The member ids are read in the delete's transaction before the memberships
go, and the permissions events fire after it commits, as before; the
smoke now covers a group delete.
- golem15.users.manage_backend_links (no default role), en and pl labels
- record actions on summercms.cabana.users: link_frontend_account asks for
the frontend user's email (exact, case-insensitive, active users only),
records linked_by and fires the link events; unlink_frontend_account
(danger) removes the link
- a taken or unknown account answers 422 on the prompt
- classes.FrontendPermissionCatalog: the seeded rows, then codes activated
plugins declare through pact.HasFrontendPermissions (seeded row wins);
both permission editors offer it
- classes.MCPUserGuard (guard "user"): reads user.api_token, user.scope:*
and user.permission:*, allows with the route's checks (session scopes,
group grants, every code), dispatches with an in-memory token credential,
resolves usr_ personal tokens; registered in *pact.MCPGuards and published
as pact.MCPPersonalTokenResolver
- GET /_user/api/v1/token/me (user.api_token, user.scope:read) and the MCP
tool me (user_me)
- pact.MCPSubjectChanged on token revoke, Users saves and User Groups saves
and deletes
- golem15_user_backend_links (1:1, both sides unique) and one-shot hashed
golem15_user_backend_link_requests (golem15.user.backend_links.request_ttl, 10m)
- classes.BackendLinks: CreateLinkRequest, ConfirmLinkRequest (row lock,
JWT iat not before the request), SetLink, RemoveLink, LinkedBackendUser;
published as *classes.BackendLinks and pact.MCPLinkedBackendResolver
- GET /_user/api/v1/backend-link/{code} and POST /backend-link/confirm (jwt.auth)
- My account section frontend_account with link and unlink
- BackendLinkedEvent, BackendUnlinkedEvent and pact.MCPSubjectChanged after commit;
deleting or deactivating a frontend user removes its link
- golem15.user.frontend_url (falls back to app.url)
The key defaults to true, so the route table is unchanged. False skips only
those three registrations: they get the router's own 404, with no custom
handler and no framework change. /register keeps allow_registration and the
turnstile guard. The key is read at boot, and a value other than true or
false fails boot like golem15.user.turnstile.
Default off, so body-token clients are unchanged. When on, the cookie carries the auth.cookie attributes via bouncer.LoadCookieConfig and the body keeps user (and message); SameSite stays Lax, with no CSRF token; personal API tokens are untouched.
8e4b863 answered a cookie-carried refresh in the body only and blacklisted the old jti, so an HttpOnly cookie (golem15.sociallogin token_cookie) kept a dead token. Now the cookie named auth.cookie.name gets the rotated token and the body is {}; bearer and auth_token refreshes are unchanged, and refusals write no cookie.
JWT iat is whole seconds and every cutoff check is iat before tokens_valid_after, so a sub-second cutoff refused the login that followed a reset within the same second. POST /reset-password and the admin Users password set now truncate the cutoff to the second, like RevokeUserAccess; email_verified_at keeps full precision. Change-password and bouncer's comparison are unchanged.
Behind a reverse proxy every visitor had the proxy's RemoteAddr, so one client's failed logins locked the account for all. The throttle key is now surf.ClientIP with http.trusted_proxies, the expression /register uses; X-Forwarded-For from an untrusted peer is still ignored. RemoteIP is unchanged.
Boot runs before summer serve publishes the database, so the plugin's GORM
hooks, the Postgres jwt_blacklist store and its sweep now go through
lagoon.OnDatabase, and the jwt guard resolves the published store on every
request. A logged-out token is refused on jwt.auth, /fetch and /refresh.
The jwt guard reads the cookie names from classes.SessionCookieNames().
The four routes (and the other signed-in routes through authenticate) read the bearer header, then the token and auth_token cookies, through classes.SessionToken and one cookie-aware guard.
A bearer header still wins and no credentials stays 401 with the old bodies.
A cookie-carried /refresh answers the rotated token in the body and writes no cookie.
The refusal is the same 401 invalid-login answer as a wrong password and is counted by the login throttle.
The activation is checked after the password and before the deactivation restore, so a refused account stays deactivated.
require_activation false keeps the previous behaviour.
POST /logout read the token from the Authorization header only, while the
jwt guard also accepts the token and auth_token cookies. A session carried
by a cookie (golem15.sociallogin's token_cookie sets an httpOnly one that
the browser cannot turn into a bearer header) was answered 401, nothing was
revoked and the cookie kept authenticating jwt.auth routes until the access
token expired (golem15.user.jwt.ttl, 60 minutes). Logout never cleared a
cookie either, and it and EndRequestSession kept the jwt_blacklist row only
until the access token's exp, so once the sweep removed the row POST
/refresh revived the logged-out token for the rest of its refresh window.
classes.EndSession, which Logout now runs, revokes every session token the
request carries (the bearer header, the token and auth_token cookies) that
verifies, an expired one too while it could still be refreshed, until the
later of exp and iat plus refresh_ttl, plus a minute, as bouncer.Refresh
and the admin logout do. The answer, a 401 included, expires the
auth.cookie token cookie and any other session cookie the request carries,
with that cookie's path, domain, SameSite and Secure. EndRequestSession is
its best-effort form. Response bodies are unchanged; an expired but still
refreshable token now logs out with 200 instead of 401.
The members relation manager and the organisation field of the Users form
declare cabana ClearOnChange on organisation_role: adding or removing a
member, and a form save that moves a user to another organisation or to
none, clear the role unless the same save writes it. Needs a SummerCMS
release with ClearOnChange.
classes.RevokeUserAccess stamps users.tokens_valid_after (whole seconds) and
revokes the users' personal API tokens; DeactivateUsers and BanUsers call
it for every selected user. Restore and unban revive nothing, and a
deactivated user who signs in again gets a fresh working token.
POST /refresh now loads the token's subject after bouncer.Refresh and
refuses a missing, deactivated or banned user and a token issued before
tokens_valid_after with the existing 401 body; a refused refresh stamps no
last_seen. Suspension is deliberately not checked.
User.RegisterFillable lists what a registration body may set: name,
surname, email, password, preferred_locale and marketing_consent.
RegisterUser fills from it instead of Fillable, so organisation_id,
organisation_role, is_onboarded and must_change_password can no longer be
mass-assigned through POST /register, and created_ip_address and
last_ip_address come only from RegisterOptions.IP. Fillable is unchanged
for the admin form and trusted application code.
Every command gets long help and examples, descriptions in imperative
sentence case, and a warn-only TestCommandsDocumented over bonfire.CheckDocs.
The plugin logs through a diary component logger instead of the process
default logger. Requires SummerCMS v0.4.0; command names and flags unchanged.
user:token:create and user:token:list gain --json, user:backfill-handles a
progress bar; planning IDs leave the descriptions.
- /update clears email_verified_at in the same write when the email changes (case-only changes keep it)
- the admin Users form clears it in FormBeforeUpdate; storedEmail helper shared with guardCredentials
- README: the proof follows the address, never mass-assigned, no backfill
- additive migration 202610210001_add_users_email_verified_at (ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS, no backfill, no-op rollback)
- User.EmailVerifiedAt (json:"-", not fillable)
- VerifyActivationCode and ResetPassword stamp it in the write that activates or stores the password
TestChangePassword/real_password_account_still_requires_current_password
ports the PHP OAuthPasswordBootstrapTest case: a missing or wrong
current_password is a 422 with the unchanged body, and the password stays.
- TestOAuthProviders: old bytes without a source, order, per-request lookup
- TestOAuthIdentitiesDestroyRule: the PHP last-identity rule table, 404s,
microsoft by default, source names and opts.Providers precedence
- TestOAuthIdentitiesDestroyRace: two row-locked transactions in both orders,
the handler waiting for the lock, concurrent handlers
- TestRegisterUserPasswordLess, TestFinishLogin, TestRegistrationExports
- without a published *gorm.DB the command opens one with lagoon.OpenFromApp
for its run and closes it, as the plugin's other commands do (withDB)
- TestBackfillHandlesOpensFromConfigWhenUnpublished; README CLI note
- OAuthIdentitiesDestroy locks the users row (SELECT ... FOR UPDATE) and runs
the PHP guarded DELETE in one transaction: a self-set password or another
identity allows the unlink; otherwise 409 with the unchanged body
- the default allow-list adds microsoft, and an OAuthProviderSource's known
names are used when the host passes no Providers
- TestOAuthIdentitiesDestroyLastIdentityWithPassword (204),
TestOAuthIdentitiesDestroyConcurrentSmoke; README
- gofmt of the forgotPasswordBody line touched in the previous commit
- classes.OAuthProvider and classes.OAuthProviderSource; GET /oauth-providers
looks the source up per request and keeps the empty body without one
- exported RegistrationSettings, RegistrationsFromIP, RefreshTTL, RemoteIP
- RegisterOptions.PasswordLess (has_self_set_password=false) and FinishLogin
(restore + reactivate mail, last_ip_address, last_seen; no event)
- TestOAuthProvidersSourceSmoke, TestSocialHooksSmoke; README
Replaces TestTurnstileRoutesSmoke: empty adds nothing; open, closed and a
space-padded closed add turnstile:{mode} to POST login and register only,
every other route keeps its middleware; invalid values fail naming the key.
- empty (default) adds nothing; open or closed appends turnstile:{mode} to
POST /login and /register only; any other value fails boot naming the key
- TestTurnstileRoutesSmoke records the declared routes with a recording router
- TestRequestUser: bearer, token and auth_token cookies in guard order;
expired, foreign, blacklisted, revoked by tokens_valid_after and
deactivated tokens are anonymous; only infrastructure failures error
- TestEndRequestSession (no database): jti blacklisted until the token
expires, forget cookie with the configured Domain and Path, best effort
- TestAvatarURL: thumbnail, broken-image and storage-failure fallbacks,
gravatar with the size, the user payload's avatar_url unchanged
- TestDeactivatingEvent: one event per newly deactivated user inside the
bulk action's transaction, a listener error rolls the action back
- DeactivatingEvent and DeactivatingEventName in classes
- FireDeactivatingEvent modelled on FireDeletingEvent
- the deactivate bulk action runs DeactivateUsers unchanged, then fires
the event per newly deactivated user in the action's transaction
- AvatarURL returns the avatar thumbnail, the file path when the thumbnail
fails, or the gravatar URL, the rule of the user payload
- applyAvatar takes avatar_url from it; the payload is unchanged
- RequestUser resolves the signed-in user exactly like the jwt guard
(bearer, token and auth_token cookies, blacklist, tokens_valid_after)
and returns nil for anonymous or invalid requests
- EndRequestSession blacklists the session JWT and forgets the token
cookie with the configured cookie attributes, best effort
Register lighthouse user:{id} if the namespace is free, fire user.Deleting before unscoped delete, and backfill missing handles.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Generate a unique mention handle on API register and admin create, and fire user.Created from both paths so listeners run in the same write.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Hidden() already listed profile_data, but encoding/json would still emit
the Jsonable field. Tag it json:"-" so the DATA-07 marshal backstop holds.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
- Migration up/down covers jsonb profile_data, unique indexes, and cascade FK
- GET list with Encrypted tokens fails if plaintext, key names, or [redacted] leak
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
- Unlink 204 keeps the sibling row
- Last-method 409 matches EN and PL lang strings even with a password
- Missing, foreign, and unknown providers share byte-identical Winter HTML 404s
- Unauthenticated GET and DELETE /google return 401 JSON
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
- Destroy allow-lists providers and shares WriteNotFound for unknown, missing and foreign rows
- Last remaining identity is refused with a localized 409; password flags are unused
- EN and PL last_method_blocked strings match the PHP texts
- Model golem15_user_oauth_identities with Encrypted tokens and empty Fillable
- gormigrate 202610050001 with both unique indexes, cascade FK, and jsonb profile_data
- OAuthIdentitiesIndex returns {"data":[]} for a signed-in caller with no rows
The removal check for the json tag of users.last_seen showed that the
subtest read the user API payloads only, which are built field by field.
It now marshals the model as well, so a tag that would expose an admin
column fails it.
- resolver: several groups, numbers stored as text, empty group sets, a code only at user level, booleans
- migrations: every id once, the history applied twice, the unique code after a down and an up
- personal API tokens: no application, no principal, invalid bodies, another user's token
