if (typeof result === 'string') {
                const projected = projectOutcome(result, getContractVersion());
                // ADR-3889 §3: exit code 2 (the hook-protocol deny) may
                // ONLY be produced by terminateNow, never by runMain. runMain is
                // drain-then-exit; a deny drained this way can be truncated on
                // Windows, which is exactly why terminateNow (write-then-terminate)
                // exists. Gated on the PROJECTED code, not on the literal string
                // `'HOOK_DENY'`, so a future registry rename that still resolves to
                // this code cannot slip past the guard.
                if (projected === HOOK_DENY_CODE) {
                    process.stderr.write(`runMain: refusing to exit with code ${HOOK_DENY_CODE} — outcome ${JSON.stringify(result)} `
                        + `projects to the ${HOOK_DENY_NAME} exit code, which is reserved to terminateNow. `
                        + `A hook-protocol deny must be delivered write-then-terminate via terminateNow(${JSON.stringify(result)}, payload), `
                        + 'never drain-then-exit via runMain — a drained deny can be truncated on Windows. '
                        + 'This is a caller bug: runMain must not be given a main() that returns HOOK_DENY.\n');
                    process.exitCode = exitCodeFor('INTERNAL');
                    return;
                }
                process.exitCode = projected;
                return;
            }
            // result is undefined (void return): main declared no outcome itself.
            // Fall back to the pending-outcome cell, if anything set it — but
            // NEVER lower an exit code main() already raised on its own (see the
            // precedence order in this function's doc comment above). Without
            // this guard, a void-returning main() that set process.exitCode = 1
            // directly (e.g. `state validate --strict` on a missing STATE.md)
            // would have that 1 clobbered down to DEGRADED's v1 projection (0)
            // by a payload-carried error the SAME call also recorded via
            // io.cts's output() — a real failure silently reported as success.
            const pending = getPendingOutcome();
            if (typeof pending === 'string' && pending.length > 0 && !process.exitCode) {
                process.exitCode = projectOutcome(pending, getContractVersion());
            }
        }
        finally {
            // Cell is consumed exactly once per runMain call regardless of which
            // branch above ran (see the cell's own doc comment — "last
            // declaration wins, cleared on consumption") — so a later `runMain`
            // in the same process never inherits this one's declaration.
            setPendingOutcome(undefined);
        }
    })
        .catch((err) => {
        if (err instanceof ExitError) {
            if (err.hasUserMessage && err.code !== 0)
                process.stderr.write(`${err.message}\n`);
            process.exitCode = err.code;
            return;
        }
        if (getJsonErrorMode()) {
            const e = err;
            const payload = JSON.stringify({
                ok: false,
                reason: EXIT_ENVELOPE_REASON,
                message: (e && e.message) ? e.message : String(err),
            }) + '\n';
            node_fs_1.default.writeSync(2, payload);
        }
        else {
            const e = err;
            process.stderr.write(`${e && e.stack ? e.stack : String(err)}\n`);
        }
        process.exitCode = 1;
    });
}
/**
 * Write `payload` fully to fd 1 (and, for a deny, fd 2 too) and terminate the
 * process IMMEDIATELY with `outcome` projected through the current contract
 * version. This is write-then-terminate, the other half of ADR-3889 §3's
 * "two terminators over one registry": hooks fire from contexts (e.g. a
 * `setTimeout` stdin-timeout guard) where `process.exitCode = N; return;`
 * terminates nothing, so they need an immediate, synchronous exit — the
 * exact gap `eslint.config.mjs:563-582` documents for `hooks/**`.
 *
 * This is THE ONLY sanctioned `process.exit` call site in the repo, and the
 * only place exit code 2 can be produced: 2 is reserved to the hook-adapter
 * protocol (ADR-3889 §1), and the registry's own one-owner rule already
 * guarantees no other registered name resolves to it — the check below is a
 * defense-in-depth assertion of that invariant, not the sole thing enforcing
 * it.
 *
 * @param outcome - declared outcome name, projected via projectOutcome.
 * @param payload - JSON-serializable value written to fd 1 (and, on a deny
 *   for which no `stderrPayload` is given, fd 2 too — this is the
 *   backward-compatible default every existing caller relies on).
 * @param stderrPayload - optional, deny-only. When omitted (the default),
 *   fd 2 gets the SAME serialized `payload` fd 1 got — unchanged behavior.
 *   When provided, fd 2 gets THIS instead: a string is written raw
 *   (verbatim, not JSON-stringified), anything else is JSON-stringified
 *   like `payload`. This exists because `hooks/msd-write-guard.js`'s
 *   emitBlock does NOT write the same bytes to both streams today — it
 *   writes the full JSON `output` to stdout but only the plain-text
 *   `output.reason` STRING to stderr, because a native hook bus may read
 *   stderr verbatim back to the model on exit 2. Migrating that call site
 *   onto terminateNow requires a way to say "fd 2 gets this different,
 *   plain-text value" — `stderrPayload` is that seam. Ignored entirely for
 *   a non-deny outcome: stderr is a deny-only channel.
 *
 * PAYLOAD-SIZE CONSTRAINT FOR CALLERS (measured for #3906, relevant to P7/
 * #3911 wiring 19 enforcement hooks onto this function): the write-until-
 * drained loop above delivers a payload whole regardless of size — verified
 * up to 1MB (Node's own `spawnSync` default `maxBuffer`) with no truncation
 * and no stall, both with a concurrently-draining async reader (~30ms for a
 * 256KB payload) and with the default (internally-drained) pipe stdio a
 * spawnSync-based test harness gets for free. Node's `spawnSync` does NOT
 * suffer the classic "child blocks writing past the pipe buffer because
 * nothing on the parent side is reading yet" deadlock some other languages'
 * synchronous-subprocess primitives have; it drains stdout/stderr
 * concurrently at the libuv layer while the child runs. The constraint that
 * DOES bite on Linux is unrelated to pipe buffering: `execve(2)` enforces
 * `MAX_ARG_STRLEN` (128KiB per single argv/envp string; see `man execve`
 * NOTES) — so a CALLER that embeds a large literal payload directly into a
 * spawned command line (e.g. `node -e "...<huge string>..."`) can fail to
 * even start the child on Linux (macOS has no equivalent per-string cap),
 * with no relation to this function's own behavior. See
 * tests/cli-exit.test.cjs's "a large payload (bigger than a pipe buffer)
 * arrives whole" test, which hit exactly this constructing its own fixture
 * before being rewritten to build the payload inside the child instead.
 */
function terminateNow(outcome, payload, stderrPayload) {
    // terminateNow is total by construction: its callers are enforcement hooks
    // (P7/#3911, 19 of them) whose OWN outer catch may fail open (some end in
    // `process.exit(0)`). If resolving the contract version, projecting the
    // outcome, or the HOOK_DENY-collision guard below threw and that throw
    // propagated out of this function, it would unwind straight into that
    // caller's catch — turning a deny into a silent allow, exactly the defect
    // ADR-3889 exists to close. So every one of those steps is wrapped here:
    // on ANY failure this still terminates, deterministically, with INTERNAL
    // (never by returning or re-throwing) — a malformed call is a programming
    // error to be diagnosed on stderr, not a reason to hand control back.
    let versionForDiagnostics = '(unresolved)';
    try {
        const version = getContractVersion();
        versionForDiagnostics = version;
        const projected = projectOutcome(outcome, version);
        if (projected === HOOK_DENY_CODE && outcome !== HOOK_DENY_NAME) {
            throw new Error(`terminateNow: exit code ${HOOK_DENY_CODE} is reserved to the ${HOOK_DENY_NAME} outcome; `
                + `got outcome ${JSON.stringify(outcome)}`);
        }
        // m2 (round 5, hooks/msd-write-guard.js:159-175): emission must itself be
        // exception-safe. A failed write (EPIPE, a full pipe buffer, a throwing
        // fs.writeSync in a test) must NOT change the exit code — if it propagated
        // out of this function, a caller whose payload could not be delivered
        // would fall into ITS OWN outer catch and fail OPEN, which is the exact
        // outcome the fail-closed branches this function serves exist to prevent.
        // The decision to terminate with `projected` stands regardless of whether
        // the payload could be delivered.
        //
        // The two streams are emitted in TWO SEPARATE try/catch blocks, not one
        // shared block (the pre-#3911 defect): fd 1 and fd 2 (deny-only) are
        // independent channels with independent failure modes, and a shared try
        // meant a serialization failure on fd 1 (e.g. `payload` throwing on
        // JSON.stringify) aborted the block before fd 2 ever ran — silently
        // dropping a deny's reason. `deny(undefined, 'some reason')` used to exit
        // 2 with EMPTY stderr because of exactly this. Each block independently
        // treats an `undefined` value for ITS OWN stream as "nothing to write"
        // and skips the write cleanly, rather than serializing `undefined` (which
        // is not valid JSON text) and throwing into the catch.
        try {
            // fs.writeSync, never process.stdout.write: pipe writes via
            // process.stdout/stderr are async on Windows, and process.exit() below
            // does not wait for them to flush — a truncated payload is a silent
            // half-emission. Looped over a Buffer (not a bare string call) so a
            // payload larger than the destination pipe's buffer — where a single
            // write() syscall can legitimately return fewer bytes written than
            // requested — still arrives whole rather than truncated.
            if (payload !== undefined) {
                const buf = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload), 'utf8');
                let offset = 0;
                while (offset < buf.length) {
                    offset += node_fs_1.default.writeSync(1, buf, offset, buf.length - offset);
                }
            }
        }
        catch {
            // fd 1 emission failed; the exit code decision still stands (see
            // above), and fd 2 below is unaffected — it has its own try/catch.
        }
        if (projected === HOOK_DENY_CODE) {
            try {
                // Backward-compatible default: when no `stderrPayload` is given, fd 2
                // gets the SAME value fd 1 got (still subject to fd 2's own
                // undefined-skips-the-write and string-vs-JSON rules below).
                const resolvedStderr = stderrPayload === undefined ? payload : stderrPayload;
                if (resolvedStderr !== undefined) {
                    const stderrBuf = Buffer.from(typeof resolvedStderr === 'string' ? resolvedStderr : JSON.stringify(resolvedStderr), 'utf8');
                    let stderrOffset = 0;
                    while (stderrOffset < stderrBuf.length) {
                        stderrOffset += node_fs_1.default.writeSync(2, stderrBuf, stderrOffset, stderrBuf.length - stderrOffset);
                    }
                }
            }
            catch {
                // fd 2 emission failed; independent of fd 1 above, and the exit code
                // decision still stands regardless.
            }
        }
        // n/no-process-exit is not registered for src/**/*.cts (see the ADR-3889
        // reference note in the module header) and both compiled .cjs copies of
        // this module are lint-ignored build/generated artifacts, so no disable
        // directive is needed here for the one sanctioned process.exit call site.
        process.exit(projected);
    }
    catch (err) {
        // Anything above threw: an unrecognized --exit-contract/MSD_EXIT_CONTRACT
        // value, a non-string/empty/unregistered `outcome`, or the HOOK_DENY
        // collision guard. Diagnose on stderr — swallowing this silently would
        // make a typo'd outcome name or a bad contract-version env var
        // undebuggable — then terminate unconditionally. The diagnostic write
        // itself gets its own swallow-on-failure guard, because even a failed
        // diagnostic must not stop the exit below from happening.
        try {
            const detail = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
            const message = `terminateNow: programming error — outcome=${JSON.stringify(outcome)} `
                + `version=${JSON.stringify(versionForDiagnostics)}: ${detail}\n`
                + `This is a caller bug (unrecognized outcome/exit-contract, or the HOOK_DENY collision `
                + `guard), not a declared outcome. Terminating with INTERNAL rather than propagating: an `
                + `enforcement-hook caller's own outer catch may fail open (process.exit(0)), and unwinding `
                + `into it here would silently convert a deny into an allow.\n`;
            node_fs_1.default.writeSync(2, message);
        }
        catch {
            // Diagnostic emission itself failed; the exit below is unconditional
            // regardless.
        }
        process.exit(exitCodeFor('INTERNAL'));
    }
}
module.exports = {
    ExitError,
    runMain,
    setJsonErrorMode,
    getJsonErrorMode,
    EXIT_ENVELOPE_REASON,
    projectOutcome,
    resolveContractVersion,
    getContractVersion,
    terminateNow,
    setPendingOutcome,
    getPendingOutcome,
};